

## **Japan's Regional Diplomacy: Placing the Alliance**

**Yoshihide Soeya:** Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I'm very pleased to have two very distinguished scholars to comment on my presentation.

### **A Middle Power**

Recently, particularly since I wrote a somewhat controversial book in 2005 entitled *Japan's Middle Power Diplomacy*, I have been talked about and perhaps criticized, without my presence, about my thesis. I do not think I can fully elaborate on that particular concept within this short period of time, but without talking about middle power diplomacy, I do not think I'd be allowed to speak anywhere recently.

So let me do that at the risk of perhaps being somewhat mistaken, but nonetheless, I have a very firm belief in this concept as perhaps the only workable, comprehensive strategy on the part of Japan and so I'm very serious about this. And perhaps a flipside of that would have to do with my criticisms as a Japanese toward Japanese policies as well as some of our opinion makers with regard to the discourses which they tend to entertain in talking about Japanese diplomacy and regional issues.

### **Contending Discourses on the Postwar Order**

The most fundamental fact as far as Japan's diplomacy or even a strategy is concerned (this is of course in the postwar period) has to do with the very fact that the so-called peace constitution, the postwar constitution of Japan, enacted in 1946, and the security treaty between Japan and the United States, originally signed in 1951 but then revised in 1960, both of those have not changed at all;

this is true for the constitution since its inception in 1946 and for the U.S.-Japan alliance since its revision in 1960.

Even though debates have become very lively with respect to those two fundamental premises of Japanese diplomacy, I see no realistic prospects where actually those two could be substantially revised. Even touching just a single word of those two basic premises of Japanese postwar diplomacy is hard to imagine. I think this is a debatable point, but I have some firm conviction in that prediction.

Again, I do not have much time to elaborate on the reasons why I think that way, but here, the important point to make is if actual changes of those two fundamental premises are very hard to imagine, then we have to wrestle with the apparent gap between the fact that those two premises will not be changed in the immediate future on the one hand, and intensifying debates about those premises despite the prospect that actual changes may not happen.

I think that gap is a source of confusion in many ways about Japanese diplomacy or even strategy. Discussions of Japanese strategy on the basis of changing discourses, to me, do not suggest much as far as Japan's actual future direction of change. Of course, they imply some changes, but not to the extent of fundamentally reformulating postwar Japanese diplomacy equivalent to a paradigm shift of sorts.

Some of the discourses - if that is the case - are quite irrelevant as far as Japan's strategic choices are concerned even though

they may actually form a very important part of the domestic political context in which policy debates and policy making are being processed daily.

And so, a kind of straight projection of the future direction of Japanese strategy on the basis of these changing discourses is almost a non-starter as a strategic argument. As a political argument, that is very important. And I think that applies to the basic nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance. I will come to that later.

But if I may briefly touch on that, for both the U.S. and Japan, there is no other alternative strategically, somewhat for different reasons, but perhaps for the same set of objectives.

Politically, however, management of the alliance often becomes very difficult because of the implications and actual impact of those political discourses and exchanges of somewhat uneasy arguments between Japanese and American opinion makers and policymakers.

And so that is the nature of the contending discourses and approaches in Japan as far as I look at them. The fact will remain that the two fundamental premises, the postwar constitution and the U.S.-Japan alliance, have not changed, and are not likely to be changed in the immediate future.

That involves an important reference point in my argument on Japan's middle power strategy. In other words, Japan's strategy, particularly in the domain of traditional security where the role of the military still remains important, Japan's role in the past several years, not to mention throughout the postwar years, has never been that of a so-called traditional great power, and in my view, there is no indication to suggest that

Japan is moving in that direction. Again, some of the discourses may give you some different impressions, but that is not actually what is happening in decision-making circles; included are politicians who tend to make some conservative arguments without pondering any direct relevance for Japan's strategic choices in the future.

### **Collective Self-Defense**

I think there are some indications of that point. For instance, there is an increasing argument calling for the right of collective self-defense as part of Japanese security policies. But to what extent that debate about the right of collective defense is an integral part of a bigger strategic debate is very questionable. In other words, I do not think I have heard - I do not think any of you have ever heard either - of any political actors, and maybe public opinion makers as well, who would argue for the right of collective self-defense and simultaneously talk about a future picture of Japan possibly fighting in an American war in the event Japan has the right.

If Japan has the right of collective self-defense, to me, that would mean Japan would be at least legally capable of fighting in an American war, given the alliance between Japan and the U.S. and just like many other middle powers normally do. Australia, South Korea have often been part of American wars, and Canada, being part of NATO, they have lost almost 100 soldiers in Afghanistan.

So those are somewhat natural things for U.S. allies who would exercise their right of collective self-defense under the alliance setup. And if Japan actually does have that right, I think that is the picture of the future. But whether the Japanese public, or for that matter, even Japanese politicians who are

arguing for that right are ready to accept a picture of Japanese Self-Defense Forces soldiers fighting side by side with the Americans is very unclear. Under the name of the right of collective self-defense, I have never heard of anybody raising that prospect for public debate and showing that picture to the Japanese public and indicating that possibility.

### **Constitutional Revision**

The same applies to the constitutional revision debate. Again, if constitutional revision is to be achieved, particularly with respect to Article 9, then what I would foresee logically – at least logically – would be a revision of the security treaty between Japan and the United States, because the current security treaty is based on the current Japanese constitution. If Japan revises Article 9 and becomes a country capable of fighting in an American war, then theoretically today's security treaty will become obsolete. But again, I have never heard of anybody arguing for the revision of the Japanese postwar constitution raising such a prospect as a future scenario for the Japanese public, which, to me, is irresponsible as an action on the part of our politicians, and intellectually lazy and strategically not quite relevant.

Therefore, a natural instinct of many who listen to these intensifying arguments or conservative arguments for the revision of the postwar constitution would be that Japan would leave the alliance and will become an independent security actor involving so-called remilitarization. But to me, that is the least possible scenario. After revising the constitution, leaving the alliance, becoming truly independent, that is a least likely scenario. The U.S. would be the first country which would make

every effort to stop Japan from moving in that direction even after revising Article 9, so China should not be worried too much; the U.S. will be responsible for that. I think that is a real picture for the future.

But again, my point is, discussions on the revision of the constitution are not truly a strategic discussion and the motives or driving forces for these discussions come from a sense of dissatisfaction among conservative politicians about what they perceive to be the postwar situation of Japanese politics, diplomacy, and security policies. So this driving force comes from their sense of frustration about the past and the present, not from any sense of an explicit future scenario.

So unless we begin to look at the future and talk about future scenarios and choices on the basis of a future-oriented sense of direction, I do not think constitutional revision will be realized, even though discourses may intensify. I think the fate of the Abe administration demonstrated that, and there are many indications that reveal the nature of our constitutional revision arguments.

