

# **Integration versus Confrontation: The Complexity of Sino-Japanese Relations**

by

**Professor Takahara Akio**

**Takahara Akio:** It is a true pleasure to have this opportunity to talk to you about a very important topic, Sino-Japanese relations now and in the future. Thank you very much to the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, the panelists here today and the audience.

As far as Sino-Japanese relations are concerned, you may have heard or seen a lot about the confrontational aspects of the relationship but I think it is important to understand the relationship in full. I will talk to you first about the positive aspects of the relationship that tend to be neglected, particularly in the media. I would also like to discuss the increasing integration of the Sino-Japanese economies and interaction between the two societies.

## **Increasing Economic Integration**

The growth of trade and investment that's been taking place between the two countries is well known. Last year in 2004, China became Japan's largest trading partner with a trading amount of 168 billion USD, surpassing the United States for the first time since after World War II, excluding Taiwan. Exports this year have seen a modest increase of 6.3% in the first half of the year but in 2003 exports from Japan to China increased by 43.6% and last year increased by 29%. Investment in China from Japan on a contract basis increased by 50.2% in 2003, 15.2% last year and despite all the political trouble between

them in the earlier half of this year, investment rose by 26.8% in the first three quarters of 2005. I think the Japanese economy has been more or less lifted by the rise of China and that the so-called Chinese economic threat which had been talked a lot about, mostly during 2000 and 2001, is hardly talked about anymore.

Therefore it is quite natural that if you have a look at the handout, the first page shows a diagram of the Japanese sense of closeness to China, and the solid line shows the percentage of Japanese that feel close towards China and the dotted line shows the percentage of Japanese that do not feel close to China (**See Appendix 1**). On the furthest right is the year 2004; on the furthest left is the year 1978. There is a rise in close feelings beginning in the years 2002 and 2003; there is a two-three point rise, which reflects to a great extent this change in the perception of China, that its rise actually benefits Japan and the Japanese.

There are some other indicators too. A Nikkei survey in March 2004 showed that 70% of Japanese entrepreneurs wanted a trilateral FTA—Free Trade Agreement—between Japan, China and South Korea. Nowadays over one million Chinese are employed directly by Japanese firms in China and if those employed indirectly through contracting and so on are included the figure goes up to 9.2 million Chinese workers hired by Japanese firms.

## **Japanese Government Promotes China's Economic Growth**

If this is the trend in the private sector, what has the government been doing? The government has been an active promoter of this trend, and one of its measures has been the provision of ODA to China. Since 1979 Japan has been by far the largest donor country to China; the amount has gone up to 3.43 trillion yen and despite the decrease in yen loans in recent years Japan has been by far the largest donor to China up to this year. The important aims of Japan's ODA to China include things like supporting the reform and opening policies of China. In the beginning it was meant to facilitate Japan's access to China's natural resources. Another important aim has been to promote economic growth and China's sustainable development because it is important for Japan's interests that China experience stable development; a disaster would be the collapse of or turmoil in China, which would cause a big impact in the world and in the region in particular.

Currently Japanese ODA to China focuses on social development, including poverty eradication and the environment. These areas are causes of social instability and are important target areas designated by the current Hu Jintao/Wen Jiabao government in China in its pursuit of the so-called scientific view of development, which lays a lot of emphasis on the balanced growth of the national economy.

Integration is progressing bilaterally but it's not only between the two countries; actually integration is a regional as well as a worldwide phenomenon. The Japanese government in this context has had a

consistent policy to support China's integration into the regional and the global systems, like when China was trying to join GATT and later the WTO. It was in 1991 that then Prime Minister Kaifu visited China as the first national leader of the industrialized countries in the wake of the June 4<sup>th</sup> incident in 1989. The message he wanted to send at that time was that the integration of China into the regional system, into the world system, is actually beneficial not only to China and to Japan but to the region and to the world as a whole. In substance Japan preempted the engagement policies of the Clinton administration in later years.

More recently, Prime Minister Koizumi has been repeatedly praising China's policy of promoting regional cooperation in East Asia. There is an element of competition there, as seen in China's policy change—China wasn't as positive in the early 1990s towards these regional efforts as it is now—and this policy change towards regional multilateral fora has been greatly and widely welcomed by the Japanese and other neighboring nations of China. This is happening actually not only in the realm of economics but also in the area of security too.

## **Expanding Sino-Japanese Societal Interaction**

The activities of Japanese NGOs in China are not well known, but there are actually around 1000 Japanese NGOs engaged in exchanges and other forms of cooperation with China. For example, the number of Japanese NGOs directly engaged in planting trees in the greening of China has been rising constantly despite political tension that

has existed between the two nations, from 29 in 1999 to 81 in the year 2004.

In the realm of culture, I will begin by saying that Chinese classical literature and China's history are very much marveled at by the Japanese even to this day. There are many Chinese classical novels such as *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms* and others that have been rewritten many times by contemporary Japanese novelists in Japanese and they are extremely popular.

In the educational area, among the second foreign languages that are learned in Japan, Chinese is the most popular and is studied by the largest number of students in Japan, not only in universities but in senior high schools too. I was surprised to recently find that now over 10% of Japanese senior high schools provide Chinese classes. I'm very sure that this number is going to increase in the years to come.

At the Aichi Exposition held this year the Chinese pavilion received the largest number of visitors. The Japanese are now going all out to invite Chinese tourists to Japan, and the year 2006 is designated as the Japan-China tourist exchange year. The Japanese have also proposed setting up an annual regular meeting of the ministers in charge of tourism between Japan, China and South Korea, and this is most likely going to take place from next year.

On the Chinese side, Japanese animation is one of the strongest motivations for the Chinese to learn Japanese. It is estimated that the number of Chinese learning Japanese was 240,000 in 1998, and that figure jumped to 390,000 in the year 2003. The Asian Manga Summit,

which in reality is a global manga summit because manga writers from all over the world attend, was held in Beijing in 2004 and this year it was held in Seoul. Japanese manga writers played a very big role in initiating this.

However, demonstrations did mar Sino-Japanese relations. Jeering and violence in the Asian Cup soccer games took place last year, but what are the real feelings amongst the Chinese towards the Japanese? This is very difficult to gauge. Some papers have quoted ad hoc surveys done by Chinese newspapers or Chinese research institutes but in China there is nothing equivalent to the annual regular social survey conducted by the Japanese government. There has been one research study conducted by Professor Liu Zhiming of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and he claims that his method is the most scientific and disciplined amongst the surveys that exist in China. According to him it is very interesting that by the year 2004 the percentage of Chinese who dislike Japan compared to 2001 had actually dropped by ten points.

What about the demonstrations? More recent surveys in September 2004 and June 2005 indicate that those who dislike or somewhat dislike Japan, according to Professor Liu, increased by 6.2 points to 46%. However, those who like Japan or somewhat like Japan only decreased 0.8 points to 27.7% and in the Southern coastal city of Guangzhou, those Chinese who like Japan showed an increase. How will this be interpreted? I'll come back to this point towards the latter part of my talk.

