

Reconciled Publics vs. Polarized Politicians: Korea-Japan Relations after the End of the Cold War

by

Professor Park Cheol-hee

Park Cheol-hee: Good afternoon. It is an honor to be invited to this Asian Voices Seminar. First of all, let me express my thanks to the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA for inviting me here. I am very pleased to make a speech in front of such a distinguished audience.

Common Goals Bound Korea and Japan Together

I will talk about Korea-Japan relations after the end of the Cold War. It's a thorny topic which interests all of us here. Japan has long been considered as Korea's geographically close but emotionally distant neighbor, but during the Cold War, Korea and Japan maintained what one expert called "alignment despite antagonism." The need to cope with a security threat from Socialist countries bound Korea and Japan together, which facilitated and expedited cooperation between the two countries. Also, making Korea and Japan an economic powerhouse in Asia was the utmost concern of the political leaders in both countries. The development of these goals bound Korea and Japan together. These goals have laid the ground for facilitating cooperation between Korea and Japan, putting the history issues behind them.

However, the end of the Cold War changed the strategic terrain in East Asia. The ideological rift that has divided nations in East Asia is weakening. Also, a rapidly growing China is considered an opportunity rather than a threat. Coun-

tries in the region have varying perceptions about the threat coming from North Korea. After their common threat disappeared, the rise of national sentiments in Japan, Korea and China could be seen. Whether Korea and Japan can continue to cooperate as virtual allies in East Asia, in this changed strategic setting, is a critical concern for those who are interested in East Asia.

I'm going to talk about the nature of Korea-Japan relations in recent times. One of my main points is that the general publics in both countries are virtually reconciled, without regard to the thorny issues that divide them. But politicians are polarized in very domestically mired issues.

Conflict and Discord Characterized Korea-Japan Relations in 2005

I will begin by talking about what happened in the year 2005. In commemoration of the 40th anniversary of diplomatic normalization between Korea and Japan, the year 2005 was designated as the Korea-Japan friendship year. However, conflict and discord stood out rather than friendship and collaboration. The thorny issues that have haunted both Korea and Japan eventually roiled their fragile bilateral relations.

The first one was the Dokdo/Takeshima issue. In February, a small prefecture in Japan, Shimane Prefecture, declared a "Takeshima Day" to celebrate the 100th

anniversary of the island's allegedly legitimate annexation to Japan. Shimane Prefecture's move awoke and provoked a sleeping nationalism among Koreans. After this event President Roh abruptly switched his position from quiet diplomacy to hard line diplomacy and launched a verbal assault on the Japanese government. The Japanese government was bewildered by Korea's abrupt shift and unusually strong response but failed to make an utmost effort to reduce the tension. After all those twists and turns, however, both the Korean and Japanese governments came to realize that there is no easy solution to the problem of territorial issues. They reached the conclusion that each side is formally arguing that the island is theirs. But they are not trying to change the status quo at this moment; they have made it a dormant issue to avoid conflict.

Next came the textbook issues. The Fusosha textbook became a long-term concern between the two countries, but it was nothing new. What provoked the Korean people was not the Fusosha textbook itself; this time a photograph of the Dokdo Island in a civil ethics textbook became a big issue in connection to the territorial dispute that was going on. After long twists and turns again, many in Korea and Japan could breathe easy when the selection rate of the Fusosha textbook reached only 0.4% in August last year.

The Yasukuni issue is one of the most controversial issues in recent times. The Korean government and the Korean president continue to say they are against the Yasukuni Shrine visits of Prime Minister Koizumi. Koizumi visited the

Yasukuni Shrine on October 17th, which was his fifth visit during his tenure. This visit was a very carefully thought out and well designed, risk-minimizing tactical visit because he went there without prior notice to the media and without wearing Japanese traditional clothing, contributed money out of his own pockets, and stayed about five minutes without entering into the main area of Yasukuni Shrine. From the Japanese perspective he tried his best to minimize negative responses from neighboring countries. From the Korean perspective, however, what is much more important is the fact that he went there, despite strong opposition from Korea. President Roh was very frustrated with the move and is said to have given a history lecture whenever there was a summit meeting after that. This year no summit meeting is expected to be scheduled. The polarization represents the relationship between the Korean president and the Japanese prime minister.

Looking at this whole chain of events that damaged the bilateral relationship last year, the South Korean media described the year 2005 as the worst year of bilateral relations after the normalization of ties between Japan and South Korea. However, I don't think 2005 is the worst year. In the mid-1990s, one Japanese cabinet minister, Takami Eto, made a remark that Japan contributed positive aspects to Korea during its colonization of the Korean Peninsula. President Kim Young-sam was very furious. He stopped several exchange projects with Japan and even tore down a building that was the main symbol of Japanese imperialism.

Positive Developments in Korea-Japan Relationship

The next administration, the Kim Dae-jung administration, made a very drastic move to create a future oriented relationship between the two countries. But when the history textbook issue became a real problem in 2001, he also severed cooperative relations between the two countries, closing the cultural doors he had promised to open. So 2005 was not the worst year because despite all the history related disputes and difficulties, Korea and Japan promoted exchange programs, opened cultural doors to each other and their citizens, regardless of these issues, and visited each other without any problem. This is a meaningful development which is different from the last ten years.

Statistical data that relates to bilateral relations also shows that 2005 was not that bad because in the year 2004, for example, Korean exports to Japan reached \$21.7 billion, which is about 25.6% of total exports. The same year, Korean imports from Japan were about \$46.2 billion, comprising about 27% of total imports. Korea is the third largest trading partner with Japan, after China and the United States. Japan is the second largest investor in Korea, only after the United States. Japanese tourists occupy the biggest share of foreign visitors since 1975, consisting of about 40% of all foreign visitors to Korea. In 2004, 2.4 million Japanese visited Korea, which comprised about 42% of all foreign visitors to Korea. Koreans comprise the biggest percentage among all foreign visitors to Japan. In 2004, 26.3% of all foreign visitors to Japan were Korean. According to my research, as of July 2004 there were a total of 3,387 flights a

month between the two countries. That means there are more than 100 flights that connect Korea and Japan in a single day.

