

China's Role in Regional Security Cooperation

Zhu Feng: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. It is a great honor for me, coming here to say something on China's role and involvement in regional security cooperation.

I think for a long time China's role and its involvement in this area have been very controversial issues, because in the post-Cold War era, a lot of discussions have described China as some kind of troublemaker or potential troublemaker. But I think from a Chinese view, our role and involvement in the region now is not only getting very noticeably improved, but our future is also very, I would say, remarkably and inevitably tied to regional security, prosperity and peace.

China's Vision of America's Role

That is why, from a Chinese perspective, I think the first thing I would like to introduce here is what our vision of America's role in regional security cooperation is. The American factor is always a central piece of China's reactions and of China's thinking. We also see some kind of growing controversy between the two powers over our security future. Some will argue that China must be, let's say, the biggest challenger or most likely potential competitor of the United States. So then China represents big uncertainties in future scenarios.

Then other people also will argue, for example, just based on China's authoritarian system, its not-yet-finished domestic transformation and China's fast growing appetite for resources - we are searching for those things around the world in places like Sudan - so then China's future also will inevitably come into

collision with the U.S., both regionally and globally.

Anyway, I think all of you also know that my country's views of the United States have been very polarized and divided. We also have hawks, we also have Chinese neocons, and those guys always just argue against the United States - the U.S. is imperialist. In their view, a future China also has to think about how capable we are to fight against things that result from America's imperialist nature or structure.

We also have moderates. The moderates believe that the United States can always be China's partner. So without very solid cooperation between the two sides, then China also will be done for because the U.S. is the hegemon, the U.S. is a big trading partner, the U.S. is also the biggest way for China to absorb ourselves into the international community.

I think such divided thinking about the U.S. will not prevent China from working from our mainstream, so here I would like to introduce some of the major points from China's mainstream - what is America's role in regional security cooperation.

First of all, I think we believe that the U.S. is a stabilizer. Without your very solid security commitment and very brilliant, I think, forefront military presence, regional security might turn out to be quite a different picture. For example, Japan will go nuclear, and the rearming of Japan also will be a very big fear for Chinese nationalistic sentiments. Then, probably, South Korea also will be rearming and inter-Korean relations also will be getting very unstable and volatile.

Then if we look at maritime security, getting through the Malacca Strait, South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, so without America's strong military presence, I do not think those very huge maritime areas will be secure. So I think quite a few Chinese will just adapt to such an American strategy to secure our region, secure our prosperity.

Second of all, I think from our view, the U.S. is also a balancer. For example, Taiwan Strait relations, the U.S. strongly declared that any conflict should be resolved peacefully. It is always very depressing for most Chinese, but actually, I think such a policy has also offered a very important solid base for Chinese leaders to rethink their policy with a very sober mind. Since the middle of the '90s and into the early part of this century, that way tentatively brought about some kind of coalition approach and also helped ease the trouble from Taiwan. I think America's strong strategic pressure is one of the very important factors to keep China on track, so that is why I think now we also see China's growing flexibility on how to handle Taiwan issues after Ma Ying-jeou took office. Both sides reached out and a new situation is taking shape. I think we should always - both the U.S. and China - stay away from possible military conflict.

I think the third role envisioned for the United States is that you are also our intimidator, China's intimidator. Such a perception does not come from a judgment of your country or your military as being very evil; it just comes from some theoretical and practical experiences. For example, what is the role of bilateral relations? According to President George W. Bush, he said it is important but complex, so from the Chinese view, we also believe his assumption. The U.S. is always something we have to react to. For

example, in history we see a lot of such cases - a dominant power would like to have a preemptive attack against a rising power. So that is why a potential preemption from the United States as a dominant power vis-à-vis China as a great potential power is always a very scary scenario for us. That is my outline of the Chinese vision.

China's Evolution

So let me turn now to China's low expectations of regional security cooperation. First of all, I think China always believes that we are a very proactive participator in regional security cooperation because it is the only way for China to realize our security and our prosperity. For example, we get along with the ASEAN countries; we also spend a lot of time pulling closer to Japan; we also would like to be very friendly to the two Koreas, however they look at China. I think such proactive and steadfast participation in regional security cooperation was and continues to be the precondition for Beijing's economic achievements over the past three decades.

Before 1979, what was China? China, I think, was probably the most belligerent country in the world. We once fought the U.S. military in the Korean War. We also fought American and Taiwanese troops in the Taiwan crisis, then we also got into military conflicts with India. We also fought with Soviet Union's troops in the border areas. Then we also used military force against Vietnam. We also got into a maritime conflict with the South Vietnam government.

So from 1949 to 1979, 30 years of Red China, but what was Red China's role at that time? We said we export revolution.

We would like to fight with anyone. So at that time, I think that China was the biggest aggressor in the international arena. No country was more prone to fight than China.

But this year marks the 30th anniversary of China's reform and opening up. From 1979 to this year, there was no single war that my country was involved in. We fought in no military conflict. Yes, we had the Taiwan Strait crisis - we launched missiles, we were also testing Taiwan and the U.S. for your political and military readiness for some kind of use of force, but we stopped there. So since 1996, the missile testing in the Taiwan Strait, we have not done a single missile test of that kind.

So then, I think the last 30 years has truly witnessed a tremendous change of China's national security strategy and China's policy toward its neighbors. Now we would like to address different security concerns for our interests and promote a good neighbor policy. So it is always just about China's offense, China's charisma offensive, smiling diplomacy. So we totally changed. That is why I think China now recognizes that making friends with neighbors, benefiting our neighboring countries, that is not just a way to promote China's investments, markets or other raw materials, but also the most reliable way to make China secure.

Military Capabilities

I think the second thing, expectedly, we would like to increase our military capabilities. It is a little bit complicated why China has spent so much money on a military buildup and it suffers a lot of criticism. The Chinese government and the PLA also have defended some of their

defense measures. I think it is also the empowerment of the weak.

But I think the central point for the Chinese government and Chinese people about military modernization is a sense of China as a great power; we have a strong sense of national pride, we always believe we are a global actor and a great power. So no great power both in theory and in history would like to sit stupidly by, looking and waiting as our military equipment gets out of date. I think such a great power aspiration is a driving force behind my country's high level of military buildup.

Of course, I think the second factor we can figure out behind China's military buildup is intimidation in the face of a future confrontation with the United States. So whatever China spends in military acquisition, I think that China still sees a huge gap between the two militaries; such a gap will not be overcome very soon. So that is why I think Beijing is just trying to catch up somehow, rather than just lagging far behind the U.S. military. So that is the second factor.