## **Contentious Issues between China and Japan**

Next I will talk about points of confrontation in Sino-Japanese relations. The first point I would like to raise is the rise in the Chinese military and Japan's reaction towards that. The Chinese Communist Party believes there is a competition of comprehensive national power which is intensifying day by day in the international arena. According to Chinese leaders, comprehensive national power comprises economic power first, military power second, science and technology power third and the power of national integration fourth. I think by that they mean some centripetal force that integrates the nation together. This idea justifies the military buildup as China is determined to excel in each of these elements of comprehensive national power. After the end of the Cold War and in the wake of the Gulf War in 1991, in 1993 the Chinese came up with a new strategy with a focus on defending their maritime rights and maritime interests and extended the area of defense from the mainland to air and especially the territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zones. This idea was applied to the modernization of the PLA—the People's Liberation Army.

In the 1980s Deng Xiaoping used to say that the military must endure. He made it very clear that economic development was primary and defense buildup had to be secondary. In the days of Jiang Zemin things began to change and Jiang himself said in late 1999, and I quote, "In recent years the state has done its utmost to increase input in military expenditure. We must gradually formulate a mechanism to achieve mutual promotion and coordinated development of defense

build-up and economic development." Coordinated development of defense buildup and economic development is the current official formula, and economic development as primary and defense buildup as secondary is no longer quoted by Chinese leaders.

From the Japanese point of view there have been several serious incidents such as a Chinese reconnaissance ship sailing around the Japanese archipelago, and China's repeated violations of the agreement to inform the other side of activities of so-called "Ocean Research Vessels" in designated waters. Because of these incidents, a few years ago the Japanese and Chinese governments came to an agreement that when the vessels go into certain seas they have to inform the other side prior to the act. But from the Japanese point of view the Chinese have not been abiding by the established rules. Also, last year a Chinese nuclear submarine intruded into undisputed territorial waters.

The Chinese are increasingly concerned, particularly about Japan's reinforcement of security ties with the United States. Japan is going along with the transformation of the U.S. military and has agreed on joint development of missile defense. Japan and the U.S. also included Taiwan in their common strategic objectives earlier this year. These facts do not mean the remilitarization of Japan that is widely discussed in the Chinese media. From reading the Chinese press one gets the impression that the Japanese military budget is growing very rapidly but in fact the Japanese military budget in the past three years has not risen but has been declining. According to the National Defense Program Guideline that was adopted in December last year,

which is the plan for a military buildup for the next ten years or so, Japan is actually going to decrease its military equipment such as fighter planes, destroyers, tanks and other things.

The Chinese media, however, criticized the Japanese government for proliferating the so-called China threat theory and pointed its finger at the National Defense Program Guideline and the Defense White Paper that was issued this year. In fact, the two papers said that China continues to modernize its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces and that it is also expanding its area of operations at sea. These are objective facts that any neighboring security agency should be concerned about, especially when there is a surge of antagonism towards one's country. The papers also said that Japan would have to remain attentive to China's future actions, but I think this is quite different from listing China as the primary threat as is reported widely in the Chinese media. I am concerned that the Japan threat theory is gaining currency in China and this will not serve China's interests. Truth must be sought from facts.

### **Rise of Nationalism in China and Japan**

The second point of confrontation: the rise of nationalism in the two countries. Just to remind you of a few of the incidents in 2004 and 2005, there have been Yasukuni Shrine visits by Prime Minister Koizumi in January 2004 and October 2005, approval of a controversial textbook by the Japanese Ministry of Education in April 2005, the forceful landing of Chinese activists on Uotsurijima—that's one of the Senkaku

Islands, or Diao Yu Dao in Chinese—in March 2004, jeering and violence at and after the Asian Cup Soccer Games in August 2004, and violent demonstrations triggered by Japan's bid to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council in April 2005. How are these to be explained? In my view, both top-down nationalism and popular nationalism are rising in both countries.

### **Top-Down Nationalism**

Let me begin by explaining what I call top-down nationalism in China. Chinese leaders have always promoted patriotism. In Chinese terminology nationalism is not necessarily a commendable thing because there are fifty-six nations in China. Chinese have to be patriotic, not nationalistic. To increase the integral force of the nation, the fourth element in comprehensive national power, patriotism has been used quite often by Chinese leadership. It is even said that "patriotism and socialism are essentially the same thing in modern China." The slogans include "The great revival of the Chinese nation." What that means remains a question. Other slogans such as "You get thrashed if you lag behind" were said again at the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of WWII. I tell my Chinese friends, "Don't say that. China is not lagging behind anymore. Who would thrash China? What would the countries that are actually lagging behind think if you tell them, you'll get thrashed if you lag behind. It won't help China if you continue saying those things."

Patriotic education is often criticized in Japan as the cause of trouble but patriotic education is rather a broad concept in China. It not only includes school education but other media such as films and

TV programs which have a very big impact on the image of other countries, books and journals, museums—there are all sorts of ways to promote patriotic education in China.

What about top-down nationalism in Japan? In 1999 there was the legalization of *hinomaru*, the Japanese national flag, and the legalization of *kimigayo*, the national anthem of Japan. Those things are usually legalized in other countries too. When it was legalized in Japan it was said that citizens would not be forced to sing the national anthem or fly the national flag. But what's been happening in certain localities such as Tokyo, if teachers do not hoist the national flag, if they do not sing the national anthem in ceremonies, they are being punished.

### **Popular Nationalism Increasing**

There has been a conspicuous rise of popular nationalism in China. Chinese rapid growth in the 1990s boosted their self-confidence. But it also reacted to their remaining sense of inferiority and produced a very assertive kind of nationalism in China. Peter Gries pointed out that before in the days of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the Chinese used to portray themselves as the victors of WWII, but nowadays they see themselves mainly as victims. I think that is correct, and the victim mentality lingers on. But with the boosting of their self-confidence there has been a resurgence of a large power mentality amongst many Chinese. An interesting point is that I can sense an element of anti-governmental sentiment or movement in disguise that is blended in the nationalistic movements that have been taking place in China.

What about Japan? A rise in popular nationalism in Japan also has been seen. The Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform was established in 1996. This is the organization that has been producing these controversial textbooks and my understanding is that their nationalism advocates defense: they're feeling defensive, they want to defend national pride and patriotism in Japan, which in their minds have been eroded by the masochistic teaching of history in Japanese classrooms. This movement was related to globalization and the bursting of the economic bubble in the earlier part of the 1990s. This rocked the value system that the Japanese had treasured until then.

In Japan, or in the world rather, Japan had been praised as an example of a good combination of tradition and modernization. But now the Japanese are being told that their way of management is no good, that they have to change their ways fundamentally, which worries people and decreases the self-confidence of some Japanese who attempt to rebuild their pride by beautifying the past. This has been happening to some part of the Japanese population. As far as their anti-Chinese sentiment is concerned, it also arises from the sense of being eclipsed by their vigorously growing giant neighbor, China.