In 1965, when Korea and Japan normalized relations, about 10,000 people crossed the sea between them in a year. Currently, 10,000 people cross the sea almost every day. This is a huge change in the relationship between the two countries. Not only that, there are a lot of Japanese tourists everywhere in Korea, and they speak Japanese without any problem and without any hesitation. If it were about ten years ago, the Japanese tourists would have been very reluctant to speak Japanese in front of Koreans. Nowadays, Koreans do not care if Japanese tourists speak Japanese in subways or market areas. There is a natural acceptance of Japanese people among Koreans. Also, the Yon-sama phenomenon, the “Korea Wave,” is prevalent in Japan today. He’s much more popular in Japan than in Korea.

Historical Reconciliation between the Korean and Japanese Publics

In a survey conducted by the Cabinet office of Japan in 1997, about 46% of the respondents replied that they had a favorable feeling towards Korea. In 2004, it rose to about 56%, so the favorable feeling towards Korea is getting stronger as time goes by. This means that ordinary people in Korea and Japan naturally accept each other without a sense of utter differences between the two. When they meet and when they talk, they are not necessarily thinking about history issues. This is a drastic departure from the past. It seems as if the public virtually made a kind of historic reconciliation. But I don’t think, despite looking

at all these positive developments, that time will solve all problems. Though I am cautiously optimistic about the bilateral relationship between the two, I do not believe that the bilateral ties between the two countries will naturally improve over time. Rather, I'd like to emphasize the point that Korea-Japan relations should be managed very carefully and very strategically. If not, unexpected problems can arise.

History Issue Continues to Divide Korea and Japan

I would like to examine why these history related issues are coming up over and over again to divide the two nations. The first thing to consider is the change of regional dynamics in East Asia after the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, a clear and imminent danger was felt among Japanese and Koreans from nearby enemies. The Communist threat was the binding force that held Korea and Japan together, for all their differences. During the Cold War, even though Korea and Japan had history related conflicts, there remained little choice but for Korea to compromise with Japan, sometimes reluctantly. Japan refrained from making any provocative move against Korea because of the need to handle this common security and economic threat. When bilateral ties were troubled by unexpected events, political leaders could use backdoor channels to put out the fire before they exploded.

That kind of mechanism worked during the Cold War, but the end of the Cold War shifted the terrain in the region. In 1992, Korea normalized its relationship with China, and after that economic ties

between Korea and China developed very rapidly. For example, in 1995, the trade volume between Korea and China was approximately \$16.5 billion. Last year the trade volume between the two countries reached \$111.9 billion. China became Korea's number one trading partner, like Japan's. Also, Korea came to rely on China more to contribute to the long-term transformation of North Korea. Dismantling the Cold War structure on the Korean Peninsula is a dream for the Korean governments, and China has more leverage than other countries in the region. Korean-Chinese relations are much better compared with the past. The China factor is very important in the dynamics of the region.

China is related to the history issues in a very tricky way. If Japan makes a provocative move relating to history related issues, such as a Yasukuni Shrine visit, then Korea can never support the Japanese position. Like it or not, Korea will side with China. Many people say that the Korean government is becoming pro-Chinese. I don't buy that notion. But as long as Japan stubbornly sticks to the history issue with its own version of history, without humbly listening to Koreans, Korea will take sides—though reluctantly—with China. This is a newly developed dynamic that could not have taken place in the Cold War, which means that in the Cold War, Korea was compelled to compromise on history related issues. Not any more. Although Korea wants to compromise with Japan now, Korean politicians cannot legitimize such a move politically if Japan does not make sincere diplomatic gestures. The Cold War no longer divides Korea-China relations, which has profoundly changed the regional dynamics.

Rise of Populist Leaders

Domestic political changes must also be considered. It seems to me that both Korean and Japanese political leaders are not necessarily leaders; they are more followers of public sentiment. Both President Roh and Prime Minister Koizumi are not free from populist temptations, which is a historic change in the political terrain. The so-called “Age of Charismatic Political Leaders” is gone. In Korea, the three Kims are gone. In Japan, the factional leaders are losing influence. What is happening instead is the rise of populist leaders. It will take time to find a new type of political leader who has different assets and can draw a consensus among political colleagues within each country.

Looking at politics from that aspect, I think Roh and Koizumi are almost political twins in the sense that they usually send messages directly to the people rather than talking to politicians or their party. They rely on sentiment or instinct rather than relying on technically coordinated and collectively prepared suggestions. They listen more to the voices of the noisy minority in the civil realm, rather than respecting the opinions of the silent majority.

Leaders in both countries are very much mired in domestic political issues without any strategic thinking. Korean political leaders should stop lecturing Japan on past history issues, especially to its leaders. History issues are not the only issues that matter. Those who are forgetful of the past can be blind to the future; at the same time, those who are mindful only of the past cannot build a constructive future. Korea and Korean leaders should endeavor to undertake

more constructive and cooperative gestures toward Japan. At the same time, Japanese political leaders should make more constructive moves towards Korea, and should move first.

If Japan truly wants to stand against China as some people say, Japan should embrace Korea sincerely and seriously. Unless Japan engages Korea from a strategic angle, Japan will encourage Korea to move towards China. Putting Korea and China in the same boat is a huge strategic mistake. Instead, Korea and Japan together should promote a democratic political order and democratic market economy in East Asia. The history issue is now a barrier rather than a promoter of trilateral cooperation in the region. The history issue should be dealt with from a strategic angle rather than as a political move or domestic issue.

Finally, I'd like to touch upon the role of the United States in mitigating the conflict between the two countries. The United States should take a universal humanitarian approach that negates war and colonialism conducted by any nation. The Yasukuni Shrine visits are not simply a shrine issue. What matters to Koreans is how to interpret the history that the Yasukuni Shrine visits bring them. I find more cases of the U.S. defending the Japanese position by saying that Korea and China should overcome the history issue rather than admonishing Japan. This is a one-sided position rather than sincere advice from a neutral arbiter.

In order to settle this issue, Japan should not knowingly provoke its neighbors. War and colonialism are not the kinds of issues that can be defended. If the United

States tries to defend the Japanese position regarding these history issues because of its realist concern for strengthening its alliance with Japan, it will send the wrong signal to the world that the U.S. is defending Japan's military past—which it fought against in WWII. A security alliance is one thing, and the history issue is another. The first thing the United States should do is to make it clear to Japan that Japanese colonialism cannot be defended.

