

The ROK-U.S. Alliance in Transformation: Korean vs. Regional Dimensions

by

Dr. Kim Sung-han

Kim Sung-han: I'd like to thank the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA for giving me this wonderful opportunity to speak to distinguished experts here, many of whom are friends of mine and familiar faces to me. Last night, I really enjoyed watching the TV debate between John Edwards and Dick Cheney. I'm neither a nice guy like John Edwards nor a nice guy like Dick Cheney. I'm neither a man with a golden tongue like John Edwards nor a man with a long resume like Dick Cheney, but as a person who has been studying international relations, particularly ROK-U.S. relations for the past two decades, I'm very honored to have an opportunity to talk about the current status, as well as the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance.

Today's agenda consists of five parts, the first of which is about the meanings of transformation and basic questions that need to be dealt with today (**See Slide 1**). The second part is basically the overview of the ROK-U.S. relationship, particularly since the end of the Cold War. The third part is the four schools of thought regarding the future of the alliance. For the first part, I will be introducing the most recent polling research, which was conducted by the East Asia Institute and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in July this year. The concluding part is about how to envision the ROK-U.S. alliance.

There are two meanings of transformation. One is literally to change something markedly so it can be converted from A to B.

That is the literal meaning of transformation. The other meaning of transformation recently is the DOD process of making U.S. forces better, lighter and faster.

In today's presentation, I will use primarily the first definition of transformation, but the second definition is also applicable to the ROK-U.S. alliance assessment. In terms of degrees, transformation is stronger than change, but weaker than revolution, so in this sense, transformation is not just a change, but a deep or deeper change in the nature, function or condition of something. In this sense, I can raise a couple of questions.

The first question is whether the nature, function or condition of the ROK-U.S. alliance is really changing at the moment. The second question is whether the United States is trying to make the alliance better, lighter, and faster, and also whether South Korea is really agreeable to this.

Changing Alliance After the End of the Cold War

Since the end of the Cold War, we have been experiencing a lot of changes in our alliance. The ROK-U.S. alliance is the product of the Cold War, based upon a threat from North Korea. So in this sense, the end of the Cold War means the central axis or the mainstay of the alliance no longer exists. But the alliance was exposed least of all to the aftereffects of the post Cold War because of the North Korean nuclear crisis of

1993 and 1994, which reaffirmed the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Also, the ROK-U.S. alliance faces a very important turning point in June 2000; the inter-Korean summit meeting raised the hopes of many South Koreans that the two Koreas would be able to resolve their own problems independently. The summit of 2000 created a controversy in South Korea on whether the tension reduction on the Korean Peninsula would be really compatible with the continued existence of the ROK-U.S. alliance.

Against this backdrop, the second nuclear crisis that erupted in October 2002 has not really contributed to strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance, unlike the first nuclear crisis. At the moment, I would say the South Korean people are in a dilemma, not knowing whether to choose between their brothers in the North who share blood, and its ally across the Pacific who shed blood during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The United States sees that the ROK-U.S. alliance is facing two major challenges: one is coming from North Korean tactics to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington; and the second challenge is that South Korea is experiencing anti-American sentiment and has a potential demand for the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Redeployment of U.S. Troops in Korea

Recently, both allies have agreed to move Yongsan Garrison in Seoul to the Osan/Pyeongtaek area by the end of 2008 and also to move the second infantry division to the same area, in consideration of the Korean security situation after integrating its bases into two zones by 2006. The Bush administration revealed its plan to withdraw some 12,500 soldiers out of 37,000 soldiers stationed in South Korea by the end of 2005. These include 3,600 troops

from the Second Brigade of the Second ID who are already redeployed in Iraq, but as soon as I left for Washington—actually, I read in today's morning paper, which reported that Seoul and Washington have agreed to complete the process of reduction not by the end of 2005, but by 2008, so they are completing it in gradual steps.

This year, 3,300 troops are ready to be deployed in Iraq and additionally, 1,400 will be reduced, and next year and the year after next year, 5,000 soldiers will be reduced, and in the year 2007 and 2008, 2,500 forces will be reduced. All together, the number will still be the same—12,500 soldiers may be reduced by the end of 2008.

The negotiators from both sides wanted to make some progress before the annual SCM (Security Consultative Meeting) which is scheduled for late October 2004. If they had failed to agree on the rescheduling of reductions, the troop reduction issue could have had been linked with the issue of renewing the South Korean troop dispatch in Iraq that is scheduled for the end of this year, and then the situation might have put the alliance under stress. But I'm very glad they agreed on rescheduling the reduction process.

Status Quo View of the Alliance

Let me introduce some schools of thought about the future of the alliance. There are at least four schools. The first one is what I call the status quo school, which argues that it is quite necessary to maintain the status quo of the alliance. In other words, the ROK-U.S. Alliance should be limited to deterring North Korea and not be used for additional wars. Additional wars of the alliance would only serve U.S. interests at the expense of South Korea, as well as other regional countries' interests.

This is a scenario that comes out of the so-called “entrapment fear.” In other words, when the United States, for example, militarily intervenes in the Taiwan crisis, South Korea might be entrapped into that conflict against its own will. This is a bad kind of situation, a very sensitive situation. The ROK-U.S. Alliance’s role should be confined solely to deterring a North Korean attack or threat. To this end, the United States military presence should only continue until the threat from North Korea disappears. Once the threat disappears, then all U.S. forces should be withdrawn or reduced to the level on which only a symbolic number of U.S. forces remain.

Non-alliance School of Thought

The second school of thought is what I call the non-alliance school. It believes that it is quite necessary to establish not a military alliance relationship, but a strategic partnership between Seoul and Washington. Here a strategic partnership means that the U.S.-ROK would be almost withdrawn and military exercises would be conducted, if necessary, with ROK forces on a regular basis. The basic assumption of this school of thought is that the threat from North Korea has already been significantly reduced.

The United States provides the nuclear umbrella as well as deterrents for South Korea, and South Korea is solely responsible for its own defense. It is also argued that considering serious anti-American sentiment in South Korea, it is virtually impossible to relocate the Yongsan Garrison and the Second ID to the Osan/Pyeongtaek area in light of possible violent protests over there. Therefore, it is rather realistic to search for further ways to move towards a strategic partnership, rather than sticking to the status quo or the current military alliance.

Multilateral School Supports Establishment of a NE Asia Security Dialogue

The third school of thought is what I call the multilateral school. It argues that the military security cooperation should be institutionalized in Northeast Asia. For peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia, we need to establish a Northeast Asia security dialogue or Northeast Asia peace community—whatever you call it—in which the two Koreas, the U.S., Japan, China and Russia participate and also, in this sense, it is desirable to transform the current six-body talks into a multilateral security dialogue.

