

## Whither East Asia?

by

**Dr. Anwar Ibrahim**

**Anwar Ibrahim:** Thank you and congratulations to the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA for taking this initiative. It's very timely indeed. Yeats used to describe, and I used to cite this repeatedly: "Asia," according to Yeats, "is vague immensities." The East Asia Summit is of course a misnomer because Australia and New Zealand are participants, and now India. Notwithstanding these concerns, it is a reality. The East Asia Summit will take place in Kuala Lumpur on Wednesday and to me it is certainly a milestone in the development and history of the region. But some reservations and criticisms have been expressed about whether or not this is another serious effort towards regional cooperation. Still, I think ASEAN leaders on the whole must be commended for taking the initiative to hold this summit. This is unique in the sense that regional groupings in the past have always been or tend to be initiated by the bigger powers, or the superpowers within the regional context. In the East Asia Summit the initiative was taken, rightly so, by the smaller medium states in ASEAN, as they tried to embrace their larger, influential neighbors, namely China and Japan, and now India.

I have been known to be quite critical of many of ASEAN's positions and policies, especially its failure to address some serious trade and economic issues. ASEAN is a success story when it comes to trying to forge a better understanding and rapport between states, but it has not been successful in terms of trade and

economic areas or fields. ASEAN can be rather irrelevant and obsolete because of this failure and this outmoded policy of non-intervention in domestic affairs of member countries. The resolution of East Timor had virtually nothing to do with ASEAN. Aceh: very little to do with ASEAN. Myanmar: a classic failure of ASEAN. And of course now the brewing problems in Southern Thailand. Even the haze or environmental issues have not been addressed by ASEAN. But notwithstanding, it is a success story only in so far as forging an understanding to be able to withstand much of the continuing conflict and pressure over territories, boundaries, etc.

### **ASEAN Reasserting Relevance in Asia**

By organizing this summit ASEAN is reasserting its relevance and importance as a key player in the larger region. Whether it is intentional or not, ASEAN will provide a formal structure and prepare the ground for the emergence of a formal community. This East Asia Summit will have a lot of potential if leaders have the courage and imagination to address some real substantive issues such as economic cooperation, security considerations of the nuclear proliferation of North Korea, tensions between states, particularly Korea, Japan and China, and also some contentious border disputes. This has to be addressed because I don't think the manner in which ASEAN has been engaging and forging that sort of collaboration has been too resounding a success.

The balance provided by ASEAN in engaging China, Japan and now India, is pivotal in insuring understanding and security in the region. This is crucial because it is the desire of ASEAN and the people of that region, from the inception of ASEAN as a reality, not to be dominated by any single country. They have been successful in their attempt to avoid being dominated by any superpower, but the strength of ASEAN is its capacity to engage effectively with China, while at the same time continuing to engage on extremely cordial and friendly terms with the United States of America. The nature of the region, its internal logic, and larger political and cultural elements, will assert and influence the future development of the Summit.

I've stated that the term East Asia is a misnomer, and I'm a firm believer that the Summit must begin to think in terms of a truly Asian, original entity. It is not realistic to marginalize parts of the region as espoused by some individuals who want to see the Summit as a beginning of a powerful and swaggering block. This is certainly not something desirable because the Summit cannot begin with the notion of confrontation with others as had earlier been attempted and espoused by the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC). To create a grouping based on prejudice and the notion of rivalry is to start something with ill will. It will not be productive and will not benefit the region. It is against the spirit of the founding philosophy of ASEAN. ASEAN was formed during the Cold War to avoid being drawn into block rivalry and superpower competition. Therefore it makes a lot of sense to include Australia and New Zealand, which may have strong historical and

cultural ties with the West. What matters in this case is what a nation—what both these countries—see as their relevance to the region and how these countries consciously relate themselves and their interests to their neighbors and the future. Asia therefore should be inclusive of Australia and New Zealand, who must be treated as friends and partners because they have legitimate stakes in Asia, as is seen from the importance of India. Ignoring India means ignoring an emerging economic giant and its contributions to the civilization of Southeast Asia. India is also the world's largest democracy.

### **East Asia Summit Will Establish Formal Structures and Practices**

While the Summit comes from the conscious minds of the ASEAN leaders to assert their relevance under the new economic and political environment, the event's main function will be to establish formal structures and practices to what has been developed as spontaneous order. The powerful development of spontaneous order and the movement of ideas and social forces are equally important to the future development of the region. The issue of governance, democracy and infrastructure for the voices of the people to be heard, are issues that must be addressed. I admire the courage of the new Indonesian president SBY—Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono—being the leader of the largest Muslim democracy, in openly expressing the need to deliberate on these issues of governance, democracy, etc. I believe that the leaders of the Summit will also address mainly the issues of economic and trade interests: how to promote intra-regional trade and investment? How to ensure that this is effective in enlarging its boundaries and

working and collaborating with the European Union and North America?

I alluded earlier to the importance of Southeast Asia and the Southeast Asian nations in ASEAN in forging this new collaboration in the region. It is therefore critical that it embraces the major countries in the region. These countries in Southeast Asia were once called the Indianized states of Southeast Asia, or the Greater Part of India. Then they were part of an Indochina region synthesizing the cultural influences of India and China. Then there was the maritime Southeast Asia and some parts of Vietnam and Cambodia which were Islamized for 700 years. Then there were European influences that began with the arrival of Vasco da Gama in Calicut in the 15<sup>th</sup> century, the Portuguese conquest of Malacca and Goa, later followed by the colonization of the British, Dutch, Spanish and French, and of course the American role in the Pacific War. So through hundreds of years of evolution, synthesis and assimilation Southeast Asia has integrated within itself all the elements of great global civilizations and traditions.

### **Cohesive Asia Would Benefit International Community**

The participation of the other sub-regions within this Summit and the evolution of East Asia into a truly working, cohesive Asia would immensely benefit the international community. Of course geography and contemporary economic realities are crucial foundations of the East Asian community but history and culture must also be important determinants. The region has a history of killing fields, oppression, major bigotry, slavery and dictatorship,

and it has to have the strength, the resolve, the courage and the imagination to understand that this is not purely from the forces of imperialism outside Asia. The pressures are both from within and from outside the region. It is therefore essential that countries within the region accept this as the need to forge a better understanding of cohesiveness as historical inevitability.