Secondly, the United States should advise Japan to resolve the history issues from a strategic standpoint. The United States should keep both Korea and Japan as strong alliance partners in order to maintain peace and stability in the region. However, the history issue is something that damages the region. If the history issue continues to surface as the issue that antagonizes nations in East Asia, Korea will drift away from Japan reluctantly, not willingly. China will gain much more as a result. Up until now the United States kept away from the issue and waited for it to resolve itself, but I don't think there's any signal that the issue will fade away soon. Considering the strategic situation in East Asia, it's time for the United States to give friendly advice to Japan to cease making any unnecessary historical controversy.

Thirdly and finally, I think the United States should be armed with a liberal vision of engaging East Asia much more seriously. This administration seems to pursue a China encirclement strategy rather than a containment strategy. Japan understandably takes the position of balancing China by bandwagoning with the United States. But the fact of the matter is that the United States is cooperating with China in many areas,

including counter-terrorism and non-proliferation, such as the North Korean nuclear issue. China is not a Soviet-type enemy that should be demolished or contained. A rising China is undoubtedly a challenge to all nations, but it will never be an enemy that can be defeated. The United States should encourage Japan, at the minimum, to selectively engage rather than simply antagonize China. By doing that, in the long run the United States, Japan and Korea could be active engineers who promote democracy, a market economy and human rights in the entire East Asian region, including China and North Korea.

Kojo Yoshiko: I'd also like to thank the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA for giving me the opportunity to discuss this important topic. Talking about how to improve Korea-Japan relations has proved to be a difficult task recently. Dialogue between Koizumi and Roh seems difficult, although they state repeatedly that good relations between the two countries are necessary for both Korea and Japan, and also for a stable Northeast Asian region.

Japanese Public Sentiment

First, I would like to comment on Japanese public sentiment more closely than Professor Park did. He said that public reconciliation has been achieved, so perhaps there is no problem between the two countries, and that relations are bad because of politicians. I agree, but I think both countries' public sentiments should also be looked at closely. According to an opinion poll conducted by the Japanese government in October of last year, about 51% of Japanese respondents felt close to Korea, while about 44% did not feel close to Korea. Compared to the

same opinion poll in 2003, that is two years ago, the ratio of people who felt close to Korea dropped by 5%. This is the first decline since 2001. Also, the ratio of respondents who think that Korea-Japan relations are not good increased from 35% to 51%. This opinion poll was conducted before Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, so I think the opinion polls suggest two things.

First, when the recent opinion poll is compared with a similar opinion poll from the mid-90's, when there was also Japan-Korean friction regarding the textbook issue, the ratio of respondents who felt close to Korea last year was much higher than in the mid-90's, even though the ratio dropped. This means that in Japan, public perception of Korea has improved a lot since the 1990s, probably due to good economic relations and the recent "Korea Wave." The Korean open-door policy to Japanese culture created lots of opportunities for Japanese people to understand Korea and learn about Korean culture. This will form a basis to increase mutual understanding.

However, another interpretation of this opinion poll is rather pessimistic. Public sentiment is easily affected by politicized issues. Despite the "Korea Wave" in Japan and good economic relations, this opinion poll suggests that culture and economic factors alone cannot improve public sentiment as a whole once issues such as the history issue and the territorial issue are put on the political agenda. In this sense, although Japan-Korea relations are improving dramatically, recent relations are still fragile in nature. If this fruitless exchange between Koizumi and Roh continues, it might deteriorate the foundation of public

perception that has been constructed in past years in both Korea and Japan.

Secondly, I'd like to comment on the political style of both leaders. I agree with Professor Park's assessment of their political styles. Prime Minister Koizumi and President Roh have similar political styles in the sense that they relied on a high degree of popularity amongst the public as their power resource when they came into power. They have been sensitive to public popularity rates. Their political style in responding to public support contributed to aggravating bilateral relations. Prime Minister Koizumi and President Roh are a new generation among politicians in both countries in the post-World War II period.

Younger Generation of Japanese Politicians More Assertive

In Japan, the younger generation of politicians tends to be more assertive than the older generation when they talk about Japan's foreign policy towards neighboring countries. Their stance is that Japan cannot keep apologizing and has to speak up for itself, especially on Japanese foreign policy. They believe that Japan has to be more autonomous than before. The public easily accepts this kind of stance, especially when Japanese people see that anti-Japanese movements in China and Korea are increasing in the media.

According to another opinion poll conducted in Japan and Korea last year, one of the top reasons why the Japanese do not feel close to Korea is that there is strong anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea—the same reason that the Korean public raised for why they don't feel close to Japan. This kind of chain

reaction is typical when relations are deteriorating, and it is difficult to stop this vicious cycle. Politicians should not mobilize public sentiment to accelerate this vicious cycle, but both leaders do not seem to pay much attention to it. I agree with Professor Park's comment that both leaders should pay more attention to building good relations from a strategic point of view.

Regarding the history issue, it is almost impossible to have the same perception of history between two countries, but countries can increase their mutual understanding of each other's historical perception. In this sense, Korea and Japan should work hard to create mutual understanding. However, both leaders have put the history issue and territorial issue on a primary agenda to be solved. Instead, they need to put these issues on an agenda to be controlled. The history issue is easily related to nationalistic sentiment in both countries, so both Koizumi and Roh should be more careful about dealing with this issue.

In order to understand the frustration between Korea and Japan, more attention should be paid to Prime Minister Koizumi's logic. He said that the visits to Yasukuni Shrine are not to praise the war or the history of Japan; the visits to Yasukuni Shrine were in no way intended to glorify or justify war, but were more for the war dead. This is a matter of the heart, so how could foreign countries intrude? This is Koizumi's logic.

Japanese Public Views Yasukuni Issue as a Matter of Autonomy

If opinion polls are looked at closely, people who support Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine responded that Ja-

pan should not change its stance because of pressure from foreign countries. This means that people are not so interested in the Yasukuni Shrine issue per se, and I suspect that most of the Japanese public is not very aware of the issue of the Yasukuni Shrine because domestically the issue has been mainly argued in terms of separation of government and religion. Once the issue is formulated like this, people think it is a matter of Japanese autonomy. Koizumi's logic formulates the Yasukuni issue not as a matter of history but as a matter of state autonomy for Japanese people. Prime Minister Koizumi has to stick to his stance, otherwise he might lose his popularity among the public. The public would not think that he has changed his policy regarding the history issue, but instead would think that he is weak toward foreign powers. For Japan, there does not seem to be a solution to this problem because Prime Minister Koizumi will keep going to visit Yasukuni. The next prime minister might have to stick to this policy for a while too, because of this reason.