### **Causes of Mutually Negative Feelings**

There is a problem here: the interaction of societies is fine, but interaction also creates nationalist sentiments and negative feelings about the other side. This diagram shows that in the year 2004, which is the last set of figures, the percentage of Japanese that felt close to China dropped by more than ten points

(See Appendix 1). An interesting fact is that in 2004 the percentage of those that felt close to China was by far the lowest among youths in the age bracket of 20-29. Actually, 6.3 points lower than the average. However, in the previous year, in 2003, this age bracket had shown the highest percentage of close feelings towards China. How did this drop happen? If it turns out that younger people tend to watch soccer on TV more than has been assumed, then the Asian Soccer Games had a very big impact on how the Japanese feel about the other side. I think that these visual images of the other side have a very important role to play in forming its image. If that is the case, there is the danger of a vicious circle because negative feelings on one side are causing and amplifying negative feelings on the other side.

What are the other factors in the negative sentiments about the other side? One is a mutually held psychological complex about the other side. Some Japanese—not all—feel superior to China about their economic development, the level of social development including the rule of law, sanitation levels, education standards, etc. In these terms the Japanese are superior to the Chinese. But the Japanese also feel inferior to the Chinese due to the latter's long history of tradition, a long history of civilization, and status and influence in international society.

In China it is just the opposite. Some Chinese feel superior to the Japanese about their traditions, civilization and the power and the status they enjoy in international politics, but they feel inferior to the Japanese in terms of their economic development and social development. And when one side feels that

their superiority is being undermined, they feel threatened. A few years ago the Japanese were very worried that the Chinese were catching up in economic terms. Japan's bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council may have caused some Chinese to feel that their superiority was threatened. This is the hypothesis that I've held for some years.

### **Media Contributes to Abundance of Negative Information**

Another problem is the abundance of negative information on the other side, mainly coming from the media. The media makes many mistakes, simple mistakes of facts or misinformation of facts, misinterpretation of facts and a lot of generalizations: "The Chinese are like this and that" and "The Japanese don't apologize for the war, don't acknowledge the Nanjing Massacre." Whenever I hear these generalizations in a conference I raise my hand and say, "You just said the Japanese don't acknowledge the Nanjing Massacre, but I am Japanese. Am I included in your definition of Japanese?" This action is necessary, since these kinds of information become very misleading.

What are the causes of these problems in sending out information? I think one important cause is commercialism in the media. It is very interesting that Professor Liu Zhiming, who I mentioned earlier, conducted a research of newspaper reporting in China, which indicates that the newly established newspapers that are facing severe competition in the market tend to have harsher reporting on Japan. This finding of Professor Liu's in China also seems applicable to the Japanese situation. I

have never conducted similar research myself, but I find it is the weekly and the monthly magazines that are fighting for their survival that tend to be more critical of China. Professor Liu says that the stable, high quality papers tend to be more objective in their reporting about the other side. The same can be said for Japanese society. News on the Internet is even harsher about the other side. This is also the same in the two societies.

Another problem is the lack of education in intercultural communication. The Japanese have to understand that the way the Chinese perceive things, the way they think is very much different from the way the Japanese perceive things and think. There is a lot of mirror imaging that takes place, like the Chinese often say that Japan now wants to become a big political power and a big military power, wants to dominate East Asia, wants to be a hegemon in the region, and so on.

It goes the other way too. Prime Minister Koizumi said “I don’t understand why the Chinese and the Koreans don’t understand me, why I go to the Yasukuni Shrine,” but if someone lives in another culture of course he or she will not understand why the prime minister visits the Yasukuni Shrine. This is very basic but I have to say it, that when people try and communicate outside of their culture, they have to begin from the assumption that cultures are very different and they have to use many words to have themselves understood by the other side.

My final part of the talk relates to what will be done from now on. But before I do that, let me just briefly summarize what I have been talking about so far. I think economy and culture do act as

positive factors, which improve the image of the other side. Even in China, where negative feelings about Japan are stronger and have been growing amongst some individuals, I sense that the bedrock of pro-Japanese sentiment has been formed, especially in urban society. That is the tentative conclusion I have now. This process of economic integration and societal interaction will continue to progress and will function as a bond between the two nations.

However, the interaction of popular nationalism in the two countries could send the negative perceptions about the other side plunging into a vicious circle. China’s rise, which is both a cause and a result of economic integration, also has an aspect which gives rise to political and strategic confrontation and which develops a sense of uncertainty about the future relationship. So there is certainly a need for good management of the relationship.

### **Ways to Improve the Sino-Japanese Relationship**

I would like to talk about what Japan and China could do to improve their relationship. First point: Japan has to support the stable economic rise of China, because an unstable, trouble-ridden China would be a huge time bomb for the world but particularly for the neighboring nations including Japan. Japan, despite being in the midst of huge fiscal deficits, should continue providing ODA to China, for its national interest as well as on humanitarian grounds. And Japan should announce that it will be the last donor country to stop providing assistance to China. Once things go very wrong in China, worldwide support will be nece-

ssary; Japan is counting on the United States.

Second point: China and Japan have to promote a security dialogue, both bilateral and regional:

1) China and Japan need a mechanism for crisis management, such as in the East China Sea.

2) China and Japan must discuss how all parties, including the U.S., can coexist comfortably in the East Asian region. Japan should take the lead because it, compared to the U.S., feels more pressure from China's military rise.

3) China and Japan should aim for a Northeast Asian security architecture; many are promoting this based on the six-party talks that were held about the nuclear crisis in the Korean Peninsula.

4) China and Japan have to quell nationalism on both sides. First, both countries must feed better information to the public, and increase the quantity, variety and quality of information about each other. Both countries must not demonize other nations. China and Japan must increase understanding about how ordinary people on the other side live and think, and what their values are. This is very basic but I think both nations lack an understanding of the other to that extent. China and Japan should stop generalizations. A common problem here is commercialism; it is difficult to solve this problem. However, it helps if both sides are conscious of this problem that exists on both sides. The Japanese media should establish spontaneously an ombudsmen system that will check factual mistakes. This cannot be expected to take place in China,

which is a Communist dictatorship. To increase the variety, quantity, and quality of information on Japan, the fundamental thing is to bring more Chinese to Japan. Japan has to increase peer-to-peer personal contact at all levels: housewives talking to housewives, kindergarten teachers talking to kindergarten teachers. Better use of the Internet, not only by the Japanese government but by firms, by universities. Japan should have more information in Chinese aimed at a Chinese audience. The Chinese should have more information in Japanese.

5) "Take history as a mirror and look towards the future." This is what the Chinese have been saying. That is fine: Japan should teach more prewar history to Japanese children and China should teach more postwar history to Chinese children. Then and only then can both countries look towards the future.

6) China and Japan should work on joint projects for a common cause like the East Asian Community and establish that as a framework for sustainable peace and sustainable development in the region.

7) China and Japan should cooperate in many functional areas. For instance, maintaining maritime security. They can cooperate more in enhancing energy efficiency in China, and they can also explore and develop energy. They can jointly negotiate with the suppliers of energy; which has been proposed by Japanese experts. The setting up of a joint UN-PKO training center either in Japan or in China. There are plenty of good examples of joint cooperation and joint projects, such as the treatment of abundant chemical weapons in China

that were abandoned by the Japanese military at the end of WWII.

I'm sure that through combining efforts China and Japan can understand each other better. Thank you very much.

