

China's Rise, U.S. Unilateralism, and Changing East Asia

by
Dr. Ezra Vogel

Ezra Vogel: It's always a great pleasure to visit the Beltway and dispense wisdom and advice without having the responsibility of carrying it out. In my brief two years working in Washington a decade ago, I came to have great respect for the talented people here whose advice is ignored, who receive inadequate recognition, and yet still go to work early, stay late, cope with pressure, and remain dedicated to their work and to our country. Our nation owes you a lot.

Those of us working on East Asia in universities are granted free time to do research of our own choosing and, since we have no secrets, to make Asian friends without worrying about revealing secrets. It is our privilege when we visit Washington to consider broad trends beyond the immediate issues that press upon you here.

As I reflect on trends in East Asia, I believe there are two factors likely to continue to drive the East Asia region in the decade ahead: the rise of China, and U.S. unilateralism.

The Rise of China

The pace of Chinese growth may slow down, but anyone who visits China from time to time is aware of the speed of change and the breath-taking, can-do mood. The factors that drive growth, the spread of technology and know-how, the improvements in the quality of training, the growing demand as consumer income rises, and the opportunities to sell on the global market,

are likely to continue at least for a decade and perhaps much longer.

You in Washington are working hard to understand what this means for U.S. security and our business interests. I want to call attention to another aspect of the rise of China that we see daily at the university, the changes in thinking. Let me illustrate this change by drawing on the experience of my university, Harvard. You may think I am taking advantage of this opportunity to toot our own horn. Yes, I am guilty, but I do so also because I know best our own situation. Comparable developments are taking place in all major universities in our country, each of which has large numbers of Chinese students.

At our university we have Chinese students and visiting scholars, not only in engineering and science, but in every major specialty. We had a conference at our medical school a couple years ago in which we expected 300 doctors from China; 700 came. We have a major collaborative project, linking all parts of our university with Chinese on environmental issues. We have Public Health School faculty working with Chinese counterparts on issues like AIDS, SARS, and health care economics. Our Design School knows that more construction projects are going on in China than in any other country; so faculty and students are involved in China projects in building design, in preserving historical neighborhoods, in urban planning. Our Kennedy School has had projects to train people from

the People's Liberation Army, in international relations.

As we speak, there are about 60 promising mid-career officials ending an annual six-week program about improving local government; I taught them yesterday. Our faculty is thrilled with their dynamism, enthusiasm, ability, and openness. Many of the ones in last year's program have already been promoted to high positions. We have students studying comparative democracy who intend to go back. We have students in art history, not just studying Chinese art, but who are in to painting and Western art. We have students in philosophy and religion, looking at Chinese as well as other philosophical traditions. Each year, journalists from China spend a year here exchanging views with Western journalists, and in recent years they have been going back, full of ideas about how to expand the boundaries of how and what they report. We have students at the Fairbank Center working with Western scholars, exchanging views on how to view Chinese history, society, economic, and politics.

We have joint projects with the Chinese Communist Central Party School on diplomatic history. We have students at the business school studying marketing, manufacturing, and international finance. We have students at the law school working on laws in almost every imaginable field, including how to protect intellectual property, how to regulate a securities market, and how to pursue corruption. Chinese students and scholars here are full of questions about almost everything and they soak up new ideas like a sponge. We have students at our Ed School asking about how to remake universities as well as how to remake elementary and secondary schools. A few years ago, an associate dean of our graduate school had difficulty persuading one of the

departments about the quality of Chinese applicants from certain Chinese universities, but now that departments asks if she has any more applicants from places like Qinghua.

Exciting Intellectual Renaissance

If you were to talk with these students and continue to visit them back in China, I believe you would agree with me that we are witnessing the largest-scale and most exciting intellectual renaissance in the world today. Young Chinese are asking all the good basic questions: what parts of their ancient civilization are worth preserving, how can they be adapted, which programs in the West work best, how some of them might be adapted to China, what kind of society they want, how to cope with new problems like environmental degradation, AIDS, SARS, and old problems in new form: corruption, migration, class differences, poverty, social protests. Having those students in our classes and research centers is the teacher's dream: the students are eager, open, quick, and able, with new angles that force us to think. I wish more of you had a chance to get to know them.