Korean politicians say this is a history issue, but Japanese politicians say this is not so much a history issue, this is a matter of state autonomy. This kind of gap or miscommunication makes the Yasukuni Shrine problem more complicated. In my opinion, if the Korean president agrees not to aggravate the history issue anymore, the Japanese prime minister should not visit the Yasukuni Shrine. Since stability in the Northeast Asian region is very important for both countries, these issues should not be obstacles to improve Korea-Japan relations. Both governments have to work positively to escape from this vicious cycle. Thank you.

Kent Calder: Thank you. First of all, regarding terminology, inevitably when one coins a phrase one has to oversimplify and I look forward to the larger work that I'm sure this is a piece of. What is meant by publics? What sort of indicators is Professor Park thinking of there? What is meant by polarized? Clearly President Roh Moo-hyun and Prime Minister Koizumi have been at loggerheads over the Yasukuni issue. I can think of a lot of other politicians who've been trying to be much more conciliatory, such as Mori, Murayama, Fukuda Yasuo, Han Sung-joo, Ban Ki-mun. Of course that's the side of this he didn't have a chance to cover. Certainly there have been some important efforts at conciliation.

In terms of the evidence, what sort of evidence does Professor Park use to marshal, to suggest this provocative thesis: "Reconciled Publics vs. Polarized Politicians?" I can think of some counter evidence, so it would be interesting to know more about the broad patterns. Reconciled publics? I remember we were both in Seoul when I was a visiting scholar at Seoul National University during the actions by Shimane Prefecture. The response in Korea was very strong and in some sense quite broad-based; there was a general feeling of outrage about what had happened with Takeshima Day. A lot of this has been hyped in Japan.

As far as public opinion data is concerned it's probably useful to distinguish the last seven or eight years since President Kim Dae-jung's visit of 1998, which made a very important step towards conciliation. Look at the data from around 1998-99 on through around 2003 or 2004, there is some pattern of

reconciliation that was accelerated by the *hanryu* (Korea Wave) and the Yon-sama boom. I am interested in Professor Park's reactions to what's happened in public opinion data since 2004 and since Prime Minister Koizumi's latest visit to Yasukuni, or when it became clear that this was not just a couple of visits but that this was a consistent and sustained pattern. My impression is that in the last year, in the *Naikakufu* (Cabinet Office) polls of Japanese opinion, in terms of how much affinity one feels for Korea, the numbers have turned the other way. I think this partly reflects a certain mobilization or an interactive effect between the polarized politicians that he speaks about, and the public whose opinions have begun to shift precisely because of this struggle, and also influenced of course by the larger regional dynamics—the increasingly bitter interaction between China and Japan.

Regarding the argument itself, I agree with the point that Professor Kojo also made about Professor Park's assessment of style, of the politician's populist leadership. That's an important point, and what he says about parallelism in the two countries is certainly right. My question would be, if that is the case, what about the implications for the future? What's going to happen to the reconciled publics, if they are in fact reconciled, and whether economic evidence of, for example, large numbers of trips across the East Sea or the Japan Sea is indicative of reconciliation? That raises a set of questions itself but assuming that there is some degree of reconciliation, then what's going to happen is that the leaders, in their rivalry with one another, pander to the public and stimulate nationalism for political advantage. It seems to me, particularly

on the Korean side at least, the political complexity, the impending presidential election, the uncertainties in domestic politics, the vulnerability of the opposition on the issue of pre-war connections—one should imagine these might mean that politicians would have the incentive to mobilize these reconciled publics. On the Japanese side the dynamic is more serious in its relations with China probably than it is with Korea.

U.S. Should not Involve Itself Directly in Asian Bilateral Issues

On this issue of U.S. policy I've just completed a piece that deals more with Japan-China relations than Japan-Korea relations, but the most important point is that the United States should not get directly, formally involved in this, particularly in the case of Japan-China, because in that triangular relationship there is an embedded geo-strategic dimension. In a triangular situation it's easy for that to be manipulated in ways that affect the U.S.-Japan alliance. Regarding the situation in Korea, that dimension is somewhat different, but once again official statements and views by the U.S. government have broader implications on policy concerns.

That said, another important point of course is stability and on that I agree very much with Professor Park, that regional stability should be a central goal of policy. It's only that the things that need to be done perhaps ought to be more indirect. Should there be congressional hearings that might deal with some of these issues? Some parts of this can be dealt with undoubtedly at the Track Two level. Should there be things done bilaterally between the various countries first and then addressed in a

broader setting rather than trilaterally? The mechanisms, it seems to me, are really quite important although the ultimate objective is stability. I think we all tend to agree on that point.

I really see this as an interesting argument, fresh and counter-intuitive, but that leaves some important questions in terms of both the definition and the argument itself, the evidence and then its unresolved policy implications, which is exactly what we need for a good discussion. Thank you.

Park: Rather than respond to the points one by one, I will make a broad, general statement on a few questions. I completely agree with Professor Calder and Professor Kojo that politicians have an incentive to use this issue, because for populist politicians history is an easy bait they can use at any time. Political moves could also affect public opinion negatively at any time.

Political Leaders Use History Issue to Try to Achieve Political Gains

I want to emphasize the importance of political leadership and political leaders' careful management of the history issue, because I think that public opinions change but politicians change much more rapidly. They sometimes do it intentionally without knowing the strategic meaning of what they are doing. The first thing I want to emphasize is that many people think that anti-Japanese political sentiment has disappeared if I say that the two publics made a virtual historical reconciliation. That is not the case. It is dormant, it is sleeping; it can wake up at any time. The question is whether the political leaders will deal with this issue or not.

The second point is that political leaders always try to use this issue for domestic political purposes or for the sake of preserving state autonomy. The real question is, what are the political gains from this dispute? As a person specializing in Japanese politics and also looking at Korean politics very carefully, I don't find that much political gain from this history dispute. Many people, especially my Japanese friends, say that President Roh is using this issue for domestic political gains. I thought the same thing when he used very provocative words such as a "diplomatic war with Japan." What is he talking about? That is very undiplomatic language. If he truly wanted to use the history issue politically he should have gained politically, but despite this provocative rhetoric on the history issue, the ruling party was completely defeated in local elections in April 2005. Despite his attempts to use the issue for political gains, this showed that publics can make more sober judgments than political leaders.