The third factor is about China's regional security concerns. For example, we also feel Japan's future is uncertain. It does not just come from our perception of unresolved historical problems, it also comes from, for example, Japan's strategy of balancing China after it recognized China as a looming giant. We could be a danger to Japan. So as a result, China also has to take countermeasures; the military buildup is also targeting China's security concerns.

Dependence and Alienation

But anyway, let me move on to my last part. I think China's expectation of our role

and what we expect of the role of the United States is to live very harmoniously. Otherwise, we will see little possibility of the U.S. and China joining hands and attempting to cooperate on various issues. For example, today's regional security is very notably premised on the balance of power. The U.S. enjoys regional preeminence, alliance politics is always its security anchor, and half of the region is tied up in this form of cooperation. But such a balance of power-based approach alone will not offer the Chinese a lot of incentives for intensifying cooperation.

For example, now there is another kind of controversy which is so striking to the Chinese. Chinese leaders would like to join in the global bailout campaign to help the U.S. and other countries overcome the financial crisis. But such a policy has come under fire because some Chinese feel, for example, that the U.S. is the biggest backer of Taiwan, the U.S. always keeps hammering China on Tibetan issues, human rights issues, then why should China feel compelled to reach out to the U.S. even in financial terms?

I think such a view is truly mistaken because I think that China's participation in the financial bailout is a vivid reflection of our growing interdependence. If the U.S. is finished, China will be finished too. Such a sense or such a conviction is truly very overwhelming in the minds of most of the Chinese elite.

But the problem is an emotional one for the Chinese, it is hard to keep the two ends meeting. For example, we have to potentially or strategically guard against a very superior United States, but on the other hand, we also have to get along well with each other, whether it is financially and economically or otherwise.

So that is why I also see a growing contradiction for the Chinese on how to look at our commercial partnership, while strategically the U.S. is alienating the Chinese by, for example, proposing the TSD, the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, between the U.S., Japan and Australia. Then the U.S. also promotes their view of values, then encourages Japan to try value-based diplomacy, and pursues a very big architecture like a coalition of democracies. I think these gestures probably are some kind of preventive defense or diplomacy vis-à-vis the uncertain future China, but actually it also brings about in China a growing feeling of being alienated.

Need for Cooperation

So that is why we need some new way to make the Chinese totally believe that our investment in bilateral relations will likely bear fruit, will likely drive both sides into some kind of unstoppable cooperation and coordination. That is why I think regional security cooperation always will be addressed with that kind of conviction. I mean, yes, strategically it is not easy to just dissolve the beliefs or concerns of both countries. Some such concerns are very containment-oriented and even contentious, but we need a way to reframe our security relationship and reduce distrust and antagonism and pump our energy into some new cooperation.

So that is why I think regional security cooperation is an embodiment of both countries' building up their relationship and their cooperation. In my view, I think future regional security cooperation shall be primarily based on a very constructively formulated security relationship between the U.S. and China. So far I think we have been seeing both countries truly creating a relatively mutual relationship.

President Bush's Asia Policy

With President Bush very quickly stepping down, I have to say that the bright legacy of his foreign policy is his Asia policy. Much of President Bush's Asia policy, I believe, has been totally successful. For example, President Bush made relations with China stable and also intensified our relationship and we have also established a variety of channels to bridge both sides. Just two weeks ago we finished the last round of SED, the Strategic Economic Dialogue. Then just this week, I think the Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo - he is a top official in China responsible for foreign policy - also paid a visit to the States and had a strategic dialogue with his American counterpart, Mr. Negroponte. So I think such different levels of channels are truly pulling the two sides closer, and it very productively facilitates our communications and cooperation.

Then we also see that President Bush has been very strongly against Taiwan's independence, so both sides have also narrowed the gap of how to approach the Taiwan issue. When the Taiwan Strait is more peaceful, I think it is also a big contribution to closer relations between Washington and Beijing.

I think another indicator to show how successful Bush's Asian policy is, the Pentagon restructured security deployment or military deployment according to the hub and spoke strategy, and relations between Tokyo and Washington have been strengthened. I think very remarkably, after the Lee Myung-bak government came to power, Seoul-Washington relations also greatly warmed up, and I think the regional alliance framework with the United States is also getting more robust.

I think the third indicator is that you knocked on India's door and opened good relations with New Delhi. The nuclear cooperation treaty also created a new era for Beijing and India, and I think New Delhi is very decisively leaning towards the United States rather than always towards Russia.

Regional Architecture

So I think, if you will agree, the successful development of Asian policy during the two presidential terms of the Bush administration also offered a very solid base for us to envision the future regional security architecture. From Chinese view, first of all, we would like to join hands with the U.S. to revitalize security multilateralism. What's security multilateralism? I think it is to build a new framework to accommodate the contending security concerns and find ways that approach or address our concerns that are cooperative and coordinated.

We have also come to some kind of a new moment; the Six Party Talks offer very imaginative, logical points for us to think about future evolution. If the Six Party Talks finally realize the nuclear dismantlement of North Korea, I think there is no doubt it could offer us a very important testing ground to keep all the leading members of the region together and create collective actions to address our concerns.

Another one is the list of regional institutions. For example, we have ARF, ASEAN Regional Forum; we also have EAS, East Asian Summit meeting; then we also have APEC; we also have ASEAN Plus Six, ASEAN Plus Three, such different setups.

But the problem is, why has East Asia seen so many regionalized or institutionalized setups, but regional security remains inherently stressful? I think one of the reasons is still the lack of hard power cooperation. For example, why do the Six Party Talks continue despite their lack of success? I think one of the biggest reasons is that the U.S. and China conducting very frequent talks also very significantly helps reduce our distrust over how to react to North Korea. So as Christopher Hill stated, I think there is nothing like them in bilateral relations between the U.S. and China to keep the two sides close.

That is why I think the ARF and IISS have sponsored the Shangri-La conference. An annual defense ministerial-level meeting cannot successfully reshape the regional landscape if it is hosted or driven by small or intermediate actors. But if the big powers could very, very seriously take into account their institutionalized cooperation, the Six-Party Talks is a very good opportunity. If we can continue to walk in that direction, then I think future institutionalized cooperation, even in a security realm, with support from great powers, will be taking place.