But there are two different voices in this school. One is what I call the multilateral minus school that supports multilateral security dialogue as an alternative to the ROK-U.S. alliance, not as a supplement but as a substitute for the alliance. The other school is a multilateral plus school that aims to take advantage of the security dialogue as a supplement of the ROK-U.S. Alliance.

Comprehensive School Argues for a Comprehensive Regional Security Alliance

The last school is what I call the comprehensive school. It argues it is quite necessary to realize a comprehensive regional security alliance. The alliance should be transformed into a regional security alliance that plays the role of a stabilizer in the East Asian region. It should be one that shares the basic value of democracy and a market economy and that realizes an equitable relationship and also improvement in the military inter-operability between Seoul and Washington.

We are in the same boat. A new ROK alliance for the future should be based upon

the notion of providing a partnership for human security, a 21st century type of security. The new alliance should be able to cope with terror, drugs, environmental pollution, illegal migration, piracy, etc., which we call the 21st century security threats, and South Korea in the meantime should gradually regain its wartime operational control. This is the comprehensive program.

In light of four schools of thought, we can see that there are some, not contradictions, but conflicts of dimensions, or Korean versus regional dimensions. The strategic thinking of the status quo and the non-alliance schools are rather confined to the Korean dimension, but the strategic thinking of the multilateral and comprehensive schools aim at the regional dimension that goes beyond the Korea Peninsula, or like a regional role of the ROK-U.S. Alliance.

The EAI-CCFR poll which I will introduce shortly shows that status quo supporters constitute about 32%; support for a weakening of the alliance to the direction of providing South Korea with a more independent kind of posture, 31%; support for strengthening the alliance is at 37%. It's somewhat balanced. In my judgment, the multilateral plus school means we also need to launch the Northeast Asia security dialogue, but it should be playing as a supplement to the alliance relationship in this region.

The multilateral plus school should be combined with the comprehensive school to create a real vision of the ROK-U.S. alliance. From the South Korean perspective, the ROK-U.S. comprehensive regional security alliance should co-exist with the multilateral security dialogue in Northeast Asia, as a supplement and not a substitute for the alliance.

Results of EAI-CCFR Poll

Let me introduce briefly the EAI-CCFR polls which were conducted in July this year. I was invited by EAI, the East Asia Institute, to make questions as well as to analyze the outcomes. I just introduced several conspicuous outcomes in light of the current status of the ROK-U.S. alliance.

The first question was: What is your opinion of the USFK? (**See Slide 2**) The USFK should remain in South Korea indefinitely, 13%; for a considerate period of time, 38%; but the USFK should be withdrawn gradually, 43%; the USFK must withdraw immediately, 6%. It includes quite competitive views. The for-presence group consists of 51%, while anti-presence is 49%.

The second question was: How do you evaluate the impact of each of the following countries upon South Korean security: China, Japan, North Korea, U.S. and Russia? (**See Slide 3**) All of them are beneficial to South Korea. If you look at North Korea, 27% and 22% combined is 49%; no impact is 10%; a bit threatening and significantly threatening is 41%. That means North Korea is no longer seen as a threat in South Korea.

Question three was: Officials in Washington have proposed reducing the number of U.S. troops in South Korea by one third. The security of South Korea if the U.S. reduces troops would be very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad? (**See Slide 4**) The positive response is about 60%. This is interesting. Previously, the anti-presence proportion was about 49%. Here, very good or somewhat good altogether is about 60%. 60% is larger than 49% by 11%, which means even though you are supporting a U.S. military presence, you are

rather positive about a reduction of U.S. troops in South Korea. This is probably because of the learning process of the last couple of years. The two governments had been saying that reduction of U.S. troops is not going to be harmful or damaging to South Korean security, so the South Korean people have been learning that assessment or explanation from both governments.

Under what circumstances do you approve of a U.S. preemptive military strike against North Korea? (**See Slide 5**) Actually, this question wasn't asked in the U.S. survey, but quite interestingly, the response of "I do not approve of a U.S. preemptive strike against North Korea under any circumstances" is 39%. For reference, I didn't put it right here, but the United States survey showed only 4% on this category, which is a big contrast. I think unconditional anti-war sentiment in South Korea is too high.

Do you think the South Korea-U.S. alliance should be maintained after the unification of the Korean Peninsula? (**See Slide 6**) This is quite different from the previous research. 54%, 31% and 6% altogether is regarded as positive, so those in favor of a U.S. presence after unification is very high at 91%.

Among the following East Asian countries, which do you think South Korea should cooperate most with? (**See Slide 7**) Support for cooperation with the US is 53%; cooperation with Japan is 4%; cooperation with China is 24%. This poll was conducted before South Korea and China came to have the history scandal, so I think South Korea's best partner still was the United States before South Korea quarreled with China over history.

What is the role of the USFK in the future, to become a regional stabilizer, or to just be confined to the prevention of military con-

flict on the Korean Peninsula? (**See Slide 8**) 60% supported the role of USFK as a regional stabilizer, rather than just having a deterrent role on the Korean Peninsula vis-à-vis North Korea.

Outcomes Show Conflicting Research

Actually, these outcomes show some conflicting research. Some of them are showing that North Korea is no longer a threat to South Korea, but on the other hand, people give credit to the USFK, which is expected to play a regional stabilizer in the future. People also support the continued U.S. military presence, even after the reunification of the Korean Peninsula.

In this sense, against this backdrop, I can say that the political leaders of our two countries need to suggest a future vision of the ROK-U.S. alliance so that people, particularly the South Korean people, may not be confused or puzzled. I would suggest that we need to launch a ROK-U.S. security dialogue or strategic dialogue to discuss the vision of the ROK-U.S. alliance.

This strategic dialogue should be at the Track 2 level, not the Track 1 level. At the Track 1 level, we already have the Future Of The Alliance (FOTA), so at the Track 2 level we can attract some distinguished experts about our future relationship, and we need to discuss detailed visions of the alliance. We also need to continue working with the FOTA, and later on, probably in the middle of next year, we will submit a vision report to the two presidents.

In November of next year, South Korea is supposed to host the APEC Summit meeting. Usually, the APEC summit meeting has the ROK-U.S. Summit meeting too, so the two presidents may declare a joint vision statement at the APEC Summit meet-

ing before the end of next year. Then we can take off for the future by envisioning our ROK-U.S. alliance and relationship. This is my hope. Thank you.

Selig Harrison: I'd like to thank Professor Kim very warmly for a very helpful, well-organized, clear analysis of the situation. I think his classification of the different points of view is quite correct, and his anatomy of these points of view is also correct and it's a perceptive contribution. I'm not really going to differ with anything that he said, except for one point that I'll come to at the end. But I'd like to add several themes that I think will broaden this discussion.

