

Japan and the United Nations: Past and Present

by

Ambassador Kitaoka Shinichi

Ambassador Kitaoka: Thank you for your very kind introduction. I'm particularly happy to hear your remarks about what kind of time in history we are living in. The fact that you drew our attention to that point is particularly what I like. At this time, the world is changing quite a lot.

Let me say a few words about my appointment. I have been a scholar in political and diplomatic history of modern Japan up until the end of the Cold War. At that time, I began to think and write about contemporary changes in history, because so many things have taken place since then: the end of the Cold War itself, the unification of Germany, the collapse of Soviet Russia, in Asia the democratization of Taiwan and Korea—very dramatic changes in history. In order to analyze those changes, people thought that those who have a historical prospective could provide better explanations than contemporary observers. That's why I began to receive many requests to write about those things.

I have so far published fourteen books, half on history and half on contemporary topics. While writing on contemporary issues, I began to have more interaction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and also with prime ministers, such as a bilateral dialogue among public intellectuals, and an advisory board to the foreign ministers and prime ministers. And then a request came: "How about becoming an ambassador?" And at the beginning, I declined a couple of requests. Minister

Heizo Takenaka, who has been a very good friend of mine, called me and said "Kitaoka-san, would you make a phone call to this number?" I called that number, and Tanaka Makiko-san answered, who was then foreign minister. And she said very politely, "Do you have any interest in becoming ambassador to some country?" I just wondered whether or not I could contribute to our diplomacy.

If I had been a specialist, for example, of the politics of Italy, then I would have accepted it with pleasure. But I have been a specialist of Japan, so it's very difficult for me to find any place where I can contribute. The proposals were at European countries, where life might have been very pleasant and enjoyable, but would be of no use to my academic career. So I declined them. Within a few years, a request came, this time about the DPR, second ambassador of the Japanese Permanent Mission to the United Nations, and I thought it would be very interesting—also because I like New York City. I also thought it would be good for my future academic studies.

Let me go back to the topic I'm going to talk about. The topic is very vague, "Japan and the United Nations, Past and Present." I will begin with Japan's entry into the United Nations; it was in December, 1956. At that time, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru came to New York City and made his first speech to the United Nations, where he said Japan would be willing to be the bridge between East and West. I don't know what

he meant by East and West, because East may mean Asia, or East may mean socialism. He said it with much excitement and pleasure, because Japan had to wait almost five years to be allowed to get into the United Nations, since Soviet Russia vetoed Japan's participation.

Japan's Three Doctrines of Diplomacy

There was a conflict between Japan and Soviet Russia. Japan concluded a peace treaty in San Francisco in 1951, and it became effective in 1952. Soviet Russia did not sign the peace treaty and blocked Japan's participation. Eventually, Japan normalized its relationship with Soviet Russia, though it is not a perfect one. The Soviet Union then decided not to veto, and Japan was allowed to get into the United Nations. There was such excitement about Japan's entry. In the first diplomatic bluebook, which was published in 1957, it was written that Japan should follow three doctrines of diplomacy. One was a United Nations-centered diplomacy, the second a diplomacy as an Asian country, and the third was cooperation with free countries. This is evidence of how Japanese people were excited about the entry into the United Nations at that time.

The United Nations was established in 1945, and it was the United Nations against its enemies. We were one of the enemies at that time; it still remains in the UN Charter, to some extent. It was the year of Japan's surrender, and in February of 1946, Japan's constitution was written by the general headquarters of the Allied Powers; Article 9 was incorporated at that time. The second part of Article 9 is very famous, or infamous: that Japan shall not have any army, navy, air force, or any war potential.

Reasons for Article 9

It was just within half a year from Japan's surrender. The main objective was not to allow Japan military forces, to prevent Japan from becoming a military power again. At that time, the United Nations and the so-called Peace Constitution was a similar kind of thing. But the constitution was very well-received by the Japanese people, who were exhausted after a long war. "No more war" fit very well with Japanese people's feelings. That's why people accepted the constitution rather enthusiastically.

There were difficult issues. Within a few years, the Cold War expanded into Asia, and Japan had to choose to go together with the United States—that was a clever choice. Then Japan pursued a pro-western diplomacy. In that sense, though, Japan was not divided into two countries like Germany, yet Japan was internally divided into two countries. One was a pro-western, capitalistic country. The other was a pacifist, pro-socialist country. This sentiment was relatively strong, and though Japan as a whole followed the pro-western course, the pro-socialist and capitalist sentiments remained very strong and tried to get one third of the votes or one third of the seats of the parliament, which was enough to block constitutional revision.