I don't know whether there's any domestic political gains or not for Japanese political leaders. I don't know what kind of a political advantage they can get out of the Yasukuni Shrine visit. They can say they are trying to preserve state autonomy, but I don't think in terms of votes, in terms of popularity, that this is the critical thing that contributed to Koizumi's popularity. This is not a form of good political food they can eat enjoyably, so that's the reason why Japan and Korea should put this issue aside rather than directly deal with it and cook it for political purposes.

About Prime Minister Koizumi's logic about the Yasukuni Shrine visits, I understand and agree with Professor Kojo

that this is not a matter of history but a matter of autonomy for Koizumi, but this logic is slightly twisted to me. I always say to my Japanese friends, "Convince me before you try to persuade the Korean public, because if you can convince me then I can persuade the Korean public." But I still am not convinced by his logic. The problem is that, for example, Prime Minister Koizumi justifies his visit by saying that he's not going to the Yasukuni Shrine to pay respects to war criminals, but that he wants to pay respect to ordinary, unknown soldiers. I really want to respect his opinion but how can he differentiate Class A war criminals and unknown soldiers deified in the same place? That's the big problem. I'm not convinced. Also, he's repeatedly saying, "I'm not going there to beautify and glorify the past war." I want to respect his opinion, but if he wants to show respect to ordinary soldiers, why doesn't he visit another shrine?

One final comment about the terminology of polarized publics. I think it's a legitimate question, because a public is not one entity. Organized civil movements and the unorganized majorities must be thought of in separate ways. What causes trouble between the two countries is not the silent, unorganized masses. The problem is, in the case of Japan, rightwing oriented civil organizations and movements. In the case of Korea much more leftwing oriented civil organizations make trouble. Sometimes they are pro-North Korean and anti-Japanese. They always cause problems.

Political leaders should listen to the voice of the silent majority. Political leaders should lead public opinion and

the public rather than just listening to the voice of the noisy minority.

Charles Kupchan: We will now open the discussion to the floor.

Q&A

Questioner: I understand there's a Japan-ROK group to look at history, to look at textbooks. My first question is, what role is that playing, and more fundamentally, do you think there is room for a common interpretation of history on both sides? Is there enough flexibility on the Korean side, for example, to recognize some of the positive elements of Japanese occupation, and on the Japanese side enough flexibility—if I can ask Dr. Kojo as well—or are we likely to end up with what the Japanese call *heikousen*, “two lines that never meet?” Could this commission exacerbate rather than improve understanding of the historical issue on both sides?

Questioner: My question very much relates to the previous question. This discussion today was rather sensitive regarding the historical issue, maybe not putting it as a first priority, but is there any substantive improvement that Japan can make on the historical issue? Would another kind of apology or compensation or transfer of the Yasukuni Shrine solve the problem or would the situation just deteriorate more?

Questioner: The thing that always puzzles me about this Korean-Japanese business is this. I bring it back to the U.S., which took half of Mexico, and the Mexicans probably never have forgotten it. If they came to the U.S. and criticized the way it writes its history books, the U.S. would respond by saying, “It's not

Mexico's business, it's the U.S.' business.” So why don't the Japanese take a strong stand on that issue and say no in a polite way? Would the Koreans welcome a Japanese delegation to investigate their textbooks?

Also the Yasukuni Shrine is the same kind of thing. I think the U.S. would be offended if some other country criticized Arlington Cemetery. I think these are domestic issues.

The third question: I don't think Korea will make any headway in its relations with Japan if it continues with this subject. Why don't they try to drop the subject? I think that would help the whole relationship much more. I noticed that in China they suddenly have stopped anti-Japanese demonstrations because they were not getting what they wanted out of Japan. They got instead an emphasis on internationalism. The Internet gave them international opportunities. I think that what Korea does in constantly pushing Japan is to get the wrong result. My question is, what does Korea get out of it?

Questioner: What is the attitude of South Korean society to the problem of the North Korean-Japanese normalization process in general and to the abductee issue in particular? Is it influencing to some extent South Korean-Japanese relations, or not?

Park: Thank you again for all the thoughtful comments. I'd better start with the Korean history textbook. Korean history textbooks are not exempt from the same problem if the matter is looked at reciprocally. The time will come when Korea has to revise some of the contents or style of its history text-

books, but I have to say that there are many movements to try to mitigate the problem, first by jointly composing a new history textbook by Korean and Japanese scholars. For example, in May 2005, one history textbook was published from joint research by a civic, intellectual initiative, without any government intervention or help. The scholars tried to show a common perception of the history issues in this history textbook. It's not widely available, but still it's out. This is the start of a new effort to interpret this situation in a different way, which is a very constructive move.

The scholars are also trying to hold a second round of the joint history research committee. In the first round of this joint history research group the participants conducted research and made recommendations, but the government had no obligation to listen to their opinions. In the second round, however, they are trying to make it much more effective and to disseminate their research results after a three year joint study. I don't know whether that will be possible or not but still, there is a movement like that to try to make the joint research committee much more effective, intellectually and politically.

As for a substantive improvement in the history issue, one is that the Korean government is continuing to put pressure on the Japanese government. Why doesn't Japan set up a third facility, not the Yasukuni Shrine, not *Chidorigafuchi* (National Cemetery), what about a third facility that everyone can go to, including the Korean president and Korean people? I often go to the Yasukuni Shrine not to pay my respects, but just to look at what is going on there. Some-

times I enjoy it, and sometimes I am very much reluctant to enter such a facility. If there is a third facility that everybody can go to without hesitation, possibly it will help to mitigate the problem. The worst case scenario is that a third facility is created and the prime minister and politicians go there, and then again visit the Yasukuni Shrine as usual. That would not solve the problem. That's something to worry about. Still, it is a necessary political measure.

Korea's Constant Requests for a Japanese Apology

Finally, about why Koreans are constantly asking for an apology from Japan. What is the political gain of it? Until the mid-1990's, Koreans requested Japan to apologize. But afterwards, Koreans did not request the Japanese government to apologize first. When Japanese political leaders or the Japanese government raised history-related issues, Korea responded to them. Then the Japanese government and political leaders made some provocative moves. Again the Koreans said, "You'd better stop." In the eyes of the Japanese, it was perceived as pressure from the Koreans to apologize. But the fact of the matter is that, more often than not, Japanese politicians initiated the provocative moves and Koreans responded to them. That's the reason why I think the history issue should be taken aside. If there is no provocative political action by the Japanese, Koreans will never ask for more apologies. Korea does not want to do it, but because there is a continued movement to make it a political issue on the part of the Japanese, Korea always requests an apology.