Economics of Alliance Are Very Important

I think that it's a mistake to look at South Korean attitudes towards the American military alliance solely in terms of security considerations. The economics of the situation are very important. There are economic concerns that explain why many South Koreans are very unsettled at the idea of a change in the status quo.

For example, point number one, the U.S. alliance creates a climate of stability favorable for foreign investment and for the preferential economic treatment by international financial institutions that South Korea has received—for example, the 1997 IMF bail out. There is the feeling that this climate of stability would be jeopardized, perceptions of a stable South Korea would be jeopardized in the world economic and financial community by any sudden changes in the nature of the alliance and the U.S. military presence.

U.S. Provides a Large Economic Subsidy to South Korea

There is a deeper economic factor involved that is not really articulated directly. I would call it an almost unspoken, underlying, but very real reason why the prospect of an end of the alliance is unsettling to the South Koreans, and that is that the U.S. military presence and the alliance commitment of the United States provides a very large economic subsidy to South Korea, an economic cushion, if you will. This subsidy enables South Koreans to postpone hard choices concerning how fast and how far to move toward unification and thus it postpones hard choices between civilian and military budgetary priorities.

The U.S. presence enables the South to minimize the sacrifices that would otherwise be necessary to maintain its existing high levels of defense spending. By the same token, the withdrawal of U.S. forces would force Seoul to make some basic choices that it hasn't had to face—whether it should seek the same level of security that it now has provided by the U.S. presence by increasing defense expenditures.

Or would the goal of accommodation and reunification with North Korea be better served by negotiating a mutual reduction of forces with North Korea? They don't have to face this choice with the status quo that now exists. Lower income groups in the South would benefit from a diversion of resources from military spending to social welfare programs. By contrast, upper and middle income groups have acquired a vested interest in the status quo in terms of their standard of living.

Without the U.S. subsidy, South Korea would have to double or triple its military budget with obvious implications for other

aspects of the economy, if it wanted to replace the conventional forces now deployed for its defense by the United States, not to mention the much higher outlays that independent nuclear forces would require. The direct cost of U.S. forces in Korea now is \$2 billion per year, very roughly.

The U.S. spends, however, more than \$40 billion annually to maintain the overall U.S. defense posture in East Asia and Western Pacific on which its capability to intervene in Korea depends. And at the present time, I would say, and I don't mean to sound unfriendly, but I think Seoul has come to regard this U.S. economic cushion for its security as an entitlement. I think we have to look at the economic dimension in order to understand South Korean attitudes. The feelings regarding this whole question of the future of U.S. military presence are complicated psychologically. Of course, all the security considerations that were mentioned apply.

Recent Developments in U.S. Policy on Projected Reduction of U.S. Forces

I'd like to put the recent developments in U.S. policy on the projected reduction and location of U.S. forces into perspective. It seems to me that the United States is basically increasing its military punch in Korea with what it's doing. We're going to spend \$11 billion more on upgrading capabilities to show South Korea that it doesn't have to be afraid. We're going to have more bombers in Guam earmarked for Korea; we have an AEGIS destroyer earmarked for Korea; we have an AEGIS destroyer in the vicinity.

We're not taking the multiple rocket systems and rocket launchers at the DMZ away from the DMZ. They're going to be right there. Basically, the strategy, it seems to me, is to reduce land combat forces, our land

combat forces that have been vulnerable to the North Korean forces forward deployed at the DMZ, at the same time increasing our air, our naval, our intelligence, our TMD capability. What we're doing is getting our combat forces out of harm's way, out of the range of North Korean artillery fire, and getting our bases, our forward bases—some of them—out of the reach of North Korean artillery.

Thus, in strategic terms, we are trying to nullify and weaken North Korea's deterrent. That doesn't mean that this is a nefarious scheme, as North Korea has alleged, to make it easy for the U.S. to stage a preemptive strike, but it certainly is a way of nullifying North Korea's deterrent capability. We've really been in a military position that hasn't made sense to be so forward exposed.

Of course, the alliance is changing, and what this redeployment and reduction does is to end the trip wire concept, a very important concept that was maintained throughout the Cold War. South Korea has encouraged the U.S. to maintain a trip wire so that we, American forces, would suffer casualties at the beginning of any conflict and thus we'd be more likely to send reinforcements into the Peninsula.

Ending the trip wire is long overdue, and the task force on U.S.-Korea policy that I chaired last year recommended that it is time to end the trip wire concept. We've given the South Koreans \$19 billion in military grants and foreign military sales. Over the years, we've had a huge defense production relationship with Seoul, which the U.S. government has actively encouraged.

South Korea should be ready—and it is ready—to assume the burden of suffering the first casualties if there should be con-

flict at the DMZ again, and I think all Americans, if you put the issue to them, would say, “Why shouldn’t that be the case?” But, of course, that’s a very different issue from disengaging from South Korea completely and saying the defense of South Korea is none of our business. Of course, it will continue to be so for many years.

U.S. Actions Add to Tension With North Korea

But I think that the unfortunate element of what’s happening with the redeployment and relocation of U.S. forces is that this could have been done in the context of making peace with North Korea with trade-offs, which is what I advocated in my book *Korean Endgame*, which John was kind enough to mention. Instead of doing that, we are regrettably doing these things, all of which I think are right and make sense, but we’re doing it in a way that adds to tension with North Korea and makes the situation more dangerous.

I very much regret the way in which the Pentagon has proceeded with these changes in the context of a confrontational posture toward North Korea, even though what they are doing, I think, is defensible. Except that when you decide you’re going to relocate in Osan and Pyeongtaek, you’re making China look at this and say, “Well, they’re picking a place that’s best for these forces to be available for use in dealing with us,” and therefore you’re complicating both the U.S. relationship with China and potentially South Korea’s relationship with China.

In conclusion, I would just like to say that I do disagree with Professor Kim on multi-lateral plus. He seems to favor this option. I don’t think it will work because multi-lateral plus would have inherent contradictions. The U.S. wants the ROK and

Japan to be partners in containing China, basically, and being available for contingencies in Taiwan, though there may be other things also. And I think that would build into such a multilateral plus concept essential contradictions. I think multilateral minus is what we should be working for now gradually, not abruptly. And certainly the six party framework has been a very encouraging development. It’s a completely phony issue in this campaign because there is no reason why you can’t and shouldn’t have both multilateral and bilateral, but the fact is that evolution of the multilateral framework in this dialogue with North Korea into a multilateral security organization, I think, is a very appropriate thing at this stage in history and I hope that it happens.

Thank you.

Joel Wit: I’m very happy to be here and I’m happy to see my friend Sung-han, whom I haven’t seen in a while, maybe since we worked together on a study that came to the conclusion that the comprehensive regional security alliance was the best approach. This was around a year ago. And I have to say, honestly, I remain very skeptical that this approach will work. It may be something that will work in the near term, but I think there are a number of significant problems with this approach.