The last point I would like to say is, so far, regional cooperation excludes the U.S. For example, when I talk about ASEAN Plus Three or ASEAN Plus Six, the U.S. is not there. Then we also talk about another security drive made by China - SCO, Shanghai Cooperation Organization - the U.S. is not there either. Then we also see there will be a new Northeast Asia summit meeting just between Korea, China and Japan - the U.S. is also absent.

So in those sorts of regional institutional cooperation that exclude the U.S., does that definitely mean that it is in China's interests

to see U.S. always stay away? My conclusion is that it is not. I think in economic terms, regional cooperation, we always have to proceed in some way that is Asianized. We have to prove that the regional members will stick with it.

However, I do not think there are any Chinese who think that the future security scenarios in the region will be totally without America's participation. So if we turn to security matters, I do not think that China has any ambition to keep the U.S. out. The problem is we have to get in together. We have to join hands. For example, if the U.S. and China could truly energize the regional members and build up a regional security framework on a multinational basis, China could reap a lot of benefits. The first one, we can keep the U.S. from driving China away from the TSD or other U.S.-centered regional security setups. If China is always involved in multilateral regional security cooperation, that will raise our level of confidence. We are not just secure; we will not be isolated. So what is isolation? In China's vision, it is equal to some kind of containment policy. So we would like to welcome your participation. We also would like to see that we can join hands.

The second benefit that we can reap is we can also develop a framework to address contending security concerns in a multinational way or in a multilateral way, for example, Taiwan issues, they have tremendously improved. So then I think that Beijing also would like to keep Taiwan issues on the agenda on multinational occasions. For example, for the future stability of cross-strait relations, we have to face up to Taiwan's demand for their international space. So that is why I see a bigger possibility for China to compromise over their claim to enter the WHO. So if

Taiwan can get into the WHO, yes, of course, we can also allow the Taiwan issue to be addressed multilaterally.

So the last way China could benefit from security cooperation and security multilateralism is, we could also develop a very constructive basis to reduce our scared feeling or our very coherent sense of China's weakness in front of a much more powerful United States. So then we can also very decisively curb the concern that in the future the U.S. will strike China or the U.S. will prevent China from moving on our legitimate claims or something like that. So such a multilateral framework - my last word - will offer a very imaginative new basis to underly a future of small productive and constructive ties between Washington and Beijing. Thanks.

Mitchell B. Reiss: I would like to thank the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA for organizing this afternoon's meeting. I think we all recognize what an independent and provocative thinker Dr. Zhu is, not least because it certainly is unfashionable these days, Dr. Zhu, to say anything nice about President Bush and the Bush administration so that was refreshing.

Bases of Cooperation

I am going to be focusing a little bit more on operational questions; I will leave it to Mike and John who are really the experts on IR theory to tackle that end of it. As I understand Dr. Zhu's talk, he is arguing that there is an opportunity now for the United States and China to build on the success of the Six-Party Talks and I agree completely. However, he goes on to say that a regional security cooperation mechanism or arrangement really will not be possible until the denuclearization of North Korea and the

establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

And my response to that is, I do not know that any of us will ever live to see that day. And I'm wondering why do we actually need to wait that long, because there are many problems that demand our common attention today and I would not want North Korea to exercise a veto over the ability of our two countries to work together collaboratively.

But I have some questions over what exactly this cooperative mechanism would be aimed at. Now a traditional basis for cooperation is common values, but as Dr. Zhu suggests, the United States and China do not always share the same values. So another basis is common interests. Do we share the same interests? Do we share the same threat perceptions? And here, too, I'm not sure that the United States and China actually do, or if we do, we share it from opposite sides of the same coin.

Years ago, a British official was asked to explain the mission of NATO, and he said very succinctly and quite famously now, "The goal of NATO is to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down." If you try to transpose that maxim to a possible cooperative arrangement between China and the United States, who is it that we want to keep in, who is it that we want to keep out, and who is it that we want to keep down, and is there agreement on any of those questions? Never mind all three of them. And it is not clear to me that there is.

Now, it is certainly possible that framing the issue that way may be a relatively old fashioned way to look at alliances and cooperation in the 21st century, because it seems to me that there are a number of

issues where China and the United States do have overlapping, even identical interests, having to do with environmental damage, Islamic extremism, narcotics and human trafficking, piracy and health issues like SARS and the Avian flu, a range of transnational issues where neither the United States nor China nor any country by itself can really solve these issues. There has to be cooperation across the board.

And I would argue again that there is no need to wait until the six-party arrangement either succeeds or does not succeed; these problems all demand immediate attention. But I'm a little bit more skeptical than Dr. Zhu that China actually wants to institutionalize U.S. cooperation in this manner. And let me just give two pieces of evidence; one anecdotal, one not.

A few years ago when I was director of policy planning, we actually came up with a similar idea, Dr. Zhu. We thought, okay, let's have policy planning exercises with five of the six members of the Six-Party Talks - North Korea was not going to be invited. We thought symbolically we would have an empty chair at the table and when they behaved themselves, they could attend. Immediately, South Korea, Japan and Russia all agreed to join the United States in hosting this roundtable on policy planning but China was opposed. And China was opposed quite adamantly and could not be persuaded, so these talks never took place.

An additional piece of evidence is the genesis of the East Asia Summit, where Beijing worked very hard to keep the United States from actually being a member of it. Now, this may sound harsh, but I do not mean it to be. I do not blame China at all for behaving in this manner. It was only about 200 years ago that the United States

adopted a very similar policy called the Monroe Doctrine towards our European friends to try to make sure that they did not interfere in our sphere of influence in the western hemisphere and in the southern hemisphere here. So again, I think that China might be forgiven if it is adopting a similar measure of trying to keep the United States at arm's length from interfering overly much in what China may consider to be its sphere of influence.

My conclusion then is that I do think that there is an opportunity for the United States and China to deepen their relationship, but I'm not sure China is enthusiastic about that. And if China is indeed enthusiastic, I'm still not sure if we can identify a common mission for ourselves. Thank you.

Michael Mastanduno: Professor Zhu has provided us with a very engaging and sophisticated talk. It demonstrates, I think, a very attractive combination of someone who is both knowledgeable about the policy world and also very savvy in the world of international relations theory. It is indeed a rare combination of someone sufficiently comfortable in both worlds that they can talk to both audiences, and Professor Zhu does that very well. On top of that, he compliments the Bush administration - it is a hat trick of some sort.

