

The Current Dilemma of Sino-Japanese Relations

by

Dr. Jin Linbo

Jin Linbo: Thank you very much Professor Kupchan for your kind words. I also want to thank the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA for such a wonderful opportunity. It is a great honor to speak at the Asian Voices Seminar in front of so many distinguished scholars, government officials, diplomats, businesspersons and reporters, on the topic of the current dilemma of Sino-Japanese relations—a topic that has been heated up by the nationwide anti-Japanese rallies in China in April of this year and the continued political confrontation between the two countries.

Current Status of Sino-Japanese Relations

As the title of my presentation indicates today, I would like to talk about the negative rather than the positive aspects of Sino-Japanese relations. I will first give you a general assessment of the current status of their relationship and then provide a brief analysis of the main issues and problems that currently face Sino-Japanese relations, and finally touch upon what China and Japan should do to achieve an amicable and stable bilateral relationship in the future.

China and Japan are the most important big powers in Northeast Asia and close neighbors. China is the largest developing country in terms of population and geographic size. Japan is the second largest economy in the world. It is in this context that we should say that relations between China and Japan carry signifi-

cant global as well as regional implications. Being aware of these implications, China and Japan have made great efforts in establishing and maintaining a friendly and stable relationship during the past several decades and their efforts have resulted in remarkable achievements in various areas, especially in the fields of economic cooperation and personal exchanges.

Statistics show that the trade volume between China and Japan has reached a record high of \$168 billion in 2004, and Japan's direct investment in China has accumulated to \$66.6 billion in the same year. Japan is not only an important investor in China, but also the biggest donor of overseas development aid to China. With regard to personal exchanges, there were more than three million Japanese visitors to China and more than half a million Chinese visitors to Japan in the past year. It is quite obvious that increasing economic interdependence between the two countries benefits both sides.

Downward Turn in Relations

With all the great progress that has been made during the past three decades, the overall relations, especially the political atmosphere between China and Japan, took a downward turn about ten years ago, and sank to their lowest level in decades this year. This April, several big cities in China, including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Chengdu and Shenyang, were swept by a wave of

anti-Japanese demonstrations. In both Beijing and Shanghai thousands of anti-Japanese protestors chanted slogans and carried banners urging boycotts of Japanese products and objecting to Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Some protestors even attacked Japanese shops and restaurants and smashed the windows of the Japanese embassy in Beijing and the consulate in Shanghai. In response to what happened in China, an anti-China demonstration and some criminal activity against Chinese property in Japanese cities such as Tokyo and Osaka have also occurred. Here, these two close Asian neighbors have explicitly shown strong animosity toward each other. This is taking place in such a way that mutual antagonism between China and Japan has reached its highest level ever since the two countries established diplomatic ties in 1972.

The renewed Sino-Japanese animosity gives cause for concern regarding potential instability in East Asia. It is a pity that sixty years after the end of World War II, there has been no true reconciliation between the two peoples and there's no immediate prospect of swift change.

What are the main problems or root causes that impede the rapprochement of these two Asian neighbors? In my view, for the time being, there are at least five difficult problems, namely the history issue, which has been symbolized by the controversial Yasukuni visits by top Japanese leaders, Japan's bid for a permanent seat on UN Security Council, disputes over territory in the East China Sea, the Taiwan issue, and the mounting mutual antagonisms and so on, that became the stumbling block to the im-

provement of Sino-Japanese relations and need to be properly handled in the years to come.

It is quite obvious that all the problems mentioned here are inter-related with each other, but for the sake of easier understanding and a transparent analysis they can be divided into two types. Roughly speaking, problems like historical issues and mounting antagonism come from the perception gap based on the different views and values that have existed between China and Japan for a long time. Problems like the UN Security Council issue, territory disputes and the Taiwan issue resulted from the collision of their tangible national interests. I will give you a general analysis with a focus on the history issue and the Taiwan issue.

History Issue Divides China and Japan

The issue of history is the most sensitive and long-standing problem in Sino-Japanese relations. During the last three decades Sino-Japanese relations have been disturbed by the issue of history, including the treatment of history in official Japanese textbooks, high-ranking Japanese officials' frequent attempts to whitewash aggression and atrocities, and official visits to Yasukuni Shrine. The most recent example of historical issues negatively affecting bilateral relations is Prime Minister Koizumi's fifth visit to the Yasukuni Shrine and the strong protest taken by the Chinese government and its people. The Chinese government condemned the visit as "a serious provocation to Chinese people" and canceled the bilateral talks on the North Korea nuclear crisis that had been scheduled for Monday. It is likely that the Chinese

government may take further retaliatory measures in the days to come.

The basic stance of the Chinese government on historical issues is “taking history as a mirror and looking into the future.” It argues that a correct view and attitude on history should be regarded as a political basis for Sino-Japanese relations. This stance emphasizes both the past and the future. China strongly opposed the visit to the Yasukuni Shrine by top Japanese leaders and publicly urged the Japanese prime minister to stop visiting the shrine in the future. China’s strong reaction on the issue of history in general and the Yasukuni Shrine issue in particular is more than just a political gesture; it reflects genuine frustration and resentment amongst Chinese people. This is a nationally held feeling that the Chinese do not have towards any other country, including the United States.

In comparison with China’s stance, the Japanese government tends to emphasize the importance of a future relationship rather than reflection on the past. To put it simply, Japan wants to put an impossible early end to the past with a view to concentrating only on the future, while China emphasizes both the past and the future. Such a gap between the two governments in addressing the issue of history clearly reflects the clash of their traditional views and social values. The traditional political cultures of both countries have been influenced by the Confucianism that set the concept of benevolent government and which stresses the importance of morality rather than legislation as a fundamental framework for ideal politics. However, modern Japan’s political framework was later influenced by its comprehensive introduction of Western civilization, which

attached great importance to legalism instead of benevolence and morality in its internal and external politics through the Meiji Restoration. China, on the other hand, still makes much of moral obligation as the most important principle in the formulation of its national policy, especially its foreign policy, even after it began to reform and open up in 1978.

It is against this background that the perception gap between China and Japan failed to be narrowed even by many years of extensive debates, and it remains to be seen when the two countries will be able to reach an agreement on the history issue. I don’t think it will come soon because of two reasons. One is that both governments are not likely to change their basic policy on the issue in the short term. Another is that it is unrealistic to expect that such a perception gap between China and Japan will be narrowed by any concrete measures.

Mounting Mutual Antagonism between China and Japan

Partially affected by the unresolved history issue, mounting mutual antagonism between China and Japan became detrimental to this poor relationship. In recent years the opinion polls conducted in both countries show that an increasing number of Chinese and Japanese people do not have good feelings towards each other. Geopolitically, China and Japan are so close, but psychologically they are quite remote, despite their common cultural roots. The negative feelings towards each other are strong, especially among the younger generation. According to a survey conducted by the *Mainichi* newspaper last month, more than 70% of respondents in their 20s through 40s said they didn’t like China. In con-

trast, 65% of the 2,418 respondents had a favorable impression of the United States and 44% liked South Korea. There is no doubt that a deteriorating mutual image between China and Japan will further poison the political atmosphere on both sides and make the improvement of this bilateral relationship even more difficult.

