

India: Relations with the U.S. and Asia after the Bush Visit

by

Professor T.V. Paul

T.V. Paul: I would like to thank the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA for organizing this event.

I'm going to talk about the political and strategic dimensions of the India-U.S. nuclear accord. I think there's a lot of discussion going on about the technical merits of the accord. I have written quite a bit on the political and strategic dimensions of India's rise and the constraints and opportunities that India faces in the international system.

Accord's Mixed Implications for India's Integration into World Nuclear Order

The accord has mixed implications for the nonproliferation regime and India's integration into the world nuclear order. The critics' arguments are now getting a lot of press coverage. First of all, the argument is that the agreement undermines confidence in the nonproliferation regime. It enhances the political role of nuclear weapons, sets bad precedents, and increases India's weapons capability and numbers. It is argued that the accord will result in a three-way nuclear arms race in Asia. I'll focus on some of these issues before getting into larger implications for Asia and the world order.

I'm a supporter of the India-U.S. agreement. It is a smart thing to do. I don't think it will have a profound implication for the regime although it is going to create some discussion about equity,

fairness and the treatment of different nuclear states and non-nuclear states by the United States and other nuclear powers, and their commitment to non-proliferation principles. The question to be answered is whether India is so unique as to receive this kind of accommodation when the United States is opposing the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs.

There are tradeoffs and unintended consequences in major groundbreaking initiatives such as this. In the 1970s the United States opened up relations with China, which created considerable stress and strains in the Asian continent, and the Indian subcontinent especially, because it pushed India to the Soviet side. Of course it made the Cold War competition much harder for the Soviet Union, which would collapse later on.

Accord's Impact on Nonproliferation Regime Is Minimal

The accord's impact on the non-proliferation regime is minimal because countries are not going to go nuclear just because India has an agreement with the United States. For Iran, North Korea, and possibly Saudi Arabia, their logic of nuclear pursuit is situational and idiosyncratic. Regime security is a second factor, but regional competition is of course very important, as is their competition or adversarial relationship with the United States these days. This deal will have a marginal if any impact on

them. Brazil and South Africa gave up nuclear options when India was developing nuclear arms. Interestingly, Brazil and South Africa are talking about developing a Free Trade Agreement with India. They realize India's unique situation.

The NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) is not an apolitical instrument respecting sovereign equality of all states. There are side deals and payoffs that are very much part of the NPT structure. For example, there was the extended deterrence and civilian nuclear support offered to Western allies. This was very instrumental in Germany and Japan giving up their nuclear options and signing on to the NPT. In fact, during the 1970s in Japan it created a lot of debate. Japan was very reluctant to ratify the treaty until it was given a lot of assurances.

India was not willing to accept any such deals because of its peculiar structural position and nonaligned policy at that time. The Indian acquisition of nuclear weapons took about thirty years or so. India was a reluctant proliferator. It chose the path after struggling with the unequal nuclear order that was thrust upon it by the great power system. But the great powers could not allay India's security concerns originating from China's acquisition of nuclear weapons and, later on, China-Pakistan nuclear collaboration.

Interestingly, even China is not totally averse to this agreement, because China could engage in nuclear trade with India. China did sell quite a bit of low-enriched uranium to India to run the Tarapur reactor just a few years ago. China may be one of the market contenders to trade nuclear materials for the planned civilian reactors in India.

India Is a Status Quo Power

I would argue that India is essentially a status quo power, defensive and reactive, and at times critical of the international nuclear order, but it has restrained itself from spreading weapons and materials to other states. Its nuclear doctrine is based on no-first-use. It has kept the components of nuclear weapons separate, making sure the weapons are not fired in anger. This generates an issue which is rarely talked about, that is, the difference between status quo and revisionist states. The nonproliferation regime is agnostic on this political dimension. Why are countries worried about Iran and North Korea? Because they are middle-sized revisionist states that have a propensity to upset regional orders, and that have active conflicts with the great power system and with their neighbors.

Unfortunately Pakistan comes into this category of states and it is very difficult to compare India and Pakistan on this issue. Pakistan pursues territorial, ideological, and religious revisionism. Nuclear weapons and active territorial revisionism, whether it is for good or bad purposes, form a deadly combination. It allows a revisionist state much more freedom of action to conduct asymmetric warfare. Iran getting nuclear weapons is quite scary because Tehran has a revisionist stance. Unless Iran changes its domestic attitude toward the international order, Iranian nuclear weapons are bad for the region. That doesn't mean that one has to go and attack Iran militarily.

Another big problem for the nonproliferation regime is that it assumes power transitions in the international system will not take place; that the permanent five will remain eternally the great powers of

the system. The NPT has no room for the orderly exit of a declining power, such as Russia or even France or the United Kingdom, or entry of a rising power. The treaty makers appeared to be totally ignorant of what is known of the 500-year-old modern international system, i.e., the rise and fall of great powers. Of course in the past, great powers, especially the aspiring ones, opted for war in order to change the system in their favor. Today that is not a viable option.

Nuclear Weapons May Help to Maintain Peace

If a nuclear weapon has any value, which I don't think is all that great, it helps to make sure a rising power does not engage in intense warfare. It also restrains the declining powers. This is why although nuclear weapons are generally bad in many respects, they may play a bit of a role in maintaining great power peace. In that sense, as a rising power, it is probably not all that bad that India possesses a minimum weapons capability. This will help India to maintain peaceful relationships with China and the United States.

The NPT was adopted in 1968 after a lot of bargaining involving nuclear haves and have-nots. Those who are students of the NPT realize that at that time it was not perceived as a pure nonproliferation instrument. Interestingly enough, the nuclear haves have completely forgotten their part of the bargain. Now it has become a pure nonproliferation instrument.

With this accord with India, the U.S. is probably doing the right thing as it is part of its efforts to shape the emerging international order. The rise of new great

powers and their socialization into the order is a critical job of the reigning hegemon, if one considers that as the United States. India is perhaps the only candidate during the next ten to twenty years to knock at the doors of the great power club, but one that is not protected by any nuclear umbrella.

India does hold certain hard and soft power resources. Very few other states have anything similar—I'm talking about developing states—in terms of military, economic, knowledge, technological, and demographic based power resources. Soft power, including culture, a role in international organizations, and state capacity are of course a big part of India's power assets. It is clear, if the comparative statistics on India's economic growth are examined, there is something going on here and it's going to advance even further if conditions remain favorable.

India just happened to be a latecomer to the nuclear club. Latecomers have a tough time entering exclusive clubs. India missed the boat in 1945 when the UN system was established and again in 1967-68, when the NPT was struck. Had it conducted a nuclear test before January 1, 1967, it would have been considered as a nuclear weapons state.

My reading is that slowly but surely there is a discrepancy emerging in India's status. The discrepancy is between ascribed status and acquired capabilities. States in the past would tend to become very nationalistic and revisionist if they were not given the kind of role they were supposed to get. India's status discrepancy is created by historical accidents, great power politics, and India's own strategic miscalculations and foreign policy mistakes.