Basic Problems with Comprehensive Regional Security Alliance

There are some basic problems which I haven’t quite resolved in my own mind, and I’m just going to throw these things out here since I haven’t had a lot of time to think about this coherently. I’m kind of unconvinced that the reasons that underlie a comprehensive alliance really are reasons for an alliance.

And I should say here—and it may be a fine point—but as an American, I understand there are a lot of different kinds of security relationships between the United States and other countries and those relationships are not all alliances; they're not like the U.S.-ROK alliance. That doesn't mean they're not close; it doesn't mean they're not viable, but they're not all alliances.

When I look at the reasons outlined for this comprehensive security alliance, it kind of leaves me really cold. If there's not the problem of North Korea anymore and we're all working towards dealing with terrorists and drugs and counter-proliferation and those kinds of things, and there's no mention of China here, I'm not sure if a regional security alliance is aimed at China, and I assume it isn't.

I find it difficult to understand why we need to continue the current alliance if we're dealing with these limited issues. Moreover, not just that, I find it difficult to politically sustain a close alliance if we're dealing with terrorism and pirates and drugs.

This points to a broader issue here which I have mentioned before in other settings and some of you have heard me talk about this. I emerged from this agonizing study of the future of the alliance last year which was conducted by Americans and Koreans, sort of fulfilling my role as curmudgeon which I find I increasingly do these days. I emerged basically questioning: why do we always have to have this alliance in the future; why does it have to exist?

Uncertainty of Issues Facing the U.S. in Asia

I don't want people to think that I'm questioning that under the current circumstances, but I think if you can all try to stretch

your minds a little bit and look ten years down the road and try to imagine different scenarios for Northeast Asia, right now if you look at the issues that are facing the U.S. in Northeast Asia and the wide range of uncertainty about how they're going to turn out, you can imagine a lot of different scenarios. You've got the future of North Korea; does anyone know if North Korea is going to exist in ten years? Does anyone know if North Korea is going to be like Pakistan in ten years? Does anyone know if the six party talks are going to work?

None of us in the U.S. know that. There is a wide range of uncertainty there. There are wide ranges of uncertainty about the future of U.S.-Chinese relations, the future of Chinese-Korean relations. Just a year ago, we would have all been sitting here saying Chinese-Korean relations are really getting close. A few months ago or even now, we might have a different perspective on that, given recent events. And there's also the issue of Japan's future. All of these issues are going to affect the situation in Northeast Asia ten years from now.

North Korea Nuclear Issue

One of them I would like to highlight just very quickly because I don't think enough thought has been given to this. There is this assumption which I find everywhere I go, and people probably put me in this group, but there is this assumption that when there's a will, there's a way in negotiating on North Korea's weapons program. That is, the Bush administration was unfair, and if there was someone else who would meet bilaterally with the North Koreans, we could resolve this problem. Let's stretch our minds a little bit.

What happens if we can't resolve it? What happens if North Korea at some point de-

cides the Pakistan model is a good model for them? I know a lot of them are thinking about it, and everyone can say well, “I was just in Pyongyang and they told me if the United States would only do this or if the United States would only do that, we’d negotiate a solution.” I’ve dealt with North Koreans and I try to maintain an appropriate level of skepticism about this.

Implications of a Pakistan-like North Korea

The issue is, well, think about it. What happens if there’s a Pakistan-like North Korea ten years from now? What effect is that going to have on the alliance? You could argue the logical effect is the alliance will continue and we’ll take measures to buttress the alliance, and there might be additional military deployments and we’ll be closer than ever.

That may be true, but what happens if China is willing to live with the Pakistan model for five years, ten years, on the assumption that if they’re patient, they can convince the North Koreans to change their minds? Will that have an effect on the alliance? Will it have an impact on South Korea? Will there be South Koreans who say, “Maybe we can live a little bit with the Pakistan model since the Chinese can?” I know every South Korean in this room will deny it vehemently that they can live with a nuclear North Korea, but somehow I’m a little skeptical that that’s a unanimous viewpoint.

Leaving the Pakistan model aside, when I look at the future of the alliance, I like to look at it from an American perspective, from the perspective of an American who’s had to work in government in the context of a lot of different security relationships with other countries around the world—in the Middle East and other places as well. And

all of those relationships, to some degree, are fine tuned to a lot of the domestic factors that are in play in the country itself, in the United States. They are fine tuned to the security environment in the region itself, and they can work well even if they aren’t like the current U.S.-ROK alliance, and it’s quite possible that in the future, in some distant future, when things have changed a lot in Northeast Asia, there may not need to be an alliance. There may be a security relationship, but there may not need to be an alliance.

In working on this joint study we did—I’m not going to name names—but it was interesting to me that no one could envision a relationship between the United States and South Korea where there weren’t 3,000 American ground forces in South Korea. It doesn’t mention in this paper about how many American troops were there. But 3,000 was always the magic number. I just couldn’t understand that. So I talked to other military men who would say that you don’t need 3,000 ground forces under certain conditions. You can have access to an air base; you can have a logistics unit based there; you might do joint training. But you may not need 3,000 people there.

Different Components of a Security Relationship

That’s what I think we need to do here. We need to stretch our minds a little bit to think about this and understand the different components of a security relationship. It can be a formal alliance with a mutual defense commitment; there can be other informal commitments between the two countries; there can be public statements between the leaders about how close we are. There could be the permanent or period stationing of military forces; there could be ground forces; there could be periodic

appointments of air forces; there could be joint planning. The same thing for training and exercises, prepositioning of equipment—that's another component; port calls by naval vessels, defense industrial cooperation. These are all components of the security relationship and the combination of some of them or all of them can communicate a close relationship.

Q&A

John Ikenberry: I think that rather than ask Dr. Kim to respond to those comments, provocative though they were, I would like to open things and then he can weave his response to them in his comments and responses to your questions.

Questioner: Thank you very much for a very interesting presentation. I just want to ask about the polling. We read an awful lot about anti-Americanism in South Korea. We saw polls a few months ago on whether the U.S. was a major threat. It was considered a major threat by South Koreans and with numbers in the 70% range of anti-American feeling, but your data comes out with a majority supporting the alliance, indeed, 37% wanting an enhanced or stronger relationship. I'm trying to figure out how this all fits together. Does this mean an emotional level, a strong anti-Americanism, or are South Koreans looking in more pragmatic terms at their future with the U.S. as the most benign partner they can think of, both strategically and economically? How do you put this altogether with the contrast with other polls?

Three Kinds of Anti-Americans In South Korea

Kim: What made this poll outcome possible? I would rather respond like this. There are three kinds of anti-Americans in South

Korea. The first category is ideological. They deny the United States in terms of the history of civilizations. The United States is not contributing to history or civilizations. They are small in number in South Korea but they are very organized.