**Charles Kupchan:** Mr. Yang, we look forward to hearing your views.

**Yang Bojiang:** Good afternoon. I'm very happy to be here, to have the chance to discuss Sino-Japanese relations with my American colleagues and especially with Professor Takahara Akio. He has a very comprehensive and balanced view on current Sino-Japanese relations. I also have some points on which I do not necessarily agree with him. There are two points that I would like to discuss.

One is about the priority of the Chinese government. I don't think the priority of the Chinese government has changed from economics to anything else. From the perspective of an ordinary Chinese, I have some friends in the army in Beijing and in the local provinces. It's true that in past years the military budget has increased, but to a very great extent it has been used to improve the military's living standards. They have bigger houses and better salaries than before.

My second point about the top-down nationalism theory is that I disagree with this. Japan experienced a wave of what I call top-down nationalism, namely the Nakasone Yasuhiro age. Now things have changed. During the current period, the Koizumi period, there is a kind of bottom-up nationalism. China has a similar situation; who pushes whom? I don't think the Chinese government is pushing the public, but the public is

pushing the government. Otherwise how can such a phenomenon be explained?

In the past two years, especially since the fourth generation of leaders came into office, the Chinese government has tried a lot to improve Sino-Japanese relations. What is most impressive is the latest meeting between Koizumi and Hu Jintao in Indonesia on April 23. The Chinese government was hesitating until two days before on whether its top leader should meet Koizumi. That was a very difficult but very significant decision on the part of the Chinese.

Next I would like to follow up on three points in Professor Takahara's speech. My first point is a follow up on how to estimate current Sino-Japanese relations. Sino-Japanese relations have a lot of positive and negative aspects, but unfortunately—here is something similar with what he said—some of the negative parts of the relationship have been exaggerated or overstated. Meanwhile some of the positive parts, for example bilateral cooperation, have tended to be underestimated.

### **Chinese Government Trying Hard to Improve Relations with Japan**

One example of this is the Taiwan issue. Everybody knows the Chinese government's stance is that the Taiwan issue is a Chinese domestic issue. In spite of this, a couple of years ago, China started a bilateral dialogue with Japan at the so-called second-track level. The next round, maybe the fifth or sixth round, will be held in Tokyo next month. Given the very sensitive situation of Sino-Japanese relations, sometimes even when the Chinese government does something to cooperate with Japan, it

can only do so without fanfare. This supports my view that the Chinese government has been trying hard to improve the relationship.

My second example is the DPRK and the nuclear issue. The second wave of the DPRK nuclear crisis broke out in October 2002. In April 2003, then Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Junko visited Beijing and asked for more cooperation, more understanding and more support on the abduction issue between Japan and DPRK. Since then it is believed that the Japanese side has been able to feel that it has been getting more understanding and even some cooperation from the Chinese side.

Back to the 1970s. It is well known that China started the Open Door and Reform Policy in late 1978. Before that then Prime Minister Ohira visited Beijing. Imagine that there should have been some silent consensus, that the Chinese are going to shift their policy from closed door to open door and the Japanese are going to support the Chinese. Especially at the early stage of the reform and opening-up policy, the Chinese gained great support from the Japanese, which was important because at that stage the biggest difficulty for China was the shortage of capital and hard currency.

### **Problems in Current Sino-Japanese Relationship**

My second point is that, about the problems between the two countries, they are as serious as some media organizations exaggerate them to be. I'm cautiously optimistic about Sino-Japanese relations. But there are still problems, on two points especially. One is the suspension

of meetings between the top leadership. The second one is a kind of confrontation between the two peoples. What is the essence of such a confrontation or such a conflict? I think it's about how to deal with complicated relations between the two rising powers in East Asia. In Chinese eyes, Japan is also rising. To some extent, Koizumi's reforms have been successful. Not to mention that in political, even military realms, Japan is also rising.

I don't agree with some of my Chinese colleagues who suggest that Japan has been undertaking an overall anti-China policy. So far I cannot see a consistent anti-Chinese policy taken by Koizumi or his cabinet. My conclusion is that the Japanese government's policy is to try to cooperate with China, but conditionally, based on a higher political status. First of all, for any country, an aspiration for higher status should be understood and respected. But the problem is in which way this end is achieved. The Koizumi cabinet does not have a good approach to reach this end. Koizumi has been taking a kind of confrontational approach towards not only China but all of the surrounding Asian countries. Japan should have more communication with surrounding countries to improve the region's political environment for further cooperation.

Many people, especially my Japanese colleagues, especially those from magazines and newspapers, talk a lot about the demonstrations earlier this year, but these events have to be considered from a historical context. Some Chinese citizens have been tolerating Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni for at least four years; after his fourth visit they demonstrated

in the streets. There's a connection here, which should not be neglected.

### **U.S. Role in Improving Sino-Japanese Relations**

As for how to improve Sino-Japanese relations I agree with Professor Takahara. He raised a lot of very concrete, convincing methods to improve the relationship. I would like to add only one. It's about the U.S. role in improving Sino-Japanese relations. The United States, from two standpoints, should feel more obligated to get involved in the relationship in order to create more harmony between the two countries. One is that the United States won the Cold War by playing such a partisan game, playing one against another, but things are different now. If Sino-Japanese relations grow worse it's also not in the interests of the United States because, absolutely, tense Sino-Japanese relations will affect the stability and cooperation of East Asia.

The second point is that some Japanese leaders' denial of history is not a kind of challenge only to neighboring countries but also to the United States. It's a kind of immediate challenge to the postwar international system. The Bush administration should hold a trilateral meeting or even dialogue among China, Japan and the U.S. or even send envoys to Beijing and to Tokyo. I'd like to stop here and save more for discussion. Thank you very much.

**Steven Clemons:** Thank you. I was very impressed by the nuance that Akio Takahara brought to this discussion. It's a complicated and difficult one and of all the talks that I've heard from other scholars in Japan, I think his views are fresh and pragmatic. I'm going to offer a crit-

ique that's friendly though it may sound hard-edged at moments.

When you run down Professor Takahara's roster of things that can be done, such as supporting China generally in an engagement strategy, I largely agree. But many of his suggestions depend upon goodwill and enlightened action. They do not rest upon the fact that the world is sometimes not put together based on the good intentions of nations or people but they're put forward based on interests. So I'd like to share some other thoughts on how the future of Sino-Japanese relations can be considered and also bring in more discussion about the United States.

The United States is a key factor in terms of whether it remains engaged or less engaged or whether it has episodic engagement in Asia, which has a lot to do with the contours of Japan's interactions with China. To be quite blunt, Paul Wolfowitz in 1998 gave a speech focused on transatlantic relations—and the topic was dealing with the subject of NATO enlargement. But he argued then that the emergence of China as a great power would actually dominate all great foreign policy decisions of all the great powers for the upcoming five or six decades on whether to contain, whether to engage, or some combination of these. The U.S. has been discussing various forms of rapprochement in Russia and eventually Russian membership in NATO largely as a strategy to deal with an emerging China.