The Summit is the germination of a seed that was sowed almost a millennium ago. In a single act the Summit should evolve into a regional summit that embraces the region's past and future. To quote T. S. Elliot, one of his most profound lines in the *Four Quartets*, "Time present and time past/ Are both perhaps present in time future /And time future contained in time past." Certainly the leaders of the Summit will talk about the future but the future cannot be envisioned by forgetting the past. There were great ideals from the past just as there were incorruptible rulers and ministers of the past, and the region has to grapple with the problems of the present. There were great argumentative traditions of the past. To paraphrase Amartya Sen on scholars criticizing leaders in scholarly debates, Asia must therefore build its future based not merely on the past, but its positive past.

I will conclude on a positive note, seeing the Summit as a major international development which is unfortunately not well addressed in the United States—probably because the United States is not a member of Asia. But a very major point is being missed here, because evolving this East Asia Summit into an effective, cohesive Asian block would strengthen the resolve of these countries to secure peace and security, deal with

terrorism within their midst, and ensure that the larger democracies take a stronger position. The rhetoric of democracy from India to Indonesia would resonate well within the region together with Japan and South Korea, at the same time looking positively at the phenomenal economic growth propelled by China and India as something that would benefit the region. It would also encourage major engagement by these countries to try and resolve nuclear proliferation, particularly that involving North Korea, and also the issue of contentious debate about the historical past vis-à-vis China and Japan and some disputes over the boundaries affecting the region.

I believe this forum will allow the regional perspective to be seen, and highlight the region's capacity to deal with problems as regional problems, not necessarily dictated to by others. Unlike the initial East Asia Economic Caucus, which was cast in opposition to other regions, in particular North America and the United States of America, this grouping can be seen as complementary to the workings of the international community and instrumental in forging a grand alliance within Asia, Europe and North America, to be joined later by Africa and Latin America. Thank you.

**Karl Jackson:** Thank you very much for those remarks. I agree that this is a great undertaking that is taking place on Wednesday. The question, however, is in what sense is it "whither" the East Asia Summit? With an "h" or without? That is, will there be an expanding East Asia Summit or will there be something like the withering that has appeared to affect APEC as an organization as well as other earlier attempts to create an organization that could expand across the

whole of Asia and the Pacific. I agree with Anwar, this is certainly a new opportunity for ASEAN. ASEAN has been in the doldrums for the last several years. Anwar listed a litany of instances such as Timor, Myanmar, the haze, etc. where ASEAN was not capable or willing to make decisions that would have a decisive impact on the most important challenges facing, not only ASEAN, but other Asian countries.

### **East Asia Summit Should Be Inclusive and Non-confrontational**

There are several questions raised by the East Asia Summit. Anwar referred to one of them. Will it be a confrontational group, as perhaps envisioned in the original East Asia Economic Caucus operation? I would refer you to the web to see the latest remarks by the former prime minister of Malaysia on what he finds to be wrong with the East Asia Summit. He says neither New Zealand nor Australia are Asian countries and that he also has some doubts about Japan, because of the fact that he sees Japan as just an offshoot of the United States. It is critically important to ignore this kind of talk and to make the East Asia Summit as inclusive as possible and as non-confrontational as possible. I noticed that the Malaysian foreign minister the other day suggested that the United States should join the East Asia Summit and obviously there's a great deal of back and forth yet to be done between Washington and Asia on this. But it was at least the appropriate thing to say, to diffuse the confrontational aspects of it.

Another thing that Anwar alluded to was that if the East Asia Summit is a new attempt to create Asian-wide regional integration, to be at all meaningful, it

must have its own organizational structure. I do not think this can be done with ASEAN minimalism. The other side of the coin is that the reason for the existence of the minimalist structure of ASEAN is because the ASEAN countries often could not agree on the fundamental underlying problems. So one of the things to be looked for with regard to the meetings on Wednesday is what if any structure will come out of this new organization? If one is to believe the press there has been considerable pulling and hauling already on this: India talking about this becoming the next EU, on the one hand, and others describing it in much more limited terms. Then there is the question of where does ASEAN fit in all of this? ASEAN has served as the convener, but does ASEAN then wither away in this new organizational structure? This is a critical decision that will have to be faced. Apparently China is interested in having ASEAN Plus Three serve as the convener, in effect, of all of these meetings, but where does that leave Australia, New Zealand and India?

All of this illustrates just what a remarkable undertaking this is. This is an attempt to pull together one regional organization from a very large number of quite disparate countries. I agree with Anwar that only ASEAN could conceivably have made this attempt but I would also underline how difficult it is going to be to make this a reality in terms of concrete accomplishments because it should not devolve into the same kind of relative talk shop that APEC has become. Thank you.

### **ASEAN's Non-Presence in Last Decade**

**John Malott:** I was very impressed with Anwar's very forthright and honest description of ASEAN's shortcomings over the last several years. For those of us who spent a lot of time in Asia we were always told about the ASEAN way, or "doing things the Asian way," but I think Anwar has given a very frank description of ASEAN's non-presence over the last decade. It became basically a golf club where they would talk about the wonderful things that they were doing, but they were not really involved in most of the issues. I think more of them are starting to come to understand that it's been eight years since they proclaimed that admitting Burma/Myanmar to ASEAN would somehow bring changes there. That has not occurred so ASEAN is on the spot this time. A lot of people are going to be watching the East Asia Summit to see whether or not this truly can become a turning point in the history of Asia and of ASEAN and whether in the future some changes will be made.

Anwar mentioned the haze. I was there when the haze struck in 1997; it was so bad you couldn't even see across the street. But then the rains eventually came and the haze went away and nothing was done for another seven years until it returned and people started to choke once again. The time has come for ASEAN in effect to put up or shut up. There are certain nice things about the way business in Asia is done, but when people have to suffer for economic reasons, when people suffer political repression, or when they suffer human rights abuses because of the non-action

of the people of the region, that is a source of concern to everyone.

I also appreciate the fact that Anwar said that the East Asia Summit should not be confrontational, that it should not be seen as some sort of rivalry, meaning with the United States, and that there is nothing wrong with having Australia and New Zealand there. The last time I looked they were certainly in Asia, at least on the map, and they have a very clear economic linkage. Prime Minister Mahathir blasted Australia's presence, but Australia educates more Malaysian children than any other country in the world. They also send more tourists to Malaysia than I think any other country other than Singapore, so I don't quite know what's wrong with having one of its major economic and people-to-people partners at a summit. I think that's good.