What we see in our universities reflects changes in other parts of Chinese society. When I hear members of Congress complain about the lack of freedoms in China, there is often at least a kernel of truth to their complaints, but I feel they should be required to visit the book stores in major Chinese cities, five or more stories high, with thousands of customers at any one time, browsing books on all kinds of topics, including books from the West, in their original form and in translation. As one who watches Chinese home drama series to keep in touch with the Chinese mood, I am terribly impressed with the overall quality of the productions, the nuanced presen-

tation of many different kinds of people, the frankness in dealing with issues like official corruption, laziness, and arrogance. Television and the Internet have spread a level of sophistication far faster than anyone I know imagined when Nixon visited China 31 years ago or when Deng Xiaoping began opening China 25 years ago. In the full-year course at the Chinese Communist Party School which, like our War College, trains students for very senior positions, all students now are required to take a trip abroad as part of their training. When the Dalai Lama was at Harvard last week he expressed pleasant surprise at his conversation with a group of 38 Chinese students; he described them as open and sincere, and said that several years ago he could not have had such conversations with Chinese students. For many years, a favorite Chinese expression has been “*jie gui*,” linking tracks with the world, adapting their patterns to global patterns, just as narrow-gauge warlord railways once had to be linked with broader gauge national railways.

Of course, there is dead wood in China. Corruption is rampant. State enterprises are full of inefficiencies. Economic problems abound. The Publicity Department, formerly called the Propaganda Department, still places unreasonable restraints on what is published or aired on TV. But the change in thinking in China is just as great as the change in the Shanghai skyline.

Opportunities for Cooperation Between the U.S. and China

Our Defense Department is properly entrusted with the sacred responsibility of assessing possible threats from China as from elsewhere, and preparing to meet them. Our Commerce Department and USTR have the responsibility of protecting

our business interests, of ensuring intellectual property rights and resisting unfair trading practices. But there are also enormous opportunities for large-scale cooperation with China on all kinds of issues. China now has several hundred million people who have achieved middle-class living standards and who have a stake in national and global stability. There are vast numbers of Chinese able and ready to take part in preserving international order. One can understand the domestic concerns that cause some members of congress to lecture the Chinese, but if our goal is to change China and not just to have a satisfying bumper sticker, I believe we can be more effective by demonstrating the advantages of freedom and respect for human rights and diversity, than by lecturing the Chinese about these virtues. They get the message.

What Does the Rise of China Mean for Japan?

Japanese industry has little choice but to expand its production in China. Competing on world markets make it necessary, and the opportunities for selling in the Chinese markets make it attractive. The worst problems that Japanese manufacturers previously faced in China—shortages of infrastructure and middle management, and arbitrary imposition of *zashui* (commonly translated as miscellaneous taxes, but some would say better translated as bribery)—are largely manageable. Japanese manufacturers must still worry that Chinese employees, not committed to the firm for a long time, may someday leave, taking their know-how and technological skills to form their own ventures. They may then undersell their former employers. Chinese exports to Japan, often of products produced by Japanese manufacturers, now exceed U.S. exports to Japan, and the scale of the difference is likely to grow. At current

rates, Japanese trade with China could surpass trade with the United States before the Beijing Olympics.

Individually, Japanese businesses and their Chinese employees and local governments have found ways of working with each other. Approximately 50,000 Chinese are now studying in Japan. Several thousand Japanese are studying in China. Tourism between the two countries is growing. Japanese and Chinese governments work together in ASEAN Plus Three and in other multinational organizations. Japanese and Chinese educational institutions are developing exchange programs and joint conferences. There is a quiet beginning of contacts between their militaries.