Main Causes of Sino-Japanese Problems

I would like to discuss briefly the causes of the decline of favorable feelings between China and Japan, which were at their height in the late 1970s and early 1980s. There are two reasons that contributed to the deteriorating of mutual images between the two countries. First, the end of the Cold War fundamentally changed the strategic context of Sino-Japanese relations. The demise of the Soviet Union brought to an end their shared opposition to the threat from the USSR. Bilateral security concerns rather than concerns towards a third party began to proliferate in their relationship. While Japan is actually aware of a rising China and worried about the "China threat," the Chinese are often alarmed by the revival of "Japanese militarism." Facing a sluggish economy, some Japanese even view Chinese economic growth as a threat rather than an opportunity to Japan. Under such circumstances China and Japan appear to have a competitive rather than complementary relationship.

Secondly, the domestic situations have experienced profound changes in both countries. In Japan, with the passing of the war generation there is a growing impatience with Chinese criticism of Japan's failure to come to terms with its past. Furthermore, in recent years some

Japanese intellectuals have written a controversial textbook that seeks to find pride in modern Japanese history and in the past wars against China. Such views further widen the gap with China and other neighboring countries. While Japan's young generation knows little about the Second World War and what Japan did to China and other Asian countries, the memory of Japanese war brutality has been kept vividly alive amongst Chinese youth. The perceived Japanese reluctance to clear its dark history provides a psychological justification for the Chinese to suspect the future orientation of Japanese foreign policy. From the Chinese perspective, a Japan that is unable to satisfy its neighbors' concerns about history will also not be qualified to play a larger role in maintaining peace and stability in the region.

Taiwan Issue Causes Tension in Sino-Japanese Relationship

Among the above-mentioned problems, the Taiwan question also loomed large as a thorny issue in recent years. As a matter of fact, ever since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, national unification has been the top priority of the Chinese government. From China's point of view, the United States and Japan are the only two major powers which not only have the intention but also the capability to prevent China's unification. In other words, for China, whether the Taiwan issue can be resolved peacefully depends on the attitudes of the United States and Japan. Many Chinese believe that Japan, perhaps even more than the United States, does not want to see a fully unified China since Japan wants to use Taiwan to tie up China strategically. In addition,

Japan has never officially stated that Taiwan is a part of China and the statement issued by Japan and the United States early this year saying that maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait is one of the “common objectives” for Japan and the United States convinced the Chinese that Japan will be involved in the future conflict across the Taiwan Strait. This is probably the main reason why China has been concerned with Japan’s intentions and policy towards Taiwan ever since the two countries normalized their diplomatic relations.

In a meeting with his Japanese counterpart, Mr. Machimura, in April, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing pointed out that the Taiwan question is closely related to China’s core interests and the national feelings of the 1.3 billion Chinese people. To adhere to the one-China policy is a political foundation of China and Japan relations. It is a strong requirement of China that Japan should fulfill its commitment and not damage the national sovereignty of China.

Besides the Taiwan question, the East China Sea disputes and Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council have also been explosive issues that may cause further deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations. As for the China Sea disputes, China argues that the two sides should “put aside disputes and engage in joint exploitation” while Japan urges China to completely stop its exploitation activities. Although the two countries have not found a solution to this problem yet, it is hoped that both sides will handle the problem in a “win-win spirit” and turn the East China Sea into a sea of friendship and cooperation.

On Japan’s UN Security Council permanent seat issue, China argues that Japan is not qualified. Japan became angry at China’s attitude and the two countries are quite emotional on this matter. It seems that only a sober-minded dialogue can help the two countries find an appropriate solution.

As I have already discussed before, the problems and causes are rooted deeply in the collision of the two countries’ tangible national interests, as in the clash of their traditional views and values. So it is next to impossible to expect a completely optimistic future for Sino-Japanese relations. Instead, it is more likely that the relationship will have a pessimistic or cautiously optimistic future. If the two governments fail to actively find quick and effective measures to stop the further deterioration of their relationship, tension between the two Asian neighbors could escalate into a fierce confrontation or even a military conflict, which will destroy the foundation of peace and stability in East Asia. I do not think that this is what the countries want to see. As a matter of fact, both the Chinese and Japanese governments have the political will to stabilize their relationship, though they have not found a proper nor effective way to realize it. Both the Chinese and Japanese governments have to be ready to adjust their policies and attitudes towards each other from a strategic point of view in order to achieve a stable bilateral relationship in the future.

Solutions to Improving Relationship

For China there are two tasks that need to be done as soon as possible. First, China needs to make adjustments to its “history issue first” policy and develop a

new approach to deal with differences over the history issue. China does not have to forget, but should forgive the atrocities committed by Japanese troops during their invasion of China. Second, as a policy adjustment, China also needs to reexamine its whole relationship with Japan from a strategic perspective. Japan should be regarded as a close partner with which China can cooperate in almost all areas to push forward its regional and global agendas. Fulfilling the above-mentioned task would be beneficial to China's national interests as well as conducive to the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations.

At the conclusion of the 16th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) convention in 2002, China presented a new concrete national goal, a blueprint for its long-term national objectives to be fulfilled by 2020. The new goal is to build a welfare society in an all-round way known as *Xiaokang* society, where the general populace would be able to enjoy a much more abundant and comfortable life. The establishment of the new national goal and the emphasis on economic development added the following implications for China's foreign policy. First, China's foreign policy has to concentrate on maintaining a stable and peaceful international environment amicable to its economic development. Second, to better serve economic development requires China to carry out a pragmatic and all-round diplomacy. Therefore, if economic development remains the top priority for contemporary Chinese diplomacy, then it seems important for China to put history issues in their proper place while addressing its differences with Japan. Only by doing so will China's national interests be better served.

By the same token, for Japan, there are also two main tasks that need to be carried out in a swift manner. First, Japan should always show its sincere repentance voluntarily and without setting a time limitation to express its repentance. It is the best way to secure forgiveness from China and other Asian neighbors. Second, Japan should not view a rising China as a threat both economically and politically. With regard to the Taiwan question, mentioning China as a "potential military threat" is unwise and detrimental to Japan's national interests as well as to Sino-Japanese reconciliation.

U.S. Should Act as a Balancer between China and Japan

I would like to mention briefly the role that the United States is expected to play in maintaining, if not creating, stable and healthy Sino-Japanese relations. As a unique superpower the United States has had not only profound influence upon international affairs as a whole, but also tremendous influence on Sino-Japanese relations simply because of the complicated interactions between the three powers. Both China and Japan have endeavored to have good relations with the United States. At the same time it would be in the interest of the United States to join not only a stable bilateral relationship with China and Japan respectively, but also a harmonious relationship with these two giant Asian powers simultaneously. There is no doubt that a relatively balanced and stable trilateral relationship among the three powers across the Pacific Ocean will definitely bring long-lasting peace to the Asia-Pacific region at first and to the whole world in the future. It should not be the strategy of the United States

to stand by or even play one country against another. Instead it should act as a balancer between China and Japan. It would be best for the United States to maintain a strategic relationship with Japan while creating a friendly and constructive engagement policy towards China. Thus it would be easier for China and Japan to develop an amicable and stable relationship in the near future. Thank you very much for your attention.

Eric Heginbotham: Thank you very much Dr. Jin. Those were quite comprehensive and extremely thoughtful comments. I won't try to address them point by point but rather just raise a few points or issues for further discussion. The first is picking up where Dr. Jin left off, the importance of this issue, the implications of this issue for the United States. These are two key partners of America in which we have important interests. All one needs to do is think about the interests we have on the Korean Peninsula and the role of both China and Japan in resolving a nuclear confrontation to understand that any appreciable or dramatic decline in the relationship has a very immediate impact on our interests.