In 1957 there was a publication of a bluebook, and there were three principles. Japan pursued doctrine number three; cooperation with the West became the most important one. Just look at Japan's diplomacy after the war. After 1957, Japan revised the security treaty with the United States. Okinawa returned to Japan. These are the most important issues to Japan's diplomacy.

A UN-centered diplomacy was not pursued very much, but, that didn't create many problems, because the United Nations was not working very effectively, because of the veto from the U.S. and Soviet Russia. Japan was progressing to a high level of economic development in the 1960's. The first remarks made by a Japanese leader was a speech made by Foreign Minister Aichi in 1968, where he first said Japan was ready to be a permanent member of the Security Council. It was the first occasion, but still Japan's major focus was on cooperation with western powers. In the 1970's, Japan paid more attention and more effort to the cooperation with the G7 summit, which was considered to be more important than the United Nations.

In the 1980's, there was a time when former Prime Minister Nakasone had a very good relationship with the late President Ronald Reagan. At that time, it was said that security ties between Japan and the United States became very deep. But cooperation was confined within Japan's border; Japan didn't have to do anything beyond its border. Once, Mr. Nakasone wanted to send some mine sweepers to the Indian Ocean when the Iran-Iraqi conflict was going on, but it was stopped by then Chief Speaker of the Cabinet Gotoda Masaharu. That was why the Gulf Crisis or Gulf War was such a big shock to Japan. The Cold War itself was a kind of world order, where the two superpowers had control over their subordinates or their colleagues. That prevented regional conflicts from happening. But the control is gone, so more regional conflicts have occurred. On the other hand, Soviet Russia stopped using vetoes in the Security Council, which made the revival of the Security Council possible.

That's why the Security Council began to be active in the 1990's.

Japan's Increasing Interest in the Security Council

It is at the same time in Japan's interest that the Security Council began to revive. It is very easy to explain—it is along the line of the change of history that Japan's interest in the United Nations went up, then went down, and is again going up. But at that time it was very difficult for Japan to go beyond its border for any military role. It was the first time in May 1991 that Japan sent some mine sweepers in the Gulf area, after the end of the war there. And in 1992, Japan participated in peacekeeping activities in Cambodia. That was our first experience with any military activity after World War II beyond our borders. There was strong resistance to that in parliament. I was then a professor at Rikkyo University, a private university in Tokyo, and there were some demonstrations there.

There was some resistance psychologically because the Socialist Party, which was reminiscent of the pacifist camp, had resisted with a famous car walk, or snail walk, whatever you may call it. They could not accept the idea that military force is sometimes important and useful overseas. After their resistance failed, they were beaten terribly in the upper house election. And that was the beginning of a sharp decline in the Socialist Party. Now the major opposition parties are Democrats, which is quite different from the Socialist Party. There also was a threat from North Korea, and also tension between China and Taiwan. Japanese people began to recognize that there were dangers, threats around Japan, all over the world, which should be met

by military force. That's when Japan began to accept its military role, though not very much compared to other major powers.

Japan Becoming More Accepting toward Security Role

But when Japan decided to send Self Defense Forces to the Indian Ocean after 9/11, there was almost no resistance at that time. Japan was becoming more positive toward being a major player in world security issues. This coincided with Japan's rise of interest in the Security Council. Japan is a major donor to the United Nations; it bears roughly 20% of the budget of the United Nations. The total amount is not that surprisingly big, but while Japan is paying approximately 20%, and the United States is paying 22%, Japan's contribution is more than that from Britain, France, Russia, and China combined. China is paying just 2%, while Russia is paying 1.2%. The French and British, respectively, are paying 5 or 6%. And whatever is decided about Japan's missions, Japan is automatically expected to pay 20% of the burden. In most cases, except for Haiti or more recent cases, peacekeeping operations are in Africa, mostly the formal colonies of the British or French. Is it fair to bear that kind of burden? While Japanese people are beginning to accept a more military role in world affairs, they are becoming more interested in the United Nations, and they are becoming more and more impatient about Japan being unable to be a permanent member of the Security Council.

My idea for UN reform is not exactly the same as the Japanese government. I think the UN Security Council's role will increase because there are many

crises all over the world, and people are paying a lot of attention to those crises. But there is a limit of resources, such as money. Next year, the peacekeeping operation budget will be 4.6 billion dollars. That means Japan is going to pay 0.9 billion dollars, mostly on missions to Africa. It is a huge amount of money—0.9 billion dollars is roughly the tantamount of Japan's official development aid to Africa as a whole. That means if this expands more, then we have to make some cuts in official development aid. This is a very difficult point for Japan's diplomacy.