But the Chinese-Japanese relationship is deeply troubled by emotional problems resulting from World War II and from different views about the proper hierarchy between countries in Asia. We Americans, who have had our closest contact with Japan since 1945, have seen how thoroughly the Japanese have renounced militarism. Older Chinese, who had their closest contact with Japan when Japanese troops ravaged their country, and younger Chinese, who learn through the Chinese media about horrors Japanese perpetrated on their country, find it easy to criticize Japan.

Japanese under 60 are tired of being berated for and apologizing to the Chinese for what happened before they were born, for giving economic aid to China that is scarcely publicized in China, and for being criticized for ignoring the bad things Japan did when Chinese textbooks scarcely mention changes in Japan since 1945 when Japan renounced militarism. It is understandable that some Chinese are gleeful about catching up with Japan for the first time in almost 150 years and that some Japanese,

who believe their country is more modern and contributes more to the world, are touchy about Chinese criticisms and growing confidence, or as they see it, arrogance.

What is America's interest in the Sino-Japanese relationship? The real danger is not that China and Japan will become so close as to leave the United States out of Asia. The real danger is that the Sino-Japanese tensions will remain so severe that it will make it difficult to resolve problems and may lead to an arms race.

Improved Sino-Japanese Relations Requires Bolder Steps by Japan

Significant improvement in Sino-Japanese relations requires bolder steps by Japan, including offering a broad-scale, open examination of what transpired in World War II, and bold steps by Chinese leaders to reduce anti-Japanese propaganda and acknowledge that Japanese have in fact turned their back on militarism and colonialism. It is in the U.S. interest to encourage these bold steps.

What does the rise of China mean for the Korean peninsula? Although relations between South Korea and China began opening only in the late 1980s on the eve of Seoul's 1988 Olympics, they blossomed quickly. China and South Korea have been on a honeymoon. The amount of trade between the two is in the process of surpassing that between South Korea and the United States. Over 40,000 Koreans are studying in the United States, but already almost 40,000 Koreans are studying in China. China already offers South Korea an alternative to American economic, cultural and political dominance.

I am not a specialist on Southeast Asia, but as a whole, Southeast Asian countries concerned about China pulling foreign direct

investment away have been able to find excellent market opportunities in China, and China has been able to develop a broad range of economic and multilateral initiatives that Southeast Asians find in balance and attractive.

Well-Informed East Asians Recognize Desirability to Keep Good Relations with the U.S.

Well-informed East Asians recognize the desirability of keeping good relations with the world's preeminent military power, the world's strongest economy, and the world leader in science, technology, and higher education. They recognize that international organizations have trouble responding to international emergencies and that U.S. initiatives are necessary for maintaining international and regional order. After the U.S. invaded Iraq and made threatening comments to North Korea, the Japanese government and Chinese government have maintained far better relations with the United States than continental European nations. But the actions of the United States to reduce the threats of terrorism and prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction by invading Iraq, and the bellicose statements by U.S. officials toward North Korea have dissipated the public sympathy for the United States after 9/11 and highlighted the fear of being dragged into a conflict. The greatest damage has been to our relations with South Korea, where, in our eagerness to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, we have alienated a vast portion of the public, embarrassed our best friends, and deeply damaged relations with an ally that has been devoted to the United States for half a century.

U.S.-Japan Relations Have Gone Well in the Bush Administration

In the case of Japan, relations between our governments have gone very well in the Bush administration. One must credit the success of Under Secretary Armitage and others who are committed to our ally, who have understood what Japan can and cannot do, and have managed the relationship with great skill. We are fortunate that Japanese remember the lessons of the Gulf War where they did too little too late and know that they have an obligation to contribute to global order. We are fortunate that the Japanese public is so furious at North Korea, which snatched hostages, that they are not upset with threatening statements from Washington about North Korea. But Japanese people strongly oppose the war in Iraq and fear that if a bellicose United States initiates conflict in Korea that they might be dragged in and attacked by North Korea. Many Japanese now feel it fortunate that Japan still has Article 9 because the United States therefore cannot ask Japan to send combat troops to Iraq. In Japan, since World War II, there is a strong revulsion to any military action and a powerful desire to maintain hope for the United Nations.