So if you judge a possible future direction of Japanese diplomacy or strategy on the basis of those intensifying discussions - I'll repeat what I said at the beginning - that is a non-starter as an argument about Japan's future strategy.

The same applies to nuclear arguments in Japan's choices. As a strategic debate, it is a non-starter, but as a political debate, it is being intensified domestically. So this is the gap that I wanted to mention at the outset as the source of fundamental confusion about the discourse on Japanese strategy and confusion in interpreting the nature of

changes happening in Japan after the end of the Cold War.

### **The Alliance as the Only Choice**

Of course, it is the Japanese themselves who should be aware of this and who should be aware of the irrelevance of our debates for the actual choice of a future strategy. But that is not the case, I'm afraid. Then what? No truly strategically relevant debates, so the end result – relying on the alliance without necessarily realizing its truly strategic logic for Japan. As long as you stick to the alliance, as long as you come back to the alliance whenever you hit the walls, then it may look like Japan has a policy and it may look like things are moving all right. So it is almost by default, particularly for many conservative politicians in Japan, that the alliance has been so fundamental.

The flipside of that is the alliance has never been really conceptualized as a truly integral component of Japan's overall regional and global strategy. Some wise Americans, perhaps Dr. Auslin included, know that but they do not say that. So in a way they take Japan for granted without saying so, and they know Japan will come back eventually, no matter how political processes in managing the alliance may turn out to be difficult. And they know Japan has no other alternative to the alliance, and I think they are right, they are correct.

### **Between the U.S. and China**

So what is the task for Japan if that is the correct assessment of reality? To me, the important task for Japan is to construct its own “autonomous” strategy, not in the traditional sense expected from an independent strategic player, but an

independent, autonomous strategy premised on the alliance with the U.S. To me, this is a typical middle power strategy, like Australia, like Canada or like South Korea. That is, again, because getting rid of the fundamentals of postwar diplomacy, the postwar constitution and the U.S.-Japan alliance, will continue to be impossible as a realistic option.

Diplomatically speaking, the central focus of such middle power strategy should be geared toward cultivating a middle ground between the U.S. and China, two truly strategic players in the region and the world. The task for Japan, to me, is to create a solid infrastructure, so to speak, of an East Asian regional order between the U.S. and China, which are truly independent strategic actors, or almost small universes in their own rights, which Japan is not.

Therefore, cultivating the middle ground between the U.S. and China is a common issue, common agenda, for those who live under the realities of the very critical strategic relationship between the United States and China. And here, South Korea, Australia and ASEAN become very important strategic partners for Japanese regional diplomacy.

There is a lot of uncultivated area there, which I believe was filled partially by Japan and Australia signing the Joint Security Declaration last year. If you look at the substance of the Japan-Australia Joint Security Declaration, it is typical of middle power security cooperation. They were talking about capacity building, peacekeeping, disaster relief, and what not. No elements of traditional power military cooperation, and that is natural for Japan and Australia.

And my dream is to see a similar agreement between Japan and South Korea. If the same thing can be repeated between Japan and South Korea, that is a sea change in the security landscape of Northeast Asia, and for that matter, East Asia as a whole. There is no reason to believe that what was possible between Japan and Australia cannot happen between Japan and South Korea. I'm telling Korean friends, since I wrote the *Middle Power* book, that the Korean geopolitical perspective of the Korean Peninsula as being surrounded by the four great powers - U.S., China, Russia and Japan - is very misleading. Historically, yes, that is why and how we have that history, but postwar Japan has changed. It is very different and will remain different in coming years, I'm pretty sure. Then, maybe the more pertinent geopolitical picture which Koreans should have is - and for that matter, many Japanese should have the same picture - Japan and the Korean Peninsula surrounded by the three great powers - the U.S., China and Russia. I think, geopolitically, that is much, much closer to the reality.

In thinking about the nature of Japanese policies towards South Korea or the Korean Peninsula for that matter, that geopolitical picture is the more fundamental reference point for understanding Japanese policies, including intentions, I should say. But if you are stuck with an image of Japan as one of the four great powers, that is a typical breeding ground for conspiracy theories. Japan has *honno* and *tatema*, so, well, that may be *tatema* but your *honno* should be somewhere else and the *honno* is congruent with their image of Japan as being one of the four great powers.

That is a breeding ground, for many Koreans, I'm afraid, who tend to argue that the role of South Korea in the coming years

is to prevent the repetition of political rivalry between Japan and China over the Korean Peninsula or in East Asia. To me, that is silly - that is very unlikely to happen, and there are no elements whatsoever suggesting Japanese policies in that direction. Here, the history question is a bottleneck, but in reality that has no relevance for actual Japanese choices of security policies.

Those are some of the basic things that I have in my mind when I advance Japan's middle power strategy. And indeed, many elements of postwar Japanese policies actually do entail elements of middle power diplomacy, not to mention in the domain of international security - maybe less than a middle power, for that matter. Also Japan's economic assistance policies towards Southeast Asia, and for that matter for China and other Asian countries as well, are other cases in point. Japan's emphasis on human security in the mid-1990s is another clear indication, and the Japanese government was serious in using the human security element as part of their strategy to gain permanent membership in the Security Council of the United Nations. In fact, Tokyo has accepted a lesser role as a future permanent member of the Security Council than the U.K. or France.

But those actual realities of postwar Japanese diplomacy have never been seriously taken as signs indicating the nature of Japanese identity. To the contrary, many observers have tended to be excited about signs of Japan once again reverting to a traditional great power, including military options, and so Japan at the crossroads has always been a very popular theme during the postwar years. But in reality, Japan has never been at the crossroads in this serious sense.

People say, “Well, the post Cold War period may be different,” but I do not think so because the constraints that have made the postwar constitution and the alliance inevitable for Japan as its basic premises are still formidable. The constraints basically come from that history of a war of aggression, no question about that. On the basis of that history, the San Francisco Peace Treaty was created and Japan’s postwar regime was very deeply embedded, implanted in the San Francisco Peace Treaty system. And the U.S., the indispensable strategic referent of Japan, is the very country that feels and sustains the legitimacy of that regime.

So it is a logical inconsistency for any of our leaders who would question the history issue and simultaneously say the alliance is important. Again, that is not a coherent strategy. That is why Abe’s agenda of leaving the postwar regime, but relying on the alliance with the U.S., never had a chance of success. You cannot change the international regime just by your own unilateral actions – that is tantamount to a revolution. Nobody in Japan is contemplating such a revolution as our future scenario. To repeat, even though some of the discourses might suggest that, that is not what they mean; they are simply frustrated about the postwar development of Japanese policies. So that is why those discourses do not suggest anything relevant for Japan’s future strategic choices.