My argument is that it is better to manage India's rise peacefully and integrate it into the international order rather than keep it an outsider. Making India a stakeholder in the non-proliferation regime and supporting its enforcement for regional states may have value for global peace and order. Smaller states as well as China will eventually adjust to this change. India adjusted to China's rise and it is still adjusting. The regime is built around two types of sovereign equalities: one among nuclear haves and the other among nuclear have-nots. The treaty survived so far partly because no major power is outside the treaty to challenge it.

It should be noted that great powers are treated differently in almost every international forum. Look at the composition of the United Nations. In fact, in San Francisco there was considerable effort by the smaller states to have a say in the way the UN system was created, but they agreed to the veto system so that great powers would have a different role. In 1968, the NPT also contained the understanding that power matters in the way regimes are structured. The NPT is not a very flexible instrument. It assumes that no new power will emerge.

Status Quo Has Stifled India's Technological and Economic Growth

Critics of the U.S.-India agreement have no alternative to offer other than to maintain the status quo. The status quo has of course stifled India's technological and economic growth and is the number one issue that prevents a full rapprochement between the United States and India. The accord has certain dimensions which are going to create some temporary problems with respect to other partners, but it is not clear how

much it will impinge on the regime itself. The survival of the non-proliferation regime is good for India. While it should not attempt to destroy the regime, it has to be integrated in the regime in some fashion. I don't see another option to this agreement other than India giving up nuclear weapons, which it is not going to do anytime soon.

During the past thirty year period, the nuclear issue was a major cause for the estrangement between the U.S. and India. This accord will bring a dramatic change in the way relations are conducted between two democracies, and there will be spillover effects in various other dimensions, including economic, technological and scientific cooperation in new frontiers.

Accord's Implications for Asia

Regarding the implications for Asia, whenever there are two large states entering into strategic understandings, there are going to be repercussions. The immediate reaction of Pakistan and China would be to perhaps increase their nuclear/missile cooperation. But that already is in existence. It must be remembered that the U.S. is not giving India nuclear weapons or weapons technology, unlike China, which gave Pakistan weapons materials and weapons technology. In fact, China is also building a civilian reactor for Pakistan.

There is a logic in Sino-Pakistani cooperation because of the continued two-way balancing game they have been playing with India.

I don't believe that U.S.-India cooperation will result in major shifts in the regional balance of power in the short and

medium terms. India's political and economic relations with all Asian countries, including China, are increasing rapidly. Both India and the United States are not going to give up their links to China or other Asian countries. The agreement has little military substance to it. India already conducts joint military exercises with almost every major power.

The U.S. has a major nuclear relationship with China. It is very unlikely that they are going to break or slow down this relationship because of U.S.-India rapprochement. One other thing is that Western companies today are rushing to China to sell reactors. Nobody is talking about the fact that this will free up a lot of Chinese internal uranium and other materials for building nuclear weapons, which will be directed against the United States. Why is that topic not coming up in discussions?

Most of Asia Supports U.S. Presence in Region

Most of Asia likes the U.S. presence, even though they won't admit it. The U.S. is the pacifier of Asia. Of course, war in Iraq is another matter. Asian countries are upset about this conflict. Indians also like the United States to be in the region as a major power. India's disposition is one of status quo and defensive. Pacifying the waters of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific against challenges by both state and non-state actors is a public good that India and the United States can offer to each other and the rest of Asia.

I do see some level of soft balancing or pre-balancing and hedging taking place in Asia today. But it is in the interest of all states, especially the United States, India and Japan, that no active hard balancing

occurs, which means engaging in an intense arms race and alliance formation against one another. Because countries can divert a lot of their resources to a competition that really is not good, even for the United States. Even though the United States may win that kind of competition, it would accelerate the U.S.' decline.

An economically and militarily strong India and Japan and an economically diversified Southeast Asia are likely to be the biggest sources of regional stability in the emerging international order. Economic balancing of China is more important than military balancing. If China becomes the only dominant economic power of the region, other countries will have to go to it just like old times, i.e., the Middle Kingdom versus the vassal states. But China will mellow down if there are at least two major economic actors, Japan and India, and Southeast Asia, as the cushioning element to constrain its options. China has to be institutionally constrained as military containment is not an immediate option. It may happen but clearly, in the interim, balancing based on institutions and economic ideas are a much better way to go. That doesn't preclude engaging China. No state can afford to isolate China in Asia today. China is very important for the economic prosperity of the region and for the economic well-being of other major powers as well.

Bringing India as a stakeholder of the regime is in the longer term interest of the regime itself, and nonproliferation and security in the world. It does create short term legitimacy issues. There is a tradeoff between narrow, legalistic interpretations and the wider goal of integration of a rising power. The world has changed

from 1968, when the NPT was concluded. Without strategic adjustment, India's full economic and political integration into the world order is unlikely. In the end, peaceful integration of a rising power is a public good, important for order, and for every state in the international system. Thank you.

Kurt Campbell: I like very much what T.V. Paul had to say. The U.S.-India nuclear deal is a big part of what has transpired between the United States and India and indeed has implications for Asia as a whole.

I find myself on the same general side of the fence as T.V. on the issue of the nuclear deal. But I am one who would say that the United States faces a fundamental choice between a fundamentally flawed deal and no deal. There is a group in the United States that argues that if it can just go back and work a little bit harder, it can get more concessions in areas that are critical to sustaining certain aspects of the NPT, which is something that I'd like to see if possible. This misreads some fundamental aspects about a historical dialogue that has taken place between the United States and India.

Indian Criticism of Accord

It's also the case that the most interesting criticism about the deal has not come in the United States. Most of what has taken place in Congress and elsewhere is the usual expected kind of criticism of this deal, comments I would have anticipated. What's much more interesting is the criticism that has occurred in India. If the nature of a diplomatic engagement is looked at, and this process over the course of two or three years is followed, it is absolutely clear that India has

cleaned the U.S.' clocks. They did an extremely good job diplomatically and they got a very good deal.

But nevertheless, there is enormous criticism in India about certain aspects of this deal, because it compromised issues that Indians hold very dear: certain aspects of sovereignty and of non-interference in domestic issues of sensitivity such as nuclear matters. What's interesting, what Americans don't appreciate, is that there is deep resistance in India to any kind of engagement of this sort. The people who have pioneered this deal in India are really going out on a substantial limb.

It's very difficult to bring India forward on issues, even on a deal that favors India in a dramatic set of circumstances and one in which the United States has had to give in substantially. The people who are arguing honestly about the agreement will make the argument that this does involve some very severe short term risks and consequences. But it raises the prospect of longer term areas of cooperation between the United States and India.

This highlights a couple of things. India is an ancient culture, it has tremendous understanding and knowledge of diplomacy, but in the current environment it is not a fully mature diplomatic interlocutor. What is happening is a process of India awakening to its opportunities and its possibilities in terms of its role in the international system.

It was possible just a couple years ago to go to India at any time, get every single meeting desired, and have absolutely no one else there in the capital—maybe a visiting delegation from Nigeria or some other group that would come from the

non-aligned movement. That era is fundamentally over. There was a period in the 1990s where the great diplomatic Mecca of Asia was China, where every single leader and high level diplomatic group was trying to build strong ties with China, anticipating China's rise to great power status.