### **Future Strategy of Japan**

There was a good *Wall Street Journal* article the other day that talked about the policy of “conengagement,” of contain-

ment and engagement, of straddling two different strategies in the United States. This affects Japan. The big question that people don't put quite as bluntly as I'm going to is the question that many Americans have about Japan or maybe the Japanese have about themselves is, that is, are they going to continue to be a vassal of American interests in the Asia-Pacific region? Are they going to be more independent and define their own interests vis-à-vis the United States and China? Or are they going to build some sort of cooperative new structure with China that may in fact not be in American interests?

There's a likelihood a U.S.-centric orientation will continue in Japan. What I found missing in Professor Takahara's talk was the question of what's in Japan's national interest. Japan very clearly, particularly on the military front and also within the Asia-Pacific region, has adopted a strategy in which it's trying to maintain strong American engagement with Asia generally but is also not putting all of its eggs in that basket. Former Prime Minister Nakasone wanted to build up Japan and was the pre-normal nation official in Japan; he wanted to maintain a strong U.S.-Japanese relationship, but wanted to be less dependent in many areas. He was much more of a genuine nationalist in many ways than Mr. Koizumi.

So on the question of Japan, which is constrained by geography, constrained by history, constrained by its budget and the attitude of its citizens, it is straddling and trying to maintain American engagement. Professor Takahara mentioned the East Asian Community. Japan was essentially begging the United States to send senior ministers to Asia

because China had hijacked the notion of an East Asian Community, and Japan was in Jakarta with other nations without a senior cabinet level secretary from the United States at that meeting. One Japanese minister after another came back to the United States saying "You do not understand that you're missing in Asia and there's a perception that you're disengaged or you're so distracted by the Middle East today." And China with its very charming diplomacy was seducing much of Asia and filling a vacuum that the United States had left because of its disengagement. Now there is a very different picture today where America has reengaged in Asia and is almost overdoing the nature of how to at least contain China or at least begin thinking about more of the negatives in the region.

### **Japan's Declaration on Taiwan**

It was very interesting that the decision on extensions of the European Arms Embargo occurred the same week that Japan announced that Taiwan was within its security sphere and would assist the United States with defending it. The question was that notion of Japan's declaration on Taiwan, which was always understood, as far back as the presidency of George Bush. There was always an understanding that Japan would be with the U.S. in the case of Taiwan but that hadn't necessarily been publicly acknowledged, but privately it certainly had. I believe that the United States had a lot to do with Japan coming out of the closet on that and making a public declaration because that very same month was the month that China surpassed the United States as Japan's largest trading partner. It was almost a declaration that despite this high level of economic integration which Professor

Takahara addressed, Japan is still in the American camp.

That was what the U.S. wanted to have been told and if you think back in history, John Foster Dulles, his major concern during the early part of the Cold War was that Japan not fall back into a China-centric orbit or become China dependent. Those were the terms by which Japan got its grand bargain, which was to have unfettered, wholesale access to U.S. markets to build its economy. The U.S. would have a bastion of security cooperation and be able to forward deploy its troops in Japan. So John Foster Dulles' vision ended this year in terms of the massive historic change, in terms of the economic engagement and integration that has taken place, but the politics certainly haven't caught up and it's a sketchy picture.

Although I don't put China in the same camp as the Soviet Union there were some particularly good aspects of the U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union that are missing with China. The U.S. had an incredibly complex, very rich fabric of relations with the Soviet Union so that it never had all of its eggs in one basket. There was stability, I call it a "shock absorber" strategy with the Soviets that might not have precluded conflict but at least kept silly things from escalating. That seems to be missing in the U.S. relationship with China.

### **Complicated Notions of Historical Memory**

Another part of Professor Takahara's talk that I found missing, and it's the more complicated one, is that these notions about historical memory, histo-

rical amnesia and whatnot are of course complex but I would like to imagine a world over there if one of two things existed: if the United States did not depend so heavily upon bilateral security relationships, say with Korea, with Japan, with Australia and others, and instead had something that had much more of a multilateral character, or if the U.S. bases and the U.S. security presence were not in Japan.

I believe that the recklessness that leaders of Korea, leaders of Japan and leaders of China each demonstrate when they deal with questions of historical accountability and historical treatment would not be there. To some degree it's important to realize that the American forces and the way they are positioned create somewhat of a moral hazard for the discussions of history, or the reckless discussions of history. Were the U.S. not there providing a buffer, those discussions would be much more controlled and circumspect and less likely.

This takes me to another part of Professor Takahara's talk about the notion of an ombudsmen or the notion of reasonable and sane treatments of history and national purpose, and the reality is that there are nationalist leaders or there are Junichiro Koizumis that go to Yasukuni or there are Chinese textbooks that spend 60% of their content focusing on Japan's aggressions of the past. Those are realities that the region must deal with. The question is what happens over time that isn't dependent upon just the good interests of people?

I was very involved in this historical memory question a few years ago and I asked some Chinese Americans I was

speaking to and other Chinese, “Is there any apology from Japan that would ever satisfy you? Is there an apology or a nature of apology that would ever completely solve this element?” And the answer is really no, if you’re honest. But what is missing in this evolution of Japan’s sense of national interest, its brewing sense of nationalism which Professor Takahara addressed—there are competing forms of nationalism in Japan; Shintaro Ishihara’s is a fringe, right-wing nationalism that is not part of a healthy, more liberal kind of nationalism that I believe some people like Nakasone and others were trying to stir up some two decades ago—but what the issue is, what is missing is what has been seen in Germany.

Dresdner Bank in Germany sponsored a competition where they had 20,000 song submissions from high school students who came up with avant-garde ways to talk about social tolerance, the inquiry of history, ethnic questions, etc., and they got some amazing contributions. But then they had an event that involved a government minister and the entire German press corps, and they created a national moment where these issues mattered and students were encouraged to engage in them. I was so impressed with what I saw in Germany that I went to a major Japanese corporation and asked if it would do a national competition in Japan about history or about social tolerance, or about ethnic diversity. They said, “We can’t touch that subject. We can’t do that.” And that’s what people are scared of. For a modern democracy that is able to engage in the give-and-take of ideas, the question of a major corporation not seeing it in its interest to do that kind of function disturbs those on the outside.

But it actually would be the most honest way for Japan not to react to criticism about the war past and begin creating organic, more self-introspective kinds of comments.

I most want to emphasize in these discussions about convergence or divergence that often times just a few things are dealt with. One, I think they cannot be discussed unless nations get a better handle on what the United States is going to do in Asia; in the last ten or fifteen years, U.S. engagement strategy in Asia has been discontinuous. The U.S. is over-engaged and then under-engaged, over-engaged and under-engaged. It seems to have been unable thus far to focus on Asia in terms of generating a constant strategy and a constant presence that will be stabilizing both for China and for Japan.

Secondly, China is moving very quickly to establish new multilateral structures. It’s out-multilateralizing the U.S. Chinese sovereignty in many ways is growing and becoming more internationally legitimate as it engages more in multilateral institutions but at the same time the United States is withdrawing, and is uncertain about a lot of its multilateral engagements. And I suspect that one of the great kinds of competition that will be seen, particularly between the United States and China, are competing versions of globalization: one anchored in Beijing, competing with another anchored in Washington.