So my interpretations of the regional security environment as well as the role of the U.S.-Japan alliance are based on the things which I have just said. Let me just go over them briefly.

## **China in the Regional Security Environment**

In discussing regional security environments, China will continue to be the most important factor for Japan and the U.S., or for that matter, for everybody in the region, for good or bad. In this regard, the American argument of China as a stakeholder was a very important turning point, because this somewhat marked an end to the previous arguments among Americans between containment and engagement. Whether you argue for containment or engagement, China was treated as an outsider to the U.S.-centered system; you would either hedge against the increasing power of China or engage China, and in either case, China exists outside of the U.S. system.

But the stakeholder argument invited China inside the U.S. system, so that is a step forward from this containment-engagement dichotomy. China being a part of the international system has almost become a given in our engagement with China today, and indeed the Chinese now appear to be ready to take up that challenge.

China’s search for a harmonious world has many dimensions. Initially, they began to talk about a harmonious society, but in recent years, they have expanded this argument into the domain of their external policies and relations. China’s search for a harmonious world is in a way a counterproposal to the U.S. argument of China as a stakeholder. I think the Chinese response is that “if you invite us into the U.S. system, okay, we will take up the challenge, but we have our own ways.”

So many of the Chinese scholars are now beginning to talk about the importance of code-based behaviors and rule making in

international systems. In other words, China has now become an important player in our joint task of rule making in preparing for a future world. But the rules are not only the Washington consensus. I am not sure if there is anything like a Beijing consensus, but it seems obvious that the Chinese are not going to easily accept a U.S.-led consensus building process.

So in that matter, Japan is easy for the United States; in essence, Japan will work with the United States. But China will perhaps challenge the United States from time to time, and this may be good because China has a lot of stakes in a newly emerging international system. So we are now stepping into a different world where China an increasing voice in being part of rule making, and I think there is a readiness on the part of the U.S. to accept China in that role. That was obvious in, for instance, Fred Bergsten's argument for a G2 and the recent leading role of China in the G20 and in WTO debates.

Chinese diplomacy towards Japan, of course, should remain complex, but for now I think the Hu Jintao government has succeeded in harmonizing their policy towards Japan with their overall external strategic approaches. I think that is the basic background against which people are now beginning to talk about improved relations between Japan and China. As a Japanese, I welcome that because that should open up many opportunities for creative and imaginative diplomacy on the part of Japan as well.

Of course, this overall Chinese strategy is an important background to good relations between the U.S. and China. U.S. strategy perhaps will continue to have elements of dual hedging: hedging through engagement and balancing. The U.S. does need China

now, and basically through working with China the U.S. will continue to cement common grounds of strategic coexistence with China. A web of interdependence with China would deprive China to some extent of freedom of action as a responsible stakeholder. Multilateral diplomacy, however, is an important agenda for the incoming Obama administration, which entails multi-faceted realities, and the China part is, of course, critical for the success of U.S. policy.

### **The Korean Peninsula**

As for the Korean Peninsula, I think the time has come to deal with the North Korean nuclear problem with a mid- to long-term perspective and the unification of the Korean Peninsula explicitly in mind. In other words, the so-called solution to the nuclear problem could and indeed should be addressed as a critical phase in the process of an eventual unification of the Korean Peninsula. Of course, scenarios of such a process are varied, but the implications and possible impacts of the measures taken today should be judged and planned with this long-term perspective in mind.

For Japan to do this, the alliance with the United States will continue to be the key, because Japan (unlike the U.S., China and Russia) does not have and is not likely to obtain tools with which to engage in the unification process as an independent security actor. In this context, the importance for Japan of Japan-South Korea cooperation cannot be stressed too much, and in all likelihood for South Korea as well. This applies to the ongoing Six-Party Talks, of course, and if this gets realized, I think the horizon toward the future will be totally different.

Today, however, the lack of that cooperation is giving an opportunity for North Korea to take advantage of differences between, not only Japan and South Korea, but between Japan and the U.S. as well. And here, the abduction case is very critical. The abduction issue is of course very important for Japan, or for that matter, for any democracy. If the same thing had happened to the U.S., what would the U.S. response in Congress and public opinion be?

So the problem for Japan is not arguing for this, not making this an important issue, but failure to place this issue in a more comprehensive strategic framework in dealing with North Korea and in the Six-Party Talks framework. If that is realized, then, hopefully the Americans, South Koreans and Chinese would be behind us in dealing with this immensely important human rights issue under the umbrella of the Six-Party Talks. But before that happens, Japan has to come up with a rather comprehensive policy package in which the abduction issue is properly placed.

### **U.S.-Japan Alliance**

The role of the U.S.-Japan alliance will remain critical in Japan's foreign policies as well as for East Asia under the Obama administration. Japan will continue to rely on it as Japan's fundamental reference point of its strategic choices.

But if the alliance is everything for Japan, then the same old stories may perhaps be repeated. In other words, in terms of strategic convergence, Japan and the U.S. are very close. For the overall strategies of both Japan and the United States, there are no other viable alternatives. But if that choice is taken too much for granted without necessarily being recognized as an

integral part of an explicit strategy, then it is likely that we will repeat some of the familiar difficulties in the political management of the alliance.

There are indications under the coming Obama administration that this may be repeated, particularly if the American government attempts to start from scratch; from preparing a check list of things which they would expect from "normal" allies, and eventually finding out, with great disappointment, that Japan cannot play much of that expected role. I hope that will not happen, because we know the end result of that process. But without much knowledge of the delicacies of alliance management on the part of the Obama foreign policy team, that might occur.

So the best scenario for Japan to avoid such a repetition of old stories is the creation of its own strategy, and present it to the Americans. On the basis of such a Japanese strategy, we would say to the Americans that "we can work with you on this issue, but not on that." I think that is an ideal picture of the alliance, but of course, that is badly lacking today.

I'm curious, if Japan would come up with what I call a middle-power strategy, how acceptable would that be for the U.S. and regional countries in East Asia? Imagine Japan ganging up with South Koreans and the Southeast Asian peoples and saying to Americans, "we like this but we do not like that." Imagine we begin to create some agreements among ourselves about some infrastructure of a regional order or even a community, and say to the Americans and Chinese, "this is how we would like to live in East Asia." I do not know whether that will be good news or bad news for American strategy, or for that matter, for Chinese strategy. At least, that would be

good news for Japan as far as I'm concerned and hopefully for our Asian neighbors.

As many observers have begun to argue, the agenda for Tokyo and Washington under the Obama administration will be multilateral in essence. Multilateralism is the essential mode of thinking and behavior for middle powers. We have formidable problems ahead, from the restructuring the global financial and economic systems to the handling of the North Korean nuclear problem, requiring truly effective multilateral approaches.