International Leaders Increasingly Visiting India

That process is now dramatically underway in India. So it's not just important to focus on the visit of President Bush to India but the substantial number of other visits that are taking place, substantial visits of Chinese leaders, Japanese leaders, and leaders from Southeast Asia. In fact, there is a form of competitive bilateralism, where there is a large number of countries that are all seeking to improve their relationship with India simultaneously, which has increased tremendous opportunities for India to take advantage of. I'm not sure they fully know how to take advantage of it in this context, given the drama of this onrush to Delhi. But it does create a very different diplomatic arena that the U.S. is facing in Asia as a whole.

One of the interesting talking points that the Bush administration makes about Iraq as well is, "It's too early, we'll look back on this in twenty years and we'll be able to make judgments." This completely misses the point. The reality is that the strategic consequences of Iraq, even for someone who supported the war, are unavoidable. There has been a tremendous detour of resources, of focus, and horrible consequences across the board. It's possible that the U.S. can escape Iraq

with some margin of a viable solution, but overall, at a strategic level, it has had enormous consequences for the U.S.

Dramatic Arrival of China

One of the most important consequences is of course not enough resources at the strategic level, both time and energy, to do some things in Asia at a time where the U.S. has seen the most dramatic arrival of a major power on the international scene in history. Some would criticize and say, "No, the most important arrival on the international scene of any country is the United States in the 1890s, into the first part of the 20th century." That process took arguably fifteen to twenty years.

But what has taken place in Asia literally over a period of about seven to ten years is the most dramatic arrival of a major power—China—on the international scene that has been seen in history. Many of these aspects can be exaggerated and of course there are enormous problems associated with China's domestic stability over the long term. But at almost every level, China's role in terms of diplomatic engagements, military forums, and boardrooms suggests that in all practical manifestations China today may very well be the great power of Asia, even in some circumstances outpacing the United States.

Because Asians are so polite and so careful around Americans, they don't like to actually tell Americans that their position in Asia has slipped somewhat and that they are challenged strategically by China, that in fact in many respects the U.S. position is a little bit more precarious than it was just a couple of years ago.

Bush Administration has Opened to India

One of the most interesting things that can be seen is the strategic hedge of Bush's opening to India. It has come slowly. It was to be the most important initial engagement of the Bush administration. Looking back, for the first time really in the history of a candidate, Governor Bush was talking about his desire to build a relationship with India in a way that was clearly influenced by some strategic advisors, but also animated by his own experience.

What intervenes is 9/11, creating a strategic necessity of reengaging with Pakistan in a way that caused enormous consternation among those in the Bush administration who were for India all the way, and also among Indians who believed that finally here was an administration that was prepared to engage it deeply and profoundly. After that initial eight or ten months of the administration, 9/11 detoured this dramatic process and caused great angst. It was as if after really sort of courting, sending roses and flowers and chocolates, suddenly the U.S. called and said, "Look, I think we need to see other countries for a little while. Including Pakistan."

Of course, of late there has been a return to the tilt. It can be seen in the body language and all the strategic approaches of the Bush administration, in that they've put their focus on India for the future. Despite the limitations in the agreement, it is a good bet. I'd try to see what can be done subsequently.

Challenges for India's Foreign Policy

The specific issue associated with this

forum is what else is going on in Asia as a whole. I would suggest that one of the difficulties for a country like India that has essentially a small strategic elite and is focused on a number of issues is that it is trying to do many things, all of which are difficult, simultaneously. It is trying to manage a difficult neighborhood with Pakistan, Afghanistan and others, which takes an enormous amount of time. These are almost all defensive challenges, to try to deal with instability and failing economies and failing societies.

Then, looking slightly farther afield, India is much more involved now in securing its energy security, dealing with countries like Iran—Iran could be a major problem in the future between the United States and India.

Thirdly, it is now involved in the process of trying to materialize the tremendous opportunities associated with a strategic opening of the United States. At the top level of both countries is a tremendous commitment to develop the next great strategic partnership of the United States in the international arena with India. Beneath the surface, bureaucratically in both India and the United States, are opposition and challenges and difficulty. But overall, the prospects are very sunny going forward. So that's the third thing that Indians have to focus on.

The fourth is China. Not the rest of Asia, but China, and that is a full time job both economically and diplomatically. Despite the fact that there are groups in India that are anxious about China, one of the things over the next decade that China will do is build a strong relationship with India. China has the tools, the capabilities and the incentives to strike the right kind of balance with India, to try to make sure

that their relationship is essentially free from overt, visible hostility. There will be a burgeoning of economic relationships and other kinds of issues that will be different than the kinds of dynamics that many in the United States believe will play out, in which tensions will inevitably rise between Delhi and Beijing. I would be one who would say don't count on that.

Then the fifth issue is what does India mean for the rest of Asia, what is happening outside of that? What is happening is not only this high-level diplomacy between the United States and India, and between the United States and Delhi, but a strategic rediscovery of India across Asia.

I used to always ask my interlocutors in Japan, in South Korea, in Singapore and elsewhere, "When was the last time you were in India?" It was not unusual to be in situations where you'd meet senior leaders who would say, "Actually, I've never been to India before," particularly in Japan, South Korea and even in Singapore. Absolutely no contact, very little interaction. That is all changing now. Golden Week is occurring in Japan, which in the past has always seen large numbers of Japanese diplomats and senior Diet members coming to the United States. Increasingly Diet members want to go somewhere else. Now their new destination of choice is India, because Japan wants to build a closer strategic partnership with India. There is a major move underway in Asia to try to work with India both diplomatically, strategically and, as T.V. said, commercially, which is at the top of the list.

India's Dramatic Arrival in Asia

India's dramatic arrival on the scene of Asian diplomacy has taken place. What was interesting throughout the 1990s was that most diplomacy in Asia was trans-Pacific. It included the United States in most of the important functions and institutions of the region as a whole. Increasingly since 2000, the new diplomatic forums are pan-Asian as opposed to trans-Pacific and they largely exclude the United States, or the United States chooses not to participate. The U.S. has a pretense that the forums are not important to it and that it is a big enough country and it is not concerned to let Asians meet on their own. But in reality, behind the scenes, the U.S. has more anxiety than it lets on.

What's interesting in almost all these diplomatic forums—the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit, etc.—is that India is playing a more dramatic role. I've been at a couple of these meetings and I'm surprised that you can often sense where the tension and interest is. The number two country that people are most interested in after China is India. There's a real desire to establish bilateral relationships and have meetings and move forward the process of strategic engagement. As important as the U.S.-India dimension is, what's going on in the rest of Asia vis-à-vis India is also significant.

In terms of the nonproliferation efforts of the U.S. administration, it is difficult to discern a pattern from the various four or five case studies that must be looked at when it comes to dealing with nuclear issues. There is obviously the Iraq case, which is the potential use and the actual use of military force in a preventive way

when there is a perceived threat of nuclear proliferation, and a mixture of that proliferation potentially with terrorist groups.