Worsening Sino-Japanese Relationship Could Push Korea toward China

There are some other implications that may not be well appreciated. Depending on how the decline in the relationship takes place, if in fact things continue to go the way they are going, Korea, which is really caught in the middle right now and has leaned increasingly towards China, still values the role of the United States. But if there's appreciable decline in the Sino-Japanese relationship it has

the potential to push Korea significantly farther towards China, particularly if it's viewed as something that's provoked by Japan and Japanese nationalism. A decline in the relationship also forces the United States in a way to take sides. How exactly you define the sides depends on how the relationship declines and who is viewed as at fault in the region. If the Chinese are viewed as provocative, if there are more protests, if they dispatch more surface fleets to the East China Sea and the oil fields, then perhaps the choice is between China and the rest of Asia. If, on the other hand, Asian states view this largely as something that's provoked by Japan, rising nationalism in Japan, by Koizumi or Abe Shinzo's visits to Yasukuni, then the choice could be between Japan and the rest of Asia. Either way, I don't think it's a choice that the United States wants to have to make.

U.S. Could be Drawn into Armed Conflict in East Asia

Thirdly, it is conceivable that the United States could actually get drawn into armed conflict over this. We are a treaty ally of Japan, there are territorial issues on which the United States does not have an entirely fixed position. The dispatch of the Chinese surface fleet to the Chunxiao gas field during which it came into fairly close proximity to Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the Coast Guard is an indicator that it is conceivable that at some future point, perhaps as rules of engagement are relaxed, that we could have a shooting conflict that then forces the United States to make very difficult decisions about its position. In some ways we might view this as another Taiwan for the United States, a kind of conflict that has the

potential to draw the United States into problems, and down paths that it certainly doesn't want to go at times not of its choosing, and make choices between interests on both sides. This is an extraordinarily important issue, something the United States needs to pay attention to and should be very actively engaged in.

A second question—and maybe Dr. Jin can address this further in the Q & A—is whether we're in a situation now where leaders in Japan and China are caught by the popular forces that they have themselves at least partially been responsible for unleashing. Dr. Jin mentioned China's treatment of history in the late 1980s and early 1990s, you had the nationalism campaign, there were lists, the top hundred nationalist books, the top hundred nationalist movies. Many of these, if not most of them, were about China's wars with Japan, not just WWII and the occupation of China but the Sino-Japanese war and other issues. Of course on Japan's side, I don't have to mention the Yasukuni and textbook issues. Beyond Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni it appears that there is still conscious manipulation or a desire to implicate nationalism on both sides. This is something leaders in both countries now appear to be more aware of but certainly have not done enough to bring under control or even to stop pushing the limits.

The new LDP constitutional amendment revisions include language that the Education Ministry in Japan should in fact foster and encourage nationalist sentiment, and these are things that need to be tracked. There are indicators that moderates on both sides have come under pressure. The head of the *Keizai*

Doyukai in Japan spoke up against Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni and found a bomb on his doorstep and bullets in the mail. Similar dynamics have taken place in Japan where moderates publishing articles about the need to improve relations with China have been attacked in online blogs and other places as race traitors. The question is whether we are in a situation in which the leaders of both countries increasingly find themselves trapped by their own populations and by the sentiments that they have helped create. This obviously is going to take a lot of leadership to turn things around.

Mutually Incompatible Positions on Yasukuni Issue

Dr. Jin laid out a fairly comprehensive and reasonable set of measures that need to be taken. I don't want to privilege one particular issue; there are a large number of problems here that have historical background that go back quite a ways. But I will say, until the Yasukuni issue is resolved nothing else can happen. It's arguably not the root cause but at this point there is a standoff where the leaderships in both countries have taken positions that are mutually incompatible. It's hard to imagine anything taking place until that issue is resolved, and it is an issue about which the United States has said little or nothing. The United States is Japan's security guarantor. It is arguable that the actions that the Japanese leadership takes are calculated with an eye towards what is supportable by their American ally.

In some ways the United States is at least partially responsible either way, whether or not we make a statement for the impact on policy in Japan and on the

situation itself. I don't think it would be a mistake for the United States to threaten or set ultimatums about Yasukuni. Every country certainly has a right to honor its war dead. There is a need in all countries for a place like Arlington, so this is an issue that's going to take a long, long time to fully resolve itself. But Yasukuni is really not Arlington, and it never will be. I don't think it can ever play that role.

There are many other parts to the puzzle: transparency on the side of the Chinese, what they're up to militarily, the willingness of both sides to find resolution on territorial issues, China's treatment of history as well, but we're not going to even be able to take any of those steps until there is not a resolution but an accommodation on Yasukuni.

Andrew Oros: First let me say I'm pleased to share a podium with a fellow former student at Nagoya, Japan's great, underrated city where I also studied as an undergraduate and I'm also pleased to share the podium with someone else who's very interested in issues of Japanese security, and I think that talking about these issues in not just a bilateral Japan-China way but a trilateral way that includes the U.S. is very helpful and I think many of you here believe that as well, judging by the attendance. I'm also pleased to hear some constructive, pursuable suggestions for building a better relationship between Japan and China that I hear from Dr. Jin, something that I think is in China's interest and I think is also in Japanese and U.S. interests as well. This is something that we all need to pay attention to.

Despite being pleased on these areas, I am struck in a forty minute remark not to

be able to pick out really any single cause of tension in the Sino-Japanese relationship that links back to China. I don't think that's a very constructive way to begin. Essentially it seems that the three big causes of the deterioration of the relationship that we've heard are rising Japanese militarism, Japan's lack of accepting war responsibility and the Taiwan issue, and I'm not really interested in engaging right now in a sort of tit-for-tat response on each of those points but instead I'd like to just throw that out there and then come back to the title of today's lecture which is "The Current Dilemma of Sino-Japanese Relations."

Chinese and Japanese Leaders Create Their Own Dilemmas

Dilemma implies a choice, a choice for Japan, a choice for China. It's a choice between options that either aren't pursuable simultaneously, they don't work together, or it's a choice between options none of which are favorable. That's what a dilemma is. Frankly, I disagree with the characterization here because I think both countries have favorable choices to make in the relationship and it's time to begin making more of those choices. It seems to me that the only true dilemmas in Sino-Japanese relations are the dilemmas that leaders are creating for themselves. There are tensions of course in the relationship and I'll come back to that in a moment, tensions that are difficult to manage but I think that we make the problem worse by sort of reifying this into a dilemma that's somehow irreconcilable.

The blame is shared on both sides. We've talked about Yasukuni. Prime Minister Koizumi seems to perceive a

dilemma between rightly wishing to commemorate Japan's war dead and being able to improve relations with Japan's neighbors, and I don't think this needs to be a dilemma. There's an opportunity to frankly address Japan's past problems and open new roads for cooperation between Japan and its neighbors while commemorating Japan's past. It's also not clear to me what China sees as its dilemma vis-à-vis Japan. From the outside it seems to me that China enjoys a number of good options regarding Japan. It enjoys productive foreign investment from Japan, it has an open trading relationship—recently Japan and China trade is even higher than Japan-U.S. trade and development assistance, and China has a powerful neighbor that's consistently renounced the use of force to settle disputes. So I don't see the dilemma here.