My own assessment is that the Japanese want to keep the alliance with the United States and will not support a strong military, even if North Korea goes nuclear. An independent military would exacerbate tensions with other Asian countries, strain the budget of a stagnant economy, and stir up U.S. opposition. But, as a result of the Iraq War and the bellicose stance of the United States toward North Korea, more Japanese want a greater distance from the United States. They want to expand independent intelligence-gathering and get their own missile defense system. The nightmare for U.S. officials in Japan has long been

accidents involving U.S. service personnel in Okinawa, and if there were such an incident, given the new public desire to distance itself from the United States, it is not difficult to imagine that Koizumi's successor as prime minister might well be less willing to cooperate with the United States on a range of issues, including U.S. bases.

Chinese Are More Comfortable Working with the U.S.

In the case of China, it is harder to judge public opinion because public opinion polls are limited and the press does not allow direct criticisms of their leaders and their policies. But for those of us who talk to a range of informed Chinese and read the reports of Chinese think tanks, it takes no great skill to notice the changes in attitude from time to time. Compared to Chinese sentiments after the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia and the Hainan airplane incident, Chinese are now more comfortable in working with the United States. Chinese leaders in the last two years have clearly decided to continue Deng Xiaoping's top priority, domestic economic development, and know that this requires good relations with the United States and other nations.

Yet Chinese are quick to say that the United States is losing public support around the world because of its invasion of Iraq. And while opposing North Korea becoming a nuclear power, they have clearly wanted the United States to modify the U.S. bellicose stance against North Korea. The United States, some thoughtful Chinese say, seems concerned primarily with terrorism and proliferation. What about the risk of regional conflicts between North Korea and its neighbors, or the dangers of North Korean collapse? What about concern about the quality of life in the southern tier countries?

An approach that Chinese strategists discussed several years ago, of working with the second tier of world powers to unite against the superpowers, is now less prominent. But many Chinese strategists still feel that China should keep up good relations with other countries so that if the superpower goes against Chinese interests, China could cooperate with other nations to resist the superpower. And the anti-U.S. public sentiment in the region has provided China with a much broader base for cooperation if it should some day feel that the superpower is fundamentally going against its interests.

U.S.-Korea Alliance Strained

In the case of Korea, we have strained relations with an ally that are hard to repair. Koreans have a century of grievances against the United States. In the early 1900s, Koreans appealed to the United States for help in preventing Japanese invasion, but in 1905, the United States signed with Japan the secret Taft-Katsura agreement, wherein Japan agreed not to interfere with our newly acquired colony of the Philippines, and we agreed not to interfere with Japan's sphere of influence in Korea, thus paving the way for Japanese invasion and colonization. At the end of World War II, the United States was firm in insisting that Russia not take part in the occupation of Japan, but we allowed Russia to share the occupation of Korea, which later led to a divided country. In 1949 and early 1950, the U.S. failure to make clear that South Korea was within the U.S. defense perimeter gave Kim Il Song hope that the United States might not respond to his invasion of the South. During the Korean War, the United States, along with other UN countries, fought and sacrificed for South Korea and gradually built up the loyalty and commitment between our two nations. Although President Carter threat-

ened to pull out our troops from South Korea, in the end we kept our troops, providing a trip wire in the demilitarized zone that reduced the risk of conflict. Since 1950, many soldiers and civilians in South Korea and the United States have built up and maintained a relationship of trust.