Japan's Difficult Path to the Security Council

In America, no taxation, no representation; no representation, no taxation. I don't know whether or not there is going to be a Boston Tea Party anytime in the near future. But certainly the government will find it more and more difficult to persuade the people to bear this kind of burden without a voice. My idea is that in order to strengthen the role of the United Nations, we should collect the best resources in the Security Council, such as money, soldiers, wisdom, and experience. From that viewpoint, certainly Germany and Japan should be member countries. But another difficulty is that in order to change a charter with the United Nations, we have to have a two-thirds majority of the 191 member countries, plus the unanimous support of the P5.

If the new entries are only Japan and Germany, then that will not have a very good impression on developing countries, which are the majority of the 191. They need more regional representation, such as from Latin America, Brazil, from

South Asia, and India. These two can be very important candidates. But how about from Africa? There are big countries, like Nigeria—in terms of population—Egypt, and South Africa are also candidates for a permanent seat. But can they bring enough resources to the Security Council? Or can they become liabilities, possibly, with their internal conflict or lack of democracy? It's very difficult to persuade two-thirds of the Security member countries, and at the same time increase the effectiveness of the Security Council. That's why reform is so difficult. Very few countries are opposed to the entry of Japan into the Security Council. Maybe now only one country opposes its entry very openly, and that's North Korea.

Last year, Secretary General Koffi Annan appointed fifteen members to a high level panel to think about new threats, challenges and changes—how the UN should cope with new threats, and whether or not it should change organizationally. The report is expected to come at the end of this year. That would be the beginning of a real discussion about how to change the United Nations, or not. Next year will be a crucial year, and that's one of my responsibilities, and I'm planning to do my best on this issue.

Reform of Security Council Not Likely to Happen Soon

The reform of the Security Council was not considered likely early this year. There was a very cool sentiment against that. Since then, within a half year, there have been more and more reports about Security Council reform. I can say it is not totally impossible. I cannot say I'm optimistic, but I don't think I am totally pessimistic. As in the cases of important

democratic cases in the past, say, the independence of Japan in 1951, the revision of the security treaty in 1960, the return of Okinawa in 1972—all these are made possible by the strong will and determination of the prime minister. Without that it's totally impossible. With it, still it is difficult. What's important is how to persuade the top leader—I really do not know what the prime minister is thinking about that, but if he is determined, and if he does his best to persuade most of all the United States to support Japan, we will have a chance.

Among P5 countries, England and France have said openly that they support the entry of Japan and Germany, but they are not ready to give their hand to that. The United States is somewhat similar to that; Russia is not very different; China may be opposed to the entry of Japan and Germany, but they haven't said that very clearly. If all other conditions are met—a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly and the agreement or consent of the poor countries—at that time, China will not block it alone.

Rust Deming: Thank you very much Ambassador Kitaoka. That was a very useful and interesting review of where Japan stands on the UN. I would like to mention a couple of things. First, just for the record, the United States has supported Japan becoming a permanent member since 1972, I think when Nixon met with Sato for the first time. And every American president since then has at one time or another voiced support for Japan becoming a permanent member. And during the Clinton administration, where I was in the East Asian bureau and in Tokyo, we were working quite actively with the Japanese to come up with some kind of formula that would,

indeed, provide the way for Japan to become a permanent member.

Ambassador Kitaoka has outlined many of the problems, and one of the fundamental problems is the European Union, which now has, of course, France and the UK as permanent members. The idea of Germany joining that group is anathema to countries like Italy and Spain, who don't want to be left out of the big boys' club. And as the European Union becomes more and more of a foreign policy actor, the question arises: shouldn't it have a single EU seat? But, of course, neither France nor the UK are ready to surrender their seats, but I think it's going to have to head in that direction eventually. Hopefully things will move in that direction rather rapidly, because I think the time has certainly come.