#### **U.S. Will Be Elephant in the Room at East Asia Summit**

It does not bother me that the United States is not there. The U.S. would be the elephant in the room. For those of you who are familiar with a book that was recently written by a fellow named George Lakoff about politics and framing issues called *Don't Think of an Elephant*, what he does in his college class is he walks into the room and he says "We're going to have a discussion, but for the next hour, whatever we do I don't want anyone to talk about the elephant in the room." And of course everyone for the next hour thinks only about the elephant in the room. So America is going to be the elephant in the room in Kuala Lumpur and everyone's going to be sitting there saying, "Isn't it wonderful to be here without the Americans? I wonder what the Ameri-

cans are thinking about us." Or, "If we decide to do A or B or C or X or Y or Z, I wonder what the American reaction is going to be." So the U.S. is in the room. Whether it's in the room or not, it is there. They're thinking about the U.S.

As I used to say in Malaysia whenever the subject of the East Asia Economic Caucus would come up, "Go ahead and meet, but since you're excluding your number one or number two trade and investment partner, meaning the United States, how effective will any decisions or arrangements that you make be if you're cutting out your number one or number two trade and investment partner?" I think it's wonderful that they're meeting. We don't have to be there. No one is excluding us. No one told Condie Rice that she didn't have to go to the ASEAN meeting last summer, no one has told the administration that they have to spend all their time thinking about terrorism and Iraq—there are 180 other countries in the world; no one is keeping the U.S. out of Asia. That's the U.S.' business whether or not it wishes to engage.

The last point I'd like to make is on the economic issues which are very important. It's nice to talk about an economic community. As Karl said quite accurately, APEC has become a talk shop with very little to show for it. In Asia there are countries of very different economic development levels, countries with entirely different economic systems from pure free market capitalism in Singapore and Hong Kong to communist regimes in Laos and Vietnam. What fascinates me is how the countries of Asia and especially ASEAN can continue to erect barriers against each other. They might think that they had those

barriers in years past to keep out the multinationals or to keep out Western companies, but increasingly these barriers are preventing local Asian companies, especially in Southeast Asia, banks and service firms, from developing the scales of economy that would allow them to function in a larger market. They say ASEAN is 450 or 500 million people, but it doesn't operate as a market of 450 or 500 million people because the countries erect these barriers against each other in terms of investment. I hope that they will also start to think about the economic aspects of building an East Asian community as well as the political and security dimensions. Thank you.

**G. John Ikenberry:** Thank you very much. We're going to open it up to Q & A.

### Q&A

**Questioner:** I used to be in the U.S. Foreign Service. My question is for Mr. Anwar. I have not come away from these various remarks with any clear view as to what the substance or structure of the new ASEAN or new East Asian community might be like. Are we talking about a common currency like the Euro? That seems to me on the face of it to be preposterous in any kind of reasonable timeframe. Are we talking about a common foreign policy? Are we talking about common political institutions? What are the objectives, the aims of this community aside from meeting?

**Anwar:** Criticism against this Summit is that it has not been able to reach a consensus on what it intends to do, or it does not have a clear position on economics, trade or even security, all in terms of the future composition of that entity. That

has been legitimate criticism but I suggest not to expect too much out of this initial meeting in Kuala Lumpur. Still, it is a major departure from the rhetoric of the past. In the past the focus was not ASEAN but rather the EAEC which was generally perceived as more confrontational or combative against the United States, or the countries that are again seen to be friendly towards the United States, like Australia and New Zealand. This is clearly a departure and I welcome this because a regional grouping like Asia should not be confrontational. That is a plus.

Secondly, the fact that these countries will have to sit down to engage with each other based on the initiative taken by smaller countries in ASEAN is another step towards regional integration. I am still pushing for them to encompass a greater Asia which must include India as an effective member, together with Australia and New Zealand, which has already been accepted. I think they will have to deal—that's why I suggest that they should not repeat polite, political and diplomatic discussions, as John has said about the golf meetings, the niceties, the pious platitudes. They must be prepared to go beyond this.

### Inclusion of all Asian Countries in Summit Essential

An example is the enthusiasm of India in terms of economics and trade and the president of Indonesia talking about issues of governance and democracy which is a very important and key feature. A consensus in the region is not being dictated but at least countries must be able to use the forum to articulate their concerns, to engage regionally and also to work on a strategy on trade/

economic relations, the issue of security and terrorism and engaging with the European Union and North America, particularly the United States. That is a more positive outlook and a major change in mindset from the old Cold War mindset that Karl was alluding to, for example Mahathir's thinking.

Somebody's standing up to the United States, but in a purely irresponsible and hypocritical way. Similarly such racist remarks against Australia and New Zealand have been said. Why? How can the participation of Asian countries who happen to be white be excluded? And also, even a slightly critical view of Japan. Japan has been a close ally of the United States since after the Second World War. Even at the time when Mahathir was calling for a "Look East Policy." Look at Japan for all its *bushido* and *kokoro* and whatever spirit that it has in terms of struggle and ethics, etc. I think it's a flawed thesis to be saying that because Japan is seen to be slightly close to America, ASEAN will only work with China.

I am a firm believer that ASEAN must engage with China. China is viewed by ASEAN very positively as a great, friendly country with enormous potential, but ASEAN must see the necessity of, for example, a smaller regional grouping of ASEAN to engage with China, Japan, India, the United States and Europe. After all, this is what countries need to do for their own survival, for security interests and also for economic interests. John has alluded to the fact that America remains a major trading partner in the region, not only for ASEAN but also for China, and now more so with India. I would certainly see the future, the relevance and success of this Summit in

that context, not in what they are able to decide for now. That is why I said they must have the courage and imagination to look forward. Otherwise it's another talk shop which we great political leaders are very keen to do. Beautiful speeches that ultimately nobody understands.

**Questioner:** Anwar mentioned the importance of engaging in the issues of governance and democracy and it strikes me that we are now adding to the East Asia Summit, New Zealand, Australia, India, all of them functioning democracies. This has changed the balance, or the constellation of influence and power within the East Asia Summit to China's disadvantage, a non-democracy. Is there the potential here, particularly with the addition of India, of the beginning of a very profound and enduring tension and dialogue on the issue of democracy within Asia which will begin to pit the democracies against the non-democracies? Is this going to become a really salient issue that will start to affect the political constellation in Asia?