The second category is pragmatic anti-Americans. They are issue oriented. They take issues such as environmental pollution, etc. But once the two governments reduce the gap and resolve those issues, they usually tone down their anti-American rhetoric. In that sense, they are pragmatic.

And the last category is popular anti-Americans. They are very episodic; they are fluctuating. They are very angry about certain episodes, but the next day they go to the U.S. embassy to get a visa to travel to the U.S. or to study in the U.S.

If popular sentiment is fluctuating, and for the past several months or for the past couple of years—I already mentioned this in my presentation—people have gone through a basic, very intensive learning process. The two leaders had a summit meeting and a lot of opinion leaders emphasized the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance, so I think that people have learned some kind of merits of the alliance and there was no USFK-related incident for several months. That's why people began to realize and reaffirm the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance.

Questioner: Dr. Kim, I'd like to follow up on the previous question. I recalled many polls over the years that were showing a declining favorable view among South Koreans and an increasing view of China. Even before this latest history incident, as I think you referred to it, was there a reversal of that? Are these just different polls? What are we seeing here?

Kim: There was a report about an inclination to China. That poll was conducted not among the general populace, but among the newly elected governing party members. And the question was basically not a security question, but “What is the future economic or trade partner of South Korea?” And they answered China; it’s rather misunderstood.

I kept that polling data for the past couple of years, but a consistent tendency is that the majority of the population was in favor of the U.S. military presence and they considered the United States as a strategic partner, that it’s the best partner for the future of the Korean Peninsula’s security. This kind of aspect was rather misunderstood, particularly through the mass media.

China became the number one trading partner of South Korea in the last year. Economically, China is very important, but people didn’t think of China as the best strategic partner for South Korean security. We need to correct those misunderstandings.

Questioner: The U.S. finally accepted the Korean proposal to delay the redeployment of U.S. forces in Korea, so in return, what does the U.S. want of Korea in the short term and in the long term?

Kim: That’s a very good question—what the United States wants vis-à-vis South Korea in return for a delay in USFK reductions. It wants to renew the South Korean troop dispatch which is scheduled at the end of this year. According to the law of sending troops, troop dispatch is going to be terminated by the end of this year. That means Congress needs to renew the dispatch.

In that sense, the United States government probably hopes the South Korean Parliament will renew the dispatch in Iraq. That is

going to be the more immediate concern or wish on the part of the U.S. government. A more long-term perspective is going to be that the United States will expect a South Korean contribution to the ROK-U.S. alliance by way of giving more strategic flexibility to the USFK. If you look at the joint statement of the defense ministers of the last SCN meeting last year, they included strategic flexibility of the USFK, which means the USFK is expected to play or have a rapid deployment force in this region.

Role of South Korean Forces

The next question rises concerning the role of South Korean forces. There will be two options—USFK and South Korean forces will be jointly working on combat operations in this region to deal with the regional contingencies. That is one.

The second option is going to be that the United States alone is involved in combat operations and the South Korean forces will take responsibility of peacemaking operations after the combat is over. But I don’t think we have to deal with these issues right now. This is our homework for the future, the kind of discussions about the regional role of the ROK-U.S. alliance if the two governments get to that point.

Ikenberry: Can I just jump in and just ask: the topic of our discussion today is the alliance and transformation, but I see more continuity, despite the anticipation of change, than I would have guessed thinking about this issue a year ago—the warming of relations a year ago with China, the Pentagon rethinking about alliances generally around the world, the flexibility-driven efforts to, in effect, disentangle the United States from permanent long-term, heavily populated bases in Europe and East Asia, and then, of course, the anti-Americanism in

South Korea and the growing divergence of strategic thinking about North Korea.

One would have thought that there would have been much more groundswell on both sides to see a fundamentally new conception of the relationship and of security relations generally in the region. I understand what Selig wants to see happen, and that would be a radical shift. But I don't see your view being a major shift from the status quo except to layer in more multilateral and non-narrow security issues.

My final thought is that you're taking a sober look that shouldn't be so surprising that there's a great deal of stability because the underlying interests of the two countries remain very stable when it comes to the relationship. The United States gets a lot out of this relationship—forward presence. I would disagree with Selig about if those troops were brought home. It is much cheaper to keep American troops there than in Fort Riley, Kansas. They're closer to where they would be used even if their use is not in Northeast Asia; there is a subsidy for American troops, and there is the political dimension of having a voice in the region, having a forward presence, conveying the kind of stability that you want to convey, the kind of Joe Nye type of argument about why the troops matter.

On the Korean side, likewise, you get security on the cheap, you get a subsidy, you get a nuclear umbrella, you get deterrents, and because the American interest is so strong, you are able to negotiate with the United States in ways and increasingly see opportunities to negotiate as Korea, for example, is opening up and is joining the efforts in Iraq. They now have something to bargain with in Washington. There's a kind of bargaining element to make their rela-

tionship even more satisfying because you cannot make adjustments with it.

I'm just trying to say and my query to all of you is, where's the beef? Where are the big forces that are really transforming the relationship? What am I missing in my analysis?

U.S. Actions Complicating Efforts to Improve South-North Korea Relations

Harrison: I think we just left out the fact that the policy of the present administration is inducing tensions and forcing re-examination on the part of South Korea of the future of this relationship because it's complicating the efforts of South Korea to rapidly improve its relationship with North Korea. If the president is re-elected and pursues the same or more of the same aggressive policies toward North Korea, that's going to accentuate the possibilities for major change in the alliance relationship, whereas a Kerry victory would mean more factors that favor the status quo, like the ones I've mentioned on the economic side, which would be stronger.

Ikenberry: Sig, what you're saying is it's the United States that would be triggering the change and in that sense, misreading my specification of the interest we have in not changing the relationship. But you're suggesting that a different plan, a different agenda is in fact in place, and if we're given another four years, things could move very differently than what I've suggested.

Harrison: Yes, because the agenda is not directed to just South Korea, but in terms of this administration, to both Koreas.

Wit: I'm getting a little confused so let me just tell you what I think. I think what's holding all this up is obviously the situation

with North Korea and how that turns out. That is going to determine, to a large degree, the future of the security situation in the region, and I think it's going to determine to a large degree the future of the alliance, the future of that security relationship.

As I said before, there are a lot of different ways this can turn out. If tomorrow there was an agreement that North Korea says it will give up all its nuclear weapons programs, and there's part of it that's a political and economic warming of relations between all the countries, and there's rapid rapprochement between the North and South, maybe it would move on to other agreements like conventional force reductions, or other things like that. That sounds a little farfetched at the moment, but I think that's going to uncork the bottle, and then you are going to see at play a lot of these different forces that you were talking about a minute ago. But right now, I think we're kind of all on hold while we see what happens with North Korea.