Japan Is Ready for Responsibilities of Permanent Membership

Based on my experience in Japan, for a long time I had the impression that Japan's interest in a permanent seat on the Security Council was primarily motivated by the desire to get the recognition and the prestige it deserved. But I questioned whether Japan was really ready to step up to the responsibilities of being a permanent member, with all of the hard choices that are involved, and all of the tough diplomacy. And, indeed, the question of whether Japan should be a permanent member if it could not even send its own forces for UN peacekeeping operations was another issue that was raised. I think that Japan has demonstrated clearly that it is ready to step up to these responsibilities, based on the performance of Japan since 9/11 in particular. The decision by Prime Minister Koizumi and the Japanese government

to send naval units to the Indian Ocean to support the coalition in Afghanistan, and the decision to send Self Defense Forces to Iraq under very difficult conditions—in the face of domestic opposition and in the face of strong international doubts about the wisdom of that venture—shows, I think, that Japan is ready to do hard things and make hard decisions, even decisions that are unpopular. Therefore, if there were any doubts about Japan's willingness to step up to its responsibilities, I think those doubts have been answered. I agree completely with Ambassador Kitaoka that the time has come.

But I still do sense in Japan—and I would be interested in Ambassador Kitaoka's observations—a certain ambivalence. Some people in Japan seem to be concerned that if Japan does become a permanent member, then that will put more and more pressure on Japan to participate in peacekeeping and other military operations. This could be something that begins to compromise Japan's special status of being a non-military major power.

In my own view, I think it's essential to have among the permanent members a country that is not a nuclear power. All the permanent members right now are nuclear powers; having Japan there would demonstrate that a country can attain full great power status without having to acquire nuclear weapons, which would be an object lesson for the international community, and an extremely important one.

What I do sense in Japan is that there still is a certain ambivalence, and if you look at public opinion polls, having a permanent seat in the UN is not very

high up on the list of things the Japanese are worried about. As Ambassador Kitaoka said, a lot of this probably has to do with the prime minister's lack of emphasis on this issue. I agree completely that for this to be done, the Japanese prime minister, whoever he may be or she may be, needs to make this the highest priority and needs to use all of Japan's tools of influence to achieve this objective. Thus far, as Ambassador Kitaoka said, Prime Minister Koizumi has not shown that this is a particularly high priority for him, so that certainly is a condition that has to be met before Japan can move forward.

Resurrection of Ideological Debate between LDP and Socialists

I have one other point, more broadly, on the whole balance in Japanese politics of cooperation with the UN versus the U.S. alliance. As Ambassador Kitaoka said, for a long time during the Cold War there was an ideological split between the LDP and the Socialists, with the LDP siding with the West and the U.S. alliance, and the Socialists advocating unarmed neutrality. That ideological divide has collapsed within the last ten years, with the end of the Cold War and all the subsequent developments. But I noticed when I was in Tokyo in April for a week that this debate is resurrecting itself in a different form now.

In the context of the upper house election, Mr. Okada, who is the new head of the Democratic Party, is saying that Japan really needs to focus its military efforts much more under the UN umbrella—not end the alliance with the U.S., but balance it with much more emphasis on the UN. Whereas, in the LDP—there are differing views in the

LDP, but certainly Prime Minister Koizumi and the LDP leadership are still putting the greatest emphasis on the alliance. And I can see this coming in the context of a debate about Article 9, and debate about defense policy. There are many different views in Japan about the relative weight Japan should put on the U.S.-Japan alliance, but there are those that urge that Japan act more independently under a UN umbrella, rather than in conjunction with the U.S., particularly in areas away from Japan.

I had discussions with many politicians across the political spectrum, and this was a real issue of debate and division. And it seems Mr. Okada is trying to make this a point in the Upper House election. Whether this will attract the interest of the Japanese voters at this stage, I don't know, but it's clear that the decision by Prime Minister Koizumi to put the Self Defense Forces under the coalition is not a very popular one in Japan. I noticed an Asahi Shimbun poll that had 70% against, 30% for putting the SDF units in Iraq under the coalition.

In Japanese politics, once again, this whole division between the UN on the one hand and the U.S.-Japan alliance on the other seems to be resurrecting itself in a different form, and I'd be very interested in your observations on that and where that is likely to lead.

Those are the main points I wanted to make. Let's stop there and open it up to discussion.

John Ikenberry: Thank you very much. I think we will open it up to discussion. But first, Ambassador Kitaoka, why don't you say a couple of words of re-

action, and then we'll open it up to discussion.

Kitaoka: There are many things that I should have talked about, I'll just make a very short report to you. The opinion poll in Japan, roughly speaking, 60% of the people are supportive of Japan getting a permanent seat, and 10% oppose it. Compared to the mid-90's, when you were in Japan, for example, there was a politician named Takemura who said Japan should become a small but military country. First of all, it's wrong. Japan is not a small country. At that time, the reason why I said that the determination of the prime minister is necessary—Prime Minister Koizumi was too close to Mr. Takemura at that time. That's why I say this, but as a member of the task force for the prime minister on foreign relations—I have been there for two and half years—I can witness that his interest in United Nations reform is on the rise. When he met with Mr. Bush in the first year, he didn't say much about the UN, but recently, he has continuously referred to UN reform.