Japan in this forum is smart. It is essentially developing certain military capabilities and certainly industrial capabilities to become less dependent on the United States if need be but it’s still trying to make the case for robust

American engagement and partnership. In the long run, though, Japan is doubtful about U.S. staying power, at least at current levels, and that requires some new casting. Where Japan thinks it's going or where I think it's going is it's eventually going to become the Britain of Asia, and China, which the U.S. is giving a lot of attention to and looking at it as a bold and purposeful and conscious, new, rising regional hegemon, is probably going to look a lot more like Europe generally. That means bold at times but essentially it will constantly be worried about disintegration and instability. China's going to be a very different force than the U.S. sometimes paints it to be.

### Q&A

**Kupchan:** I'd like to pick up on a point that Steve raised. He told a story about what's going on inside Japan and China vis-à-vis each other that is in some ways a story of narratives, almost impervious to incoming information. That is to say that there are images that have developed in these two countries of the other that are fairly deeply embedded in the media, in public mindsets, and despite the positive cultural and economic ties those images may not be particularly susceptible to what the other side does. That made me feel that his conclusions may be somewhat out of proportion with the challenge ahead. In other words, is an extension of ODA really going to make a difference in China if the images of Japan are as he said? Are there more significant steps, bolder steps, that one side could take to actually burst the bubble on the other, to break through these dominant images and push political momentum in a more positive

direction? What might those reciprocal steps be?

**Questioner:** I found the presentations refreshing and yet a bit surprising. For Professor Takahara, I thought I would hear more about military and the maritime disputes and encounters and so forth that have been going on: things like the Chunxiao gas field and the Chinese nuclear-powered submarine that intruded on Japan's territorial waters. Yang Bojiang didn't mention the things that I often hear from my Chinese colleagues about the resurgence of Japanese militarism, and about U.S. support for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces being ill-advised and so forth. I wonder why you didn't mention those things, because you think they should be relegated to the dustbin or because you think they are of decreasing importance, or other reasons? For Steve, you asked if there were any experts on the Taiwan issue and I won't put myself in that category but I did want to mention that I see it as a question along the spectrum of things that Japan might do in support of the U.S. To what degree and what type might be included? Is it conceivable to have the Japanese Self-Defense Forces engaged in combat to support U.S. direct combat operations out of Japanese bases, down to just logistic support à la Vietnam or something of that sort?

**Questioner:** Steve mentioned "congame-ment." Containment was a Cold War policy. What is being talked about here is the U.S. and Japan containing China. What will China do? China is getting closer to Russia through military exercises and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Are we seeing the possible emergence here of Cold War II?

**Questioner:** Hong Kong is probably, among Chinese cities, friendlier towards Japan. Professor Takahara, you were in Hong Kong for a while. I have talked to my students about anti-Japanese sentiment when it comes to major political and national issues. They can be very anti-Japanese even though they might have much better perceptions and interactions with Japanese people. My sense is, when I look at some of those very strong right-wing statements coming out of Japan, and Japan is a political society and a democratic society, I think that the disappointment about the apology issue is that Japanese political leaders or even corporate leaders do not come out and condemn those things very strongly. There might be different views but that might be an internal issue which has been projected externally when people like me or some other people—I consider myself rather moderate on this issue—would be quite troubled by that sort of thing, particularly when you think about Germany and other examples.

You mentioned social interactions as an optimistic development. As I look at what's going on in China and Japan and the chart you provided, overall the pattern is going downward even though there are some ups and downs on the sense of closeness to each other. This is on the Japanese side. Which constituencies would be more in favor of developing a better relationship with Japan on the Chinese side? Who are those people who are now developing a closer relationship with China on the Japanese side? This has been diminishing. On the Japanese side, in the past there were very strong and loud voices who would promote a special relationship on Japan-China relations, a friendly relationship. That's a special relationship

that doesn't seem to be there anymore. Instead people in general really don't talk about these things anymore. They talk about problems and challenges, and constituencies don't seem to be developing in a different direction. I wonder how you would comment on that.

**Questioner:** I want to thank Dr. Takahara and Dr. Yang for being very polite, too polite in not mentioning the American pressure that creates this rift between China and Japan. Steve brought it up a little bit but this was not one speech that Wolfowitz made ten years ago, this was constant pressure. Wolfowitz was calling high officials from both countries into his office. The pressure on the Japanese in particular to make statements against the Chinese military buildup was enormous. There's good news and there's bad news. The good news is there will be a regime change in Washington. Dick Cheney will probably be indicted and a lot of that pressure is going to be off. So the reality is that this pressure against Sino-Japanese cooperation is coming off and I think Prime Minister Koizumi at times has kind of been acting like Don Rumsfeld in a wig. He can go back to his 2002 diplomatic cooperation with East Asian nations. He made two trips to Pyongyang. The bad news is that the Japanese with this new cabinet just seem to be continuing along the same line as if the neo-cons weren't collapsing in Washington. Why? Is there some fundamental, anti-China shift in some elite circle in Tokyo that doesn't have anything to do with pressure from Washington?

**Takahara:** I mostly agreed with what Bojiang said. One point that we disagree about is top-down nationalism in China. I still believe that there is a contradiction,

to use Chinese terms, in how the Chinese government approaches the question of nationalism because you're quite right in pointing out that the Chinese government is on the defensive now. They want to contain the popular nationalism that seems to have grown out of control, out of their hands, so they are trying to calm things down. I also think they are responsible somewhat for the nationalism in China at this moment. There are means that they can still resort to in containing the excessive part of popular nationalism that seems to be rampant in some parts of Chinese society.

If only one aspect of Japanese society or Chinese society is looked at, it will be difficult to fully understand the situation. Both sides have to be looked at; both sides are real. This might lead me to comment on Mr. Clemons's points about my not talking much about interests. I think I have talked a lot about interests because my basic point is that emotions and perceptions are important, but I'm a professional academic and I believe in reason, that it will prevail.

As I pointed out, there are huge interests that the two sides share in common. But emotions and perceptions can play a large role in politics. Ways that will serve the interests of both sides, and the interests of the world, must be created. You might have thought, and Professor Kupchan too, that the measures that I have presented seem to be relatively weak vis-à-vis the huge challenge that Japan is facing. But it's not easy. There isn't a secret wand that will solve the problems in one go. It is a very arduous process of laying stones one by one. China and Japan are doing that all the time. But suddenly there's an incident like the Shenyang Consulate incident

and there's a blowup in the media and then all the stones that have accumulated are broken down. I don't think China and Japan can immediately erect something very stable because now the relationship in a sense is more mature than it was before.

### **Japan and China Still Misunderstand Each Other**

In the 1970s, for instance, there was a love affair as it were between Japan and China. They understand each other a little bit more than before. They are seeing the other side more objectively and there are certain elements of the other side that they don't like. That is very natural but one more point that I wanted to make is that they don't understand the other side fully, and although there's a lot of understanding compared to the 70s, there's even more misunderstanding of the other side. Just by decreasing the amount of misunderstanding it will be possible to greatly decrease the level of tension that exists in Japan and China about each other.

I was rather surprised to hear Steven worry so much about Japan becoming more independent. American interest in East Asia is firmly established, and both Japan and China would like to maintain the U.S. presence. It's not a zero-sum game. All countries can benefit from the contribution that America has been making and I hope will be continuing to make in the region both militarily and economically and otherwise, too.