Hopefully, as we begin to talk about those issues seriously with the Obama administration, which appears ready to listen to its allies and friends, that would lead to a fundamental, truly strategic reevaluation of Japanese choices, tantamount to what I call Japan's middle-power strategy.

Whether Japan will come up with such a new strategy, I'm afraid I'm doubtful, looking at the realities inside Japan as well as its external environment. But that is the message that I would like to leave here for you to think about and hopefully encourage Japanese counterparts in thinking truly strategically. Thank you so much for your kind attention.

**Kent Calder:** Thank you very much. I think I probably speak for a lot of us in finding it refreshing to find somebody who speaks so clearly, not the sort of *tamamushi'iro* [equivocal] statements that we often hear in discussions about Japanese strategy and policymaking. I know people have a lot of questions. Before we do that, we have two very distinguished commentators, Dr. Auslin?

**Michael Auslin:** Thank you, Kent. I know there are lots of questions and we're running a bit over, so I'm actually going to keep things fairly short. It is a great honor to be with a truly distinguished panel. We hear "distinguished" all the time; I do not think I'm particularly distinguished, but the other folks here and many of you in the audience are, so I'm just glad for the opportunity to give some reflections.

Really briefly, it is hard to know where to begin because there was so much in Professor Soeya's presentation and so much for thought. I think the particular difficulty is trying to mesh the conceptual approach with realities of policy and alliance management and strategy and the like. But I'm always happy to be provocative, so let me be a little provocative.

### **Why the Alliance Might Change**

Professor Soeya a number of times mentioned there are no alternatives to the situation today. I would say there are always alternatives. To repeat something that some of you heard me say earlier this afternoon, I think what we often lose in our discussions - and not to say that Professor Soeya did this - but what we in general often lose in our discussions is a recognition of the unnaturalness of alliances and particularly long-term alliances.

We have some very fine historians in the room like, of course, Professor Calder and Professor Yang here who can correct me, but the condition that we are in today in which we have a multigenerational multi-decade alliance with several partners, in this case, a bilateral one with Japan, is actually not the norm, that you make a presumption over time, a long-term linear presumption of common interests and willingness on the part of both partners to uphold that. That is

not how alliances worked historically. That is a particular condition of the post-World War II era because of the vacuum of power after that war, because of the predominance of power of the United States, that we were able to set these up. I think that we often get caught in the trap of thinking, well, alliances are normal and natural and we will work it out. We play around the edges. I think that is a testable hypothesis, at best.

So let me cut to the chase then and try to be quick. As I see it, really the underlying question that Professor Soeya is raising for us today is - and please correct me if I'm wrong - how the U.S.-Japan alliance and by extension, though separately, Japanese regional strategy can change. He has posited that the constraints of the constitution and the security treaty, which give animating force to the alliance, are in essence the architecture that structures U.S.-Japan relations as well as the possibilities of Japanese strategy today.

He mentioned a number of times, as well, that the discourses - and I thought very interestingly, separated the discourses into a strategic discourse and a political discourse - the discourses will not allow, in essence, or it is not realistic to expect them to move Japan into a new direction. While I certainly agree with that, I would also say though that one could make an argument that the discourses sometimes are the least important, the most fickle, the most malleable part of a constraining order on what is or is not possible in the creation of a strategy, and they are the most fickle and malleable because discourses respond to changing conditions.

I may be wrong, but at least, this is the question I'll deal with: how might the alliances and Japanese regional strategy change? Let me posit or suggest at least

three ways just for discussion's sake, neither to suggest that these are comprehensive nor that Professor Soeya himself would have brought these up in the same way.

The first one is a push factor in which, over time, the capabilities enshrined in the presumptions of the alliance outstrip the structures. I actually think that is what has been happening over time and with a particular push in the past decade. This is what alliance managers are dealing with every day. How do you, first of all, live up to commitments and agreements we have made stretching back to 1997? How do you deal with a Japanese security force that has been steadily increasing its capabilities over time and is actually now moving into the possibility of gaining capabilities that would put it at a qualitatively - not just quantitatively - different level? The ability to carry out strike operations, the ability to proactively reach out past the Japanese homeland when you look at the capability of refueling and some of the weaponry and systems that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are interested in.

When those capabilities begin to outstrip the structures, there are a couple of different choices: you can change your definitions, you can change your reinterpretations - one of them might be of collective self-defense - you can actually go back and change the paper that structures your alliance. And I think that is something that alliance managers are constantly dealing with from both ends, sometimes trying to push that process forward and sometimes trying to hold it back. But that over time can accrete and create a fundamentally different condition in the alliance and a fundamentally different nature to what the alliance feels it can do

and what is presented to the Japanese as well as American publics.

Let me move to the second way in which I think alliances can change. It is a crucial one that is so central and inherent we often overlook it - the satisfaction question - the fact that both parties must be satisfied in alliances. If both parties are not satisfied in alliances, those alliances will change regardless of the viability of other options, regardless of whether both partners feel that there is something immediate that they can turn to. If both are not satisfied within that alliance structure, that is another push factor that can dramatically change alliances.

Those satisfactions, I would say a subset of that, is the question of unmet expectations within alliances. What we do not want in any alliance, certainly not in the U.S.-Japan alliance, is a crisis to intervene that lays bare, that strips away the veneer of our supposed willingness to act together and ability to act together so that those unmet expectations and those satisfactions are suddenly brought to the fore. That can cripple an alliance and cripple it in very immediate terms.

And I will say, as many of you here know, that there are serious people on both sides of the Pacific and in both capitals thinking about that. What happens if we have a North Korean contingency, and you can think of a lot of different ones, that would lay bare the question of whether Japan is willing to be right next to the United States or whether the United States is willing to be right next to Japan? These are serious questions that I think we are dealing with - the question of satisfaction and as I said, a subset, unmet expectations.

Third and final in this is that the key factor, I believe, in Professor Soeya's presentation is the fixedness - I hate the term, I'm sorry - of the United States, meaning that the United States' willingness and position within East Asia does not change. That is the key exogenous factor. And if that does change, then whether it is going to be a middle power strategy, a balancing strategy, a hedging strategy, whatever kind of strategy it is, Japan will be forced to undertake a dramatic, radical, and immediate renegotiation of its own security policies and preferences.

As a historian, I see that happening all the time. As a policy analyst, I think it can happen less often but it must be factored into your matrix, your equation of what would be the limiting factors on this alliance. The exogenous factor is the United States, and so it is crucial to remember that regardless of what Japan desires at this point in time, and this is where I do agree with the viability question that Professor Soeya raised. If the United States is no longer viable for Japan, then we are in a completely different situation.