Q & A

Questioner: There are some critics who argue that giving a permanent seat to Japan at the Security Council means giving them an automatic "yes" to vote to the U.S. positions. I do not necessarily agree with this argument, but in order to challenge those critics, let me bring up one example. Last month, Israel launched what they called Operation Rainbow: they destroyed many Palestinian houses in the Gaza strip, along the borders of Egypt. And their argument was that those houses had hidden secret tunnels which were used to smuggle weapons and terrorists from Egypt into the Gaza

strip. The Security Council approved a resolution which criticized this operation, and called for immediate halt of the destruction of those Palestinian houses by the Israeli Armed Forces.

Fourteen countries supported that resolution, no country objected, and one country abstained: the United States. My question is, had Japan been a permanent member of the Security Council last month, how would Japan have voted on this resolution—either a yes or no or abstention—and why?

Kitaoka: This is a question of whether or not Japan will always follow the American attitude. This is not a very good example, because there can be many different cases where Japan may differ from the United States. But very simply stated, when it comes to the real, core interest of the United States, it's very hard for Japan to differ from it. If the UK differs from the United States, then it's not difficult for Japan to be on the side of the UK. There are some other conditions for Japan, like the fact that we cannot do the same things as European countries with our surrounding conditions, such as the situation with North Korea and China. The most difficult cases are the issues that hit the vital interests of the countries—in that case, we have to be very, very careful about that. I'm not in a position to say yes or no about this, but I can say that there can be many cases where Japan can differ from the United States and Japan can have influence over the United States. Also, being in the Security Council, you can have influence over phrasing; that's a very important factor.

Deming: Can I just add that we don't like being isolated in the Security Coun-

cil. Our objective is to try to get fifteen votes on our side, or at least a majority without a veto. So having a country like Japan in the Security Council gives it a chance to make its points, force us to compromise, and change the flavor. There's a tremendous amount of leverage being a permanent member of the Security Council, because the United States wants to avoid negative votes, or even avoid abstentions on issues that we support, or the other way around, that we don't support. I agree completely that just being in that room, in that group, can have a tremendous impact on our policy, as well as the broader policy of the Security Council.

Questioner: I'd like to ask the panelists to clarify for me, if possible, the perception of differences existing, if any, between the Asian neighbor countries, and the United Nations at large, concerning the rearming of Japan as a military power. It probably relates to the constitutional amendment in Japan, and the people's reaction, but I'm interested in neighboring countries' reaction to that particular perception, and the United Nations at large, to see how they look at that particular aspect of military power.

East Asia Is Awakening to Necessity of Military Operations

Kitaoka: Do you remember what Mr. Lee Kwang-yu said around 1990, when Japan was preparing for participation in peacekeeping operations? He said it was as if giving wine or liquor to an alcoholic, but he changed his mind soon. When I met with him in 1992, I remember that he said it's okay to become part of PKO, but do not become a tooth or a nail. At that time, not only in Japan, but in many Asian countries, the necessity of the

military, in order to preserve peace and security in the world, was not very well understood. That's why no countries east of Bangladesh participated in the Gulf Crisis. But now many countries have sent soldiers, doctors, people, NGOs, going to dangerous places to contribute to peace and security in the world. In that sense, East Asia as a whole is awakening to the necessity of military things for world security.

That's why when Japan sent SDF ships to the Indian Ocean in 2001, there was no criticism, essentially, from neighboring countries. I think they are more and more accepting of Japan's expansion of its military role. Related to this, if Japan changes its constitution, Japan's policy shall not change completely, but will remain roughly on the same track. Japan will remain as a peace-loving country, because Japan's prosperity is based on the international order. If Japan becomes a very independent and dangerous militarized country, then that will be the end of Japan's prosperity. It is guaranteed by the structure of Japan's prosperity, which is why I am very much optimistic about the result of the constitutional change; Japan will not return to a pre-war period policy.

Japan's expansion of a military role is not particularly welcoming to neighboring countries. I think a kind of expansion of Japan's military role is inevitable, so what we have to do is build more confidence in each other, and between surrounding countries.