I think to a certain extent he has made a fairly sophisticated argument for developing an institutional multilateral security mechanism, again, based on the Six-Party Talks. That policy, I think, is based, as he went through in the talk, on a series of premises: One, that Chinese security is tied to regional security, no wars in 30 years. Secondly, that China is not necessarily a challenger to the United States. Third, that there is a role for the United States in the region as a stabilizer, a

balancer and perhaps even an intimidator. And fourth, regional security is not simply good for the sake of regional security, but good for U.S.-Chinese relations because it can be a platform upon which to build bilateral trust which is something that is sometimes lacking in the relationship.

I think this is an interesting and as I said, a sophisticated argument, and what I want to do is raise three or four pointed questions about it in the interest - I think as Dr. Reiss has just done - of stimulating both a response from Professor Zhu and some discussion.

Differing Motives for Regional Architecture

I think the first question is, both the United States and China have expressed an interest in a multilateral security mechanism, but is the appeal of regional multilateralism compatible or potentially incompatible for the two countries? There is an overlapping interest; a multilateral security mechanism in the region could help to solve practical problems like the North Korea problem. But beyond that, I think the United States and China have very different motives for multilateral security architecture in the region. I think China's interest is first to reinforce the perception that it is not threatening; whether it is or it is not is another question, but that is clearly an important motive for China.

Secondly and even more importantly, I think the purpose for China is to preclude other kinds of regional security architecture, like for example a league of democracies, which would obviously at the moment exclude China, or an expansion of the American hub and spokes bilateral system into some kind of multilateral American alliance-based system. So I think

for China, those are the keys. A multilateral security mechanism would be something that would crowd out some of these other less attractive kinds of regional architectures.

I think though for the United States, there is a different set of motives. Most importantly for the United States, any kind of regional architecture is intended to be a supplement to and not a substitute for, both bilateral hub and spokes, and some other kind of regional structures. So for the United States, all options should be open and the United States can use bilateral, multilateral, regional, ad hoc - institutionalize the whole range of institutions.

So I think in that sense, they have incompatible objectives and that, I think, complicates further the problem that Dr. Reiss just pointed to in terms of how will this be structured and what would it actually do, what would it based on?

Differing Long-Term Interests

The second question, I think, is a much broader one and also was foreshadowed by the first question, and that is, are American and Chinese interests in the region compatible over the long term? Professor Zhu says China does not want to keep the United States out, and I believe that. I think that is credible and plausible as an argument in China's interests in the short term. The reason I say that is because the United States and China are economically interdependent. China, as he argues, is not looking to dominate the region. The key problem is a security dilemma problem. China will only become provocative or aggressive if it is provoked, so the United States can stay in the region as long as its actions are not excessively provocative to China.

Now that may be all well and good at present and in the immediate future. The question is the longer term - is the status quo of an American presence in China attractive to China, one, because it is comfortable in what some people have called an American centered world, or is it attractive for now because it is going to give China the opportunity to strengthen itself over the long term? And it is over the long term that I think the problems arise, because then the question that Dr. Reiss raised elliptically at the end about the Monroe Doctrine becomes a very viable question. And the question is simply this - over the long term, as China grows in power, is it going to find acceptable a very prominent American role in the East Asian region?

I think it is fair to think the answer is probably no, and the answer, I would follow Dr. Reiss on this, is based on America's own experience. When America proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine, it was not nearly powerful enough to enforce it. When it became powerful enough - I think maybe 1898 - it did everything it could to throw the Europeans out. Now China, I think, is far too savvy diplomatically to proclaim its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, but I do not think it is unreasonable to think that as China gets more powerful - and Dr. Zhu after all told us China has great power aspirations - that it would want some version of the Monroe Doctrine in forming its policy.

I think the problem for the United States and China is not so much today, where they both have - even if based on different reasons - common interests in a dual role in the region, the problem is down the road as China becomes more powerful. Or in international relations talk, today's problem is a security dilemma, a problem of each

side unnecessarily provoking the other. The problem down the road is potentially a power transition problem, which is more about capabilities than psychology. I think it is down the road that we have to think about creative solutions to U.S.-China competition.

Economic Crisis

Third, I think we need to think a little bit about the current economic crisis. Economic prosperity is, to paraphrase Joe Nye, like oxygen. Joe Nye, a long time ago, said that security was like oxygen; you take it for granted until it is not there then you cannot think of anything but. Well, economic prosperity may be similar. And I think the question that we need to ask in thinking about U.S.-China security relations is, what happens to security relations in the event that growth slows significantly in the world economy? Because remember, in those 30 years that China has moved toward a different economic strategy since 1978, those have been relatively prosperous years in the world economy. What happens if we have a protracted economic slowdown? Is it true that China needs growth rates of seven to eight percent in order to maintain social stability and, I would argue, regime legitimacy as well? Is it really the case that if China's growth rate falls to four or five percent, it is going to face serious social instability and questions about regime legitimacy, since economic performance, the ability to deliver the goods, is a critical foundation for regime legitimacy today in China?

I think we need to think about those questions, and they are especially relevant in the China-Japan context, which Professor Zhu also recognized. There is an international relations theory, the diversionary theory of conflict, which

essentially says when you have economic problems at home, a nice thing to do is blame those on the outside, blame the foreigners. And the China-Japan relationship is ripe for this kind of outward projection. In fact, China-Japan rivalry may be as important, if not more important, than U.S.-China potential rivalry in the years to come, and one of the questions we need to think about is, does a different kind of economic environment create a security problem that we could avoid in a context of prosperity, but which will become much more troubling in a context of slower economic growth?

Finally, the last point I will make is really just to piggyback onto Dr. Reiss' comments about what the security architecture would look like and what it would be based on. Dr. Zhu says that the trick is for a multilateral regional architecture to not simply be a talking shop like the ARF or some of the other existing arrangements. The question is, how do you do that? How do you move beyond a talking shop especially if you are going to have to solve the North Korean problem in order to get it going? Thank you.

G. John Ikenberry: Thank you very much. Well, I want to open this up now for a general discussion. So the floor is open.

Q&A

Outer Space

Questioner: Thank you very much for your presentations. I want to ask two questions. I work for a foundation that has a specific focus on space security, and what we have seen with relationships between the West in general, and certainly the U.S., and China on this very new emerging issue, where there aren't established patterns of behavior

has been very, very different to something like the Taiwan question, where there is an established method of engagement. How do you see new security questions coming through such a space, obviously the Chinese ASAT test of 2007, affecting the general U.S. dynamic?

Secondly, in our experience, you are talking about engagement from a very specific point of view; we get very different messages from our relationship with the PLA and our relationship with the foreign ministry. Now, do you think that that is going to be something which is going to become ever more important in light of potential economic crises and the diversification of Chinese interests? Are we going to be talking to two different people or is there going to be a united Chinese position? Thank you.