Challenge for Japan and China to Develop Partnership Peacefully

Admittedly there's a U.S.-Japan alliance factor that complicates things but this is not a bilateral issue between Japan and China, it's a trilateral issue that certainly should be addressed. So what about the tensions? What are the tensions in the relationship and how might these be managed? First, I'd like to say that historically there have been great tensions in the U.S.-Japan relationship and of course in the U.S.-U.K. relationship and these tensions ultimately have led to deep partnerships, so I think that the challenge for Japan and China is to develop such a partnership peacefully. I refer to Dr. Jin's comments on history and although I don't disagree with the sentiment of it, the idea that correct views of history should be the basis for good Sino-Japanese relations is certainly a nice idea,

I don't disagree with the idea of that, but I think that you can actually have a strong relationship even when from the outset you disagree about history. This is the case with the U.S. and China, where we've built a relationship on a fundamentally different view of history and it's not as if things are perfect between our countries but I think things are going in a good direction and so perhaps it's worth noting that we can begin to have a better relationship and continue a discussion of history and one doesn't have to precede the other.

Multiple Processes Help China and Japan Explore the Past Together

Secondly I agree with Dr. Jin that Japan can benefit from further discussion about its past, especially vis-à-vis its future. I don't think this needs to be pre-conditioned but I think this is a good idea. I also agree with something Eric mentioned just briefly which is that China also can benefit from the idea of embracing openness about its past and this is something that perhaps the two countries can work on together not as antagonists but as shared explorers of the past and how this relates to the future. I'll point to a number of processes that I think are helping this: the APEC process that's deepening the recent six-party talks over North Korea, the growing bilateral diplomatic links between Japan and China. I think these all provide opportunities for leaders and diplomats to begin to discuss these issues privately and to craft a way to discuss them in a more public forum as well, not to limit this to a private forum.

I understand the sentiment of the Chinese diplomatic and government world to want to temporarily cut relations with

Japan over the Yasukuni issue. South Koreans have expressed similar concerns at the moment. But I think this is exactly the wrong direction. The time when people are saying things you don't agree with is the time that you engage with them and try to come up with better solutions.

Poll Conducted in China and Japan Has Silver Lining

I agree that Dr. Jin has pointed out this concern about public opinion in both countries. There's a bit of a milestone regarding public opinion that's worth noting. In August of this year is the first time that a joint public opinion poll has simultaneously been conducted among Japanese and Chinese and this is I think exactly the direction we need to be moving in, in a direction of openness. The results of this poll from August 23rd are not as bad as Dr. Jin suggests and this is something that's worth looking into because certainly the *Mainichi* poll you cited is a very reputable organization. But according to the polls in August of this year 62.9% of Chinese respondents had either a very bad or not very good impression of Japan—that's almost 63%—and about 38% of Japanese respondents had a very bad or not very good impression of China. Yet there's a silver lining to this cloud. According to this same poll, about 65% of Chinese respondents believed that economic relations between the two countries benefited both sides and 59% firmly supported or support China-Japan cooperation in regional issues. We shouldn't just look at one poll number, we should look at a totality. The willingness on the Chinese side, at least that's all that I found in the polls, suggests a common basis to move forward and I

think that's very much in the spirit of Dr. Jin's remarks.

Let me conclude on the security issue. One of my mentors at Columbia, Robert Jervis, wrote famously in the academic world about the "security dilemma" that faces countries all around the world historically and today. Certainly Japan and China are such a dyad. Japan feels threatened by China's military buildup, which we should note is the sort of buildup that's driven in part by a higher GDP in China and is exactly the kind of military buildup that Japan undertook as its GDP rose. China feels threatened by Japan's expanded military capabilities in recent years and in its deepening alliance with the United States, and we can look briefly at the academic literature on the security dilemma to see what is written about this.

How do you solve a security dilemma? The academic literature on security dilemmas stresses openness, that you need to show each other what you've got basically to keep an arms race from happening and here I think that there is again movement in the right direction. Just this week Secretary Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defense, is scheduled to visit a Chinese missile facility for the first time. This is a good sign. As I mentioned before, the six-party talks are also a good sign of cooperation. Sadly, I agree with Eric that greater militarization of this area of the world is quite likely despite our best efforts and thus I think it's even more important to develop institutionalized openness and cooperation to ameliorate this so-called security dilemma.

U.S. Involvement in Yasukuni Issue

Yasukuni is also an issue that's quite important to me. I'm happy to see that the U.S. is beginning to get a little bit more involved in this from discussions in Washington and I think this is reflected also in the *New York Times* opinion piece this week that condemned Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni. Here, again just to conclude, it's worth noting divided public opinion among the Japanese on this issue. Before Koizumi's visit in August only 38% of Japanese polled were in support of the visit, and 53% were against it. This has actually changed since Prime Minister Koizumi's actual visit and now the number in support is slightly higher than the number against: 48% supporting, 46% against. But I hope that the Chinese media, again which could benefit from greater openness, will report the complexity of this issue and not try to characterize this as a whole bunch of Japanese militarists, to show this is an issue that people disagree on in Japan and in democratic societies sometimes large groups of people don't get their way and they can criticize the government and work for something else. I want to end on a positive sign. In the same polling conducted this week, 64% of Japanese polled favored building a new war memorial in Japan apart from the Yasukuni shrine, and only 26% opposed this idea. And I would say, do it, just do it. This is something that could lead directly to improvement and to get beyond talking. Thank you.

Charles Kupchan: I'd like to give Dr. Jin a few minutes to respond to the issues that have been put on the table by Eric and Andrew. Before I do that let me add one other set of issues to the plate

and then we'll open it up for conversation. These are questions that came to my mind as you were speaking, things that to some extent I find puzzling from an analytic perspective and I put these questions both to Eric and Andrew as well. One of them is on the generational issue. You mentioned that anti-Japanese sentiment is particularly pronounced among younger Chinese. I don't know if the same is true among younger Japanese but I find that puzzling in the sense that if you were to read let's say Tom Friedman, the *New York Times* columnist, you would be told that everyone between the ages of 20 and 35 is listening to an iPod, sending text messages with the left hand and surfing the web with the right hand and has no time for nationalism or geopolitics. In the Euro-American context there is a consequential generational change taking place that's putting WWII essentially off the map in ways that I think are troubling for U.S.-Europe relations because that older generation was more Atlanticist. I'd be interested to hear your interpretation of why, as the WWII generation passes, you're not getting more cohesion but seemingly more polarization.

The second issue is that to me it's not at all surprising that there's anti-Japanese sentiment in China because China fits the model of countries that historically, as they go through periods of modernization, become more nationalistic because of domestic turmoil, income inequality, liberalization or modernization that creates vying among different factions. If you compare Japan to many other countries you would expect nationalism. Why is there also anti-Chinese nationalism in Japan? That's more puzzling to me. What is its political role? Where does it

come from? It seems to me if you answer that question you may get a better chance of figuring out how to moderate it.

Jin: There are several issues I want to mention. First, I will try to answer the question raised by Professor Kupchan. I think many, many people in the world including the Chinese are puzzled by the current confrontation between China and Japan. Simply because they can hardly understand the rationality behind the confrontation, given the increasing economic interdependence between the two countries. To answer your question from the Chinese perspective, we need to see why the young generation gives so much attention to the history issues that seem remote from today. I think, to put it in simple words, it's because Chinese society is now getting more open. In the 1970s when China and Japan established their diplomatic ties, there was almost a majority of Chinese that opposed that strategic choice made by the Chinese government. But they didn't find a chance to express their views against it. They didn't even know the process. In recent years because of the openness and also as a result of the wide use of the Internet, they have come to know more about foreign policy issues. So that was why in recent years more and more Chinese people, especially the young generation, got involved in the formulation of Chinese foreign policy.