China and Japan Could Be Source of Security Concern for South Korea

Kim: I think that Joel is in a kind of a strategic thinking that's rather confined to—I'm sorry to say this—the Korean Peninsula, and not a vision as a whole. From the Korean perspective, the disappearance of the North Korean threat is not the end of a South Korean security concern. We have to think about China and Japan as well. If you look at the current situation's strategic environment of South Korea, both China and Japan are powerful enough to provide some security concerns to South Korea, possibly in the future.

There have been a few historic moments when both China and Japan were both powerful. That means they competed with each

other, as you saw in the Sino-Japanese War about a century ago when those two powers were both powerful, and they ended up with a war or a violent confrontation. From the South Korean perspective, we need to think about a sponsor who will reclaim as a balancer among those major powers that surround the Korean Peninsula. My point is we need to go beyond the Korean Peninsula, not just be confined to the Korean Peninsula security kind of stretch.

Wit: I absolutely agree. We're not just talking about North Korea; we're talking about the regional security environment and I laid out some of those factors—the future of Japan, US-Chinese relations, Chinese-Korean relations. All of these things are very uncertain. All I'm saying is that first, if you look ten years down the road, are you telling me that no matter what the situation is in Northeast Asia, these historic concerns mean that the alliance has to continue, that we have to have a comprehensive alliance?

The second point is that, given the situation in Northeast Asia, given these historic concerns, if the situation in Northeast Asia is pretty good—let's say there is a functioning multilateral security dialogue, that the threats are very minimal and relations are very good between all the countries involved, although there is always the danger that that will collapse. But does that mean that a comprehensive alliance has to be in place, or is there another kind of security relationship between the United States and South Korea that could serve this kind of reassuring role?

Ikenberry: Just a footnote on Dr. Kim's point about even absent North Korea. At my only visit to a Blue House hearing, Kim Dae-jung talked about his recent visit to Pyongyang and he was asked by an American who happens to be director of policy

planning now at the State Department: “What did you say about the presence of U.S. troops if there is a comprehensive peace and some kind of reorganization of the North and South?” And Kim Dae-jung said, “I started to ask Kim Jong-il about that and Kim Jong-il interrupted me and said, ‘I know your views, I read about them in newspapers. I share the views that the U.S. troops should remain even after unification. We live in a crowded neighborhood with great powers all around us.’”

That was cheap talk, I know, at the summit, but that was a kind of a reflection of this notion that the offshore balancer is one variable that suggests that there’s going to be a demand for the alliance, regardless of what happens to North Korea. That’s just an argument.

Harrison: Kim Jong-il was saying that in the context of friendly relations between the United States and North Korea, a U.S. policy that U.S. accepts North Korea and co-exists with North Korea, normalizes with North Korea and helps North Korea, would promote unification. In that context, American forces are welcome in the Korean Peninsula. That’s a major element of this issue. It wasn’t in a vacuum, let’s put it that way.

Questioner: Joel Wit said that one of the ways the alliance could manifest itself or the relationship can manifest itself without a formal alliance is through defense and industrial cooperation. It’s my understanding that the current administration in South Korea is trying to diversify its defense suppliers. There are two major systems coming up, one a helicopter and the other an AWAC system, and it’s possible that either or both of those will not include the U.S. defense companies taking a prime lead in those efforts. How committed is the current administration to this policy of diversifica-

tion that they might choose a plane or helicopter that’s technologically less advanced, just because it’s not American?

Kim: Diversification of defense suppliers has been rather a consistent policy objective of the South Korean government, but also this question contradicts another task of maintaining the inter-operability between Seoul and Washington. But if you look at the defense infrastructure as well as the hardware South Korea produces, actually the diversification level is very high. But at the same time, they are being asked to maintain inter-operability between Seoul and Washington. So this is one of the major tasks we need to resolve in the future, but personally, I think inter-operability is more important than maintaining the criteria of diversification of defense suppliers.

Questioner: Mr. Harrison mentioned the economic dimension and I’d like to ask Dr. Kim about that in a different regard. If you look on the IFANS website, there are an awful lot of very good essays that point out, for example, that South Korea’s security interest will be safely fulfilled only if it maintains friendly relations also with all the major neighboring powers—China, Japan and Russia, as well as, of course, with the United States. I think President Roh in his army days speech also mentioned this. How can you really talk about this—it’s a nice label on the can, but what’s inside the can?

If there’s no idea of how the region is going to build a strong economic foundation together in some kind of a regional economic development program—I’m talking about something like a Marshall Plan for Northeast Asia—then you’re stuck and Korea is stuck, forever being in the middle between the two that are the offshore balancers. And who do you trust? I understand there are some people who talk about an economy

first strategy towards dealing with North Korea. I know Mr. Harrison has been looking into the Northeast Asian energy thing; he's done a whole study on gas pipelines and what not.

I'm bringing up the whole question of the iron & silk road policy, not just the reconnection of the railroads, but the fact that the whole region's infrastructure is a mess. Manchuria's infrastructure is a mess; Siberia's infrastructure is a mess; the Russians are worried about losing Siberia; the whole thing could fall apart. So what about a regional economic development program with components of all kinds of infrastructure, not just take the energy and ship it out, but actually raise living standards as a way to actually ensure that there is regional stability?

Kim: I think the economy first strategy is quite necessary, but we are facing the North Korean nuclear problem, so our primary task is to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, first of all. At the second stage, we will be able to transform, for example, six-body talks into a regional security dialogue in which we will be able to discuss regional economic cooperation, as well as other security concerns. We need to set the priorities in light of current concerns.

Reduction of U.S. Troops in Korea

Questioner: In contrast to the U.S. troop reduction to 12,500, which has been debated extensively in the Korean media, as far as I can tell Defense Minister Yoon's proposal to cut 50,000 troops has elicited no comment at all, and indeed, his statement to the National Assembly of 10,000 in the first year, 10,000 in the second year, shows a rather quick time line for that reduction. Could you comment on that?

Kim: Defense Minister Yoon proposed that reduction idea. If you look at the Korean force structure, it's somewhat heavily army oriented and somewhat Cold War structure oriented, so in that sense he probably expressed his desire to transform that kind of a force structure into more like a 21st century force structure.

Another dimension is related with the U.S. force reductions. Because the United States is reducing its forces, South Korea is pressed to increase its own defense budget, but the national budget is rather limited, so it's very hard to increase the budget sharply for a short period of time. As a kind of interim measure, we need to reduce our troops first and then we will be able to find some room in which we will reduce some wasted money in our defense expenditure. That is sort of an interim measure, but in my assessment, at the same time the army oriented force structure will be somewhat necessary because South Korea is aiming for reunification of the two Koreas.