Zhu: Thank you for your good questions. First of all, I think, yes, China is now trying to march into outer space. They spent a lot of money and also won a lot of audience and applause domestically, but personally, I'm very critical of this space program. I'm not a security expert, but in my view if China would like to update their military technology and capabilities, I think we should have turned to different procurements. We can use that amount of money for improvements in China's navigation, surveillance, and even a tracking satellite-based system. That is my view. I think that should draw a lot more attention from the PLA.

I know a little about this outer space program, and personally, I believe that it truly has strong military significance and military meaning. It is obvious, otherwise it's just a waste of a lot of money. But the problem is how adequately it will contribute to the increase in China's

military capabilities; I think it is still very questionable. It is my first answer for you.

The second question, I think, diversity in China, in U.S.-China relations...

Same Questioner: In terms of very different messages coming out of different agencies within China.

Zhu: Different messages from different agencies.

Intragovernmental Coordination

Same Questioner: On some of these emerging security questions. Our past experience was with our contacts at the foreign ministry, even behind the scenes we are getting very, very different rhetoric and also options than what we're getting from the PLA now. Where are these new policy areas? How is that going to be brought together in terms of driving forward the relationship?

Zhu: I agree. Your observation is very insightful and very accurate. One of the challenges now that Beijing is facing, I think, there is no substantiated cross-discipline or cross-departmental coordination. So, for example, the PLA has its own voice, it has its own belief system, so then they will deliver the messages they want. The foreign ministry, yes, of course, they also toe the line, it is also an official department, but they like to talk about what they think of the international environment and China's security concerns. We also see other governmental departments, for example the CPC's international department, and we also have other departments.

I feel very embarrassed when they send different messages, and it seems to me that

we cannot perform as well as the United States does right now. We still lack efficient and timely coordination across lines and departments. So it is a big issue. I think in the future it will be improved but it hasn't been yet.

Architecture in a Fluid Situation

Questioner: I want to pick up on Mike's question about the long term or the medium term because I think this is really key. I want to elaborate on it a little bit. I think all of the actors in this scenario are not permanent but they are changing in nature. What I mean specifically is that when I had conversations at PACOM, Pacific Command, I was told that this hub and spokes model is not really accurate anymore; that in fact, these are customized bilateral relationships depending on the needs of the country. And of course, we are trying to carry out a realignment of troops, lily-pad strategy, et cetera.

So when you look forward, the U.S., it seems to me, might have a very different reaction to a China that was economically and politically open, maybe soft authoritarianism or authoritarian capitalism, as opposed to taking the current configuration of politics and hardliners and whatnot and simply projecting it forward. All of which leads me to think that it is really premature to talk about region-wide institutions or mechanisms first. They have to be built, it seems to me, from the bottom up and since the strategic environment is so very fluid and each country has such different needs, then it does not make sense to me to - this is the question for Professor Zhu - start with the institution first rather than political stepping stones first. Thank you.

Ikenberry: Mike, do you want to say a word about that and let Professor Zhu get prepared?

Mastanduno: I think that is an insightful comment. When you think about how institutions tend to form, they tend to form in response to security threats, see NATO, or in response to solving a certain kind of functional problem. The interesting thing we have here is a discussion about an institution that was formed, the Six-Party Talks, to solve a particular problem. It seems to have - even though it is not yet successful - succeeded to date beyond the wildest dreams of the people who initiated it, that the temptation was to say, "Well, we must leverage this to solve some other kind of problem." So the question is, what would that problem be?

In a way, it is a nascent version of the NATO debate. NATO did so well during the Cold War that even though the threat is gone, let's find something else for NATO to do because it is very precious, it is very hard to get an institution started. So I think a previous questioner was absolutely right. If you do not have a purpose, it is very hard to drive the institution, and that it makes it all the more difficult to think about the Six-Party Talks mechanism as a mechanism for regional security only after it solves the problem that it was going to do.

Zhu: Thank you for your question. This, of course, I think is a big dilemma now that China is in, and it is a big dilemma I'm also in, personally. I feel very strongly that Beijing's interest in such a regional security architecture buildup based on security multilateralism truly is, I think, growing. Then just as I said, Beijing will also see a lot of very productive outcomes if such a regional security framework could stand up.

But the reality is also very crude, and it is not easy to change dramatically, so that is why I also have to underline some of the obstacles I see in the way for the region to move forward. The first one is America's level of interest. I see now the interest is very low. Yes, of course, Condoleezza Rice outlined some ideas about increasing regional security cooperation. Then we also see there is one working group in the Six-Party Talks framework dealing with a multilateral security mechanism aiming at building a peace regime in the Korean Peninsula. But I do not think it is truly a key component for America's vision of how regional security could be strengthened.

I think the U.S. also enjoys very robust and very stable military superiority and military allies. NATO is also working with almost all of these countries. That is why I see now that the U.S. is less compelled or sees it as less imperative to move in that direction.

The second point is for Japan. It seems to me now that there are quite constructive or profitable aspects of moving ahead with such security multilateralism. However, some of the Japanese right wing newspapers will complain, is this or that operation a new kind of multilateral security cooperation? Some people talk about conspiracies, dismiss the U.S.-Japan alliance, talk about the 1922 Washington conference and the dissolution of the UK-Japan alliance by the Four-Power Treaty. So I see Japan as less energetic.

Then the third factor, I think, so far we see proof that security cooperation on a multilateral basis is some kind of new motive for all the powers. So far, the Six-Party Talks have not succeeded, as I think Dr. Reiss just pointedly said. Will that

succeed or not? So far, nobody knows. That is why, yes, it is not easy. But the problem is, I think for China, I think such a multilateralism is very appealing, attractive.

Ikenberry: Let me just clarify on the proposal for a regional security mechanism, which after all, the fifth working group of the Six-Party Talks is working on trying to design such an institution, that this would be a forum or a dialogue for exchanging information on military policy. It is certainly not an alliance, it might move towards cooperative security in that it might entail exchanging information, even getting involved in exercises of one kind or another or consultation in the very early phases of budget and procurement sorts of things. This is what we mean by cooperative security, enmeshing each other in affairs of defense in the early stages.

So when we say to have an institution, you have to have a purpose to the extent the purpose is to exchange information and create greater transparency and to reduce the security dilemma, you have answered the question, right, that the purpose is to create more transparency and reduce uncertainty that drives competition and arms racing. I just want to clarify whether I have characterized your position that this is a forum or a dialogue as opposed to something more ambitious.