Japan's Strong Reaction to Chinese Criticism

And another question is why Japan, a quite mature and developed society, has also become quite emotional and showed strong nationalism. My answer to this question is that it is because Japan is a

country with a very strong nationalistic tradition; if you read the books about modern Japan, especially about the Meiji Restoration and before the Second World War, you will find that the Japanese people are quite nationalistic. But the reason for their strong reaction to Chinese criticism lies in the Japanese belief that China is using the historical issue as a diplomatic card to put pressure on Japan. It's not understandable for Japanese, especially the young generation, because they feel that they have already done enough to show their repentance to the Chinese people. So why does China after sixty years continue to persist on past issues? That kind of feeling is quite strong among the Japanese people.

I turn to other questions raised by Professor Oros. You said something I can agree with, that there is some kind of adjustment that the Chinese government should make with regard to its policy towards Japan. From the third party perspective it's quite natural to raise that kind of question. But you know the Chinese political system and society are not quite similar with that of Japan and the United States. China is in a transitional period and we have to regard the problems happening in Chinese society with that kind of a perspective and some kind of understanding. It takes time for the Chinese government to base its foreign policy on a ground that might be similar in character with what Washington and Tokyo did, which probably will happen in the future. I'm basically optimistic about it, but it takes time.

As for the poll you cited in your remarks, yes, of course, the majority of Japanese and Chinese want to see closer economic cooperation between the two countries.

But that is quite contradictory with their stance on the political and historical issues. If you separate the two questions you will see opposite answers. I don't think that increasing economic cooperation between China and Japan can automatically change the basic stances of the two peoples on many political issues. It's rather opposite, that the Chinese government and the Japanese government should actively do something to improve their bilateral relations. They should lead public opinion in the right direction in their own countries.

Oros: I agree totally with Dr. Jin that improved economic ties between Japan and China alone are not going to fix this problem. They have to be supplemented by other activities on both governments' sides.

Heginbotham: It's true that the historical issue and animosity is not going down with the younger generation. It's often been portrayed as getting much worse among the younger generation. That is probably an exaggeration. The survey data, at least from the Chinese side, shows that opinions are about the same among younger and older cohorts. On the Japanese side, I'm not as sure, although on many basic security issues that seem to converge in some ways with the attitudes towards China, it's true. On the question of why nationalism is still a force in Japan or seems to be on the rise, I agree with the statement that part of it has to do with the fact that the Japanese do not understand why China will not accept their apology. The apology's been made, reparations have been made in the form of ODA if not formal reparations, but also I'd add this goes back to a fundamental difference in perception about what happened during WWII and the

role that Japan itself played as opposed to the leadership. The Japanese see themselves as victims here both of their own military as well as the international environment. I wouldn't exaggerate it but to some extent they see the country as having been forced into the war and certainly they see the country as having been hijacked by its military leadership.

Q & A

Questioner: I have a question about how the Chinese government sees the internal growing anti-Japanese sentiment. It doesn't look like the government agitates the anti-Japanese movement at all, maybe it's more like a grassroots movement. But having very tense relations between China and Japan is not in China's interest especially in terms of economic growth. I'm curious about how the Chinese government honestly looks at the internal anti-Japanese sentiment movement. Are they positive about it or are they kind of worried about where it will go?

Chinese Government Does not Want Further Anti-Japanese Protests

Jin: The result and the current stance of the Chinese government have already answered your question because the basic stance of the Chinese government is that they don't want to see further anti-Japanese movements occur in Chinese society. The reason for this is very simple. As China concentrates on economic development, maintaining domestic stability seems more important. Although the Chinese government has not regarded the anti-Japanese sentiments per se as something wrong or something that even should be condemned, massive quickly spreading anti-

Japanese protests would be very dangerous for political stability in China. Because of this, the Chinese government doesn't want the issue to be heated further. But at the same time, I also don't think that China will change its political position towards Japan on the matter.

Questioner: Dr. Jin and others if you'd like, how do you think the Sino-Japanese relations have been influenced over these last few years by the adoption in Washington of the preemptive war policy by the Bush-Cheney administration? And secondly, in that regard, I'm sure you know that we're coming on the post-Cheney era now with probable criminal indictments of the Cheney circles in the White House and also the broader recognition of the disaster in Iraq so that you could very well see Cheney and Rumsfeld and others of this circle removed. What kind of impact will that have in Asia, or is it having one already?

Jin: You raise a very sensitive and difficult question for me to answer, but I think basically what happens in the United States—its policy towards China and Japan—of course will affect the Chinese government's attitude and the Japanese government's attitude towards each other. The U.S. government's position is to adopt a new kind of strategy that stresses the role that Japan has to play both in regional and global issues. Now Japan, compared to the past, feels that it will get more and stronger support from the United States because the U.S. needs more support from Japan in the process of implementing a preemptive strategy. It would encourage Japan taking a strong attitude toward China; China already feels threatened by the U.S.-Japan alliance, which has given rise

to anti-Japanese sentiment in China. It probably also invites criticism from within Japanese society as well, because many Japanese people don't want Japan to be so supportive to the preemptive strategy of the United States. As for your second question, it is more difficult for me to answer. Maybe Eric and Andrew can answer your question.

Heginbotham: I'm not sure I'll address the second question but on the first question, and this has less to do with the doctrine of preemption than with really coalitions of the willing and the post 9-11 shift in U.S. perceptions of its interests with allies, that the allies do not inevitably and always take absolute preeminence in U.S. security interests and that protecting those lives, fostering those lives, those are not always front and center. Basically we have a variety of security interests around the world, they're shifting, flowing, in each case we have a different set of countries that can participate and can help us out. This is a doctrine or an idea—the idea of coalitions of the willing—that is likely actually to survive the end of this administration and even into a Democratic administration if one's elected. It's maybe a fact of post 9-11 international politics, maybe moderated to some extent, but I think that shift is structurally defined at least until the war on terrorism ends or something else happens. Other countries may be more important so there's some insecurity on that point and it does drive or has driven Japan to go quite far in solidifying its relationship with the United States. That may in fact make it appear somewhat more proactive/aggressive, depending on one's position.

Questioner: I see that you are all trying to see the silver lining in this deteriorating relationship. Personally I don't see any silver lining. I was in Japan recently and was very struck by how everybody was criticizing China, and in that kind of environment I don't think the proposals that some of you put forth of establishing a dialogue or exchanges can get started. That has been the case with the Japanese and Chinese governments' effort to establish some scholarly exchange to discuss the textbook issue, which never got off the ground, unlike Japan's relations with South Korea.

I agree completely with Eric who said that only a very strong leadership could put a right perspective and a right tone in this debate to resolve the issue, just like what Kim Dae-jung did for the Japan-South Korea relationship. I don't see any silver lining because I don't see any leader with the courage and stature of Kim Dae-jung coming in Japan or China. You could say that Koizumi's departure from the scene next year may be a silver lining but it could get worse. My question is that Dr. Jin and some of you talked about the possible U.S. role in resolving this conflict. As Dr. Jin said, Japan is an increasingly strong, enmeshed ally of the United States in the U.S.-global military strategy and everyone understands that this alliance will be deployed if something happens in the Taiwan Strait. Under that understanding, how could the U.S. play any role in mediating? As long as the U.S.-Japan alliance is there and getting stronger and changing in nature, how could the U.S. play a role in resolving this issue?

Kupchan: Let's take one more question and then we'll come back to the panel.