Deming: In 1997, when I was in Tokyo, our ambassador in Beijing asked me to come over to China, to spend a week talking to Chinese think tanks, bureaucrats and military personnel about the

U.S.-Japan alliance. The 1996 U.S.-Japan Security Declaration and the 1997 revision of the Guidelines created a very strong perception in China that the U.S. and Japan were ganging up to contain China and that this threatened to stimulate the revival of Japanese militarism. I spent a very difficult week, both in Beijing and Shanghai, dealing with lots of suspicion, lots of accusations that the U.S. and Japan were plotting to contain China. I tried to do my best to explain that the U.S.-Japan alliance was not directed at China and was important for the security of the region.

Asian Attitude toward U.S.-Japan Alliance Changing

I went back last November to a conference in Shanghai, and indeed some of the people I talked to six years earlier were there, and Japan didn't come up at all in that context. One of the PLA members there said, "I remember when you were here six years ago. I didn't believe then that the U.S.-Japan alliance had a beneficial effect for the region, but I believe that now, at least for the mid-term. And we now understand that Japan is a much different society than it was before." That's not universal in China—there's still a lot of complaints about history and other things, but I found a tremendous change of attitude. I think that applies to Southeast Asia as well, for Lee Kwang-yu and others, and to South Korea as well. It's a very different environment than it was as recently as six or seven years ago.

Questioner: Mr. Ambassador, Japan was one of the countries that was subjected to the War Crimes Tribunals after the war, and there's now a very intense debate at the UN about the U.S. request

to be granted immunity from war crimes questions. And I understand Koffi Annan is strongly opposing the continuation of that immunity, in light of Abu Grahیب and the indications that the White House itself and the justice department directly called for suspending Geneva Conventions. So, I think your views on this would be of great interest, given your own history.

Kitaoka: Generally speaking, the trials are a very difficult thing. We are still suffering from the results of the Tokyo Military Tribunal, so the victor should be very, very careful about that. In order to realize real peace, punishment should be confined to the really guilty people; the reconciliation process is also very important. Judgment should be rooted to the people over there. I was very much concerned about bringing people from Afghanistan to Guantanamo. They are saying that they are not protected under the Geneva Convention, they are not given the rights of the suspects of ordinary cases. No guarantee was given to them, and that's not what a civilized country should do. As a great country, I hope the United States will learn to act in a more civilized way.

Questioner: If there are two powers, namely hard power and soft power, since Japan is a loser of the Second World War and also the second largest contributor to the United Nations, Japan is in the position to be the champion of soft power. That Japan is the second largest contributor I already mentioned, but at the moment, Japan is not a member of the UN Security Council, consisting of fifteen nations. I don't understand why Japan is not a member of the UN Security Council.

Concerning the North Korean issue, China is playing a very important role through the six-party talks. If North Korea continues using brinkmanship, do you think the North Korean issue will be discussed at the United Nations?

Kitaoka: This is not important, but first of all, economic power should belong to hard power. The reason why Japan is not in the Security Council is very simple: vested interest of the victors in the war. In the UN Charter it is written that five countries are given a permanent seat, and others are elected. There was one change of the Charter regarding the Security Council in the 1960's. In that case, only non-permanent seats were expanded. There was no expansion of the permanent seats. As far as the non-permanent seats are concerned, they are elected, and re-election is prohibited. You have to make a full effort to be elected, many, many times. That means there is a kind of attraction to very small countries: they can get something from the competition of the middle powers. That is one of the reasons why change is difficult.

If some countries are promoted to the permanent seat countries, that may weaken the power of the already permanent seat countries.

Deming: I might just add that Japan has been elected to a non-permanent seat ten times, I think, since it entered the UN in 1956, which is remarkable. I think Japan has been the country that has been elected the most times as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, which represents the broad recognition that Japan belongs there, permanently.

Questioner: I have a technical question. What about the option of a seat on the permanent Council without the veto? Is that acceptable to Japan? One would argue that it's rather inconceivable to see Japan singularly veto a UN resolution—a Security Council resolution.

And second, you brought up the example of UN peacekeeping missions to Africa, the fact that Japan does not have a, shall we say, colonial legacy there. But, on the other hand, if Japan indeed influenced UN peacekeeping missions, would that mean that peacekeeping missions to Africa would be reduced?

Japan Could Enter UN without Veto Power

Kitaoka: It's possible. On the first point, as ambassador, I cannot say yes. But theoretically, I think the veto is not a very good thing. We should think more about restricting the use of veto; it should be used only in the case when a country's vital interests are at stake. Otherwise, for example, China once used the veto toward Guatemala, or something like that, because of the reason that it has ties with Taiwan. In the reality of today's power politics, if we give a veto to the United States and to no other countries, that is just responding to the reality of the world.