In the early part of the current administration, we refused to negotiate with North Korea. South Koreans felt that when their President Kim Dae-jung visited Washington early in 2001, that he was not treated with respect and was pushed to be more confrontational with the North and that the United States did not support his sunshine policy. Some administration officials made bellicose statements about North Korea, not ruling out the possibility of military attack. The impression in South Korea was that U.S. officials were not sensitive to the fact that North Korea had artillery on the other side of the demilitarized zone that could have devastated Seoul. This greatly strengthened the impression that they were endangered by U.S. policies.

People in their 30s and 40s, in public opinion polls, reported that the United States was a greater threat to peace on the peninsula than North Korea. When Koreans noted that there was little resistance in Iraq to U.S. invasion, twice as many South Koreans said they were disappointed that there was not more resistance in Iraq to U.S. invasion than were pleased. The bellicose statements of U.S. officials helped make it possible for a president to be elected in South Korea on an anti-U.S. platform. Although President Roh Moo-hyun has since his election made statements that acknowledge the need to cooperate with the United States, he has a strong anti-U.S. streak that we must live with until the end of his five-year term.

The anti-U.S. mood fueled by the accidental death of two South Korean girls by a U.S. serviceman truck driver, and the failure of the United States to turn over the serviceman to local authorities, has peaked. South Korean complaints about U.S. service personnel prompted Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to announce that our troops will be pulled back from the demilitarized zone north of Korea. Many South Koreans suspected that this decision was taken to remove Americans from danger of retaliation in case we should attack North Korea. Our friends in South Korea who have worked faithfully to support the alliance felt abandoned when this was announced without consultation. It is one thing for the United States to work with South Korea in finding a way to reduce U.S. troop presence, and it is another to make a unilateral decision to pull back troops at a time when many felt this increased the vulnerability of Seoul to attack by North Korea. One can understand the U.S. Defense Department strategy of having more mobile forces and reducing the numbers of U.S. troops who stay in bases abroad, but in the long run, we need the full-hearted cooperation of countries where we may want bases to use.

Many South Koreans want deeply to maintain the alliance with the United States, but we now face an immeasurably more difficult task than we faced when this administration came to power. And South Koreans now have a choice: they can move toward China and away from the United States.

U.S. Must Adapt Policies to Democracies in Asia

In short, we have maintained good working relations with Asian countries since 9/11, but we have dissipated much of the sympathy for the United States among the public. In the 1970s we strongly wanted

Korea, Taiwan and other countries to become more democratic. Now our wish has been realized and we must learn to adapt our policies to our success. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines has long been democratic and Indonesia has become more democratic. In the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia we have the additional problem of publics with a large Muslim population. If we want to work well with East Asian governments in the long run we must have the support of their public. It is hard at this point to say how enduring these public anti-American sentiments will be, but I worry that once trust is broken, as in South Korea, it is not easy to repair. So my message, as an East Asian specialist to you inside the Beltway is a simple one, that for our long-term national interests, the United States needs to give far more attention to keeping the good will of the East Asian public.

Mike Mochizuki: It's really a personal honor and pleasure to be able to share the podium with Professor Ezra Vogel. Ezra has been my dear teacher who has encouraged and supported my career over the years. I should also note that it was twelve years ago that Ezra first guided me to China. He led a delegation of Japan specialists on a trip to China and that really opened my eyes and interest and my mind to China.

I've had the privilege of returning to China on numerous occasions since then and have been able to watch the rise of China, but if I say anything misguided about China today, I would have to give some of the credit to Ezra for getting me off on the wrong foot. But seriously, when John asked me to be a discussant for this program, I was delighted to accept, but I was told that Ezra was going to talk about the trilateral relationship between the United States, China and Japan. So I was struck when I saw the title

of the program that it was about the rise of China and American unilateralism, and that Japan had disappeared from the title and had become the dependent variable. So it's striking that the author of *Japan is Number One* would no longer see Japan as a possible driver or shaper of international relations in the Asia Pacific region. I assume that Japan is now a reactor rather than an actor in the region.