I'll really wind up there. Other than that, just to say that the question of the East Asian regional order, I think, is one that raises such a whole host of questions that I personally am very leery of saying that there is anything that we can really look to as a reality or as something even desirable to be quite frank, except in the very long term. But I will certainly leave the questions of China and other countries in the region to my good friend, Alan Romberg, who knows them far better than I do. Thank you.

**Calder:** Thank you very much, Michael. Now our senior commentator, Alan Romberg.

**Alan Romberg:** Thanks, Kent. I'm going to be even briefer. There is a rich menu of things that Professor Soeya has put out there for you to consider, and I think you ought to be able to comment on that. Let me raise a few questions about what he said but also some questions about what Michael Auslin said.

### **What Does the U.S. Expect?**

I think that in both cases, an important issue is what the United States expects of Japan. I guess this gets to the unmet expectations, but it also is crucial in terms of thinking about what the alliance is all about. At the beginning of the Bush administration, going into the Bush administration, we had the so-called Armitage-Nye first report put out there, which now is explained as not really as ambitious as it sounded at the time. But to caricature it a bit, it sort of looked on Japan as perhaps becoming the U.K. of East Asia. A lot of us thought that was not realistic for a lot of reasons, but the most important one was Japan was not about to play that role. And I do not think it would have been a stabilizing factor in East Asia had we sought to really push very hard for it. We did push some, and I think there have been changes over the last several years where Japan has a more robust capability and so forth, but it is not that role.

The key thing there I would argue is that Japan, whatever its increasing capabilities, is not looking to play nor is it looked to to play a combat role. I think that perhaps Michael and I would disagree about whether that is a good thing or a bad thing, at least as I read the summary of his report on the U.S.-Japan alliance, changing Article 9 and so on. But in any case, I do not think it is going to happen. I would agree with Professor Soeya about that. I do not think it

is in the U.S. interest, and I do not think it is in the interest of East Asian stability that that happens.

What I do agree on is that if the U.S. commitment, both its general reliability as an ally and including its extended nuclear deterrence, were to become questionable, then Japan would indeed have to face a lot of very important choices and it would be a potentially revolutionizing event. I do not expect that. I do not see any inclination anywhere in the policy community in the United States to move in a direction which would call into question the commitment of the United States to the alliance with Japan and to the maintenance of stability and peace in the region. But I think, to me, that would change the nuclear question in Japan, that would change the combat question in Japan, it would change a lot of things in Japan.

I guess I would ask, does an unwillingness to take on perhaps a strategic great power military role really equate to being a middle power? Professor Soeya himself raised the question about whether that is really the best term to be using here. I would argue it may not be.

I was involved in a project a year or so ago primarily of Americans thinking about the region, and one of the questions was where does Japan think of itself vis-à-vis China? And I think, maybe wrongly - I'm interested in your view and the view of a lot of people in the chairs here - the view of the group was that Japan is not really seeking to be number one, but it really does not want to be number two either. And there is a difference. I would not take that position as equating to Japan viewing itself as a middle power or playing that role. I think that the role of Japan, even the military role, circumscribed as it is, I would argue is

more important than that term suggests but I do not want to focus too much on the term.

Going back to the question about “what if,” what if there was a war over either Taiwan or Korea, the two so-called flash points? Right now, Taiwan looks good in terms of not pushing us in that direction, but that may not be a permanent state. I certainly hope it is a permanent state, but we never know. And Korea has all sorts of obvious potential problems. What happens? What is the role that Japan expects to play? What is the role the U.S. expects it to play? What is the role in Korea that Koreans even would want Japan to play? I think that it is not so obvious that the natural thing is for Japan to jump in as a combatant in the sense of carrying out combat missions, but I also think it is a fundamental fact of U.S. strategy that the United States would assume that Japan will play the role of a very close ally in facilitating whatever action the United States takes, because we will be basically operating from the same strategic assumptions, the same set of strategic goals in terms of maintaining peace and stability. We may not have the same exact view about the politics of the situation, although there, I think, to a large extent we would, but maintaining peace and stability, not allowing military force to be used to upset the order in the region, I think is a shared fundamental goal of both sides. And I think Japan would in fact play that sort of role, again, not a combat role but an important role.

### **Regional Order**

One thing that did not get mentioned and I’m not going to dig into it, but I think there is a place for thinking about how emotions matter, how it plays here. We all know there is a certain history and certain views

of history that count here regarding both Korea and China. I think that those need to be brought into the discussions when one thinks about this - it is not just history, it matters today. You mentioned sort of dividing the Pacific with the U.S. and China on one side, and Japan, Australia and others on the other - it is not going to happen. And number two, it would be among the most dangerous configurations I could think of.

Very quickly on Michael’s point, the cost of a breakup in the alliance would be enormous, I would argue likely disastrous for everybody concerned, and I think that also will make the alliance continue. Maybe in historical terms it is not normal or natural, but I think in real terms it is in a sense.

I guess the other thing I would add is on the East Asia regional order. I share the view that an East Asia regional security structure is not likely to prosper. I think that a lot of things are happening in the region in terms of regionalism, but I do not think even if the nuclear negotiations in Korea were satisfactorily resolved and as a result of that you were able to form some peace and security mechanism as has been talked about, I do not see that as maintaining the essential peace on the hard security issues. I can see it playing all sorts of useful roles, but it is not going to solve the Taiwan issue, it is not going to solve the Korean issue, it is not going to solve the disputes between China and Japan over resources in the area of the East China Sea and so on. It will do a lot of other good things but it is not going to do that, so I would not see that as a key factor, if you will, as a substitute for alliances. I’ll stop there.

**Calder:** Thank you very much. I think we have raised a lot of issues that we have now

on the table. The organizing concept, just to repeat here, is the notion of Japan as a middle power, the subject of Professor Soeya's previous book. What does that actually mean? To me, there are some issues there. What is the likelihood actually of this happening? There are several alternatives as Dr. Auslin suggested. What are the implications if in fact this is Japan's role? It sounds like they are rather benign to hear Professor Soeya, and I guess I was not clear that there was strong dissent from that. Then the utility for the international system, if in fact we see Japan as a middle power, it sounds like it is a rather passive thing. Are there other chessboards? Is it possible particularly in the kind of world that the Obama administration foresees or that the world is really creating with the whole series of soft security issues? For example, it amounts to more than what was suggested.

### **Japan's Relations with Korea and China**

I know there are a lot of questions. If I might just ask one that relates to the comments of our two discussants. Both of them said that they thought the East Asian regional order, a cohesive one, was unlikely. I was not so clear as to how you, Professor Soeya, see this. You said that you thought this low-profile Japan as a middle power would make your relations with other major Northeast Asian neighbor nations - Korea and China in particular - probably better. Then it just occurred to me that in those three countries you have 30 percent of global GDP. You have considerable complementarity along a whole series of lines. If this low-profile Japan forges deeper and deeper ties with China and Korea, now maybe I guess our discussants suggested that will not happen, but I do not know. What do you see as the implications of Japan as a middle power?