There is the Libya case, which has to be seen as a tremendous success of diplomacy, although the question is whether that success lays at the feet of Britain or the United States. It's an argument that tends towards the other side of the Atlantic rather than the U.S.

Third, there is the North Korea case, which is to do everything possible to avoid acknowledging that it does not have a policy and that its options—invade, negotiate—really are none of the above. The U.S. just chooses to pretend and hope that China will solve the problem perhaps downstream.

Then there's the issue of India, of really sort of breaking the rules of the so-called nuclear club because there is a view, which I would agree with, that they do not apply well to India. There is the view among some in the United States that somehow what the U.S. has done will trigger developments in China that are untoward, which always takes me back to a set of discussions that the U.S. had in the late 1990s, where it looked for a moment as if China's developments on short range ballistic missiles, which they were making at the time like sausages, were beginning to reverse. The idea that China's mindset on nuclear and missile matters will be dramatically influenced by developments in India is just not correct. In fact, most of what has been seen vis-à-vis Chinese strategic developments were set in place a decade ago and now this is being played out, and has largely been dominated by anticipation of developments in East Asia with the

United States and Japan as a whole.

The last issue is what will happen with Iran. Iran poses the largest problem not just for U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East but also, ironically or not ironically, to this fledgling partnership between the United States and India. India's relationship has developed probably much more dramatically with Iran than any other country in the world over the course of the last five to seven years. India has very carefully managed to not get offside with the United States recently on nuclear matters. But the question is whether they're going to be able to walk that fine line of supporting the United States and being prepared to take action if Iran continues on the nuclear path, and not violate or compromise very important relationships between India and Iran in the future.

I'm excited about this relationship between the United States and India. It comes at a difficult time for the Bush administration, in the sense that if it had come earlier it would have had more ability to maneuver Congress and critics. It's an administration that despite its love of external democracy has more comfort with a different style of governance inside the United States, particularly with Congress and with Republicans and Democrats. Negotiating aspects of this deal in a much more pluralist situation in the United States will be more difficult for the Bush administration. There will be grudging acknowledgement that this needs to go forward.

The only difficult aspect for India is that the only thing worse than being ignored strategically by the United States in many respects is to be embraced by the United States. Because with that comes criticism,

interference and discussion about the country in a way that has been largely and blessedly absent over the last twenty or thirty years. With the strategic embrace comes all aspects of the American character, which makes India and the United States probably the two most difficult countries in the world to deal with, with the United States probably being number one. Thank you.

Martin Walker: I find myself in broad agreement with both of the two previous speakers. The starting point for any discussion of the strategic implications of the U.S.-India nuclear accord is that remark by the former Indian defense minister, George Fernandes—possibly an incautious remark but one which has certainly reverberated ever since—that India’s nuclear arsenal was in fact aimed at deterring China. That remark put into the public forum something that had been widely suspected or feared or perhaps guessed at.

The fact is that there are two very fast rising, fast growing, huge, major powers in Asia, each of them over a billion in population, and each of them a country whose rise is going to have dramatic implications for the rest of the world and not just for Asia. Quite naturally, that suspicion that there could be some latent or putative hostility between India and China has had a fairly electrifying impact upon Asian security studies.

Having said that, the most important single distinction between China and India, apart from the fact that China began its economic takeoff some years ahead of India, is that China remains a command economy, it remains a Communist state—although perhaps increasingly nominally—whereas India is seen

as the world’s largest democracy. That’s one thing which India—and this is very important—has in common with the United States, that they’re both pluralist democracies. For that reason, it’s important to realize that in neither one of these states is it entirely guaranteed that the government or administration can deliver upon agreements that it negotiates.

Objection to Nuclear Accord in India and the U.S.

For example, the Bush administration has a good deal of work to do with the Congress to ensure that the accord with India actually goes ahead and gets supported by Congress, and that the change and modifications the treaty requires actually get passed. Equally, this was by no means a done deal in India. I was invited out to India about a week before President Bush arrived and was there for that week when it looked as though the entire nuclear accord was going to collapse.

I was met by a former senior security official who was an old friend of mine, and who said that the day I arrived Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had been called upon by leaders of the smaller parties in his coalition to be told they would vote against him in a vote of confidence in the Indian parliament if he signed the deal as it was being presented by the Americans at the time. Indeed, up to almost the last minute it was by no means a done deal that an agreement would be reached. Finally what happened was that President Bush himself, at the very last minute, overruled his advisors and said he felt that the grand strategy thinking behind this deal was for him much more important than the legalities

of the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Also the implication of that, because the strongest single argument on the side of the anti-proliferation lobby and those State Department diplomats who were arguing against the deal, or arguing to weaken or dilute the deal, was that if the U.S. drives a coach and horses through the Nonproliferation Treaty for India, how does it make a legal case to proceed against Iran and bring the rest of the world with it, and particularly to bring the United Nations Security Council with it? By embracing India on the nuclear deal, it might lose the almost equally important prize of successfully negotiating or imposing a non-nuclear situation upon Iran.

How did this come about? It's important to remember that there were two separate negotiations between India and the United States. The first one was in July of last year. What was agreed then between Prime Minister Singh and President Bush was a kind of statement of principles. The headline result of that was that the U.S. would welcome and support India's rise to great power status. As part of that strategy, the U.S. would support India coming out of its nuclear purdah and being an accepted nuclear power state.

Indian Red Lines on Nuclear Accord

The small print of that had yet to be negotiated, and the small print was very important. The Indians certainly thought they had a deal but in September, when they got the first American draft of what that small print would look like, New Delhi was appalled. They found that some of their red lines had simply been brushed aside in this American draft.

What was difficult was that at the time there seemed to be an initial acceptance both from Prime Minister Singh and from the very influential Congress Party leader, Sonia Gandhi, which I think happened because they weren't looking at the small print and also because they hadn't yet consulted India's nuclear scientists, who became an absolutely critical factor in the negotiations that followed. Having talked to some of those Indian nuclear scientists, I can tell you what their red lines were.

They were determined to oppose any nuclear accord that did not take care of three particular things. One was they wanted to safeguard India's fast-breeder reactors in the future, which are now developed and about to come on-stream. Those will be the reactors that produce the fissile material that India will require to widen and improve its nuclear arsenal. They were determined to keep that out of any agreement that would allow international inspections or International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervision over those reactors.

The second thing they wanted to safeguard was India's own thorium technology. India is very short of uranium. But India does have a lot of thorium, and what India has been developing on its own, although based upon an original idea from the U.S. Navy in the 1950s, is how to use thorium rather than uranium as the nuclear power material. Thorium has some advantages. In particular, it's probably more stable than uranium and it's certainly less dangerous than uranium. But it is very hard to ignite and it does produce a great deal of waste. However, the Indians reckon they have cracked most of these problems and certainly have already in operation a

reactor with a uranium core and thorium cladding. But the Indians were determined to keep this to themselves and not to have these reactors and this technology and these laboratories be inspected by the IAEA.

The third thing that the nuclear scientists and indeed some of the national security establishment were concerned about was that the American draft said that this agreement would be binding “in perpetuity.” The Indians felt that was a bridge or a timeframe that was too far and that nobody could really honestly commit future governments to abide by something forever.