I guess that in my remarks what I would like to do is to challenge that proposition somewhat by first focusing on the Sino-Japanese relationship and then the U.S.-Japan relationship and what that means for Japan's role in the Asia Pacific region. There is no question that I agree with much of what Ezra says about the problematic nature of Sino-Japanese relations. To use the term that Ben Self at the Stimson Center has coined: definitely there has been an end to the "friendship paradigm" in Sino-Japanese relations.

The Japanese are no longer obsequious towards the Chinese because of feelings of guilt towards the past; the Japanese no longer see economic aid as being the proper tool for promoting good ties with China; and the Japanese are no longer extra sensitive about Chinese reactions to Japanese security policy.

Now it's clear that Japan and China are interacting on the basis of hard-nosed calculation of their respective national interests. And that's what makes, I think, the bilateral relationship problematic. But does this mean that Sino-Japanese relations are headed towards a downward spiral, as some might argue?

Sino-Japanese Relations Adjusting to a New Equilibrium

I've argued in other forms in Washington, DC that I don't believe that the Sino-Japanese relations is headed towards a downward spiral, but really it's an adjustment process to what I would call a new equilibrium. And the fact is that I would see the point of this new equilibrium is first—I think there's been a gradual shift in Chinese attitudes and policy towards Japan—one that is more accommodating, if not more magnanimous and willing to listen to Japanese expressions of their interests.

Secondly, and I think this is the most profound thing, I've noticed the development of mechanisms for problem solving at the state level between Beijing and Tokyo on a whole range of issues from the economic to the security side.

Thirdly, although there are mutual security concerns about the future, I think the Sino-Japanese relationship is far from becoming an arms race.

And finally, I really do not see a rivalry between China and Japan for regional leadership. Instead, what I see is a competitive form of bilateralism for promoting regional integration.

Now, I do accept that at the societal level, there is much more work that needs to be done to foster understanding and trust between China and Japan, but at the state level, I think Sino-Japanese relations are moving towards a new equilibrium.

On the U.S.-Japanese relationship, I agree with Ezra that in the Bush administration, the U.S.-Japanese relationship looks remarkably good. In a sense, this puts in mind a fundamental paradox about Japan today.

The Japanese supported the United States in Iraq despite the public skepticism – if not outright public opposition – of the U.S. military operation against Iraq.

If you look at some of the public opinion polls, the public opinion profile of the Japanese, it's remarkably similar to that of the Germans and French. And secondly, what is interesting is that despite the fact that France and Germany – by taking a position very distant from the United States, that provided an opening for the Japanese to be less than cooperative with the United States, but instead they became much more supportive of the United States.

Koizumi Did Not Suffer Politically from Supporting U.S. Military Action in Iraq

And then finally, the paradox about Japan is that Prime Minister Koizumi did not suffer politically from this stance and now his public support has again begun to rise. So why is that the case?

Well, it seems that there are possible explanations for this. One could be what Ezra has pointed out – the increasing Japanese animosity towards North Korea, that Japan needed to cooperate with George Bush on Iraq so that President Bush would work with the Japanese on North Korea. But I also think other factors were important. Another factor is although the Japanese public may not be so supportive of President Bush's policy, they were quite proud of the fact that Prime Minister Koizumi was able to share intimate moments with President Bush at Crawford, Texas, so it was really kind of an expression of how Japan's standing in the U.S.-Japan alliance had increased.

But I think the most important reason for this paradox in Japan is that so far the cost

of support for the Japanese for its support of U.S. operations in Iraq has been minimal. In terms of monetary support, it pales in comparison to the \$13 billion that the Japanese paid in 1990-1991 for that Persian Gulf conflict.

And finally, although the Japanese have played a more robust military role this time around, Japanese military personnel have not been sent in harm's way. So I think in the future, some of the warnings that Ezra has made are quite important, because if the cost for the Japanese in supporting the administration's policy towards Iraq were to increase both monetarily and in terms of life, then the public skepticism is bound to kick in.