Another idea is that of the double veto or half-veto: if two or more countries oppose an issue, then that can work as a veto. One country's opposition alone doesn't constitute a veto, but it's still difficult. Theoretically, it's okay, but no country is likely to release its veto. As a result, there is some possibility that new members are allowed to come in without a veto. That could be a final compromise.

Ikenberry: So if the offer were: “Japan, you can come in as a permanent member, without a veto, Tokyo would say...”

Kitaoka: As an observer from the outside, I think if the choice is no participation, or participation without veto, then Japan would choose the latter.

The second point is very important. Whenever we discuss the role of PKO or what kind of missions the United States should play, I always say that there are many cases where countries are failed or failing; there are many countries which need help from the outside. Let’s look at the cases where failing countries didn’t take place. In East Asia, the economic level was not very different in 1945 between Africa and East Asia, but now there’s a big difference. They are used to authoritarian regimes in East Asia, but through economic cooperation, economic development, through the rise of the middle class, there was democratization in many countries. We could go this way, and Japan played some important role in helping economic development; we could bring this kind of experience to the Security Council.

Giving too much aid may spoil the ownership of the people in the case of conflict resolution. The major players should be the people who live there, not the people outside. This is an important point: how to mobilize their willingness to grow is more important.

Questioner: Everybody understands the Japanese argument is that it wants a Security Council seat. Everybody is sympathetic, but I don’t know anybody who believes that the Security Council will let Japan in as a veto-wielding member. It’s an important issue, and I’ve written

about it many times, but I think the truth is that this is not going to happen. I think most people think that; I think the U.S. lends support for Japan’s argument precisely because they know that it’s not going to happen.

And you talked about criteria for being a Security Council member—there is no criteria, as Ambassador Kitaoka said. The criteria is that they were the winners in World War II. Japan has sent military forces to the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts—China hasn’t. China hasn’t sent anything to a peacekeeping operation.

Deming: No, they did.

Questioner: They have? Well, I’m sorry. But, you know, not all the Security Council members send military support to all important issues. There is no criteria, in truth, and so the criteria can go up higher and higher, to keep Japan, or Germany, or whoever—the truth is that world politics will not allow this to happen. That’s been argued many times. So why don’t we just admit that it’s not going to happen, and wouldn’t it be better for Japan and Japanese diplomatic forces to expend its energy in other ways of realizing Japan’s goals?

Kitaoka: For example?

Questioner: I don’t think that Japan’s lack of a Security Council seat has led to any adverse decision by the Security Council that directly effected Japan. And, as Rust said, Japan has been a non-permanent member many times, and it has a great influence in East Asia and East Asian politics and it can wield influence through ASEAN, APEC, and various organizations. Or, on its own it is the second largest economic power in the

world. So why would it need a Security Council seat that's not going to happen?

Permanent Seat Would Increase Efficiency of Japanese Diplomacy

Kitaoka: With a permanent seat or without a seat, there is a big difference in the efficiency of Japan's diplomacy. It takes up several times more energy in order to put Japan's point into the world community, in some cases. I think the United Nations should play an important role in maintaining international peace and order. And in order to do that, important countries should be the active members of the United Nations. For example, if you think that way, the United States would not need the United Nations.

Japan has never put its full effort into this. Japan should do more, and Japan should be on the side of strengthening the UN's role in the world. And in order to do that, such countries as Japan and Germany should put energy into this issue. If you give up, then that will never happen; that's not very good for international peace and security, as well as Japan's national interest.

Deming: I think it has less to do with Japan's interest than it has to do with the viability of the United Nations. At this stage, fifty-nine years after the end of World War II, the five permanent members are still the countries that won the war. They are not representative of the power structure in the current world—not just Japan, but Germany, India, and others. Unless the UN can be reformed to reflect the new realities, it's going to become irrelevant. And that's the key: Japan has to be in the UN Security Council to help save the UN, not simply because it will protect Japan's interests. I think that's the most important element.