India Seeks Status of Nuclear Power State

In a sense, what the Indians really wanted was the status of being a nuclear power state like the original five who had put together the NPT. This was the one thing upon which the Americans finally held out and said “No, what we will do is to give you a kind of halfway or shadowy twilight status between being a fully fledged nuclear power state,” as opposed to what the American draft of September had suggested, which was that India was rather like other putative eventual nuclear power states, or states seeking nuclear status.

The final accord that was reached just twenty-four hours before the first meeting between Bush and Singh in Delhi last month took place because Bush personally decided that it should. But I know that Nick Burns from the U.S. State Department was very much surprised when he got to Delhi, when he thought the deal was ninety percent concluded. When he arrived in Delhi he found that it

was actually on the rocks and could well not have taken place at all.

It was because of that political pressure upon Prime Minister Singh, some of his party saying that they would vote against him on a vote of no confidence, and also because Sonia Gandhi decided that she would support the nuclear scientists in their absolute insistence that these red lines be respected, that the Indians held very firm in the final phase of the negotiations and this deal was reached.

As far as the Bush administration is concerned, it seems to be that this deal was about choosing a grand strategy under which the United States seeks to embrace India as a major strategic partner and friend going into the future, and quite possibly some Americans seem to think of it as an American ally which will be rather like Britain in Europe, that it will be a guaranteed ally in the future and a guaranteed balancer against the rise of China. That is the American goal and, set against that, holding onto the flawed and fraying Nonproliferation Treaty didn't seem like such a great prize, despite the impact upon the Iranian negotiations.

India Does not Want to Become America's Client State in Asia

However, anybody who's been to India at all recently will agree that the Indians do not want to become the kind of guaranteed American ally that Britain has been in Europe. They do not want to become America's client state, to help encircle or restrain China. India certainly thinks that its own national security priorities could well include difficulty with Iran over energy in the future. The Indian government took a fairly controversial decision when it decided to vote

with the U.S. in the International Atomic Energy Agency late last year and it's uncertain it will be able to do so again.

India is also still seething with resentment at the way in which it felt it was being treated as though it were some kind of bad boy in the international nuclear order simply because it had embarked upon nuclear weapons tests in 1998. As the Indians point out, they have been exemplary in being against nuclear proliferation, which is not something that can be said of either Pakistan or China. The fact is, India has been a highly responsible nuclear power state for some time already.

India and China both Fear Encirclement

The other point I'd like to stress is that even though India doesn't want to become a guaranteed American ally against China, India does not want to have a walk-on part in a new Cold War in Asia. There are some very uncomfortable realities for both India and China. The reason why the whole of Asia is fundamentally quite unstable, as these great tectonic plates shift in China, in Japan, and in India, is that there are two rising powers in the form of India and China that are both rather alarmed and frightened powers, because they both fear they're being encircled.

If you're sitting in Beijing at the moment and you see American troops in Japan, South Korea, you see the Americans building up a base at Guam, you see the Americans becoming very friendly with the Vietnamese, America almost having base facilities in Singapore and America building up military bases in Central Asia—and now you see the Americans

wooing India—it must look from Beijing's point of view as though you're being encircled, even if at the moment this is kind of a soft encirclement or “encirclement light,” which takes place while the Americans are pursuing very close relationships economically and are trying to maintain good relations diplomatically.

But equally, if you're sitting in Delhi right now, you also feel encircled. If you look towards the West, towards Pakistan and the Western part of the Indian Ocean, you will look at the port/naval base of Gwadar in Pakistan, less than 100 miles from the Iranian border. It's being built by Chinese technicians, with Chinese financial support, and it's probably going to be one of the most advanced ports and naval bases in the Indian Ocean.

As far as the Indians are concerned, that looks worrying, particularly when they look to the West. If they look to the Bay of Bengal, they see that China is also building a rail link from Hunan Province down through Burma (Myanmar) that will reach to the Bay of Bengal, which is to say that India feels encircled by Chinese ports and Chinese naval bases.

From the Chinese point of view, it's entirely logical that they should have what a recent Pentagon report called “a string of pearls”—reliable bases through the Straits of Malacca and the Indian Ocean to secure their energy supplies. After all, the Chinese understand that their energy lifeline depends upon these two routes. One is the tanker route through the Indian Ocean, past India, to the Straits of Malacca. India, frankly, has got its thumb potentially on that Chinese jugular. The other route is the land pipeline the Chinese are building from

Central Asia. Land pipelines of that kind are highly vulnerable to cruise missile or aerial or special forces attacks. In other words, as far as the Chinese are concerned, it looks as though India has got the capability to squeeze China's energy lifeline at will.

These two rising powers each feels some nervousness at the potential of the other to do it damage, to encircle it, to constrain it. This double encirclement is what makes this entire part of the world so neurologically unstable at the moment.

Bush Administration's Sensitive Diplomatic Overtures to Asia

One of the most promising aspects of the Bush administration's foreign policy has been the way in which it seems to have realized that Asia is going to need considerable sensitivity in U.S. diplomacy in the future. It's going to be critical to U.S. security in the future. It's going to be critical to the U.S. economy in the future. And it's also going to mean that the U.S. is probably going to have to stay engaged in that part of the world. If that means that some modifications to the NPT must be made in order to embrace the rise of India, then it's clear that this administration has agreed with that, and in my view most responsible Democrats would probably go along with it.

The deal will go through the U.S. Congress without too much difficulty. There may be some attempts to try to modify it, to impose conditions. I doubt whether they will succeed because the U.S. Congress is itself seized of the importance of Asia for the U.S. future.

Many of us recall when we were studying the period about which A.J.P. Taylor

wrote a book called *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*, we probably realized that the struggle for mastery in Asia had begun. One of the basic documents for that book was of course Bismarck's memoirs. In his memoirs Bismarck observed that the most important fact—he was writing in 1893—to the 20th century would be that the British and Americans spoke the same language. A very prophetic remark, as it turned out. I suspect that the most important fact of the 21st century is going to be that Americans and Indians also speak the same language. Thank you.

Q&A

John Ikenberry: With that, we have set the stage for a lively discussion. Please raise your hand and direct your comment or question to the panel.

Questioner: I was wondering if the other speakers agree that the U.S. Congress will readily pass the deal. I've heard different views on this issue.

Campbell: The one thing that I was uncertain about from Martin's presentation was when he said that he thought most Democrats would support it. What's interesting about this agreement, even though there was an initial effort to portray this as a Republican-led initiative, what can be seen is that the administration has pivoted and has now for the first time really given a little bit of credit to the Clinton administration and suggested that the initial period of engagement was not exclusively a Republican initiative but actually started under President Clinton and has continued. That's not simply because President Bush the elder and President Clinton are going off everywhere together as best friends, but is more a recognition that the

government is going to need some Democrats to help them get this over the line, because some of the most fervent criticism of it has come not from Democrats but from Republicans, who are more concerned by it.

I would be one who would suggest that because there is so much public criticism right now, it actually suggests that it will go through. If there were less talk about it then there would be more anxiety that it would be held up and it would bog down.