Questioner: I would like to go back to this question about something before a mechanism gets started in the region and the idea of political stepping-stones, I think, was the term that you used. How do you see this recent China-Japan-South Korea summit, which is supposed to continue into the next year? That is something that is slightly different than the kind of multilateral regional lineup and funny hat arrangements we have seen for the last 20

years. Is there a chance for a real substantive dialogue, say, between - I think Japan and China had some discussion of security concerns about violations of maritime territory. It seems to me that that is the kind of political stepping stone you will really need to have in the region in order to get the two big actors anywhere on the same page before you get into any sort of mechanism. And the Six-Party might not be something we ought to be trying to build on but something that will go away once North Korea gives up whatever it has.

Ikenberry: Can I take another question? Maybe we will just kind of spread things around. Is this on a security mechanism?

Security Dilemma and Power Transition

Questioner: I have a question for Michael, following up on one of his comments. You said that in the U.S.-China relationship, we face a security dilemma problem now and a power transition problem in the future. Then, if we face that situation, what is the state strategy that best positions the United States? Because it would seem to me that if you are in a security dilemma and you take a cooperative approach to manage it, that disadvantages you for the long term in the obvious way, but if you take a competitive state strategy, you make rivalry a self-fulfilling prophecy. So I would be curious what you think the U.S. should do in that situation. Thanks.

Mastanduno: Okay. I think you hit it dead on. That is the problem for the United States and it is not surprising that the strategy that has emerged is what you might call a hedging strategy, which is, cooperate economically, and quietly put the foundation for possible containment with a set of bilateral alliances in place. It is not

surprising the United States is pursuing that.

I think though what you have to do in this situation is lean towards cooperation, and the reason I think you lean towards cooperation is, one, because practically speaking, you do not have a very clear containment option - you simply do not have it. You do not have it, one, because of the very positive economic interdependence that the United States and China have; and two, because you will pretty much be doing it alone. It is not clear that there is a coalition that is going to form around the containment strategy.

The other reason that cooperation makes sense is, for the United States, in strict realist terms, there is a lot of time. If you think about this from the United States' perspective, you are not looking at Britain and Germany in the late 19th century. You are looking at a much larger gap militarily between the two countries, so there is time to see if what I would call a great experiment actually works. For the United States, it is a liberal experiment. It is, can you actually use cooperation, particularly economic cooperation, to help transform a rising power into a potentially more accommodating one? Americans believe that kind of liberal logic and this is a great test of it. If it does not work, you probably have time to switch your strategy.

Ikenberry: There is a great argument about that liberal strategy in the next issue of *Foreign Affairs*, so I look forward to that. Professor Zhu, do you want to answer the other question?

China-Japan-South Korea Summit

Zhu: I think this question is very important, but I do not think such a trilateral summit

meeting will provide a stepping-stone because I think it is still a very primary device. But it is good to offer a trilateral basis to address in a collective way issues of common concern, for example, history problems and how to read or interpret very contentious historical explanations, not just of modern times but also of ancient times.

And they can probably explore what kind of cooperation could be pursued in order to increase trade and financial cooperation. But that is still too weakly functioning to have them look at security issues. Such a weakly functioning summit meeting will not, it seems to me, become a very big driving force.

Military Modernization

Questioner: Thank you, Professor Zhu, I appreciate your comments. One specific question I have, and this builds off of Dr. Ikenberry's thoughts. One of the central problems and why there is such fluid security dynamics in the region right now is because one of the fundamental things that has changed over the past decade or two is China's military modernization program. Some of the questions that regional neighbors, including the U.S. and Japan and others, keep asking is for what reason - and really wanting to engage China on a really substantive dialogue on this issue. And you mentioned specifically earlier about China's desire to be a great power, and this is a symbol of that. But there is a lot more substance to that question of the rationale and the direction and intent of a military modernization program.

So the question is, what type of environments would China feel most comfortable and confident in discussing this issue with those in the region that care about the issue? Is it bilaterally with major

powers, with smaller powers? Is it in some sort of multilateral mechanism with major powers, northeast Asia, something in the ASEAN framework? What sort of environment would China feel most confident, comfortable and candid in to discuss these sorts of things, if there is such an environment?

Zhu: I think that is quite a good question. First of all, yes, it seems to me that Beijing feels very comfortable with the current situation. Yes, of course, we see some rampant feelings from the PLA, but that is a very hawkish sector and reflects very conservative thinking. But I do not think the PLA will dominate China's view and will misguide my country in the future. So that is why I think Beijing would like to launch such multilateral talks and explore the possibilities.

But a reason behind my judgment is that, for example, if you look at China's Taiwan policy, it is getting more flexible. It also shows Beijing is looking at the whole problem over the long run - such a contest between the two sides. So we are very confident. Give us time, give China time to use that approach, and we will be less worried about future Taiwan independence scenarios.

The second indicator is, I think, the naval buildup. There has been a hot debate about China's aircraft carrier, but I can tell you, the PLA were truly trying to put aircraft carrier construction into effect much earlier. But I do not think that actual construction of the first aircraft carriers is on the way. The reason is simple. Yes, I think a nationalist would say, "Why not? We should have aircraft carriers." But what do the aircraft carriers mean for China? One aircraft carrier could secure our maritime domains and keep China's shipping lanes

safe? One aircraft carrier, in my view, is just a toy. It is just a means to improve some people's feelings - we also have an aircraft carrier. Look at India. India has two. They will quickly have a third one.

Beijing sometimes feels scared, but the reasons why they are scared are not external, they are internal. They still feel very comfortable about current regional and international surroundings. Look at China's top leader, Hu, his gesture in the last summit meeting with President Bush. They feel very, very comfortable with each other. They feel they have a personal relationship. That is an indication of China's comfortable feeling.

Economics and Adventurism

Questioner: I would like to hear Dr. Zhu's opinion about the point that was raised by Professor Mastanduno about the effect of an economic downturn, perhaps a depression, a long-term economic downturn, on China's foreign security policy, whether that will lead to some kind of adventurism or not.

Also, another question is when you talk about the regional security organizations, whether you look at NATO or any other organization, there are two kinds - there is usually an uncontested leader in a group. The EU is different. It is a gathering sort of like ASEAN, I suppose, of equal-level players. When you talk about East Asia, in addition to the question of whether to include the U.S. or not, there seems to be a question of who would be the leader or who would be seen as a leader. And if you take Japan and China, it is my sense that neither country can accept to be seen as second place. And then Professor Reiss talked about the difficulty in developing the Six-Party Talks into some kind of a regional

forum. It seems to me that until there is an uncontested leader that emerges in the region, there will not be such an organization.