Koreans want to see normalization between North Korea and Japan that facilitates the transformation of the North Korean system in a long-term way, not in a short one. The abductee issue is a hurdle or barrier that impeded the normalization process. I think it's time to deal with the abductee issue more seriously, not in a public or open way but in a secret way, because if it becomes a public and political issue, North Korea cannot step back and say, "Yes, we are sorry." They returned all the surviving members and allegedly the thirteen abductee cases are almost cleared up. There are a lot of arguments and counter arguments about it but still, for the situation to improve, it has to be handled in a different way, in an indirect way, in a secret way, or in a much more serious, separate discussion, disconnecting it from nuclear and other issues. I think that's the Japanese government's position and they are trying to do it that way, by separating the nuclear issues and normalization issues and abductee issues.

Calder: Responding to the question about what might be done rather than addressing the substance that Professor Park has already talked about, it's worth accenting the time window. It seems to me on the Yasukuni issue, Prime Minister Koizumi is locked in. He's determined about what he feels he has to do, but a new prime minister is coming in September. A key issue now is the extent to which the new prime minister is locked in to similar stances, not only on Yasukuni but on a variety of other issues. The political campaign means Japan is in an agenda setting period. What degree of freedom is the new leader going to have to flexibly deal with these issues after

September? That's a crucial question people ought to think about.

Kojo: I'd like to comment on the joint history study between Korean and Japanese scholars. I don't think that they completely agree on a common history. I heard from a participant of this joint project that it's very difficult to reach a common understanding of the facts because history is an interpretation of facts. Nobody knows the real facts, so it's a very difficult task. But this joint history project continues, and is an important beginning of mutual understanding. If Korea-Japan relations are compared to China-Japan relations, such a project does not exist between Japan and China. In these terms, perhaps Korea-Japan relations are more forward looking.

Also, the textbook issue. One person asked why the Japanese government doesn't speak out and say "You should correct your textbooks if you say something about our textbooks." Recently, the Japanese government tried to explain its textbook inspection system, that Japanese society is a democratic society, and if textbooks pass a certain criteria, the government will approve them. I think that Korea and China also have a textbook inspection system. Before we discuss the textbooks of other countries, though, we should know what kind of inspection system they have. At this moment, there is a lot of misunderstanding, so the Japanese government should improve its public relations towards other countries.

Park: I do not think Korea and Japan can completely agree upon the same perception of history. That's impossible. But the importance of this joint history committee is that if one is politically

truly, sincerely committed, the issue can be contained to that committee and become a scholarly issue rather than a political one. The committee should function in a way that contains the history issue as scholarly work, not a political issue. Leave it to the scholars rather than the politicians. I think that principle should be followed in order to manage this issue much more carefully.

Another comment about the textbook review system is that I agree, in Korea, there is more than one type of textbook. Until junior high, students have one textbook, but in high school, more than one textbook can be selected because Korea has the same textbook review system as Japan. About four kinds of history textbooks are available for students. Korea is familiar with the review system and with what exactly is going on in Japan.

Kupchan: The general topic that is on the table this evening is comparative national identities, or comparative nationalisms. As someone who watches carefully both Korea and Japan, I was wondering whether you could shed light on three different dimensions of the nationalism issue. One is the question of how much is top-down and how much is bottom-up. You mentioned this issue in passing but if you look at Japanese politics and Korean politics, are they about equal parts of elite manipulation of public attitudes versus public pressure that shape elite behavior? Or do the two countries differ on whether the nationalism comes from the top-down or the bottom-up?

Second would be on the question of sentiment toward the United States. Geopolitically speaking, South Korea

and Japan are in somewhat similar positions—both are Cold War allies, both have troops in Iraq—but you find a much more intense anti-American sentiment or let's say skepticism of America in Korea than there is in Japan. In fact there was an article in the *New York Times* this week about how minimal the protest has been over the recent issue of the arrest of a serviceman in Okinawa compared to what it would have been before. Why? Why have these two countries moved in such a different direction?

I would also ask you to comment on China. Attitudes toward China seem to be getting worse and worse in Japan while the opposite seems to be happening in Korea. Is it just the history issue or is there something else going on? Let's take some more questions from the floor.

Questioner: During your presentation you seemed to indicate that the publics on both sides are easily manipulated by politicians' maneuvering. Isn't it also true that the publics can think for themselves and consider the strategic aspects with China?

Questioner: I am from the Japanese embassy. Because I have been making a lot of efforts myself to make the relationship between China, Japan and Korea tighter at the Ministry of Finance of Japan, I always feel very sad and puzzled when I hear that Japan has become more nationalistic, or when I hear about the historical view of the war. Of course Japan cannot have completely the same history as those countries. Still, Japan admitted that it invaded those countries, that the war was a very misguided war and that it caused a lot of

suffering; Japan feels very deep remorse about its history.

As Professor Kojo said, this is not really a historical issue. On the Japanese side it is more an issue of autonomous attitudes, while from the perspective of Korea and China, what Japanese leaders sometimes do is show a lack of seriousness about history. But this is not really a historical issue for some Japanese people. I myself felt strong resentment from Korea and China, and Japan should be more sensitive to those things, but is it indeed possible that the Koreans and Chinese take too seriously some of the provocative statements made by some Japanese politicians. It's not the whole Japanese community's statement; it is the statement of certain leaders, including Prime Minister Koizumi. Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni is not totally approved by the public; it's about half and half. It is not a history issue as I said, it is just a stance on autonomy. Isn't it possible to interpret it as a style issue instead of a historical issue and take a little bit more of a tolerant attitude towards those few provocative statements?

Questioner: I'd like to ask Professor Park about President Roh's notion of the "balancer." Is this a well thought out notion? If it is, how does it reflect the trend you've mentioned, namely the shift towards China? Or is this notion of balance only applicable towards the issue of North Korea, or does it have more of a strategic vision to it? Does the Korean foreign policy community or public in general appreciate this notion of balance? I have one more question, for Professor Calder, which is do you see any rising frustration in Washington with regard to the Japanese action to-

ward this issue? I feel there is, but I would like to ask your opinion on that.