Ikenberry: I would just like to add my two cents on that. I think there is a growing sense that the post-World War II institutions have outgrown or been overtaken, really, by the evolution of the international system. One speaker in this series who spoke eloquently about this was Ambassador Kishore Mahbubani, a Singaporean permanent representative, now going back to Singapore, who focused not just on the United Nations, but on the whole set of multilateral institutions. He has made a very strong case that representation isn't quite congruent with underlying capacities and interests. And he was thinking of some of the multilateral economic institutions, like China and India—not so much Japan—but to the Security Council, it's clearly Japan, Germany and maybe India, and maybe Brazil. So, I think I would agree with Ambassador Deming that there is a kind of dysfunctional quality to an institution that clearly looks like it's not representing the underlying reality. It's going to take a package and a trick, I think, to make it happen, because there are all these blocking logics, particularly in Europe.

I wanted to make one other point which the ambassador may or may not want to respond to, and that is that in some ways, the other issue that Japan should be involved in is the other substantive issue about how questions about the use of force are going to be talked about and legitimated in the 21st century. There might be a case where Japan eventually gets through the Security Council, and nothing important is happening at the Security Council. Because the most important questions of international relations are the use of force, how to respond to threats, particularly these new threats that may require preemption, that may require new types of interventions,

new compromises to sovereignty, and new thinking about Article 51.

I would be very interested in hearing Japan's thinking about how to make the Security Council relevant, because a lot of people are talking—at least in this town, and elsewhere—about creating, if not a new institution, creating formal mechanisms to try to “multilateralize” and thereby legitimate the use of force: Democracy Coalition, Democratic War Council, etc.—because the UN is just too big and sprawling. And even more so, if your dreams are to be realized and there were to be an expanded Security Council, it would be even less of a vehicle for mandating the use of force.

So, as we're wrapping up here, can you just say something about what Japan might bring to the table in terms of how to make the UN relevant on the use of force?

Use of Force Is Complicated Issue for UN

Kitaoka: When and how the use of force can be justified is the biggest and most difficult issue of the high level panel committee. However many constraints we may put, when it comes to the real interest of the country, they may

not respect it. Before Iraq, there was a case in Kosovo. Intervention in Kosovo by NATO was not justified by conventional international law, but still they did it because there was clear misery over there, and it was widely publicized to the world.

But on the other hand, after this Iraq case, there is a possibility that the world will suffer from the under-supply of intervention. The United States will not intervene easily because of this difficulty. There is a possibility that a great sacrifice is taking place, but no one would like to intervene. Making the criteria about intervention is very difficult. The Charter level should be changed a little bit, because to have no intervention doctrine is a little bit out of date, considering today's more developed perception of human rights. They are just attacking a very delicate issue, so as of now, I have no clear idea about this point which would be effective.

Ikenberry: Well, on that note, we have much more to discuss, and I apologize for not getting to all of your questions. But I want you to join with me in thanking our speakers for the very stimulating discussion today. Thank you very much. (End)

About the Panelists

Main Speaker **Ambassador Kitaoka Shinichi** is Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Deputy Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations. Previously he was a Professor of Political Science at the University of Tokyo and a Professor at Rikkyo University. Ambassador Kitaoka also has been a member of the Prime Minister's Task Force on Foreign Relations, the Japan-India Wisemen Group, and the Advisory Committee for Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi's "Vision of Japan in the 21st Century." He has received many awards, including the Yomiuri Prize for the Opinion Leader of the Year and the Suntory Prize for Liberal Arts. Ambassador Kitaoka received both a B.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Tokyo. He has published many books and articles, including *Dokuritsujison: Fukuzawa Yukichi no cho-sen* (Pride and Self-Independence: The Challenge of Fukuzawa Yukichi, 2002), *Futsu no kunie* (Toward a "Normal Country," 2000), and in English, "Is Nationalism Intensifying in Japan?: Focus on Recent Change in Security Policy," *Journal of Japanese Trade and Industry* (2002).

Discussant **Ambassador Rust Deming** is Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. He joined the INSS Directorate in September 2003 on the completion of his tour as U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia. Prior to that, he served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He has also been Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau's Senior Advisor to the United Nations General Assembly. Ambassador Deming has spent much of his career dealing with Japanese affairs, having served in Japan as Charge d'Affaires, ad interim, and as Deputy Chief of Mission. He has received numerous awards, including the Secretary of State's Career Achievement Award in 2003. Ambassador Deming received a B.A. from Rollins College and an M.A. in East Asian studies from Stanford University. He is also a graduate of the National War College.

Moderator **Dr. G. John Ikenberry** is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. Previously he taught at Georgetown University. Dr. Ikenberry also has been a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. He earned his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago. Dr. Ikenberry is the author of numerous publications, including *State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy* (2002), *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (2000), and *Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government* (1988).