As for Japan trying to bring in the U.S. as a counterbalance against the rise of China, I am not fully convinced because as far as the military aspect is concerned,

Japan is not fully confident about what the Chinese military is going to be used for in the future. As a hedge Japan would like to reinforce its military cooperation with the U.S. and I think that is quite natural. If there are Japanese politicians or Japanese bureaucrats that go beyond that, my view is quite different from the politicians and bureaucrats that think like that. Shintaro Ishihara, Junichiro Koizumi, yes, there are those kinds of people that must be dealt with. In what way? There is no simple solution. I wish Prime Minister Koizumi had more time in London when he went to study there because immediately after he went to London his father passed away, so he had to come back home. Had he more time there, had he had more opportunity to mingle with Asians who were there I'm sure there would have been a big difference in his perception and understanding of Asia.

Chunxiao, the gas field in the East China Sea, the military confrontation: I did mention some things about this. As far as the energy issue is concerned I am rather optimistic that now the dialogue between the two sides is progressing towards a very constructive goal. There is no reason to fight over energy when both China and Japan are huge consumers and they both know if they fight only the suppliers will benefit. The experts have a very deep understanding and agreement on this point. The negotiations and discussions of the officers in charge of this are progressing very constructively.

Cold War II? I don't think so, because unlike the Soviet Union in the past China is very different. China is Japan's largest trading partner, for instance. Can Japan have a Cold War with its largest

trading partner? It's not in the interests of either side.

The apology issue. Right-wing statements coming from Japanese politicians. If that politician were a member of the cabinet, he or she would have been sacked. That has been the practice for the past twenty years or so. Only the Koizumi cabinet has not done so. Is this a new trend? I don't think so. Let's wait for the next cabinet.

### **Many Japanese Want to See Improved Sino-Japanese Relations**

Where are the constituencies for promoting a relationship between Japan and China? As far as the Japanese are concerned, who would not want to see a better relationship with China? I can't think of many people. Maybe some right-wingers but there's a great misunderstanding outside Japan that for instance those people who support the prime minister's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine are anti-Chinese. This is not true. I believe that a great majority of those Japanese who support the prime minister's visit to Yasukuni at the same time would like to see the relationship with China improve. This is a twist from the viewpoint of foreigners but they're not contradictory in the minds of the Japanese.

As for the Chinese side I'll leave it to Bojiang to answer but I think the Japanese more or less have understood that China's rise helps Japan and it is most important to have a very good and constructive relationship, a partnership, with China. The question is whether China will treat the neighboring nations, including Japan, as an equal partner. This is a very important point. In order

to have the Chinese keep on saying that they would like an equal partnership with each country in the region I think China and Japan should work together. This should serve the interests of all, including the Chinese.

Neo-cons in Japan? I'm not sure. People talk a lot about Mr. Aso and Mr. Abe. They have occupied very important positions in the new cabinet. But what they will actually say and do from now will have to be seen. Thank you.

**Questioner:** Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Command just went to visit China recently and they pointed out the need for greater military to military contacts. What is the reaction in China about this?

**Questioner:** I'd like to point out one issue. I'm not a Chinese expert but I'm trying to read the *People's Daily* every day. The coverage of Japan is 70% negative. About half is about historical issues and half about the restoration of Japanese militarism. I found that the coverage of the recent visit of President Bush was also covered very selectively. I heard that the *People's Daily* is read by a small portion of people but I understand it will dominate the political message from the political reading or interpretation or announcement by the Chinese government. I wonder if there are any ways to diversify the information to be carried to the Chinese people in general because I heard that in a recent survey of Chinese students the most familiar Japanese name is first Koizumi, second Tojo Hideki and third Yamamoto Isoroku. About ten years ago Takakura Ken, the movie star, and more soft names were popular. I think recently the

information about Japan is so selective. From the Japanese side and the Chinese side information about the world should be much better circulated, or announced, in a diversified way.

**Kupchan:** Let me just add one further issue to the agenda. It's already been touched upon, and that is the role of the United States and the U.S.-Japan security alliance on this issue. Looking from Beijing what changes in the U.S.-Japan security alliance would win Japan favor in China's eyes? Sometimes the Chinese say that they would like the United States to leave the region but that's hard to believe because that would prompt Japanese militarization and perhaps worsen the situation. What is it that China wants from the U.S.-Japan security alliance? What changes would it see as furthering Sino-Japanese rapprochement?

**Yang:** With regard to Japan's strategic direction and its connection with the U.S.-Japan alliance, some conclusions I made a couple of years ago have been proved by the case you raised. For sure, there is something in Tokyo far beyond the U.S.-Japan alliance. For some Japanese politicians, the strengthening of the alliance is a sort of tool or path by which to achieve Japan's own goal—to upgrade its international political status. In Chinese I call it *jie chuan chu hai*, something from the bottom of the heart for some leaders there. Unlike some of my Chinese colleagues I do not necessarily consider it to be 100% bad, because in a historical context, such a tendency is unavoidable or “natural.” But the problem, the key point is how can it be controlled? This includes Japan itself and also the United States, which is

why I said the United States should feel obligated to keep everything on track.

This is also related to another question by Professor Kupchan, which has something to do with the Chinese view of a U.S.-Japan alliance. If the U.S.-Japan alliance is similar to a European style alliance, I don't think it would worry the Chinese, but unfortunately it is not. Nevertheless, my feeling is that China is less worried than before, with the background that Sino-U.S. cooperation has improved in past years. An analysis of the so-called February 19<sup>th</sup> Two-Plus-Two Declaration by Japan and the United States in Washington is telling. In it, Taiwan was mentioned. I don't think since then that anybody can see any change in the Chinese so-called strategic assessment because of that statement. Also, nobody can see any real redeployment of the Chinese military, even with regard to the Taiwan issue.

As for the question raised by the Japanese embassy official, first of all I would like to express appreciation to those Japanese who came to China, especially to poor and underdeveloped Northwest China to do charitable acts, such as planting trees. Just before I came here two months ago I read a book describing such persons who have been working there for years. I was impressed. The problem is that if Asia observers hope that Chinese, especially the younger Chinese generation, will remember more good Japanese people's names, the Japanese side should create more good names for the Chinese side to remember. In past decades there were politicians such as Tanaka Kakuei and Ohira Masayoshi, but now who is there? There is only Koizumi Junichiro and nobody else.

As for the question mentioned by Professor Takahara about top-down nationalism, just yesterday I read something in the *New York Times* about the judiciary in China. I believe topics like this are the issues that Chinese people and the government are most interested in. In other words, Chinese society, including common people and the government, is more interested in its own development, such as the reinforcement of the rule of law, than with creating any negative relationship with foreign countries. Why would China do that? Some people would argue, "Oh, because you're the Communist Party you need something to concentrate on to maintain your legitimacy." I think that is wrong. In the same way that socialism has changed since the Cold War period, the Communist Party has changed a lot. The position of the Chinese Communist Party has changed from a revolutionary party to a ruling party, a governing or managing party. To some extent the Party has succeeded in broadening its base to absorb more interests of the different groups within society. It already has its legitimacy. What more does it need?