**Anwar:** I like that. The ASEAN way, the Asian way, the past way. Nothing was discussed. The Asian way of the present and the way it must develop in the future is that it needs to bring up this subject and the concerns of the present and the future. It is not a matter only of talking about democracy and governance but it is an essential feature of human development. It is a consensus of the international community. ASEAN should not have this complex of feeling it is the dictates of Washington, never mind what President Bush says. But I think the issue of freedom or governance has been the main agenda of all the freedom fighters in the region and I would use

that instead of being seen as an agenda of the West or America.

How do you then engage the issue of governance, the issue of transparency, the issue of a free media? I think this needs to be articulated. I'm not suggesting that India should dictate its political system to China but India could say, "We have a vibrant democracy and we're moving ahead." There is also Indonesia, which had a peaceful transition from three decades of dictatorial rule to a peaceful democracy, a vibrant, working democracy although they will have to grapple with the issues of economic development and corruption. It takes the courage and imagination of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to talk about the issue of governance when it is generally clearly perceived that Indonesia has to grapple with the major problem of corruption. There is not a method dictating a position. A concern within the region is people-to-people contacts and also the involvement of civil society groups. ASEAN should not necessarily come up with this big idea of an Asian currency: "The Europeans have their own currency. Why must we be dictated by the Euro and the American dollar? We must have our own currency." It sounds nice but nothing happens afterwards. ASEAN will have to be realistic.

Similar with the issue of democracy and governance, ASEAN will have to be realistic. What I am calling for is that it must be on their agenda. At least it must be articulated by its leaders. They may have their own interpretations, their own terms, but issues of killing fields have happened, major human rights abuses, the detention of Aung San Suu Kyi, the problems that may erupt because of the

present conflict in Southern Thailand. These must be politely and diplomatically addressed in the region.

### **New Organization Must Tackle Difficult Issues**

**Jackson:** I remember being on a panel on the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of ASEAN and the name of the panel was probably "Wither ASEAN?" and it has withered since 1997. That is to say it reached its high water mark as a result of the settlement of the Cambodia issue. Subsequently, it faced a whole series of issues, as Anwar enumerated, where it was incapable of acting. I agree wholeheartedly with Anwar that if this organization—the East Asia Summit—adopts the ASEAN modus operandi of colorful shirts and funny songs and no issues, it will disappear. It will be short lived. Instead, the new organization, if it is to have a prospect of enduring, must actually tackle difficult issues, not just economic issues but also the political and human rights issues that Anwar mentioned. I think the world has evolved so much since ASEAN's mode of operation was put in place in the late 1960s. India's very presence next to China at the Summit sends a message about the importance of democracy and the fact that democracy can function and endure even if you do have a population in excess of a billion people.

**Ikenberry:** John's point is an interesting idea, that it may be actually healthy and functional for the United States not to be inside of this Summit, if in fact the Summit moves in the direction of bringing governance, democracy and human rights into the mix in a way that ASEAN never has. It probably is good that the United States isn't involved

because that takes away at least some of the baggage that some might refer to in resisting that agenda. There may be some interesting pathways.

**Malott:** I think one of the issues for the Asian countries, for the East Asian Community, is to what extent they're going to deal with the issue of democracy and human rights, and not just in the easy places like Myanmar—Myanmar is a no-brainer, it's a give-away, it's a low-cost, "Oh, let's all complain about the situation and then we feel good and go home"—but will they talk about the fact that in certain countries when Anwar goes home he gets zero inches in the press because he's basically shut out from the television and the newspapers in Malaysia? Are they going to talk about human rights problems in other countries in the region or not? Are they going to raise these things or is that off-limits for all of them?

### **Many Asians Surrendered Political Rights in Exchange for Economic Growth**

One of the concerns I've had, I think there's what I've called a Faustian bargain in Asia. It's a different kind of bargain, but it's basically too many people have been willing to surrender their political rights in exchange for economic growth and development. It's not just that the governments do this. There are many, many people as Anwar knows from his own personal experience and as I watched from afar for the six years that he was in jail—the silence of many people in Malaysia. Not because they weren't concerned but because maybe they were afraid to speak out or maybe it was part of the idea that "Well,

life is good for me, the economy is doing well, all that really matters is whether or not I have money, whether or not my children can go to school." It's not a dictatorship in the sense that someone can tell you where to live, whether you can get a job or whether you can go to university. Are they going to move beyond that in Asia? How can more and more Asians be convinced that there is a linkage between their economic freedom and their political freedom and that this bargain that they've made over the years is not really healthy for their future?

**Questioner:** I was formerly at Georgetown when we organized that "Wither ASEAN?" meeting and you're absolutely right, Karl, I'm very hard-pressed to see anything happening since; there has been a lot of retreat. You forget the utility of these meetings where they sing songs and have funny shirts. You may recall when Suharto hosted the APEC meeting. While he was still ruling Indonesia he was in charge of selecting the batik pattern that each visiting head of state would be wearing and I think the prime minister of Malaysia showed up and to everyone's great mirth was wearing easily the most ridiculous batik pattern in the group picture. So God works in mysterious ways.

The question about India and China is absolutely central because it's not that nothing is just happening on the human rights side within the ASEAN membership. It's not that even the leverage that a kind of lowest common denominator grouping should give the ASEAN countries is being well employed. It isn't in most people's opinion. But that these enormous powerhouses rising to your west and to your north are so huge that why don't you just in a sense stop

pretending that there's ever going to be a common marketplace which is going to work with economies of scales? Why don't you just cut the best deal you can with either of the emerging powers in energy and industry and everything else? I say the question intending it to be provocative but I honestly don't think that there's any more juice in ASEAN. It's very hard to see it really developing now with its cascading problems and the continuing aversion that you described of any real stomach for the serious job of creating a marketplace.

### **ASEAN Must Engage with China and India**

**Anwar:** I agree with your concerns regarding ASEAN. I think that is why my position is that ASEAN must utilize or engage and make use of the enormous phenomenon and changes taking place in China and India. Not just to give an excuse. A standard excuse given by ASEAN leaders including business leaders on why investments are not coming, why it is less competitive than other countries is because of the attractiveness of India and China. This is absurd. ASEAN must be able to be more competitive, to see what a comparative advantage of nations is. It exists. There has to be more efficient rule of law, and there are areas that ASEAN can have an edge in, such as better training. ASEAN should take a position and not have an attitude of not sending students to the best universities in America because the U.S. takes a position that is not conducive to ASEAN's thinking. And ASEAN cannot allow its universities to degenerate into third class universities led by mediocre professors. If this happens, ASEAN will be heading for trouble.