Questioner: I wonder how many in this room have taken a look at the official website of the Yasukuni Shrine. It has both Japanese and English pages. In very unambiguous words, it calls the Tokyo War Tribunal one-sided, unilateral, arbitrary, and it also says, therefore, those Japanese war criminals are martyrs and they are among the gods to be commemorated at the Yasukuni Shrine. So come and worship those gods. At the same time the government of Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Article 11 clearly states that the government of Japan accepts the results of the Tokyo War Tribunal. So, if the leader of the current government of Japan visits the Yasukuni Shrine, it creates some very delicate, complicated, diplomatic problems. Do you have any comment on this?

War over Taiwan not Likely

Jin: I should say that it is very difficult for the United States to play a kind of balanced role because the U.S. strategically has closer relations with Japan, but with regard to the issue of Taiwan I don't think there is a pending war in the Strait. Theoretically speaking, China cannot denounce its right to wage war against Taiwan's independence. But I don't think it will take place. It is quite possible for the United States to play some kind of role if it wishes to do so. Even if a war happens it might only happen more than ten or twenty years later. I don't think it will take place concerning the Taiwan question because China now wants to concentrate on economic development, so there's no room to wage a war against the independent movement in Taiwan.

The second question on Yasukuni, I agree that it is really a serious question and should be addressed by the Japanese government and Japanese people as a whole. After WWII, the acceptance of the results of the Tokyo War Tribunal was the new departure of post-war Japan. It's the obligation of the Japanese government and its people to deal with that. But I don't think it's a good idea for others, especially other governments, to get involved in the process. That will make things more complicated. The Japanese people and some NGOs within Japan should actively do more to change what their government does in the wrong direction.

Growing Japanese Hostility toward China

Oros: I appreciate your comment and actually I agree with it more than I disagree. I also am troubled at the growing sense of hostility in Japan toward China. Among Japanese I know people that seem very easygoing and straightforward in other ways have surprised me with their comments about China. And I agree with you also that there doesn't seem to be any clear obvious leader to change this problem. Of course it would be nice if Prime Minister Koizumi were the one to do this as his swansong before he steps out but I don't expect that to happen. At the same time we are now more aware of the degree of hostility that's there, and sometimes it is a crisis that promotes a solution. Certainly you can look at the racial issues in the United States as an example of that. Leaders emerge from unusual places. One possibility, the Democratic Party was just trounced in the last election, right? Perhaps in its new leadership a new generation is taking control. Perhaps the

foreign ministry will put more pressure on other ministries to play a greater role in resolving this. I'm not saying that these are the most likely scenarios but we have to work towards this because if we just ignore it it's very problematic. Another possibility, the war memorial that's been shelved since 2002, maybe this is the time to bring this about. One of my other mentors, Aki Tanaka, was on this commission. A lot of work's been done on this, and maybe it's time to read this again.

The U.S. can play a positive mediating role. Certainly it's not an honest broker. But the U.S. brokers many negotiations around the world without being seen as impartial. Obviously the relationship with Israel is the best example of this. The U.S. can try to promote a dialogue at times, and the U.S. can also push Japan to act in certain ways, to use its special relationship when it's appropriate. For example, the U.S. could do much more on this Yasukuni case although that's something that needs to be done privately rather than publicly, but I'd like to think that more has happened. We should not give up on this and work to create real solutions.

Questioner: I'm from the Ministry of Finance so I look at more the economic area than the political area. I don't think the relationship between Japan and China is really deteriorating because as Mr. Jin mentioned there are many good, positive developments. For instance, there are more visitors from China and from Japan and they really love sight-seeing in each other's country. There are more students coming to Japan. Seventy thousand Chinese students are now studying in Japan. The first second language in Japan is now Chinese, not

French or German as it was before. Many Japanese love watching Chinese movies and so on. So culturally, and also of course economically, we have a tighter, deeper integration between those two countries and our trade is almost balanced. It means we can enjoy trade in both ways.

The governments have also become more deeply integrated, such as the Finance Minister's meeting after the Asian financial crisis. We now feel that we are tightly interconnected and we should explore this way. That is the consensus among Finance Ministry officials. I cannot really agree that the relationship is totally deteriorating. It is deteriorating in some areas. For instance, the Yasukuni issue, as many people already argued, more people are against the idea of the Yasukuni visit by the prime minister and a Japanese high court already decided that it is against the constitution because it is against the idea of separation of government and religion.

Of course there is the argument that we should speak out more, and we cannot keep apologizing. Several prime ministers, including Koizumi himself, have already apologized. He made a strong, remorseful and repentant statement this May. And we have been repeating it. There is a sentiment among Japanese about how long must we continue this. But at the same time many people try to remember what Japan did in the war, how big the mistake was for us and for other countries. Many people from that period are now dying and they try to keep those memories alive. More and more papers and books are published on the atrocity, failure, and the mistakes of the Japanese about WWII. I don't think we are now having a stronger nation-

alism. It is maybe a movement to try and regain some national pride such as saluting the flag. We also must play more of a role in the international sphere including sending soldiers to Iraq for recovery, not for war, so I don't think our nationalism or militarism is gaining power. We must deepen that kind of positive element going forward.

Questioner: With the American political process, it took a Richard Nixon to open up ties with China. Richard Nixon's conservative political base was pretty firm. Is it possible it may take someone like a Koizumi or a future conservative leader in Japan who visits Yasukuni, political gestures like that, to actually create a breakthrough in relations with China?

Jin: It was mentioned that we should also emphasize the positive aspects of the relationship and I agree. But the reason why I focused on the negative aspects of the relationship is because I think the negative aspects in Sino-Japanese relations are now more influential, in the short term, not in the long-term. If we take a long-term view, economic interdependence will prevail in deciding the direction of these relations.

The second question about what kind of role can we expect for right-wing politicians? I think it's true that Mr. Koizumi did something very, very unacceptable for the Chinese government, especially his repeated visits to Yasukuni Shrine, but at the same time I think he also did something very positive which other politicians in Japan cannot do. For example, Koizumi, in his early years in office said that a rising China is not a threat for Japan. I don't think that other politicians can say that openly. The Chinese government and the Chinese

people should look at a person like Mr. Koizumi from at least two perspectives, a negative and a positive one at the same time.

Both Governments Making Efforts to Improve Relations

Heginbotham: It is clear that both governments see extraordinarily strong interests in a stable relationship and that there are many people working both inside government and outside of government to build the foundations for an improvement in relations. On the government's side, economic engagement is obviously extraordinarily heavy, it's supported by, at this point, a very intensive diplomatic dialogue; at the vice-ministerial level there is a set of foreign ministry meetings, we just had the third and I believe they just started in April, so it's a pretty intensive set of dialogues. If we could get past some of the issues which basically make the relationship a non-starter then this does provide a strong basis to build on. But all of this progress is more than negated by some of these spectacular political events and that public perceptions continue to erode very quickly.

We have a patient whose been struck by a car and is critically injured and we're sort of treating it for an ulcer here. The main priority right now has to be to staunch the bleeding and stabilize the patient. I completely agree with Andrew's point, there is a fairly straightforward solution here and that's the Fukuda plan, that is something the United States can engage in despite its security relationship with Japan. We do this with many other countries, we have all kinds of strategic engagement now with China—it goes by a different name but it's

engagement. At the same time we also discuss in frank terms human rights and other issues. With Japan we can certainly move forward politically and to some extent militarily although we might rethink how fast and what our priorities are. But at the same time I see absolutely no reason why the United States should not be pressing for and encouraging and expecting a new, non-denominational war shrine that can get the relationship past these issues.