**Clemons:** One of the things that I consider a constraining factor in this discussion is the fact that history is on the side of those people who predict conflict. So whether you want to talk about neo-conservatives or liberal internationalists or wherever you come from in this spectrum of the foreign policy world it would be a huge mistake not to think about very clear high probabilities of an eventual conflict of some kind with China because that's what history says happens when a major power emerges. To avert that, one has to be realistic about those notions and reality but at the

same time put other strategies in place, hopefully to avert it. My concern is that there are lots of vested interests in government and whatnot and various places that are winners or losers given the course of direction. There are a lot of vested interests that become winners if a new and more compelling threat is manufactured. I worry about that dimension of American foreign policy strategy. But you can have miscalculations and mistaken assessments on both sides. History is on the side of those predicting conflict.

A future Cold War, I disagree with Professor Takahara, is not only possible it may in fact be better than many other possible scenarios. So let's not fool ourselves to think that there isn't, particularly over Taiwan, a set of scary scenarios that could unfold, that I'd settle for a Cold War in that circumstance. But I don't prefer a Cold War. Countries need to rid themselves of some notions of what sort of futures they have. They need to create a future where China becomes a regional node of responsible management of power and hopefully has enough new DNA promoting civil society at some point more than it does today. That may be the best option that can be had. Nations can also go the very negative route of the self-fulfilling prophecy of conflict, so care is necessary.

The question about the politics of apology is very important but one of the frustrations I have in this discussion is I see a lot of misbehavior on both sides. And I see misbehavior in the sense of how I'm looking normatively. But if I were Taro Aso or Abe or Fukuda and wanted to be the next prime minister and succeed in the Japanese political market-

place, one of my sources of legitimacy in the eyes of Japanese citizens is how I can be the normal nation guy, how I can fill Koizumi's footsteps and to some degree Ichiro Ozawa's and to some degree Nakasone's and make that a reality. Being the pacifist with China or the pro-engagement guy with China is no way to become seen in Japanese civil society as a legitimate national leader. This reality needs to be thought about.

### **Japanese Constitutional Revision Will Benefit U.S.-Japan Relationship**

The same thing is true in China that legitimacy for one's position is driven by this kind of new nationalism that is forming. I applaud it. I don't worry about it. I actually look forward to a day when Japan's lobotomy that it got during the occupation period is over. I use the word lobotomy, quoting the political minister of Japan who used the same words, that Japan is coming back and is beginning to feel its appendages again.

Koizumi has just put on the table a constitutional revision, and wants to raise the Self-Defense Forces to a ministry. I am for that. I worry about a Japan that continues to identify itself and its character and its constraints entirely in terms of what the United States does or doesn't do. In the long run that sense of being a supplicant or a vassal to American interests could backfire very badly on American interests and where the source of legitimacy of future prime ministers is based on how anti-American they are or not. That's why I look at the present situation as relatively unhealthy in the U.S.-Japan relationship and actually what I see is a much healthier relationship where Japan takes back its sovereignty on a number of fronts and

continues on that basis to identify a healthy U.S.-Japan relationship where they'll be with the U.S. in some cases and where they will diverge from the U.S. That's a much healthier kind of relationship for the U.S. to have with the Japanese into the future and the 21<sup>st</sup> century than exists today.

One more thing about Japanese and Chinese leadership. There are not enough good metaphors in terms of thinking about what an alternative scenario in Asia might look like. It would be very useful to go back at least to the spirit of those framers of the 1945-46-47 period that looked at international institutions, that looked at the United Nations, that looked at the GATT, that basically carved up and created institutions that would help stabilize global affairs and create space for the emergence of new great powers. Most of the international institutions today are anachronistic and no longer reflect the power realities of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. There are few good ways to resolve conflicts along the lines you're talking about. One of the things that can be done with great people and great minds is come back and say they're going to create a watering hole or a punctuation point to redefine how


Japan, China, the United States, Brazil, Europe, and Iran are going to interact with each other. That is perhaps a bolder take on how to do it but the last thing I want to do is to look at simple Sino-Japanese relations in a bubble, separate from the great questions of what goes on with global stewardship in the future. That is the best way to secure Chinese-Japanese relationships, not to count on just the benevolent or enlightened interests of a few people. Something much more rigorous is necessary.

**Takahara:** As far as Japan is concerned, it is situated in between a superpower and a potential superpower. In this sense it is in the same boat as Korea and Southeast Asian nations which all depend on the United States and, whether you like it or not, Japan will be further dependent on China for many things. Japan has to handle wisely its relationships and I hope that Japan's friends in America will understand this point. Thank you.

**Kupchan:** Please join me in thanking our panelists for a very interesting discussion.

[End]

Appendix 1: Japanese Sense of Closeness to China (1978-2004)



内閣府「外交に関する世論調査」 Public Opinion Polls on Foreign Relations, Cabinet Office, <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h16/h16-gaikou/images/z05.gif>

## About the Panelists

### Main Speaker

**Takahara Akio** is Professor of Contemporary Chinese Politics at the Graduate School of Law and Politics, University of Tokyo, and is currently Visiting Scholar at the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University. Previously he taught at Rikkyo University (1995-2005) and Obirin University (1991-1995), and was a Visiting Scholar at the Consulate-General of Japan in Hong Kong (1989-1991) and the Japanese Embassy in China (1996-1998). He also is a member of the Japanese Steering Committee of the International Politics Graduate Course at the School of International Studies, Beijing University. Professor Takahara received a D.Phil. from the University of Sussex, and a B.A. from the University of Tokyo. His publications include “Japanese NGOs in China,” *Japan’s Relations with China: Facing a Rising Power* (Lam Peng Er, ed., forthcoming), *New Developments in East Asian Security* (2005, co-editor, in Japanese), and *Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin* (1999, co-author, in Japanese).

### Discussants

**Steven Clemons** is Senior Fellow and Director of the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, where he previously served as Executive Vice President. He also has been Executive Vice President of the Economic Strategy Institute and Senior Policy Advisor for Economic and International affairs to U.S. Senator Jeff Bingaman. Mr. Clemons also was the first Executive Director of the Nixon Center. In addition, he was Executive Director of the Japan America Society of Southern California, and in 1983 he co-founded the Japan Policy Research Institute with Asia specialist Chalmers Johnson. Mr. Clemons received a B.A. and M.A. from the University of California, Los Angeles. He writes and speaks frequently on domestic and international economic policy matters, and on U.S.-Japan and Asia Pacific economic and security issues.

**Yang Bojiang** is Visiting Fellow at the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, the Brookings Institution, and Professor and Director, Institute for Japanese Studies, and Director, Institute for Korean Peninsula Studies, at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). He is a council member of the Chinese Association for Japanese Studies and a committee member of CSCAP China. Mr. Yang received an M.A. from CICIR and is currently a Ph.D. candidate. He has published the following articles in Chinese, among others: “Japan in the Process of State-Transition,” *Strategic and Security Review 2004-2005*, (2005) and “Japan’s Security Strategy and Sino-Japanese Relations in the Early 21<sup>st</sup> Century,” *Japan in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Political and Diplomatic Tendency* (2000).

### Moderator

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