Having said that, I still feel that ASEAN would have some relevance if it takes up this issue not from a protectionist angle that is working now to its disadvantage, but to have a positive force because there are still 300 or 400 million people as an entity that would benefit, but if they are all competing in the same industry they will lose out. Notwithstanding whether an ASEAN region exists or not, you are right, absolutely so, that ASEAN will have to continue to engage effectively with Japan, with China, with India, and with the United States and Europe. That is why I disagree very strongly with my old adversary, in saying sometimes, "Well we will only work with Japan. Period." "And now we'll only work with China. Period."

Or then ASEAN will be at loggerheads or continue to be confrontational and combative, imagining itself as a great superpower in the region. It's that kind of country that loses and for no reason. Again, it does not mean that ASEAN should be timid or submissive. ASEAN can have strong views vis-à-vis Afghanistan or Iran or Iraq. It can express these views, but it can express them as friends who differ on some major policy issues rather than treating countries, particularly the powerful ones, like enemies, and being dragged and swallowed by other superpowers within the region. So you're absolutely right on that.

**Questioner:** In the mind of the key Chinese policy makers, what do you think they would consider a successful outcome of this meeting to be? What are they really looking for on the economic side and the political side? How would they like to see this organization evolve?

## **China Wants to Be Perceived as a Major Partner in the Region**

**Anwar:** I'm not a Chinese expert. But I would feel strongly that the Chinese want to be perceived as a major partner in the region, not as an adversary. They are taking pains to respond to some of the concerns expressed here in Washington about the growing threat of China both in terms of security or economics. The Chinese have become more actively engaged with Southeast Asian countries both in terms of economics and joint security concerns, or even the issues of terrorism and patrolling the seas. A lot of issues have been raised although again, nothing substantive came out of it. But China has become more active in its engagement and friendlier. What it expects from such a regional grouping is to be able to explain its position: "We are your neighbor, we will engage with you, we will trade with you, we will listen to you, we will give assistance to the poorer countries, but we are not, as is said by many of our adversaries, going to be a hostile player in the region." And that will be their attempt.

ASEAN's strength with these countries is to continue to force them in that direction because it is not always consistent when it comes to a foreign policy position vis-à-vis China. The best option is to make sure that as neighbors ASEAN continues to engage China. But of course they're quite distracted too with the issue of North Korea and their relations with South Korea and Japan from time to time, which have to be dealt with. But it depends because the issues have never been addressed on an agenda. ASEAN tends to be exceedingly polite and always talks about Asian values—do whatever you want and don't

discuss it—and this is dangerous. That's why I alluded to the argumentative tradition because Professor Amartya Sen's economics have been most effective in debunking the entire notion of Asian values, which undoubtedly have been defending or rationalizing the excesses of authoritarian leaders in the region.

**Questioner:** This morning the prime minister of India made a public suggestion for an Asian free trade zone. What do you think is likely to be the reaction of the Summit to this suggestion?

**Anwar:** I think Manmohan Singh is probably trying to just explore and initiate discussion. It is certainly very premature to think that the countries are ready. These countries are still a decade behind in the sense that their thinking is a bit too protectionist. When countries in the region feel too protectionist then the whole idea of a free trade zone is going to be very difficult. ASEAN, for example, has been dealing with this ASEAN free trade area for years and has not been able to resolve that. The statement by Manmohan makes a lot of sense but it is an indirect way of getting India on board in the region and it is a smart way, assuming that India is part of this new cohesive Asian force. Not East Asia because certainly India's not part of East Asia, that's why I think this new alliance or grouping called Asia should be forged, and then the next Summit should be an Asian Summit.

**Malott:** I agree with Anwar's last point. When Prime Minister Singh said that, I think it's most beneficial for the Indians themselves to listen to it because they are probably the furthest behind in terms

of the liberalization of trade and foreign investment in the country. It's a country of tremendous potential but it's been held back because of these lingering restrictions that it's had for a long time.

The other nice thing again about India is that for a long time Mother India—it's like the U.S., it's a continental economy basically and its focus is primarily on itself, and then there's the rest of the world out there—I think it's really good for India and for the rest of Asia that India is now looking East and is starting to pay attention to its economic relations with Southeast Asia and with China. That's a good thing for the future.

**Jackson:** The really important thing about India and India's involvement in the East Asia Summit is that it can serve as the balancer or as a second balancer at least between Japan on the one hand and China on the other. Having India in the room is an extremely important thing for decreasing the kind of hostility that has grown to be as salient as it has over the last eight to ten years between China and Japan. Obviously ASEAN also can serve as a second balancing influence and I think that the really important thing for the ASEAN leaders to do is to make sure that they do not fall into the role of simply following China's lead. If they do, they will make themselves powerless and irrelevant.

**Questioner:** I wanted to follow up on the ambassador's comments about the elephant in the room and I'm curious about what the panel thinks of the perceptions of the U.S. in ASEAN and particularly U.S. foreign policy. There's been a widely held view that China's doing better in the region than the U.S.

### **Distance Increasing between the U.S. and Asia**

**Malott:** I think that this was a trend that was happening anyhow. In other words the fact that Asia was doing so well economically, that economic growth had spread beyond Japan, America's ally, that today there is more trade within Asia than there is between Asia and the United States; regardless of what has happened in American foreign policy over the last three years or so, this trend was happening. Asia had a growing sense of being Asian through this pan-Asian consciousness. To some extent there was a distancing from the United States. The end of the Cold War also brought a certain distancing. But the U.S. certainly has made things worse with the foreign policy that it has pursued over the last few years, particularly since the invasion of Iraq. That's had a very clear impact in every country in Asia, except in Japan, when you look at the public opinion polls.

American visa policies have not helped. When you look at the number of Asian students who used to come to the United States—Silicon Valley could not operate without a lot of them—the numbers are way down for most of the countries in Asia and I don't think that's good for the U.S. or for the future either. As I said before, no one kept Condie Rice from going to ASEAN, no one keeps our senior officials from making the trip across the Pacific, no one kept Don Rumsfeld from skipping a trip to Tokyo. A lot of it really is in U.S. hands as well. The kinds of policies that the U.S. pursues are going to be very important in terms of Asian attitudes towards the United States.