You said that you thought this meant sort of an automatic alliance with the United States, but if it means deeper and deeper ties with China and Korea and so on, is that really the case?

**Soeya:** Thank you for the comments and questions. I do not think I have time to go over all of them. If I use the rest of the time, I think people in the floor will be frustrated. So I will just pick up some key points.

The most important point that I would like to address is one of the last points made by Professor Calder. Whether Japan is a middle power or not, that is not the center of my concern; I do not care. But the quality of a Japanese strategy will be a middle power strategy. That is how I would like to phrase it. If Japan actually concentrated its resources as an economic power in the domain of what I consider to be important for middle power strategy, then Japan's role will be much, much more active. And Japan's profile in becoming part of East Asian politics would be much, much bigger. That is how I look at this.

So I understand why it tends to be received as being passive, Japan shrinking, but my intention is to the contrary. In today's Japan, I see no coherent strategy. I'm sorry to say that as a Japanese, but I think that is the case. So Japan would not be so harmful to the region or the world, to say the least. But if you look at the flip side of the same coin, Japan has actually been contributing to the betterment of international systems, and there are areas in which we are very active and doing lots of good things.

But how can we convince observers and counterparts of Japanese diplomacy that what we actually do are integral parts of our rather bigger picture, i.e., strategy? That is

the question. It is often the case that Japan is taken for granted or our diplomacy is perceived as, if not harmful, perhaps irrelevant. So I'm arguing for a truly relevant comprehensive strategy for Japan. And Japan's role even in the military domain should be much bigger than today but in a larger framework of middle power concerns and strategies.

### **U.S. Presence in the Region**

A couple of other points - well, both Dr. Auslin and Mr. Romberg mentioned the U.S. factor and the fixedness of the U.S. and if that changes, what is going to happen? And Alan also talked about a scenario where the U.S.'s basic policies would change, even though he said - he quickly added - that is very unlikely, and I agree with that.

Within the domain or radar screen of my arguments, the U.S. changing its fundamental strategies toward Asia and the world is not there. If that happens, it is a totally different world and it requires a totally different paradigm, so to speak. And of course, that is unlikely, but if we contemplate some theoretical possibilities of that, it depends most importantly on how China looks under those circumstances.

The U.S. comfortably leaving the region might mean the U.S. having full trust in China as a central manager, organizer of an Asian order. In that case, Japan would be happy living with China. Or, I am not quite sure, but, maybe bandwagoning with China. Whether that takes the form of a formal alliance, I do not foresee that, but some kind of arrangements of coexistence with China which may be tantamount to bandwagoning as Japanese strategic choice.

But the least likely thing that I foresee even under those revolutionary scenarios is Japan rearming, even going nuclear, and becoming a regional geopolitical rival of China - I do not see that. If Japan ever pursues such a strategy without the U.S. presence, that is clearly a self-defeating strategy. But that is really hypothetical and that is not part of my argument, if I may add. I'll stop here.

### **Q&A**

**Calder:** Thank you very much. We have about half an hour. What I would suggest is that if we have questions, I'm sure there are plenty of questions and comments from the floor, and then toward the end we want to give our presenters a chance to sum up.

### **Changing Military Capabilities**

**Questioner:** I want to ask Professor Soeya to reflect on what Michael Auslin was saying about what seemed to be qualitative changes in Japan's military capabilities, and how those should be interpreted, perhaps through your middle power conception, how those could or should be interpreted by China and South Korea, namely mid-air refueling capability to strike at long distances. But not only those capabilities currently but what Richard Samuels calls the salami tactics that Japan has pursued over the years. In other words an erosion, in his argument, of constitutional principles when it came to, for instance, military exports or the militarization of space. So not only the current capabilities as I think aptly described by Michael Auslin but also, historically, this transformation of what Richard Samuels describes, constitutionally.

**Soeya:** Well, I'm not an expert in the hardware side of our defense capabilities,

but I do not have the recognition that Japanese defense capabilities are expanding qualitatively. I do not have that view or interpretation. To begin with, Japan's defense budgets have been decreasing rather than increasing over the last several years, even though we often hear a totally opposite story from many analysts. What is happening is perhaps a readjustment of our resource allocations among the three segments of our Self-Defense Forces. But not in the direction of acquiring, for instance, long-distance bombing capabilities - that is clearly not happening.

I think the most important story is the further integration of Japanese military preparedness in overall American regional military planning, such as Japan's radar capabilities as part of missile defense participation. There was news yesterday that our Self-Defense Forces failed in shooting a missile off Hawaii. But previously, we succeeded. If I may sound a bit cynical, that is the use by Japanese Self-Defense Forces soldiers of U.S. technology under the overall umbrella framework of working with the U.S. on missile defense. Military, I think Japan is, in fact, a subsystem of the U.S. That subsystem part is being consolidated, rather than encouraging Japanese military independence.

In essence, I see no indication of Japan leaving the postwar regime of defense and military preparedness. Politically, too, I see no willingness on the part of Japanese responsible defense planners in moving in that direction; basically, they are hesitant. So perhaps for this particular question, I'm afraid I have to question the premise of the question.

With respect to Professor Auslin's first point, Japan's increasing defense

capabilities changing the structure of major power relations - I do not foresee that either. Maybe constitutional revision would be necessary for that new dimension to open up, and then to what extent our defense planners, and for that matter, public opinion is ready for that entirely new chapter of our security policy, I have a very deep doubt. Once that picture opens up, I think the majority of Japanese would once again recede into, if not the same pacifist sentiment, a kind of a non-involvement mentality.

**Calder:** I think perhaps to get as many questions as we can on the table, let's take three questions and then have comments, of course, first from Professor Soeya and also from our commentators.

### **Security Council, North Korea, Conception of Power**

**Questioner:** Professor Soeya, should I understand that you disagree with Professor Kitaoka of Tokyo University, who argues that Japan should be a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council? The mission of the Security Council, as stipulated in the U.N. Charter, is to assume major responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security. And it appears to me that you are arguing that Japan does not have that kind of power or the will and capability to assume that kind of responsibility. Therefore, Japan can be more assertive or aggressive in the economic, financial, and cultural spheres, but it is better for Japan to remain reactive rather than proactive when it comes to security issues. Is my understanding appropriate or misguided?

**Questioner:** I wonder what the professor has to say about the situation with North Korea becoming a nuclear power,

threatening to smash L.A. as part of their strategy and then, of course, we have reached an agreement with them - the other nations - the Four-Power Pact. If this agreement falls through, what do you foresee as a possible strategy? If it succeeds, then the ideal of reaching a nuclear-free peninsula has been achieved, which was Japan's strategy. But if it fails, what will be done then?