Questioner: You touched briefly on the fact that the U.S. may have some sort of role to play in Japan's attitudes and its actions. Could you speak briefly on what oftentimes I think people in the United States see as a somewhat reactionary Korean public discourse? It brings to mind things like the public row over speed skating and also stem cell research. Is there any acknowledgement of this kind of discourse and any attempt to improve the discourse in such a way that issues that you brought up are taken much more seriously by third parties?

Kupchan: You have a fair amount of ground to cover, Dr. Park.

Park: My analysis is based on a much more top-down approach rather than bottom-up. That's the reason why I am cautiously optimistic. Even when political leaders talk they cannot press a button that makes the Korean and Japanese publics really reconcile with each other. I have confidence about the Korean public and the Japanese public because I have never encountered a Japanese friend who strongly advocates for the Yasukuni Shrine visits or rightwing interpretations of history issues. I often visit Japan, almost every month, all over the country, but I rarely find any ultra rightwing persons. But on the political scene, in the media, all things are about history. There is a huge gap, a huge distance, between political dealings and public attitudes. That is the reason why I'm relatively, cautiously optimistic about the relationship; but the top should be much more careful, much more strategic in dealing with this issue.

About the sentiment toward the United States, I don't think it's anti-Americanism, I think it's skepticism, especially about the unilateralist actions taken by the United States. Korea wants to say something against it, especially when it comes to Korean Peninsula related issues. Many people say that the South Korean government and people are getting more and more progressive. I doubt it sometimes. Koreans are becoming much more conservative. In a way there's a *seikatsu hoshushugi* (lifestyle conservatism). They don't want to lose what they have now. If there is any kind of contingency situation provoked by, for example, a preemptive strike, Korea can get entrapped into war. Korea would lose a lot, more than anyone else. That's the reason why Korea says, "Don't try to take a unilateral position against North Korea." It sounds like anti-Americanism to American policy makers, but it is not necessarily anti-American. Many Korean citizens send their children to the United States, and now they're even sending their wives to the United States to educate their children, which is an unusual phenomenon.

Japanese Government Sending Dual Messages

I know that the Japanese government shows deep remorse and repentance about the issue. The point is that it's a very complicated dual message coming at the same time. That complicates things a lot even though Korea respects the Murayama Declaration. Politicians are saying things against it, which is a very annoying signal to Korea. Which is true, which is *honno* (true feelings and desires) and *tatema* (façade): Murayama's Declaration, or statements by rightwing politicians? For example, in

April 2005 when Prime Minister Koizumi went to Jakarta to attend the Asia-Africa Summit meeting, he again repeated almost the same message that Murayama said, but at the same time, the same day, in Tokyo, eighty Japanese politicians paid a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. This is a complex dual signal. The Japanese government is always saying, "We are truly remorseful." I don't buy that because two different messages are being sent at the same time. In that sense it should be much more coordinated and unified in sending messages. That's a perplexing sign that Korea and Japan have to work on more collaboratively to improve this situation. If there is one, that's enough, but two messages at the same time complicates the situation.

The notion of the balancer, this is a very touchy issue but it is hard to find even one person who is talking about balance or balancing roles anymore in the foreign policy community in Korea. I don't like the term balancer because it reminds me of a realist theory of balancing against something. If one studied a chapter of international relations theory one would never use the term balancer, but somehow President Roh liked the expression and used it politically, which caused a lot of misunderstandings about Korean diplomacy. He raised this balancer concept out of the history controversy, the Dokdo related controversy between Korea and Japan. It was meant to be a history confined issue. If Japan continued to raise the history issue Korea could balance against Japan on that issue, not in a military sense, not in an economic sense. After President Roh used the term, however, interestingly enough there were bureaucrats who tried to justify the term and then tried to

expand the notion itself and amplified the concept, which spurred much more misunderstanding rather than clarifying the situation. But later, after about five or six months people came to understand that it produced too much misunderstanding for Americans, for Japanese, even for Chinese; they don't use the term "balancer" anymore. That is the consensus among the foreign policy community in Korea.

Calder: First, just one question as a devil's advocate about the notion that problems can be managed from above. In a strategic way, I point to three structural considerations. This panel can talk about opinion and how it's shifting as though it always influences policy. Sometimes it does, sometimes it doesn't, as I think Professor Park would agree.

The three points are, first of all, changes in the regional system, the shadows of reunification in Korea, not the reality necessarily, but the increasing proximity of Taiwan and the mainland together with of course a deepening arms race. Secondly, changes in the Japanese electoral system. Since 1994 they haven't been mentioned. They make broad appeals, including arguably nationalist appeals, more attractive and relative to distributive politics, roads and bridges type appeals, than they used to. That isn't the same necessarily, but there's a structural shift. Professor Park talked about incentives and arguably the incentives in the electoral system for politicians are changing. Thirdly, the structural shift in political sociology: the collapse of the left. The Socialist vote ten years ago was 14%. Now it's 3%. The Socialists and Communists have sixteen seats out of 460 in the Lower House. The DPJ, the major opposition

party of course now has a strongly conservative leader in Maehara who is significantly to the right.

On the question of Washington reactions, I see this more as a matter of a personnel shift than a really fundamental change. The shift from Armitage to Zoellick is quite clear. But Korea and China in some sense do have the high ground, which is easier to understand for the American public insofar as the issue really continues to be politicized, which I think is the argument for finding a good way for Japan to end it all. The question of insistently continuing to visit a shrine where the former war criminals are enshrined... If one understands the issue more deeply in the Japanese context, one can come to a much more nuanced interpretation of what that means, but people really don't. It's hard to understand, it's hard to grasp the Japanese view. The longer this continues, the more opinion in the United States, apart from those who focus on strategy alone, is going to shift.

Kojo: About the first comment from Professor Kupchan, how much is top-down and how much is bottom-up, I'm confident that the Japanese public will not go to the extreme. But politicians can have polarized political agendas that they propose to the public, and the Japanese public is easily affected by those agendas via the media. The media's role in Japan is very important because it doesn't have a large variety of media resources. If the media talks about the same issues, then the public talks about the same issues. In that sense political leaders can be very important in Japan. The public didn't demand, for instance, to emphasize nationalistic feel-

ings, but once politicians put this on the political agenda, the public was likely to be affected.