**Anwar:** From the perspective of ASEAN countries it is to their advantage to continue to forge stronger relations, not only within the region but bilaterally with China, Japan, India and the United States. This has always been the central, pivotal position of ASEAN from the beginning. At the time of the Cold War the survival of ASEAN rested on its ability to continue to engage with the region. But of course that's looking from the position of ASEAN. Looking from the foreign policy stance of the United States, then, of course there are some problematic areas or issues, how the policies in so far as the War on Terror in Iraq have caused so much consternation and anger among the masses in Asia.

I was looking at the figures of a survey in Malaysia and they were scary. Malaysia in general is rather moderate and friendly to the United States. But there is a real concern. It's not an issue of the fault of ASEAN countries but of how these issues are being addressed, how they are being tackled. That is why I made a remark recently at the University of Maryland that if I'm asked to write a paper on how to lose the War on Terror I would say, then follow the prescriptions of Washington. Then you're bound to lose because you don't engage, you are casting the net a bit too far, whereas you can convince the masses that it is a real issue that must be addressed and you must really honor the entire indigenous movement against terrorism and terrorists themselves. I think it is both.

It is in the interest of ASEAN, notwithstanding the anger against some aspects of U.S. foreign policy, that it continue to engage strongly with the United States and to never be deluded by some of

these demagogues who feel that the issue of freedom and democracy is something alien to ASEAN culture and tradition. It's very much part of Muslim culture and the Asian tradition to continue to have discourse on freedom and human rights.

**Questioner:** I wanted to follow up on what Dr. Jackson mentioned about Japan-China relations. No doubt one of the factors that is going to have an impact on the East Asia Summit and the meetings in Kuala Lumpur is the rift between Japan and China. Dr. Jackson mentioned a very interesting point, that the ASEAN countries should not exclusively side with China. There are two issues that separate politically Japan and China. One is history and another is geopolitics, for instance the excavation of oil in the East China Sea. Does ASEAN have any position on these issues? Will this kind of subject be discussed frankly in the East Asia Summit?

It's been little reported in the English press, but at the Summit meeting held under the auspices of APEC a few weeks ago, Prime Minister Koizumi made a ten minute statement in the plenary on his views on Japan-China relations, to the extent that I know there was no discussion. Nobody, including the Chinese chairman or the prime minister of South Korea, reacted to this. If this kind of discussion takes place now at the East Asia Summit, this is interesting. I will be really thrilled to know what ASEAN's reaction will be but at the same time this is such a delicate subject, particularly history. It's already complicated enough between Japan and China but would ASEAN leaders have something to say in this kind of forum?

## Potential Role of ASEAN on China-Japan Differences

**Jackson:** It would be a very interesting thing if the East Asia Summit could play a de facto rather than a de jure mediating role to calm down the differences between China and Japan because the two countries have been moving in the wrong direction for the last eight to ten years. Certainly I could conceive of an East Asia Summit discussing the problems of delineating what belongs to whom in terms of disputed areas, whether in the East China Sea or disputes further north. Conceivably some kind of a code of conduct operation could be created for all of them and ASEAN could play a role in that, because that would give both China and Japan a way to step down from their maximalist positions on each side and come to some kind of a compromise.

With regard to ASEAN being able to play a role between China and Japan on historical matters, I believe this will continue to be problematic, given the rather terrible record of the Japanese army in Southeast Asia during the Second World War. The war has been over for a long time but I feel that the biggest millstone hanging around the neck of Japanese foreign policy continues to be Japan's inability to put that part of the past behind it, simply by laying out whatever the facts are.

**Malott:** If I've got all of my press articles correct, my understanding is that both the Chinese government and the South Korean government have said that they will not have any bilateral meetings with the Japanese during the time of the East Asia Summit. Neither at the prime minister level nor at the foreign minister

level. So when the two largest countries, in terms of economics, in the region are refusing to speak to each other at the Summit I don't think it portends very well for the Summit. I also don't think it portends very well for Asian affairs in general. It's very much in the interests of everyone including the United States, not just the Asian countries, that these levels of tension between Japan, China and South Korea be reduced dramatically.

**Anwar:** Certainly ASEAN shouldn't be presumptuous of its role. It should engage, it should encourage discussion. This is too contentious and problematic and more of a bilateral misunderstanding or issue between Japan and China.

The more contentious issue is of course the Spratly Islands, which are claimed by a number of countries from Vietnam to China to the Philippines. The position taken by ASEAN has always been it cannot be unilateral, it must be resolved through participation and the consensus of all parties. But here the issue is seen and perceived by ASEAN mainly as a bilateral issue between China and Japan. The only positive note is that their presence in that sort of a grouping, a more regular and effective grouping, would decrease tension between these countries, because it is to ASEAN's advantage that these countries can resolve this amicably. This is not easy because of the long, historical enmity there, both political and cultural.

**Ikenberry:** Just to follow up on that, do you share the view that we heard, that the historical issue in Southeast Asia is still very much a hindrance to Japan's role in the region. Is that resolving itself

in any way? How would you see the evolution of that problem?

### **ASEAN-Japan Relations Positive**

**Anwar:** If it is ASEAN I don't share that view because ASEAN generally accepted Japan as a friend and major investor long before other countries were interested. Japan was a major player at a time when the ASEAN countries were just moving along in the 70s and the 80s. There was no tension between them except for riots in Jakarta and some other cities when Prime Minister Tanaka visited in 1974. But since then the Japanese have done a lot, really, in terms of systems, joint programs, cultural, educational, etc. That has helped ease a lot of tension. In all my years, other than the late 80s and 90s, it was a non-issue in ASEAN. But it is very alive in, for example China, Korea and the neighboring countries of Japan. For ASEAN, one statement of apology by Japan saying, "We're sorry about what happened in the past," was sufficient, that was it. I remember being involved in the debate within ASEAN on the issue of Japan and they said, "What about the Dutch in Indonesia, the British in Malaysia, the French in Vietnam, the Americans? It's gone, we've got to move on." That is the thinking of ASEAN.

There's also the issue in Japanese politics because it keeps on apologizing annually but it never seems to be that consistent and serious about the apology. So it goes on. I fail to understand why Japan needs to apologize every year when all these other countries and big colonial powers don't need to apologize every year. I said this actually in the 1990s in Tokyo and they were quite

surprised because I said, "Come out with a very serious, sincere, strong apology and be done with it and move on." But of course there is the problem with the shrine, which doesn't affect the ASEAN countries so much. Still it is very hypersensitive.