The reality is that the number of laws that have to change associated with this is much more complicated than many people realize. There are probably five to seven major U.S. laws that will have to change. All it will take is a couple of Senators to delay this. This may not go as quickly as people anticipate. It could easily bog down in other issues. So unless the administration stays on this and really focuses on it through its various congressional manifestations, it could easily be one of those things that lingers into the next Congress and then gets basically detoured in an election period. But I think there will be a consensus of responsible centrist Republicans and Democrats who will reluctantly and belatedly support it.

Walker: Yes, I agree with that. The reason why I take this view that it will go through is that I've spoken off the record to some people in Congress who are opponents of the deal, and they have told me that they don't have the votes to stop it. However, Kurt is absolutely right about the complexities of this particular deal. There's a further twist to that as well, which is that the complexities are not just in the U.S., but this is also going to have to go through the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which means a

whole lot of other countries are going to have to get involved.

What is clear is that the British and the French and certainly the Russians are not going to put any difficulties in the way. Indeed, the French and British are actively working to ensure there's going to be no problem in the NSG. China has yet to make its position absolutely clear on this. But again, because I agree with Kurt that the last thing China wants is to have any kind of open hostility or clash with India, I don't think the Chinese will be keen to stop it either. Indeed, as Dr. Paul said earlier, the Chinese did supply enriched uranium in the 1990s to keep Indian reactors going. I am told that they have made it clear that they are prepared to do so in the future if India runs short again.

Ikenberry: Can I ask a question to probe what might be a little difference on the panel about the prospects for cooperation and conflict between India and China? Martin's comments were very evocative—two rising states, perhaps a struggle for mastery of Asia, certainly a struggle for the shaping of Asia. India clearly wants to be inside of some larger entity, boundaries unformed perhaps. But is this primarily a kind of complex economic/diplomatic struggle around energy and wooing Southeast Asia or is there something much more ominous about the simultaneous rise of these two great powers that may have competing, and zero-sum at some level, leadership ambitions and militaries and security pretensions that will lead to something much more traditional in terms of great power rivalry?

I took Martin to be a little bit more worried than Kurt and T.V. T.V. intro-

duced nuclear weapons as a kind of deterrent effect. I wanted to see whether anybody wanted to emphasize things one way or another.

Concerns of India-China Relationship

Walker: Let me just explain a little bit further what worries me. It's not simply this feeling that each side is nervous about the other. Both China and India have a nervousness of the other's potential to do damage. But there is a difficult history. After all, forty years ago there were outright hostilities, with the Chinese army sweeping down into Assam. Both sides have agreed to in effect put their border disputes into a kind of diplomatic deep freeze and not let it damage the rest of their relationship.

But there are other areas of real concern, one of which is Nepal, which is a deeply unstable place at the moment. Indian officials were appalled at the latest Chinese delivery of arms to Nepal. Nepal has been seen in the past as being very much part of India's sphere of influence. The coming of Chinese arms and indeed what India believes is the role of the ISI—the Pakistan military intelligence—in Nepal is one that is certainly worrying Indian security officials.

Equally, Indian security officials feel that Pakistan's hand can be detected in some of the Islamic extremism or Islamic radical groups that have emerged in Bangladesh recently. As far as Indian intelligence officials are concerned, the ISI is not just an agency which is an arm of Islamic radicalism, but also an agency which has long been in bed with China.

Indian officials certainly seem alarmed about China's capacity for doing India

damage in these very sensitive neighbor states. That is simply one part of a whole gradient of Indian concerns, which goes all the way to this putative one about possible rivalries for energy and so on.

Complex Relationship Emerging between India and China

Paul: It's emerging as a very complex relationship. In the economic area, India and China trade relations are rapidly expanding, while Indian companies are buying Chinese firms and mutual investment is taking off in a big way. China may become the dominant trading partner for India in the future. The past relationship has been characterized by China's engagement and containment of India at the same time. China was engaging India but at the same time cooperating with Pakistan as a way to contain India to some extent.

There are a lot of sympathizers within India for China. In India, China is looked upon both as a source of admiration and a potential rival. But that is not the case in China. I don't think Chinese schools teach Indian history, as Indians do with Chinese history. This creates a major problem with respect to the Chinese domestic constituency, which is needed for building a durable relationship with India.

One other thing I would argue is that unlike in the Pakistan/Kashmir context, there is a lack of an irredentist conflict between China and India. This means that if the Sino-Indian border problem can be solved, there is a lot more room for economic cooperation between these two countries.

There is a kind of realist/liberal world

emerging in Asia, where at one level there is this long term rivalry or military buildup going on but in the short or medium term, there is intense economic interaction which probably will cushion the potential for conflict for a period to come, unless there is a crisis like Taiwan or something like that which hijacks the whole thing. But it is important to look at the Asian relationships differently from the European great power system of the past.

Questioner: I understand the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation deal is aimed at boosting the U.S.-India relationship. Why did it have to be nuclear cooperation? There should be other alternatives. Why did it have to be nuclear, not economic or other areas, like anti-ballistic missile systems?

Campbell: If you looked at a wish list of what India wanted from the United States in 1965, it would look remarkably similar to the deal and the strategic partnership guidelines that were set forward on space cooperation and on nuclear cooperation. This was an inevitable set of issues that U.S. and Indian diplomats had to get through.

What's largely lost—if you look at and listen to how most Indians talk about this agreement, they talk about it largely in terms of the past and about perceived indignities and actual lack of respect or integration of Indian perspectives in American and global policymaking circles on a host of issues. If you listen to most Americans talking about the relationship, they're talking primarily about the future. Most American strategists have very little knowledge of the past. There's a small group of Americans that know a little bit about U.S.-Indian relations. It's just not part of their

strategic culture.

Basically the U.S had a choice. It could either negotiate these issues, which have been firm and clear on India's agenda for decades, and then move on to other issues, or it could have no agreement whatsoever.

Paul: In the past thirty years, India has been a major target of sanctions. Higher level technical cooperation between India and the United States was totally impossible in a whole host of areas because of sanctions. U.S. companies could not even go to India and talk about nuclear reactors, as they would do with China or Japan for that matter. The issue is not a pure nonproliferation issue. It's a whole gamut of strategic, economic and scientific collaboration that these two countries are trying to build that is affected by the nuclear sanctions. It's a mind-setting, and kind of revolutionizing event for Indians.

Walker: I would agree with that entirely. It had to be tackled simply because the degree of sanctions began back in the late 1970s, after the very first test. Then the further tests in the late 1990s made things even more difficult. But then, this is the way of American-Asian diplomacy. The Pakistanis also suffered from this kind of thing: there was the extraordinary case of the Pakistanis paying for F-16s which the Americans then simply refused to deliver. American diplomacy has been an equal-opportunity snubber to both India and Pakistan.

Questioner: Just a follow-up to Professor Ikenberry's question. Could you contextualize the Russian factor in relation to India and also Sino-Indian interaction?

Walker: They're vying for which one

buys more Russian arms.