Zhu: I will respond very quickly. First of all, I do not think China's economic downturn, or probably, coming recession will put China into big jeopardy. I have two reasons, simply speaking: One is I do not think such an economic crisis will decisively encourage any military adventurism, because U.S. military superiority is still overwhelming. So that is why I see no window of opportunity for us like that which existed in the last economic crisis, so Japan, Nazi Germany, they tried military adventurism and revised the status quo. But now, I think it is a unipolar system. So whatever the economic or financial situation is, the U.S. will beat you up and down. Americans will be strategically and decisively dominant in East Asia, so no. So no matter how China feels, I do not think the economic financial crisis will recreate or reenact policy choices along those previous lines for China.

The second thing is, unless China's leaders will try to commit suicide, then there is no way for them to try any diversionary approach and use the economic downturn and military adventurism to build up their popularity. I do not think the CPC is now in a very big crisis of legitimacy. Yes, we have a lot of domestic stress and complaints, but most of the Chinese recognize that besides the CPC, there is no feasible and reliable leading force in China. Such things will never change. So that is why I think there is a lot of speculation about China's ruling legitimacy. I have to say it has always been overstated.

Diversity of Views in China

Questioner: Dr. Zhu, earlier you spoke of polarization of Chinese views on the United States, and you also mentioned the United States has similar views here. A lot of times in this country, who has the upper hand is decided by an election. In China, what decides, who decides who has the upper hand, do the moderates have the upper hand, and what can be done to increase their chances? Thank you.

Zhu: I think it is a very complicated question. I think basically my answer is look at China. Yes, China is still an authoritarian country, but we are an open society. Even for ordinary people, it is very easy for them to get international access. So that is why now, an authoritarian China uses openness as some kind of very, it seems to me, effective cushion to neutralize complaints or criticisms.

So China's authoritarian system is now actually very skilled in such a balanced approach. That is why I do not think the government needs to blind some people and forcefully cover up their eyes or manipulate their minds to show how China's international response would remain on track.

The second point is that since China is an open society, we have a lot of internal debate. We have very hot debates in online blogging and things like that. So even while China's views about the U.S. are pluralizing, I think they are getting more stable and have been moving toward the center over the past few years. For example, according to a survey, the number of people who feel warm toward the U.S. have clearly increased. So, China-U.S. relations are a love-hate relationship. For example, university students are very patriotic and

nationalistic. However, I think nothing matters more for them than studying in the U.S. They also believe that the U.S. is a beacon for China's future. For example, democracy, the universality of human rights, those ideas are prevailing, but the problem is how to combine and institutionalize them in China. It is still controversial and problematic.

New Administration's First Step with China?

Ikenberry: I want to come back to the audience for more questions, but I wanted to ask Ambassador Reiss a question about building on the professor's argument that the Bush administration has done a good job in engaging China. And I wanted to, first of all, congratulate you for your part in all that, but I also wanted to ask you a question, what you would recommend, building on that, that the new American administration do as a first foot forward opening gesture or, I mean that more than a symbolic step about a visit, I mean in terms of what should be the first item on an agenda of making a connection with Beijing and starting to build a relationship. What should be the sequence and what should be the issue - security, energy, economics - that you think would be the best, most constructive step given American interests?

Reiss: Well, I think the first step is to recognize the centrality of this relationship for the United States. I cannot think of a more important bilateral relationship for the United States this century than the U.S.-China relationship. So that needs to be the predicate for the Obama administration going forward.

I think given what has happened in the financial markets over the last hundred days

or so that the natural starting point is going to be economics. And I'm not an economic expert, but I think that China's policies can certainly help ameliorate or exacerbate the financial pain, not only that we are going to be facing in the United States, but other countries around the world depending on whether they stimulate their own economy, whether they continue to purchase American treasury notes. There are a whole variety of things.

Beyond that, it seems to me - and again, it is not a revolutionary statement - you cannot solve the climate change issue without having a buy-in from China. And I think it is unrealistic to expect that an American official is going to talk to the Chinese on day one and at the end of that day, that there is going to be widespread agreement. But I think that you have to have a much deeper and broader and more honest conversation than we have had so far, and I imagine that there are actually going to be areas of overlap where we can help each other and perhaps collaborate on small steps before we get to the larger agenda.

The two traditional flash points in Asia are North Korea and Taiwan. Taiwan right now, I think, is going pretty well, and as Dr. Zhu said, President Bush recognized how important that was and took steps, many of them quietly but some publicly, to make sure that this issue did not ruin U.S.-China relations.

North Korea

On North Korea, I'm very pessimistic. I think the Six-Party Talks should continue. I think they will continue in an Obama administration, but what we are looking at here is at best, managing the problem, not resolving it. It is not clear to me, and it

pains me to say so given my own history with this issue, that this is a problem that is going to be solved short of North Korea's collapse. And it would be a wonderful thing were that day to come sometime soon, and there would be lots for the United States and China to talk about in terms of contingency planning, but the reality is that the United States is the only party to the Six-Party Talks that wants North Korea to collapse. None of the other parties want them to collapse today, tomorrow, next week, next month or next year. So we have to recognize that, again, there are different interests at stake here, but I still think that on both Taiwan and North Korea, there are some very practical things that we can do.

Zhu: I would like to respond very quickly. I agree with Ambassador Reiss' analysis, but I also disagree with some of his pessimism about the Six-Party Talks and the future of the North Korea issue. So far, I think the Six-Party Talks still have problems with efficacy and they show how hard it is to achieve a breakthrough very quickly. But neglect can also be a problem.

What have we achieved from the Six-Party Talks? First, we achieved this buildup of U.S.-China cooperation and trust over the Korean Peninsula, but I cannot guarantee the future. There are very unpredictable scenarios in North Korea, but it could be that we can get through them based on China-U.S. cooperation. For example, we have to prepare for future, post-Kim Jong-il turmoil in North Korea, but I do not think either of the countries would like to react separately. We see growing U.S.-China coordination. Whatever happens there, if we coordinate very effectively, then we can find a quick and effective way to overcome the problem. I'm very optimistic about that.

The second point is, we can work out a regional approach by pooling all the regional actors into this framework. So the Six-Party Talks also could offer a contingency planning device for all the regional key actors to discuss what approach we will take in response to a chaotic North Korea.