**Questioner:** To follow up on the ambassador's elephant theory, no matter about the big elephant there are two small elephants inside the region, Japan and China. Before and during this Summit news stories were overshadowed by whether Premier Wen Jiabao would meet Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi. Today they met but casually for ten minutes and the Chinese foreign ministry said they are not actually meeting, only something like they are chatting about what kind of shellfish they like. I want to focus more on these two small elephants. Is there any mechanism inside ASEAN that will try to dominate this issue at the Summit? Vice versa, do either the Chinese or the Japanese side want to dominate this Summit?

**Anwar:** I gather because I'm in Washington now, that the Chinese and the Japanese have been very cautious in presenting their position and views, even in the meeting of officials prior to the Summit. The foreign ministry is very cautious not to be seen or perceived as too hard or too dictating about the agenda. This is remarkable. It's a welcome sign because, contrary to the view or the fear of China in the region, and sometimes rightly so, because it's not true that history should be written, that China has never been a threat to the region; no, I don't share that view, but in this present context in the Summit the Chinese have taken a lot of pains in trying to appease and assure other nations that, "We are

just a partner in this exercise.” And the Japanese too. Right through the foreign ministers and coming up to the Summit tomorrow or the day after.

**Questioner:** To push this issue a little further, I’m wondering whether the conflict between Japan and China, which doesn’t seem like it’s going to be resolved any time soon, maybe not in our lifetime, in a real or fundamental way—they may work together but reluctantly—I’m just wondering how that conflict will affect the future of Asia as a community. Are people concerned or do they think that maybe it’s irrelevant, a small issue? Or maybe from ASEAN’s point of view is it advantageous because presumably one could be played off against the other? This has been seen somewhat played out in Japan and China’s pursuit for a free trade agreement with ASEAN nations.

**Jackson:** I can’t make a prognostication on that. What appears to be permanent today, a decade from now could be gone. That is, the present frosty relationship was not always characteristic of Japanese public opinion polls. If you look ten or fifteen years ago, the image of China in Japan was much more positive than it is today. So things do change. I think that the rivalry, if you will, between Japan and China does present ASEAN with a political opportunity, but I would contend the primary opportunity it presents is that it gives ASEAN a role in making sure that Asia stays peaceful. Making sure that the Japanese and the Chinese continue to come into the room, rub shoulders with one another, and, even if they can only talk about the shellfish, it is better than having no discussions at all.

**Malott:** I was just going to comment that many countries in Southeast Asia claim the phrasing about the two elephants, that when the elephants fight the grass gets trampled. Therefore, as Karl said, it very much is in the interest of the other countries in the region, and as I said earlier in the interest of the United States that China and Japan are encouraged to seriously engage in discussions and do everything that they can to reduce the tensions between the two of them, because it’s not good for either China or Japan or for the rest of Asia, or for the U.S.

**Anwar:** It’s true, there’s a Malay proverb about how when two elephants fight, the deer will be trampled in the middle. There is some concern about this rivalry, but it is not something that has been brewing just in the last few years. It’s been there for centuries and has been alive since after the Second World War. But you have not seen it reaching the point when it leads to an immediate battle or war. In all my years in government discussing all these issues about neighbors and the tension between Japan and China, there’s never been a report on that serious a level to suggest that there is going to be a major upheaval or tension that will brew up or lead to even a minor skirmish or war. ASEAN leaders are quite settled on that, that it would be in everyone’s interest if they could resolve their differences. And you are right, I don’t think that some of these issues will be resolved in the next decade or two but the relationship still is civil and that has helped because there is no real boycott. They still seem to be meeting and there is still a cordial relationship between these countries so I don’t foresee that as something that is

really causing much consternation or worry among ASEAN leaders.

**Questioner:** One comment and one question. The comment is I think we all raise too many issues between Japan and China. In reality when I teach from time to time at Japanese graduate schools half my students are Chinese. You cannot go to a pachinko parlor in Tokyo without encountering Chinese women working there. There are 200,000 Chinese workers in Japan today and China has replaced the U.S. as the number one trading partner. There are things that go way beyond the visits to the shrine, and so forth.

One question, the real issue I think that ASEAN might have, what is ASEAN's position vis-à-vis Taiwan? Does it support China's position? Does it support Taiwan's position? Does it act like the United States, meaning it supports China but it doesn't want to meddle with the freedom of Taiwan? Or would it just like to ignore the issue?

**Anwar:** ASEAN doesn't ignore it because generally it follows the international convention that Taiwan is a part of China. This is the accepted view in ASEAN. But contrary to China's preference, ASEAN continues to engage with the Taiwanese. Most meetings, except for the formal, high level political meetings, involve Taiwan. To be fair, the Chinese are quite tolerant of that too, but because ASEAN's position is clear. And ASEAN makes it difficult for the region to completely ignore Taiwan, because it's a major investor in the region, a major trading partner to Malaysia too, so ASEAN continues to have this sort of not normal rapport but engagement at that level, even at a high political level,

but not formalized. When I went to Taipei, it was officially as a visit as Anwar Ibrahim, not the deputy prime minister. I think this needs to be tolerated. Of course the Chinese will continue to object to this but ASEAN explains to them it has not altered its position nor its foreign policy position of recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.

**Questioner:** There are some quite promising and interesting cases of where bilaterally and even in groups Asian countries have subordinated and even addressed and resolved some long festering issues in the interest of broader, shared objectives. So the question I have is whether there are specific issues that would so engage the interests of the Asian community as to allow them, then, in that broader goal context to address some of the more troublesome issues that Dr. Anwar has suggested. Two thoughts come to mind, but I'd be interested in the panel's reactions and suggestions. One is energy security, which seems to me to involve the entire Asian community. The second is monetary cooperation where there has been cooperation in the interests of Asian regional stability, and it would seem to me that that's a key issue when it comes to trying to put a cohesive program and an ongoing forum of this sort together. Those broader consolidating issues are important to have.

**Anwar:** Of course there's a strong rivalry over the issue of energy between Japan, China and India. That's not part of the agenda for this Summit, but I would certainly anticipate this as a major issue because of the very aggressive moves particularly by China in securing its interests and authority over the

energy potential and investments in that field. But monetary cooperation is not again being considered. The only time it was really considered in a meeting was among the ASEAN finance ministers at the time of the Asian financial crisis when Secretary Rubin was talking about international financial architecture. Then the ASEAN response was the possibility of having an Asian Monetary Fund that complements the role of the IMF but I think it was far too complex at that time. Once part of the crisis was resolved this matter was shelved.