Russia Anxious about U.S.-India Rapprochement

Campbell: I actually think that Russia has been slightly more anxious about U.S.-India rapprochement than China has been for a variety of reasons. Russia has had for decades a privileged, almost unique position, particularly with the Indian military. The Indian military is not particularly influential in Indian decision-making, unlike the U.S. military, which is so powerful bureaucratically in the United States.

The question is, if deep engagement goes forward between the United States and India, will that process change the nature of the Indian military's bureaucratic standing in its own government? It can easily be moved away or outmaneuvered in the current context but I'm not clear that will be the case in the future, particularly if there is a deeper defense engagement between the United States and India, for the simple fact that the U.S. military and the Pentagon are the most powerful actors in the U.S. government by an order of magnitude. That has a tendency to have a context for its interlocutors.

Russia is very worried that India is on the verge of making some enormous military purchases. The largest purchase of advanced fighter aircrafts of any country in the world is about to take place over the course of the next couple of years. If the military had their way, they would probably go with a French or potentially Russian alternative because of cost and knowing the history, even though many people recognize that there are many aspects of Russian military technology

that are inferior. However, the military will not make this decision alone. They'll have to consult with civilians. Many civilians believe that if they could finally find a way to work with the United States, that this would be an opportunity for a major set of relationships on the defense side with the United States. A foundation is necessary on which to build this relationship beyond simply outsourcing or other economic issues. Defense could be that base.

Even though there are many obstacles to that cooperation in the future, Russians glimpse that there is a potential that the big losers in strategic engagement with India, that the loser when the music stops playing and there are only two chairs left, could well be Moscow and not Beijing or Washington.

Paul: Indians are careful when it comes to these kinds of deals. Look at their recent civilian aircraft deals. They bought half from Boeing, half from Airbus. This can be done in the nuclear area also, if they are careful. The problem is going to be that the Russians won't have the monopoly they have now, which is about seventy percent of Indian military hardware. The United States will have a stake in it. Russia also has to be part of this process. Russia should not be isolated, because then Russia will have an incentive to form a coalition with China, which is not advisable.

Walker: Just to put a piece of hardware context into all of this. In the summer of last year there was a series of war games that took place between the U.S. Air Force and the Indian Air Force at Hyderabad. The U.S. sent over its F-15s with a team of very capable pilots and they went up against Indian pilots in Su-

30s, Russian-provided, Russian-built war-planes. The Indians won every single one of the mock dogfights that took place. This came as a great surprise, a great shock to the U.S. Air Force, which hadn't thought that the Su-30 was quite that good. They hadn't thought that the F-15 was quite that bad.

Equally, it's worth bearing in mind that the Indians are prepared to be extremely hardheaded when it comes to military purchases. The Pakistanis thought they had locked up the French nuclear technology with a deal under which they agreed to buy French submarines, and were then very surprised when the Indians went ahead and decided to buy French Scorpion submarines last year in a major purchase, which plays right into the alarms that people have about the future grand strategy of the Indian Ocean. These are perhaps the world's quietest new submarines. The submarines would certainly worry the U.S. Navy if it felt that they were going to be in hostile hands.

The question of quality over future defense purchases is of huge importance. But there are two other factors that I think play into Russia's role, one of which is Russia as an energy provider of the future. Certainly that's of huge importance to China, and that was what the talks that President Putin had in Beijing ten days ago seemed to hinge on.

Shifting Geopolitical Situation in Central Asia

The other factor is the very new and shifting geopolitical situation that has emerged in Central Asia with the coming of Islamic fundamentalism in parts of Central Asia, the establishment of U.S. bases in Central Asia in the wake of 9/11,

and the war on the Taliban. There is also the challenge from people power movements in some of the smaller Central Asian republics, that Russians claim is being fermented by NGOs who are working hand in glove with the CIA. It has deeply alarmed the Russians that neighboring countries are being infiltrated or threatened in this way by the United States.

But it's also India's neighborhood in a way. One of the jocular remarks made to me by one Indian official when I was in Delhi just about a month ago was, "Had I recently read Rudyard Kipling's *Kim*?" I said, "I had indeed re-read it not long ago." I said "It seemed to me that the great game in Central Asia is afoot once more." My friend agreed and said, "Remember how it turned out last time."

Questioner: Could I ask the panel to reflect a little further on the issue of great power relations in Asia? Because it seems from what they have said, and I agree with it, that each one of the great powers in Asia seems to need the United States indeed more than they need each other. Isn't the context of great power relations or the tectonic shifts that have been talked about really something that puts a terrific onus on the United States? Because if the United States is still the most important power in the region, if there is a situation in which the great powers are both cooperating and competing and maneuvering and so on, the United States necessarily is engaged. Doesn't this mean that really what should follow from the Bush administration's accord with India is a deeper reflection about American strategic concerns in Asia than is evident at the moment? At the moment the United States seems to react on a piecemeal basis. There's a

Korea problem, there's a Taiwan problem, there's an alliance with Japan.

Now there is an accord with India. But there doesn't seem to be any attempt to link the dots together and think ahead in terms of managing these very complicated and perhaps dangerous relationships.

Ikenberry: I have a question related to that. Kurt made very provocative remarks that perhaps the U.S. will look back at its adventure or misadventure in Iraq and try to go beyond that even to remake the Middle East and say that during its preoccupation with the Middle East and Iraq it will have missed the real story of the 21st century, which is the rise of Asia, which Kurt and Martin have both emphasized. In Kurt's case though, he said there's so much the U.S. could be doing if it were more attentive and were not bogged down and spending resources in this other part of the world.

So to layer onto that very important question, what should the United States be doing if it could wipe the slate clean in the Middle East and could have a kind of Asia-centered grand strategy? What would be that extra policy vision?

Campbell: First, I think your point is essentially about American policy. If you take it in pieces, most bilateral relations with the exception of Korea are fairly healthy in Asia. The U.S. manages a fairly decent number of meetings. The president and secretary of state will be there for four or five hours, quickly stopping through.

Intense Engagement Missing from American Diplomacy in Asia

The problem is that when this is looked at in its totality, it suggests that there is a substantial component of intense engagement that is missing. The story that Americans tell themselves is the famous story of—I've used this quote before—if you talk about Asia, you're never supposed to talk about Europe and use a European analogy, because Asians will immediately think you don't know what you're talking about, so you use European analogies to try to explain Asian complexities.

In fact, if one listens to neoconservatives, who are experts at changing the subject because they don't really like some things that are going on, one will hear many more people talking about China in Asia neoconservative circles more recently. Because they're still learning, they talk a lot about Bismarck and Weimar. There are very different realities that exist today in Asia. To a very large extent, until very recently that was the role that the United States played in Asia. The U.S. comforted itself with the fact that most countries believed that the United States was the ultimate guarantor of peace and stability throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

But my own sense is that that is beginning to change for a host of reasons. One is that T.V. has been using this phrase about how to think about states as either status quo or revisionist. The most interesting thing about the United States and China in particular in the Asia-Pacific region is that neither of them are

exclusively revisionist or status quo powers. The U.S. is in many respects a profoundly revisionist power in terms of potentially destabilizing the quality of certain interactions because of its promotion of democracy and a host of other things, such as seeking to destabilize North Korea.