Yasukuni a Matter of State Autonomy for Japan

I talked about how the Yasukuni Shrine issue became a matter of state autonomy for the Japanese, but for non-Japanese it is logically very difficult to persuade them that this is not a history issue. Leaders should be aware of the difficulty of mutual understanding. Also, as for the China factor, it is important for Japan and Korea to deal with the rise of China peacefully. The Japanese government is frustrated with the Korean government's ambiguity toward East Asian politics. The balancer is one example. The Japanese government wants to cooperate with the Korean government to solve the North Korean nuclear policy and also to deal with the rise of China. The Japanese government is not quite sure what policy the Korean government wants to pursue in this region. Maybe President Roh's diplomatic style is very difficult to understand for the Japanese government. That is one reason for the current tensions between Korea and Japan.

Questioner: I was wondering if Professor Park could talk a little bit more about the historical issue in Korea, particularly the colonial period and the whole question of people who might have been collaborators. It seems to me that this issue came up either earlier last year or the year before and then disappeared. I was wondering what impact that might have had on the recent change in Korean attitudes to back away from some of the historical contention with Japan?

Questioner: I find your emphasis on the top-down element of the equation rather counter-intuitive. Democratic politicians by and large respond to constituencies, speak to constituencies or speak for constituencies that they think are important for them. I'm wondering, in the case of Korea and President Roh, what is the constituency that he felt he had to address on this issue? And while perhaps there's no positive gain in speaking on an issue in intellectual terms, it may be that he or other politicians feel that to say nothing would be a negative that impacts them. One final dimension to that, in looking at what that constituency is that he thought he was addressing, is there an important generational component there, where attitudes among the older generation and the younger generation differ significantly on Japan?

Questioner: I would like to ask about the details of your terminology of reconciled publics between two countries, because the evidence or symptoms you suggested during your presentation can be regarded as cultural matters. Culturally, reconciled publics between two countries can be extended to politically or economically reconciled publics. I would like more details on that.

Questioner: I guess people got the impression that the current Japanese government is trying to deny the history of crimes committed during the Second World War. I talked to some Westerners, ordinary people, not politicians. Nobody made a positive comment on the Japanese government's attitudes toward history. Let's say fifty years ago the British people were not friendly to German people, but now the attitudes of the German government toward history are so good that British people accept Ger-

man people. It is not the case in Asia. Most people in the West don't understand the sufferings of Asian people during WWII. Nobody wants to say any positive remarks about the attitudes of the Japanese government toward history. I think that generally speaking, the issue of history from the Japanese government's point of view damages the image of Japan, and sometimes the Japanese people, because no one wants to work with someone who denies the past and who is not trustworthy. Do you have any comments on what makes the Japanese government or Japanese politicians do things that make neighboring countries angry over the history issue?

Textbook Issue is Overstated

Calder: I haven't wanted to speak too much about these issues. They revolve around the two countries. I think, especially in response to the last question, that there are some important nuances of change. I don't deny the importance of the issues per se. For example, on Japanese textbooks, I think the issue is really overstated. If you look, as Professor Park mentioned, at the Fusosha textbooks, there is a very small percentage of adoption. I know from having seen some of the supplementary textbooks, there's a significant treatment of the war and even atrocities and so on. The classroom teaching processes may be a different issue, to what extent they're covered, but as far as the textbooks go I think the issue is probably overstated.

Kojo: On the question of why Japanese politicians provoke that kind of argument from time to time, I want to ask them where those comments come from. But I think the new generation is different from the old generation. They

think that Japan made a mistake or did very bad things to neighboring countries, so they admit it. As I mentioned, though, they wonder how long they will have to keep apologizing. There's that kind of frustration among them. If that frustration reaches its limits, they will talk about their feelings without taking into account the effect of their remarks. This is not a systematic or organized attitude from the politicians.

Park: The last questions are actually interrelated. The question of investigating the pro-Japanese collaborators during the colonial times was a political issue in Korea, especially last year. I don't hear about that story a lot this year.

First, I wanted to say that it will have only a small impact on the Korea-Japan relationship. It's a much more domestic political issue. Also, they are trying to raise the issue out of the domestic political context. Hardcore supporters of the Roh Moo-hyun administration are trying to kick out so-called establishment elements in Korean society. The logic they have is that the current establishment in Korea is the way it is because of the legacy of pro-Japanese collaboration and a pro-authoritarian regime. Clearing out the dust they have in their family lineage, among other things, will improve the legitimacy of the democratic government. That is the way of thinking they have in mind. To put it much more bluntly, they want to send a political signal to the opposition party: "You have some problems."

If this issue is related to begging for money from the Japanese government, that will become a big issue, but I don't see that kind of movement in Korean society. In that sense it can be a positive

signal that they are furthering democratic society but, on the other hand, I am very much skeptical of the move because it's a story coined by civic movement activists rather than a widely shared notion among intellectuals. The so-called left oriented civic movement activists are trying to raise this issue constantly for their own purpose. The main constituency that President Roh is trying to address are civic organizations, much more leftwing oriented people.

I want to add one more comment. Until President Roh became president, in 2002 and 2003 the so-called conservatives in Korea kept silent because still many thought that the leftwing intellectuals were a minority and that they could deal with them at any time. After a few years, conservative intellectuals came to have a crisis of consciousness and became more sensitive about progressive social movements. Conservative intellectuals are trying to make their own social movement to counter the progressive intellectuals in Korea. As a person who specializes in Japanese politics it's like Japan is moving past Korea, Korea is moving past Japan. The conservative

progressive conflict is becoming prominent in Korea, while in Japan the influence of the left is really waning. It's a very contrastive picture. As for whether or not culturally reconciled publics can lead to political reconciliation between the two, yes, eventually, not suddenly. The feelings of Koreans toward the Japanese have changed gradually from immediate post-war hatred to uneasiness. Now they feel much more comfortable, but what is lacking is trust toward Japanese political leaders. If comfort can develop into real trust toward the Japanese government and the Japanese people, problems can be solved. In order to bring about trust between the two countries, who should make a definite effort? Political leaders. They should be the real pioneers and engineers, producing and building consensus and trust between the two nations. That should be the role of political leaders. Leaders should take the lead to promote cooperation and collaboration among countries, rather than trying to divide nations and take advantage of nationalist movements. I hope that very good political leaders will appear in Korea and Japan at the same time.

[End]

About the Panelists

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