**Jackson:** Obviously Asia has a problem with avian flu. It's a problem that could conceivably cross the strait between Taiwan and the mainland. I gather, at the time of the SARS outbreak, WHO was not allowed—in effect it was vetoed by China from dealing in certain ways with SARS in Taiwan. I would hope that if the world begins to witness a terrible tragedy, as it might well with regard to avian flu, that these political obstacles will fall by the wayside. Great tragedy might be the kind of action-forcing event of the kind you referred to earlier.

**Questioner:** I apologize for going back to Japan and China again but I think this actually won't go away. It seems to me that the issue goes beyond the historical record of Japan and Japan's failure to address it in that both countries have a hierarchical world view, and never in the past have the two of them been powerful at the same time. China is the rising power and my question relates to the reorganization of East Asia that might come out possibly over the long term as the result of this Summit. The Chinese seem to expect the Southeast Asian countries, the smaller Southeast Asian countries in particular, to defer to their

issues, to their agenda on issues important to them. You mentioned your visit to Taiwan as deputy prime minister and the Chinese objected politely. Now they seem to have escalated their rhetoric and if you look at the Chinese reaction to the visit of the then Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Hsien Loong last year to Taiwan it was very fierce, to the extent that it generated a mini crisis between China and Singapore. So there seems to be increased assertiveness and expectations on the part of China that the rest of the countries in the region will tow the line. My question is that if this integration process continues how do the Southeast Asian countries prevent this structure from being organized around a Chinese agenda which would reduce the freedom of action that the ASEAN countries have at the moment?

**Anwar:** If you relate it to the issue of Taiwan it is complex because the Chinese position is firm and strong on the issue of sovereignty there. Take for example the visit of the then Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, what triggered the controversy was that the visit was seen to be too high profile. Singapore has claimed to the contrary that it was a very discrete visit. But you are right, probably there is also a change in the matter of assertiveness or position vis-à-vis these visits or probably because the visits became a bit more frequent. As you know, though, it did not really become a major problem. There was give and take for a few months and then things subsided. I don't think you need to read too much into this but does it mean therefore that the Chinese are intolerant of ASEAN taking a position on other issues? I don't think so. Other than this contentious Taiwan issue,

Indonesia is becoming a vibrant democracy, India's been articulating issues, countries have been forging very good alliances and relationships with China and at the same time maintaining very strong ties with Japan. I don't believe that the rise of Japanese or its sustainability as an economic power, though smaller than China, I don't think Japan should be underestimated. Japan has the potential, has the infrastructure, has the resolve. Japan is quite underestimated.

But you also see this trend, the euphoria. First Japan, then Central Asia, then Southeast Asia, now China, then back to India. But these are euphoric trends among intellectuals and think tanks, etc. Look at the stark reality. Japan is there to stay as a major economic power. China also of course is on the rise and there is going to be phenomenal growth, although there are some major issues that it has to grapple with like economics, financial institutions, etc. India is seen to be, because of its infrastructure, its democratic environment, rule of law, a free media, etc., potentially a major player. All these factors have to be taken into consideration.

In my limited experience in government for more than a decade or so and my understanding of development, the Chinese have been quite tolerant of different expressions, of views, of contexts, etc. Only when it comes to the security of China and the position of Taiwan do they become more assertive. Otherwise they are quite tolerant. Again, after saying that, I'm not trying to flip-flop here. But I still feel that my position insofar on the issue of governance, the issue of democracy, is that I'm still open, and I think the future of the region will entail courage and imagination, will move forward, and will transform these countries into countries that are formal, democratic, and respectful of human rights and the dignity of men and women, which is very central to the entire Asian psyche.

**Ikenberry:** I think on that note of a kind of vision of the future we should stop because that is an attractive way of anticipating the future. Would you join me in thanking our speakers for a delightful and lively session.

[End]

## About the Panelists

**Main Speaker** **Anwar Ibrahim**, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, is currently Distinguished Visiting Professor, Center for Muslim Christian Understanding, Georgetown University, and Visiting Fellow, St. Anthony's College, Oxford University. Previously he was Distinguished Visiting Fellow at SAIS. He began his notable political career in 1982 when he was elected to Malaysia's parliament, and subsequently held the positions of Minister of Youth, Minister of Education, Minister of Finance, and Deputy Prime Minister. He also founded the Malaysian Youth Movement of Malaysia in 1971 and was its president for ten years. In 1998 *Newsweek International* named him Asian of the Year, one of many awards he has received. He was imprisoned in 1998 and regained his freedom in September 2004 after acquittal by the Malaysian Federal Court. Dr. Anwar was educated at Malay College Kuala Kangsar and the University of Malaya. He has published two books: *Menangani Perubahan* (Managing Change, 2002) and *The Asian Renaissance* (1997). He also has written articles for numerous publications, including *Time Magazine* and the *Asian Wall Street Journal*.

**Discussants** **Karl Jackson** is the Director of the Asian Studies Program of the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He is also C.V. Starr Distinguished Professor of Southeast Asian Studies and Director of the Southeast Asia Studies Program at SAIS. Previously he taught at the University of California, Berkeley for nineteen years. Professor Jackson served as the Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs from 1991-1993. He has also been Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council. In addition, he served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia from 1986-1989. Professor Jackson received his Ph.D. from MIT. He has authored and edited numerous books and articles, including *Traditional Authority, Islam and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian Political Behavior* (1980) and edited *Asian Contagion: The Causes and Consequences of a Financial Crisis* (1999).

**John Malott** is Managing Director (Asia-Pacific) at ManattJones Global Strategies. Previously he served for thirty-one years in the U.S. Foreign Service, where he held such senior positions as Ambassador to Malaysia, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, and Consul General in Osaka, Japan. He also served as director of the U.S. State Department's Office of Japanese Affairs and as American Consul in Bombay, India and Kobe, Japan. Ambassador Malott received a B.A. from Northwestern University and also attended the National War College. He has published many articles, including "Looking at China through a Foggy Crystal Ball," *Orange County Register* (2001), and "Asia Needs Some Self-Honesty," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (1999).

**Moderator** **G. John Ikenberry** is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. Previously he taught at Georgetown University. Professor Ikenberry also has been a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. Professor Ikenberry is the author of numerous publications, including *State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy* (2002), *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (2000), and *Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government* (1988).