**Questioner:** I was wondering if you could talk a little bit more about what the Japanese concept of power is. It sounded to me a little like you were saying, well, maybe a middle power is something a little easier for Japanese to get an understanding of and that certainly would not be in this sort of great power tradition but, I mean, do they really want to play even a middle-power role? Is there a willingness to allocate resources and make whatever kinds of calculations of risk or sacrifice that go into that even if it is in a non-military sense? But there is still a concept of power that has to be there with a strategy. Is that something the Japanese can really talk about in a public debate of any kind?

**Soeya:** Well, the last point about the Japanese concept of power - I do not think there are deep discussions on what power would entail in Japan's profile, I'm afraid. But if you take opinion polls, the general response would be that Japanese think of themselves as being a big power. I sometimes cynically describe that as Japan's great power DNA. It is a construct of the postwar years since Japan became a great economic power since the latter part of the '60s. But my argument is, yes, it is okay to call Japan an economic power, but there is a mismatch between Japan being an economic power and Japan being even less than a middle power in the domain of international security. That perhaps was

implicit in your question, asking if Japan and its people are even ready to play a middle-power role. I think my middle-power strategy would hit walls, especially in the sense that you have implied, and this relates to the next point.

My picture of Japan's comprehensive middle power strategy entails constitutional revision. Without changing Article 9, I do not think Japan will ever be able to become a full-fledged middle power, being part of international peacekeeping and sometimes part of multilateral forces like Canada fighting in Afghanistan. Theoretically, it is possible to conceptualize such a picture, but that is still too much for many Japanese. Japan sending soldiers to Afghanistan, even under U.N. auspices is still too much for many Japanese.

That has to do with the question of U.N. Security Council membership. If my middle power plan entails revision of Article 9 and fighting with other likeminded countries for the task of maintaining international peace and security, such as in Afghanistan, I do not think that is reactive. I think it is very much active compared to what Japan is doing today.

And whether that makes Japan qualified for U.N. Security Council permanent membership, I have mixed feelings. Japan searching for that position somewhat reminds many people, particularly in Asia, of the ghost of a prewar Japan, which is Japan playing the role of a great power. So their instinct is that Japan is looking for a position similar to the U.S., China and Russia in the U.N. Security Council. But I do not think that is the nature of Japan's argument for this membership. Actually, if Japan gets the position, I think Japan's role will be much less than that of the U.K. and France in the U.N. Security Council. I

think that is what the Japanese government is arguing for, in fact, membership without veto and so forth. And if that is the case, is Japan entitled to a seat? Perhaps, yes.

On the question of the impact on Japan of North Korea going nuclear, I think as long as the alliance is viable, this is not a big deal. Again, this may change our political discourses, complicate our domestic politics, but would not change our basic strategic choices, which is continuing to work with the U.S. And Japan going nuclear because North Korea is going nuclear is not going to happen. There are many, many reasons. We cannot be another North Korea; for that matter, Japan going nuclear would be much more serious. If the NPT regime cannot stop Japan from going nuclear, maybe that is the end of it, and also the end of the U.S.-Japan alliance, too. This scenario is truly a revolution, and is tantamount to a paradigm shift of not only Japanese diplomacy, but regional and world politics. As long as the current premises of the paradigm within which Japan operates are operative, I see no such option as a real choice, and no serious Japanese are contemplating such a revolutionary course of action.

**Romberg:** Very briefly, first of all, on the permanent seat in the Security Council, I think a lot of people think that a rationale for Japan getting a seat - by the way, I would argue that the U.S. is not against Japan getting a seat. What the U.S. is against, or has had trouble with, is seeing a restructured U.N. Security Council that would still be workable. But I think there has been a consistent view that within that, Japan should have a seat. And one reason is that it might, in fact, inspire a greater sense of responsibility. So it is not that Japan has more responsibility therefore it should be a member - a permanent member - but rather

a combination of that plus the fact that it would assume more responsibilities. But that kind of responsibility, I would agree, is not necessarily the same thing that one would look to other members to have.

But unless I'm quite mistaken, China, although it has probably more peacekeepers than certainly any other permanent member in peacekeeping operations, does not play a combat role. It may have armed folks, which would be a different situation from Japan, but it is not out there; peacekeeping is not peace making.

I think that today Japan does compete for power and influence in the region. I think it does that basically in terms of China. I think there are competing visions of the East Asia Summit, and I think that had a lot to do with a sense of who was going to be playing an important role in that. So I do not think Japan is not playing a power game, but it is playing a different kind of power game perhaps than the one we normally think about.

I do not think this is going to happen either, but I agree with what Professor Soeya said about North Korean nuclear weapons. A question that's sometimes asked, and I think and certainly hope it is theoretical, is what if South Korea were to become a nuclear weapons state? And we know they play around in laboratories from time to time and so on. That, it seems to me, still would not change it. I still would make the argument that as long as the alliance was viable, that would not change the outcome in Japan, but I think it would change the nature of the debate in Japan perhaps quite significantly.

**Auslin:** Yes, very briefly, I think maybe trying to step back a little bit. A lot of the things we are talking about and certainly a

lot of the capabilities we are talking about, even the policies, the willingness to declare these policies, are actually fairly rare. You are talking about an extraordinarily small group of countries in the world that act in the way that sometimes it seems we are sort of presuming is a natural way to act, just because you have a threshold of GDP or something, I'm not sure what.

So the question about Japan being a military power or a remilitarized power. Does it act like the United States? Of course not. But does it have very capable Self-Defense Forces that have a \$40 billion budget per year and highly trained servicemen and women and systems that seem largely capable to the task which it has set for itself? I would argue yes, it is not that we are at an either/or situation.

The question of when that begins to flip over into something that we presume a great power does or does not do, or a power that wants to act as a great power, is somewhat the nub of the question. But when you look at the accumulated experiences Japan has gained over the past decade in lots of different fields, from the ongoing refueling, to ballistic missile defense, decades of anti-submarine warfare exercises and patrols with the United States, the accumulated technological knowledge and technological base that Japan has, I guess, I'm just a believer that you never know what curve ball is going to be thrown at you. But the question is, what types of skills have you been building up to hit that curve ball with? And then you just swing.

I'm just not a believer that anything - I used the term before - is fixed or certain and will be what we expect it to be. I'll take just one more step back and then I'll finish. I like the fact that our discussion has fed into

these much larger questions. We have had questions about the U.N. and other things.

### **A Period of Change**

We are, right now, I think going through a period in which we will see what happens. Obviously, we do not know what will happen, and whether it is blip or whether this is a transformative end to a postwar regime that is about 60 years old, we are in a period of questioning all of that. And when those questions begin and when the fears mount that the structures that we have created and invested in and trusted for decades are no longer sufficient to meet the challenge of the day, then I think you'll see a rather rapid change.