The third point is, now we have, it seems to me, a cohesive goal. It is not just the denuclearization of North Korea. We also need to restore peace and the stability to the Korean Peninsula. But it is not easy to achieve that - looking back, we once fought a war there. We once sacrificed hundreds of thousands in the Korean War. But now, we can totally just push aside some of the very contentious issues, of course it used to be a geographical concern, and together envision the future. I think it is an unbelievable achievement. I am a little bit optimistic.

ASEAN Plus Three and East Asia Summit

Questioner: I was curious, we have talked a lot about membership and we have talked a lot about objectives of these organizations, but we have not talked a whole lot about leadership, and that is surprising because leadership has been very important in the creation of some of these organizations. In the run-up to the East Asia Summit for instance, the East Asia Study Group talked about it. The East Asia Vision Group talked about a dual leadership structure where the Plus Three would chair a meeting one year and ASEAN would chair a meeting another year.

Then in Bali in 2004, when Malaysia proposed hosting the East Asia Summit the next year, China jumped in and said, "We will gladly host the second one," that was

shot down. And now it seems that America can live with an East Asia Summit that excludes the U.S. government, but it does not really want to live with an East Asia Summit that would have a Chinese leadership element.

Is China content to see a group of weak states, ASEAN, chair a leadership or lead an organization like that so long as it excludes the United States? Is that a tradeoff that the Chinese government is prepared to make? Perhaps this is not something that we can talk about too candidly about government policies and these sorts of things, but is that what you see the Chinese government doing, or is it not quite a tradeoff? Is it something else?

Zhu: A very good question. I do not think that Beijing just used the East Asia Summit meeting as some kind of occasion to advance Beijing's leadership. Actually, it seems to me that Beijing has been very passive in creating the East Asia Summit meeting because our preference is always ASEAN Plus Three. So ASEAN Plus Three, it is very symbolic of growing integration, not just economically but also politically.

But ASEAN Plus Six, yes, it is a very disputed design. The regional key actors have different reference points, but I can tell you it is not just China. It is also Japan's initiative that the U.S. is excluded. The problems with the East Asia Summit are very well substantiated. Is it also a very reliable tool to leverage the future power influence of China? I do not think so. So far, Beijing's political involvement in the EAS, it seems to me, has been very restrained. We would like to keep it open for future participation. We would like to keep it open for future restructuring. In Beijing's view, fruitful and substantive

regionalization will not be achieved without the strong participation of the United States. So that is why we pay more attention to APEC than EAS. That is the reality.

Questioner: I'd like to bring Southeast Asia into the conversation and with reference to the weak states, but these weak states are in the driver's seat, unfortunately. If we look at ASEAN Plus Three, ARF, EAS, it is ASEAN that is in the driver's seat. And so when you talk about the two major powers, U.S. and China, working together to build or to deepen regional cooperation, I have a couple of comments about this.

First of all, this would mean China drastically changing its rules of engagement with ASEAN. The reason why China has enhanced both its material and non-material interests in the region is because China goes along with the ASEAN way, and the ASEAN way is, in fact, based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. So you are talking about deepening an institution that is deliberately shallow and it is the way ASEAN wants to work with China. So this is one comment that I have for you.

And secondly, when we talk about the Monroe Doctrine, the Monroe Doctrine's importance to China is to look at the map of China with the boundary all the way down to the South China Sea; that is all about the Monroe Doctrine. So it is Southeast Asia that the U.S. and China is concerned with.

So my first question is, for the first time I'm hearing that China wants to institutionalize these organizations in a way, moving more to a NATO-like or EU-like - I do not know. I'm not quite sure what kind of format you are thinking of when you talk about working with the U.S. to institutionalize these organizations and to

remove perhaps or to modify ASEAN's role in these organizations.

Secondly, the reason why the U.S. is not in the EAS is not because China doesn't want it to be. The reason why the U.S. is not in the EAS is because of Burma. There is no political appetite. And there is no chance that they would consider signing the TAC with the problems in Burma. So if you are talking about stepping stones, that means if you want the U.S. to play a more meaningful role in these organizations, you would want to do something with Burma, what can China do to expedite, to facilitate America's accession to the TAC by dealing with Burma and removing the obstacle to America's participation in the EAS?

And finally, to Ambassador Reiss, what are the chances of the U.S. signing on to the TAC in the foreseeable future?

Reiss: Well, I think the reasons why the Bush administration did not sign on were similar, if not the same, to the reasons why the Clinton administration did not sign on and are going to be similar, if not the same, to the reasons why the Obama administration won't sign on. So I cannot see that happening anytime soon. It has to do with - and going back sometime now, when I actually looked at the document - a promise or a pledge not to interfere in the domestic affairs of countries in the region. And the Pentagon always, and the State Department sometimes, takes offense at that unilateral constraint on U.S. flexibility and therefore, we have decided to keep it at arm's length.

Zhu: We really welcome the U.S. to enhance its involvement - diplomatic and economic involvement in regional cooperation. FTAs are very important central pieces to bring about regionalization

in East Asia. The U.S. also has been very selective in FTA assignments and negotiations as well. So far, I do not think there is a very compatible mechanism to bring, for example, East Asian member countries' FTA movements and the American selective FTA approach. So then such an incompatibility, even economically, keeps East Asia and the U.S. on different ends.

Now, secondly, on modifying ASEAN's role. We welcome ASEAN to be a big actor, but the problem is, I think, ASEAN used to be the most successful sub-regional organization but now, it has gradually become not as solid as it used to be. For example, the Myanmar issue, I think ASEAN should show how committed it is to resolve the Myanmar issue. Why should China only be targeted? Do our actions really show such an indivisible friendship between Myanmar and Beijing? No, we are neighbors, the border with Myanmar is a very, very active, drug trafficking area, both historically and presently. So we have to look at the realities in Myanmar. Strong governance will always trump human rights concerns. Beijing's reaction is just pragmatic.

I do not think China is a very big geographical concern to the ASEAN countries. That is why I disagree with Ambassador Reiss, I think. Yes, if China would like to declare an Asian Monroe Doctrine, China should be qualified. China should be able to enforce it. China also should be strongly motivated. In the future, I see my country as a leader of Asia, but it isn't yet. Can China manipulate Asia? An Asian Monroe Doctrine, I don't think China will be able to do that.

Ikenberry: Well, on that note, I think we will conclude this seminar. Thank you all

for coming. And would you please join me
in thanking our panelists.