If North Korea is integrated with South Korea, for a long period of time we need a peacekeeping operation in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula. That means we still need a large number of ground troops even after Korean unification. In that sense, there will be heated discussions about the number of troops as well as the force structure of South Korea, but as an interim measure, Defense Minister Yoon enumerated some kind of possible measures to reduce some wasted money in light of South Korean defense expenditures.

Questioner: Proliferation of WMDs is a threat to the regional as well as international community and the U.S. leads the proliferation security initiative. This is a successful movement. I'd like to ask the reason why South Korea is so reluctant to the PSI?

Kim: I don't know why South Korea is reluctant, but South Korea—I'm not representing the South Korean government—in my understanding, the South Korean government is taking a somewhat gradualist approach. The first stage is sort of a stage in which we dissuade North Korea by suggesting a roadmap to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis.

If North Korea continues to resist, then we can go to the second stage in which we will be involved with PSI or going to the UN Security Council, or imposing sanctions, etc. This is Plan B, not Plan A. The South Korean government is still working on Plan A, rather than Plan B. That's why I wouldn't use the word "reluctance," but they will be considering participation in the PSI if North Korea still continues to resist even after the U.S. presidential elections.

Ikenberry: I want to ask a question about this issue of Seoul vs. Washington strategy on the North Korea nuclear issue. Anybody else want to focus on that issue as well? Let me ask the question of what happens if, ultimately, Washington does go more readily to Plan B after the election and Seoul does not. At what point do we come to a crisis in the alliance that will have alliance implications if the divergent strategy for dealing with North Korea festers and then grows. Joel, do you want to take a shot at that?

Wit: I'm going to actually turn that around a little bit and go back to my role as curmudgeon and say that I think there's a good chance that North Korea is going to Plan B after the U.S. election. What I mean by that is there's been a lot of speculation in October about an October surprise and a nuclear test, and all that stuff I think has proved to be totally false. But I think that after the U.S. election, one possible ap-

proach for North Korea—and they've taken it in the past—is to raise the stakes and to take steps that heighten the sense of tension that strengthen that bargaining position for any future negotiations. And that kind of shakes up the situation.

I think that is entirely possible after the election, no matter who's elected—Kerry or Bush, it's not going to matter. In that situation, you're right, then the possibility for tensions may increase. I don't know what the Kerry administration would do to react to that, or the Bush administration would do to react to that. But I think it would create problems. It may be impossible, but what we should be doing now is thinking about this and going back to the old idea of red lines—which I think the Bush administration was wrong in saying that North Korea crosses red lines whenever they're created.

Bush Administration Should Be Thinking Of Red Lines

I think that's wrong. The administration should be thinking about red lines and also thinking about working closely with China to come up with contingency plans to deal with this kind of possibility, and if it can work closely with China, I think that would minimize tensions between Seoul and Washington.

Harrison: If John Kerry is elected, I don't think that North Korea will raise the stakes. I think they'll wait a while to see what he's going to come up with. What he said the other night in the debate is not necessarily going to be to North Korea's liking, but they certainly, in my opinion, are not going to rush into raising the stakes. They want to play this out to get very badly needed economic help. But I think if the president is reelected, then the question is how the PSI

is implemented. The PSI involves many scenarios that could raise the stakes.

Insofar as North Korea is concerned, it seems to me that if any North Korean vessel is interdicted, particularly if it's interdicted in North Korean waters, then we cannot predict what would happen. At that point, I think the stakes could be raised very seriously.

Ikenberry: Sung-han, do you want to talk a little bit about post-election?

Kim: Whoever wins the election, I think, will have some time to continue negotiations with North Korea, maybe during the first half of next year. If North Korea continues to resist, probably the U.S. as well as the South Korean government will be thinking of giving pressure to North Korea. But the key factor is going to be China.

It depends on China and whether it will agree that all diplomatic measures have been exhausted. China will not be thinking that way just because North Korea continues to resist or North Korea, as Joel said, raises the stakes. China will still try to resort to six party talks and try to give North Korea some more time to think about negotiations for a realistic deal for this issue, as long as North Korea does not challenge the U.S. strategy of counter-proliferation. In other words, as long as North Korea restrains itself from exporting nuclear material or nuclear weapons to other parts of the world.

Questioner: In my memory, South Koreans talk about Japan always as a negative factor. It's a very disappointing thing. If Japan is on the positive side, for example, Japan and South Korea can maintain a good relationship. How will it influence South Korean security policy in the future? For example,

on the trilateral security strategy of Japan, the U.S., and South Korea?

Japan and Korea Should Consolidate Security Cooperation

Kim: Personally, I support the trilateral security cooperation, or sort of a virtual trilateral alliance among the three countries in the future. But there is a missing link or a dotted line between Seoul and Tokyo. That's why this is our other homework—for Japan and South Korea to continue to consolidate security cooperation between our two countries. In order to do that, I think Japan needs to take care of its own neighbors, rather than jump across the region just to go directly to the world.

If you look at the Japanese bid to secure a seat at the UN Security Council as a permanent member, I don't think Japan consulted with its own neighbors. In that sense, Japan needs to accumulate some credit from its own neighbors so that they will willingly accept a more expanded role in security affairs of Japan. Otherwise, Japan will not be recognized as a real regional leader, let alone South Korea's genuine strategy partner in the future.

Questioner: It's my impression that the U.S. may be the most reluctant partner possible in a multilateral security arrangement. If the six party talks proceed and there remains enthusiasm among the other partners and the U.S. remains quite reluctant, I wonder about the implications?

Kim: That's why I support the multilateral plus school, to soften the U.S. reluctance. The United States' first priority is to maintain the alliance networks with South Korea, as well as Japan. Otherwise, the United States will continue to be skeptical toward the idea of a multilateral security dialogue

in this region. In that sense, as the gentleman just pointed out, the US, Japan, and South Korea need to show more cooperative and consolidated security cooperation among themselves and show that this trilateral cooperation will not be damaging to other regional countries' strategic interests. They need to pool themselves, otherwise the multilateral plus idea will not be realized.

This is a dilemma. But anyhow, we have been witnessing the co-existence between OSC and NATO in Europe, so that's why we need to explore those two ideas at the same time. China itself doesn't oppose the continued military presence of the United States in this region, as long as the United States doesn't try to induce Japan to contain China.

In that sense, Japan's role is very important. Japan needs to show more certainty about a

future vision. The uncertainty of a Japanese vision is another challenging factor to the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance. I think it's quite normal that Japan is becoming normal, because Japan has been a very constructive player in international relations and Japan has contributed much to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, for example. In that sense, Japan deserves to be a normal country, but what kind of role Japan is going to play specifically has not been said. Japan needs to show more and suggest more to other countries about what is going to be the future of its expanded security role in this region.

Ikenberry: On that note of suspense, a reluctance, an uncertainty, I want to thank you all for coming and invite you to join me in thanking our panelists for a terrific presentation.