Oros: I'd also like to comment on these two points to combine them together. Just to try to step back again for a moment, I think that in a sense building on an earlier point raised, we should acknowledge that what's trying to be attempted to accommodate China's peaceful rise to not have this kind of disruption in the international system lead to another war, which is an enormous challenge. From my own personal perspective, I think things are actually going quite well. But I share the concern that my perception that things are going well seems to be out of tune with what many Japanese think and what many Chinese think and this I think is Eric's point—that we need to pay attention to what the public thinks and not just have this be a question of elites trying to manage this.

At the same time, to the second question about do we need basically another Nixon to go to China, a Japanese Nixon to go to China. Well, my view is, Nixon's gone to China. That's happened. We don't really need a dramatic opening anymore. I don't really believe we need anything dramatic anymore. Japan has apologized repeatedly for its war actions; this is not to say that it can't continue to reinforce this message. We can have a new war memorial instead of

Yasukuni, in Japan there can be some effort to try to contain far-rightist thought, which of course is a very small sliver of Japanese society but can be very provocative. And I don't think it's enough to just hide behind free speech and say, well, people can do whatever they want in a democracy; there's some leadership that can be done. But to me, all of these things are incremental points, they're not dramatic departures. Sadly, again, I agree that what we need actually is some leaders to do some of these things, and try to push the public to say, you know, it's true, lots of people are going to China, lots of people are studying Chinese, lots of people are listening to Chinese music.

The last thing I would say is when I was first in Japan, studying Japanese, I went to Korea for the first time, to Seoul, and I was absolutely struck—this is now fifteen years ago—by how much younger Koreans seemed like younger Japanese that I was in college with. They seemed to dress similarly, they seemed to listen to the same kind of music and watch the same kinds of films, even though Japanese music was actually banned in Korea at that time. I thought, it's just a matter of time before these two countries come very close together because they're so obviously similar and Korea's on the rise. And I can't say that that's really what's happened in the last fifteen years, so I'm hesitant to say that this is also what's going to happen happily in the Chinese case as economic ties come together, that this is going to somehow naturally lead to better relations. I don't think that's the case and of course that wasn't the case in Europe either in the early twentieth century.

Questioner: In my view there was

something extremely important in your presentation and that is related to your concluding remarks. You have given two principles for China to act on and two principles for Japan to act on. As for the first principle, you mentioned that China should back away from the position of history first. I think this is an extremely important statement and I do not know the extent of freedom of speech in China but I think this was a very courageous statement, and I thank you for that.

Now as for the first point of view as to what Japan should do, I'm not using the same language which you have used, but in my view it is extremely important for Japan to be sincere on the history issue. In a way it is very sad that there is apology fatigue in Japan. However, if Japanese people are sincere with our history, they cannot back away from it. There is a lot to learn, in both the older and in the younger generations. If you go through various websites, there are now tons of books and documents related to the Yasukuni visit, the Yasukuni Shrine, the Russo-Japanese war, and on the whole Japanese people are very serious about their history. The problem is that on the one hand there is this history fatigue, apology fatigue, and for the moment their views are very polarized. But I think the further Japanese people continue to be serious about history, and that they continue to try and get some kind of national consensus, a feeling is bound to emerge that what they did or part of the actions they did during WWII in Asia was awful. Clearly it merits an apology.

If a Japanese person who received a typical education has enough resources and has the opportunity to probe history this is a kind of conclusion and con-

sensus which would emerge. I think on the whole Japan is moving in this direction. Someone said there is no silver lining, and if there is a hope it's only the prime minister. Is that really so? How about the Japanese people? I hope China can catch this signal, that there are many people in Japan who think that history is important, that it is ridiculous for Japan to say to the Chinese that it should be future-oriented. No, this is not the message that the Japanese should tell the Chinese. The Japanese should say to the Chinese that they are not forgetful about history. But this is the point I think which you mentioned as to what Japan should do as a first point. I have used different language but the spirit is very much the same. So if there's a small candle of light at the end of the tunnel for hope, you made a very fine concluding remark.

Questioner: I recently had the opportunity to live and study in China for a while, and on the topic of rising anti-Japanese sentiment, particularly amongst the young, one of the things that struck me while living in China was the depiction of Japanese violence on television, particularly in historical dramas. It's really quite a lot of the programming that's on television. Given that the Chinese government does have a great deal of control over what is televised and broadcasted and as well in light of rumors of government complicity if not facilitation of the anti-Japanese protests in July, I'm wondering if perhaps the Chinese government has domestic, political purposes for perpetuating anti-Japanese sentiment. I have not such a great foundation of Chinese communist history but I understand that anti-Japanese resistance is one of the foundations of the Chinese Communist party

and, Marxism being lost, I'm wondering if perhaps this has something to do with the legitimacy thing, or something along those lines.

Questioner: To give some perspective to this, I remember the 1980s, I was living in Japan at the time, and I do remember all the concern in the United States with Japan as number one, taking over one industry after another, the Pebble Beach golf course. The attitudes in the U.S. were very, very negative about Japan. This was stoked by people like Ishihara who said, well maybe we're going to just take some of our technology and work with the Russians if the U.S. won't cooperate. Some of the attitudes in Japan were pretty negative about the U.S. too. Is this worse now than that was? It seems to me we got by that without too much of a problem.

Kupchan: Let's go right down the panel. Dr. Jin, some closing thoughts, and then Eric and Andrew.

Domestic Politics Influence Sino-Japanese Relationship

Jin: First, I'd like to thank the questioner for his remarks because we have a similar kind of thinking on the issue. Secondly, I think the gentleman raised the question about the links between what happened in China today with the government's intention as domestic politics. I can't deny that in both China and Japan their bilateral relationship has become something beyond their foreign policy. It's more correct to say that it's no longer a foreign policy issue, it's a domestic policy issue. It's very, very complicated, which is true for both China and Japan. The best way for the two countries is to be more reasonable; only

by doing so they will be able to narrow the differences between the two peoples and find the proper way to improve their bilateral relations in the near future.

Chinese Government Encouraged anti-Japanese Protests

Heginbotham: I appreciate the historical context and reality check in the question. Unfortunately I really think it's a worse dynamic, a more dangerous dynamic. I don't think it's not possible to turn the thing around, the common interests are there, the recipe is there, it will take a whole lot of work, but the public dynamics of this are quite scary. Was this encouraged by the Chinese government, are there domestic motivations for this? Clearly, originally there were. There was a very conscious design program during the 1990s post-breakup with the Soviet Union. China looked around for what could motivate and support legitimacy. History was the answer, nationalism was the answer, there was a very conscious program. Things though have changed quite a bit since then. This was not the first time that the government's been scared, and they were quite scared in this particular case. But you know obviously large groups of spontaneously organized angry people across multiple cities, creating new ties and finding their voice is not necessarily something that the Communist Party has an interest in, so they're quite frightened of this. They did have advance warning, they did certainly try to channel this, they didn't try to stop it.

I was in China at one of the campuses where protests were organized in 1996 and 1997 around the Senkaku issue. At that point it was two cities, a handful of universities, they actually applied for the

right to protest and it still wasn't all that easy to put a lid on it. The protest appeal was denied, the students decided to do it anyway, the public security bureau came down. This is something of a digression but my point here is that this is a whole new animal, this was across ten or so cities, very broadly organized, they had text messaging and all these things that didn't really exist in 1996 and 1997. Even the rally points in individual cities were spread out—this wasn't something that was going to start on a campus and then march down a road, this was something that was going to start in ten places—so this is really a whole different animal and it's something that's quite frightening.