U.S. Underestimates Rise of China's Soft Power

Because of all these things and because China in many areas is perceived as more a stabilizing power in many respects, the level of soft power that China has accumulated in Asia is easily underestimated by the United States. It believes that fundamentally everyone in Asia is profoundly discomforted by China's rise, where I think complex polling and commentaries over the last several years suggest that China has made far-reaching inroads into the hearts and minds of much of Asia.

The rise of Chinese soft power in Asia suggests that the U.S. comforts itself with a conventional set of beliefs that are eroding over time, largely because it is preoccupied away from Asia. Secondly, because the U.S. has not really handled diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula very effectively. Thirdly, because there is a sense that the United States, that its ticket into the big game, is a very robust set of military commitments in Asia as a whole. Some of those involve military forces. Some of this involves a very careful set of strategic agreements with Japan.

What is happening is that U.S. forces are being drawn away into the Middle East, although it is not talked about very much. Its military alliance with Korea is shifting dramatically, to the extent that I'm not

sure how stable it will be in the future; and it is dramatically trying to change the nature of its military alliance in Japan in ways that it is very comfortable with but which much of Asia is not. So for all those reasons, there are greater questions about the United States.

If you ask me what the U.S. should do differently, if you look at what China has done in terms of the extent and duration and intensity of its diplomacy in Asia, it is impossible for the United States to match that. But the U.S. could do a much better job than it's done: longer trips, more engagement, more military focus. Also, more strategic preoccupation in the sense of, when was the last time there was a major U.S. presidential speech on what its goals and objectives are in Asia?

The reality is that there has not been one during the Bush administration. There have been important speeches by Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Zoellick, but their comments on China do not seem to be coming from the same administration, so different are their points of departure overall. A greater sense of consensus in the administration about what it wants to accomplish in Asia would be a useful contribution to peace and stability in the future.

I don't want to overestimate these problems. But if anything, the U.S. tries to comfort itself with a conventional wisdom that is rapidly melting like the glaciers in the South Pole.

Paul: I would just add economics to the mix of things to talk about. In another ten or fifteen years, China's trade with most of Asia will be much higher than that of the U.S. with these countries. What does that mean? Militarily, the U.S. probably

will remain superior to China for another two or three decades in the Pacific. A discrepancy is emerging between economic power and military power.

There is another problem, which is the not so fungible dimension of military power. Military power is not always translatable to other forms of influence, especially among highly interdependent economies. This is going to constrain America. Therefore, the U.S. has to put a lot more into the economic relationship between the other major actors in the Asia-Pacific: Japan, Korea, India, Australia, Southeast Asia, and so on.

One other point is that the U.S. needs to get into regional institutions actively. The U.S. does not seem so interested in institutions. China is very much interested in institutions as a way to increase its power. This is where China is using liberal institutions to achieve realist objectives, which the U.S. is ignoring. Institutions are also a way to achieve soft power.

Walker: Traditionally the U.S. role in Asia has been to be pretty much the offshore balancer. Its troops have either been in offshore islands like Japan or in peninsulas like South Korea. That's changed. U.S. bases are now in the very heart of Central Asia. The fish or the whale is trying to operate on land, which is often a very uncomfortable place to be. That is part of the way in which the U.S. since 9/11 has ceased to be a status quo power. The U.S. is trying to change things. That's nerve-wracking for others.

Questioner: I was wondering if one of you could comment on what role, if any, the various Indian lobbies in Washington have played in the execution of this deal

and the influence they might wield over the future of this relationship.

Walker: To my surprise, there isn't that much of an Indian lobby in Washington. The Indian Embassy is very professional, and they work hard at all of the right places, like Congress and so on. But there is nothing like China's Group of 100, for example, in which China can very quickly organize a lobby. There is still the formation or coming together of the kind of lobbying power or community power that Indian Americans could at some point mobilize. The Indians really ought to be thinking hard about how to organize this non-diplomatic interest group, this lobbying force in Washington. One of the curious features about the Indian American Caucus in Congress, is how big it is. It's so big, there are so many people involved, that it's got no real focus and no real drive to it.

I'm really quite staggered that the Indians have been able to do so well with so little, with such an embryonic lobbying campaigning power in Washington itself. Which just goes to show how much persuasion they have on their side to get both the Clinton administration and the Bush administration to make improved relations with India such a key feature of U.S. foreign policy.

Paul: I would think it's going to increase as the clout of the Indian American community reaches high in the pockets of American high-technology, for instance. In the Silicon Valley, forty percent of companies are owned by people of Indian origin. The problem is that the Indian expatriates are not too much into politics.

But that's going to change over a period of time. I don't think the Bush admin-

istration would go for this deal just because an Indian lobby is out there. They're thinking in bigger terms.

Ikenberry: I think we have entertained all the issues, so thank you very much. Please join with me in thanking the panel.

[End]

About the Panelists

Main Speaker **T.V. Paul** is James McGill Professor of International Relations, McGill University. He has also been a Visiting Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, a Senior Visiting Associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, and Director of the McGill-University of Montreal Joint Research Group in International Security. He received a Faculty of Arts 2005 Award for High Distinction in Research from McGill University, and a Peace Scholar Award from the U.S. Institute of Peace in 1989. Professor Paul received a B.A. from Kerala University, India, an M.Phil. from Jawaharlal Nehru University, India, and an M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of California, Los Angeles. His recent publications include *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry* (Editor, 2005), *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century* (Co-editor and contributor, 2004), and *India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status* (Co-author, 2003).

Discussants **Kurt Campbell** is Senior Vice-President and Director of the International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Before joining CSIS, he worked at the Department of Defense as Deputy Assistant Director of Defense, at the White House as Deputy Special Counselor to the President for NAFTA and as a member of the National Security Council staff. Dr. Campbell received a B.A. from the University of California, San Diego, a Ph.D. in international relations from Oxford University and a certificate in music and political philosophy from the University of Erevan in Soviet Armenia. Dr. Campbell's publications include *The Power of Balance: 100 Strategic Insights into the Pacific Century* (2003) and *To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign against Terrorism* (Co-author, 2001).

Martin Walker is Editor of United Press International. He is also a Senior Scholar of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and a Senior Fellow of the World Policy Institute, New School University. Previously he was a journalist with Britain's *The Guardian* newspaper, where he held the positions of Moscow Bureau Chief, United States Bureau Chief, European Editor, and Assistant Editor. He was awarded Britain's Reporter of the Year Award in 1987. He also is a regular broadcaster on the BBC, National Public Radio, and CNN. Mr. Walker received a B.A. from Oxford University. His most recent publications include *The Iraq War* (2004), *Europe in the 21st Century: Portraits of an Emerging Superpower* (Co-author, 2001), and *America Reborn: A 20th Century Narrative* (2000).

Moderator **G. John Ikenberry** is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. Previously he taught at Georgetown University. He also has been a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. Professor Ikenberry is the author of numerous publications, including *State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy* (2002), *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (2000), and *Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government* (1988).