[End]

About the Panelists

Main Speaker **Dr. Kim Sung-han** is Professor and Director-General for American Studies at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea. He is currently teaching at Korea University, an advisor to the ROK Ministry of National Defense and the National Security Council, and regularly contributes columns to *The Korea Herald*. Dr. Kim is the executive director of CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific) in Korea. Previously he was a research fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences and an expert advisor to the Prime Minister's Committee for Globalization in 1992-94. Dr. Kim received his Ph.D. from the University of Texas, Austin. He has contributed numerous articles to scholarly journals, including "The End of Humanitarian Intervention?: U.S. Foreign Policy After 9/11," "The ROK-U.S.-DPRK Trilateral Relationship," and "U.S. Policy toward the Korean Peninsula and Korea-U.S. Relations."

Discussants **Mr. Selig Harrison** is Director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy, a senior scholar of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Chairperson of the Task Force on U.S.-Korea Policy. He is also adjunct professor of Asian studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. Mr. Harrison has specialized in East Asia for fifty years as a journalist and scholar. His contact with Korea includes interviews with Kim Il-sung and leading a Carnegie Endowment delegation to Pyongyang in 1992 that learned for the first time that North Korea had reprocessed plutonium. He has written six books, including *Korea Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement* (2002).

Mr. Joel Wit is Senior Fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He works on Northeast Asian security issues as well as weapons proliferation. Mr. Wit served for 15 years in the Department of State and most recently was the coordinator for the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework. He has served as senior advisor to Robert L. Gallucci, ambassador at-large in charge of policy towards North Korea, where he worked on U.S. strategy to resolve the 1994 nuclear crisis, and has served in a variety of positions, primarily in the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. He was a member of the U.S. delegation to the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) talks and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). Mr. Wit received an M.A. from Columbia University and a B.A. from Bucknell University.

Moderator **Dr. G. John Ikenberry** is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. Previously, he taught at Georgetown University. Dr. Ikenberry also has been a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. Dr. Ikenberry is the author of numerous publications, including *State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy* (2002), *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (2000), and *Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government* (1988).

Agenda

1. Transformation and ROK-U.S. Alliance

1.1 Two Meanings of Transformation

1.2 Change, Transformation, Revolution

1.3 Questions

2. ROK-U.S. Alliance in Transformation

2.1 End of the Cold War and North Korean Nuclear Crisis

2.2 Inter-Korean Summit and Second Nuclear Crisis

2.3 GPR and Relocation of USFK

3. Future of the Alliance : Four Schools

3.1 Status-Quo school

3.2 Non-Alliance school

3.3 Multilateral school

3.4 Comprehensive school

4. EAI-CCFR Polls

5. Time to Envision the Alliance

4. EAI-CCFR Polls

*** Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (U.S.) and East Asia Institute (Korea) jointly conducted a survey in July 2004 to assess their perceptions of international relations.**

4.1 Question : What is your (Korean) opinion on the USFK ?

1. USFK

n=100

	The USFK should remain in South Korea indefinitely (%)	The USFK should remain in South Korea for a considerable period(%)	The USFK should with withdrawn gradually in stages(%)	The USFK must withdraw immediately (%)	Not sure/ Decline(%)	Total (%)
<u>Year 2004</u>	13	38	43	6	-	100

Analysis: Competitive Views (Pro-Presence : 51% Anti-Presence : 49%)

4. EAI-CCFR Polls

4.2 Question : How do you evaluate the impact of each of the following countries upon South Korean security? [This question was not asked in the US survey]

Countries' impact on South Korean security n=1000

	Significantly beneficial	A bit beneficial	No Impact	A bit threatening	Significantly threatening	No answer	Total
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
B11_1. China	23	48	12	15	2	--	100
B11_2. Japan	14	44	24	16	3	--	100
B11_3. North Korea	27	22	10	25	16	--	100
B11_5. U.S.	42	36	10	9	3	--	100
B11_6. Russia	10	41	33	15	1	--	100

Analysis : North Korea is no longer seen as a threat (benefit 49% ; threat 41%).

4. EAI-CCFR Polls

4.3 Question: Officials in Washington have proposed reducing the number of U.S. troops in South Korea by about one third. Do you think this will be good for South Korea’s security, bad for South Korea’s security, or do you think it will have no significant affect either way?

2. South Korea: Security of South Korea if US reduces troops n=1000

	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	Not Sure/ Decline	Total
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	
<u>South Korea</u> 2004	11	49	34	6	-	100

Analysis: Positive 60%

(probably because of the learning process of the past couple of years?)

4. EAI-CCFR Polls

4.4 Question : Under what circumstances do you approve U.S. preemptive military strike against North Korea? [This question was not asked in the US survey]

U.S. preemptive military strike against NK n=1000

	If North Korea continues to accumulate nuclear materials although it has not actually turned them into a nuclear bomb	If North Korea tries to sell nuclear materials to other countries and/or terrorists	If North Korea tests nuclear bombs	If North Korea test-fires long-range ballistic missiles that can reach the U.S. territories	If North Korea's attack on South Korea is imminent	If the North Korean regime continuously violates human rights in a gross and systemic manner	I do not approve of a U.S preemptive strike against North Korea under any circumstances	Total
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
<u>Year</u>								
2004	6	15	20	13	--	7	39	100

Analysis: unconditional anti-war sentiment is too high (39%)

4. EAI-CCFR Polls

4.5 Question : Do you think South Korea-U.S. alliance should be maintained after the reunification of the Korean peninsula? [This question was not asked in the US survey]

South Korea – US alliance

n=1000

	The alliance should be increase more than the current level	The alliance should be maintained at the current level	The alliance should be maintained but at a significantly reduced level	The alliance should be terminated	Don't Know	No answer	Total
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
<u>Year</u> 2004	6	54	31	9	--	--	100

Analysis: pro-presence after reunification is very high (91%)

4. EAI-CCFR Polls

4.6 Question : Among the following East Asian countries, which do you think South Korea should cooperate most with? [This question was not asked in the US survey]

South Korea's best partner

n=1000

	U.S.	Japan	China	Russia	EU	None	Not Sure/ Decline to Answer	Total
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)		(%)
<u>Year</u>								
2004	53	4	24	1	10	9	--	100

4. EAI-CCFR Polls

4.7 Question : Do you think the USFK should play an active military role as a regional stabilizer and engage in military conflicts beyond the Korean peninsula, or should it confine its role to the deterrence of a North Korean military attack? [This question was not asked in the US survey]

Role of the USFK	n=1000			Total
	Become a regional stabilizer	Confine to the prevention of military conflict in the Korean Peninsula	Not sure/ Decline	
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
<u>Year</u>				
2004	60	40	--	100

Analysis : Hope for the ROK-U.S. Regional Security Alliance ?