The depiction of Japan on Chinese TV and other uses of history by China is sort of where we begin to untangle this. Is it fair to put the onus on Japan and Yasukuni rather than addressing China's issues first? It's very complicated not to untangle here. It's not inconceivable to think that governments can begin to negotiate on this. As one individual pointed out, the government does have control at least of the TV if it doesn't have control of all the students in the country, and certainly Japan does have the right to expect that in exchange for greater appreciation and understanding on these historical issues, on Yasukuni, that China in turn will control its own behavior, especially its media.

Oros: I'd like to come back to one of the first questions that was posed in looking forward to what's going to happen in this relationship. First I want to underscore an earlier point that I made that I think that the ambition here to accommodate China's peaceful rise is quite a big ambition and something that we all

are invested in, in helping happen, and so I agree with Eric that it's somewhat different than the case of U.S.-Japan relations in the 80s, although actually I'm struck by how similar the treatment of Japan in the media in the 80s seems similar to me to the treatment of China in the U.S. media today. There's more of a parallel there. Part of what diffused the U.S.-Japan tensions was in fact the collapse of the bubble economy, that if Japan had continued to rise the way that it was, there was a growing *kenbei* (hatred of the U.S.) feeling in Japan, there was a growing nationalism in Japan at that time, so it's not clear that we really resolved that in a productive way apart from this exogenous development.

Reasons for Anti-Chinese Attitude among Japanese

But in looking at the future, Professor Kupchan asked about the younger generation and I also obviously don't have survey data in front of me but I'm not convinced that younger Japanese are more anti-Chinese than older Japanese. But if that's true I think that the reason why younger people might be more anti-Chinese, I'm quite confident, is different than the reason why older people might be anti-Chinese, if the numbers are indeed different. I can think of three reasons and they all point to possible solutions in the tensions between Japan and China. First, younger Japanese feel quite insecure today. The unemployment rate among younger Japanese is much higher than it is for other working age groups except for older men who are being forced to retire early. So they're insecure about the economic future and they see China's rise in zero-sum terms and there are some things we can do

about that but I think that's a problem. Younger Japanese came of age at the time of the sarin gas attacks in Tokyo, at a time when there was fear that the U.S. was going to withdraw from East Asia after the end of the Cold War and Japan was going to have to fend for itself; it sees the North-Korea nuclear crisis, so there's a lot of feeling of insecurity and the media plays a role in this in Japan in framing China as an enemy to Japan just like the American media plays a role in that in this country.

A second factor of why younger people might be more concerned about China is younger people in Japan are less concerned about Japan's military and the rise of Japan's military, they're less suspicious about Japan's military, this is something that my book on Japan's politics of anti-militarism will be discussing. I also think that quite apart from complaints of Japanese textbooks the reality, if we take a step back again, is that most young people, whether they're in China or they're in the United States or they're in Japan, don't really pay a lot of attention to their history textbooks and in reality the treatment of the 20th century in Japanese history textbooks is very similar to the treatment of the 20th century in any other countries' history textbooks—it's a very little bit of a very large part, so the reason why young people don't know a lot about China isn't because of textbooks, it's because young people don't know a lot about the world and they learn about the world through comic books and through television reports and through newspapers and this is why it's so important to have a societal consensus in Japan.

Thirdly, younger people tend to be more emotional and they're upset about being

asked to apologize again and again, they're upset about "being played." China is always asking for more. So what does this say about the future? Well, one is we see Japan's economy recovering and I think there are good signs that this will continue and this will make Japan feel more secure and this is a good thing. This can work in tandem with China, this can boost trade between these two countries, that's a start. Hopefully, this is probably the first two-hour forum I've been in on Asia in the last ten years where North Korea hasn't come up, so I'm going to do that right now and say that we're talking about these two countries in isolation but we're assuming that in the context of this things are going to go all right with managing Korea and that Japan and China will continue to work together on this in a positive way.

Japan Needs to Determine Future Military Role

But finally a sort of plug for my own research which is relevant here is fundamentally I think Japan does face a choice right now and this I'll put squarely on Japan's shoulders. It needs to figure out what kind of country it's going to be in the 21st century regarding its military and reassure its neighbors about this and also come to a societal consensus about this. My forthcoming book next year, "The Politics of Anti-Militarism," is really about how Japan is struggling with this idea and I think it's certainly possible that it's going to go in a good way but I think we also have to be honest that there is a sort of nascent nationalism in Japan today, people struggling for ideas about how you can be proud of your country, how you can be proud of your military and not step on

the toes of your neighbors or cause a big uproar. Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni shows that many Japanese people don't really get this point, how you can do both things simultaneously. I'm hopeful but I'm certainly not convinced that this is going to go well.

Kupchan: Please join me in thanking our panel for a very rich discussion.

[End]

About the Panelists

Main Speaker **Dr. Jin Linbo** is Research Professor and former Director of Asia-Pacific Studies at the China Institute of International Studies in Beijing. Previously he was a Research Fellow at the Graduate School of Law, Keio University, a Visiting Scholar at the Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, Harvard University, and a JSPS Invited Scholar at the Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University. His research focuses on contemporary Japanese politics and foreign policy, Sino-Japanese relations and China-U.S.-Japan relations. Dr. Jin received an M.A and Ph.D in Political Science from Nagoya University. His most recent publications (available in Chinese) are *Sino-Japanese Antagonism* (2005), *Prospects of the North Korea Nuclear Issue and Six-Party Talks* (2005), and *New Trends of Japanese Foreign Strategy in the 21st Century* (2004).

Discussants **Dr. Eric Heginbotham** is a Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation. He is a specialist on East Asian political and security issues. Before joining RAND, he was a Senior Fellow of Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He has also been a visiting faculty member of Boston College's Political Science Department. He speaks Japanese and Chinese and lived in Asia for more than 10 years. Dr. Heginbotham received a B.A. from Swarthmore College and a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He recently completed a book manuscript on civil-military relations in East Asia, *Crossed Swords: Divided Militaries and Politics in East Asia*, and has published articles on Japanese and Chinese foreign policy in *Foreign Affairs*, *International Security*, and the *National Interest*, as well as chapters in several edited books.

Dr. Andrew Oros is Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Studies, Washington College. Currently he is a visiting Northeast Asia Fellow at the East-West Center, Washington, DC. Previously he taught at American University and the George Washington University. Dr. Oros received a B.A. from the University of Southern California, an M.S. from the London School of Economics and Political Science, and a Ph.D. from Columbia University. He was also a Mombusho Fellow at the Osaka University of Foreign Studies. Dr. Oros has published several monographs and articles, including "Godzilla's Return: The New Nuclear Politics in an Insecure Japan" in *Japan's Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st Century* (Henry J. Stimson Center, 2003) and *Can Japan Come Back?* (co-author with Pacific Council on International Policy staff, 2002). He is currently working on a book on Japanese security.

Moderator **Dr. Charles A. Kupchan** is Professor of International Affairs in the School of Foreign Service and Government Department, Georgetown University. He is also Senior Fellow and Director of European Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Kupchan was Director for European Affairs on the National Security Council during the first Clinton administration, and has also worked at the U.S. Department of State on the Policy Planning Staff. He received a B.A. from Harvard University and M.Phil. and D.Phil. degrees from Oxford University. He is the author of *The End of the American Era* (2002), *Power in Transition: The Peaceful Change of International Order* (2001), *Civic Engagement in the Atlantic Community* (1999), and numerous articles on international and strategic affairs.