I think we entered a part of that period in 1991 with the Gulf War and questioning, could we really get the U.N. to work? And it seemed to work, but we had states that normally did not act in these ways - power projection or joining these coalitions - suddenly act because there was a perceived threat to broader stability.

Post 9/11, we see another set of challenges. We are now in an economic set of challenges, and all I'm trying to suggest is that the verities that keep repeating, I think that they are absolutely historically contingent; they are absolutely ephemeral when conditions change, and states will always act in what they perceive - let me stress the word "perceive" - to be their best interests. And so whether Japan would go nuclear, whether it would gain an offensive strike capability, whether it would decide the alliance no longer works for it, whether or not those are the right decisions, those decisions are often made and we also know, and I think a lot of people in this room would argue strenuously, that states do not

often act in their own best interests and we see that recently, potentially.

But that is all I'm saying in the sense of trying to inject an element of uncertainty. I just do not see the - I hate the term, sorry - fixedness so much that that we can rely on it, especially when you are in a period when lots of things seem to be changing at once.

**Calder:** Let's take some more questions.

### **Strategy and Japan's Global Role**

**Questioner:** Professor Soeya, does Japan reconciling itself to being a middle power mean that Japan reconciles itself to being a regional power and gives up its global reach and global activism?

**Questioner:** Professor Soeya, I do very much agree with your idea that Japanese discussions are not strategic in any way right now. And I'm kind of wondering what you think is the prospect of how long Japan can afford to be in that kind of situation? You have been mentioning that it won't happen in your lifetime; still, as we saw last week, we had the G20 - not a G7 or G8 - and also the Japanese economy is shrinking simply due to the decline of the Japanese population. As American preeminence declines, more burden sharing is going to be required of Japan. And the Japanese government is going to be under more pressure than before as to how to meet that kind of request from the international community. It is going to be a very tough question that Japan is going to need to face in the future, and I would like to hear your ideas. Thank you.

**Soeya:** Thank you. Once again thank you very much for the comments and questions. Well, I was a bit hesitant initially to use the term "middle power" because it connotes a

lot of different things than what I have in mind for many people, naturally and understandably. But the questions are all helpful in clarifying some of the things which I'm not clearly aware of in advancing this thesis.

One of them would have to do with the question of the relationship between my argument for a middle power strategy and Japan's global role. I think I'm advancing this from my basic concern about the lack of consistent policy or strategy as far as Japan's basic security policies are concerned. And that is why and how the alliance and the Peace Constitution are important. The Peace Constitution, of course, deprives Japan of freedom of action in the domain of traditional military activities. And the U.S.-Japan alliance makes Japan dependent on the U.S. for its fundamental security needs as well as regional and global security responsibilities. A security policy of any country constrained by those most basic premises could only be a middle power strategy, at best.

Lots of confusion about Japan's global profile or its broader strategy I think has to do with the fundamental failure of postwar Japan in rectifying that basic gap which relates to and originates from the Peace Constitution and the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the divided image of Japan both as a global economic power and a political and military pygmy constrained by these two institutional arrangements.

And in order to get over this gap, the most important starting point should be to somewhat rectify this basic twist originating in the alliance and constitutional setup. And as I said explicitly in my previous comment, in order to do that, eventually Article 9 needs to be revised.

But in arguing that, a future-oriented strategy or vision is important. And today's domestic arguments for revision are driven by, as I said in my talk, a sense of frustration about the postwar status of Japan's domestic politics and external policies. So to that extent, it appeals to some segments of our society that are equally frustrated with the postwar realities. But it does not appeal so much to those who believe postwar Japan was basically a success story. And I think that is the nature of the domestic debate among ourselves. This relates to the security debate, the constitutional debate, and the history debate.

But this pattern of debate has great limits. Eventually, Japan will reach a stage where we have to begin to think about a post-revision strategy. As I said, we have not done that yet - we have not started that debate yet. But if we are serious about constitutional revision, sooner or later, we have to begin to think about the future after revision. Then, as I implied, Japan will perhaps become a country capable of fighting in an American war, and the U.S.-Japan security treaty needs to be rewritten, at least logically speaking, and then Japan will be like today's Australia, or if not exactly Australia some country similar to it, which has fought in many American wars. Whether the Japanese public is ready for that, I have great doubt. So even my middle power strategy is too much for many Japanese today, I think. But unless we settle these fundamentals of our strategy, I do not think we can proceed beyond the current debate.

And so my middle-power argument is not directly relevant for the discussion of Japan's global profile as a provider of public goods. I do not deny that role is also very important for Japan. But that role

would become much clearer, much more explicit if we tackle the fundamental inconsistencies in our security policies originating from the constitution and the alliance.

So a global role is okay, but without touching on these basic inconsistencies, I think essentially there would remain limits to that profile of Japan.

For instance, it's often the case that emphasizing Japan's global role is interpreted as a Japanese tactic to evade some other basic security requirements. There may be elements of that logic in today's Japanese approach, because we cannot do much in the traditional security domain, including multinational security operations. There is a sense that we have to compensate for Japanese incapacity in traditional security in some other softer domains. A "global civilian power" is a case in point, which emphasizes a civilian role without necessarily talking about Japanese role in the domain of traditional security and international security.

So that relates to the second question of how long Japan can afford to continue along this line. My realistic prediction is perhaps we will continue, regrettably, precisely because we are not addressing relevant questions.

But my biggest frustration in advancing this kind of argument in Japan is that my analysis of problems and obstacles to Japanese diplomacy is not necessarily shared, even by those who are handling our foreign policies including the Foreign Ministry people. If I raise this issue and if I begin to talk about problems that Japan faces - both domestically and externally - many people would say, "Oh, Japan is doing okay. What is wrong with us? Japan

is accepted by the world, its image is good, its role is bigger than a middle power.” But I do not take these arguments as assumptions of Japanese diplomacy. So that is the most frustrating part of my endeavor. Unless the basic premises of my argument are shared by many Japanese, I do not think my arguments will go any further, I’m afraid.

The worse scenario for me is for a Japanese middle power strategy to be realized after Japan has actually become a middle power - economically, socially, politically and otherwise. And that is not entirely unlikely. I do not know how long it is going to take, but that future is surely there. In this regard as well, we have to preempt that kind of worst-case scenario, where Japan will end up in a middle power situation before having a strategy. So we should begin to debate that today.

**Calder:** Well, thank you very much to our two excellent commentators and also, of course, to Professor Soeya for a forthright and I’m sure in some sense controversial talk that leaves us with a sense that a middle power may be something more than perhaps we expected, and a conception of middle which has many, many dimensions to it. Thank you very much, Professor.