And finally, in terms of Japan's role, both in this bilateral dynamic between the rising China and the unilateral America, but also for the Asia Pacific region, I would agree with many of the analysts of Japanese foreign policy that indeed, Japan has a dualistic foreign policy, which entails on the one hand maintaining it and strengthening the US-Japan alliance; and secondly, promoting East Asian integration, including China as a core part of it. In other words, seeing China as a challenge, but more as an opportunity for Japanese interests.

Japan Can Play Stabilizing Role in Region

Some people like to capture this in negative terms – that this is a hedging strategy on the part of Japan, or Japan is just trying to enhance its autonomy. But I would see it in more positive terms. Although I don't see Japan playing the role of a bridge between a rising China and a unilateral America, I believe that Japan can play the role as a stabilizer in the region as perhaps a gyroscope. And it can do so by the following

mechanisms: One, by developing its stronger alliance relationship with the United States. I think Japan, over time, will gain a greater voice in that alliance relationship and ultimately may provide a possible constraint on U.S. unilateralism.

On the other side, Japan, by being a promoter of East Asian integration with China, being a part of it rather than outside of it, provides a mix of active support for China's rise as well as imposing certain constraints on China. So with these dualistic strategies, I believe Japan can play a stabilizing role.

Finally, since I've been working on Korea over the last six months, I just have to say that Ezra is right about the potential implications for Korea. It's so easy to focus on the great powers like China and the United States, but how China and the United States interact will definitely shape Korea's strategic choices and those choices could have profound effects on the geo-political and geo-economic landscape of East Asia. Thank you.

Quansheng Zhao: I would like to first thank Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA for organizing such a timely panel and also thank John for chairing this. I just finished this morning the final touch on my book review for Ezra Vogel. I edited the book on the US Japan and China Triangle relationship as, I guess, one of the co-editors for China International Review. It's a wonderful book from about nine contributors from three countries – China, Japan and the United States. Each country had three scholars who laid a good foundation for understanding the bilateral relations.

My only complaint with that is that it seems like they didn't have enough discussion on the true triangular relationship, and I made a wish in that book review that if Professor

Vogel and Tanaka Akihito, two of the editors, could each contribute an article, that would make the book in a much better shape because both of them are experts not only with one single country but rather with the two countries. Ezra is known not only in Japan but also in China. I guess his Cantonese is perhaps the best among those in this room.

Vogel: No, no, no.

Zhao: I'm very pleased that actually today's presentation can be considered as one of the interpretations, if you are thinking of revising that particular book. So for my comments here, I would like to follow early Michael's lead by also addressing this issue of a triangular relationship, not simply because that was the early topic, but also because that was really an implication of Professor Vogel's talk today.

Impact of Third Party on Bilateral Relations

I guess the concept that I would like to use here is the so-called the third party impact. That is, what kind of impact does the third party have on the other two parties' bilateral relations? I characterize that into direct impact and indirect impact.

First, let's look at the rise of China. What kind of impact does it have on U.S.-Japan relations? I would say it's a kind of indirect impact. If we all remember that we have a cycle in terms of public opinion here. I spoke about Japan-Beijing in the 1980s and then finally about President Bush re-emphasizing security alliance. In that case, Japan-Beijing was replaced by China's threat. So in other words, on the situation of the development of the rise of China: I fully agree with the argument that it really actually brings together again Japan and the United

States and I guess that's also one of the foundations for the new security guidelines.

The U.S. impact on Japan-China relations, particularly on Japanese foreign policy, is a more direct constraint. We all understand that the Japanese foreign policy had been very much influenced towards China, influenced by US foreign policy, not to mention the 50's occupation period but also early 70's. We all remember Nixon's shock and all the way up to today, it seems like many people in China still believe that it is better to deal with the U.S. first than to deal with Japan. And many people still believe Japanese foreign policy is basically a follower of U.S. foreign policy. So, that's also a recent call for a more autonomous independent foreign policy in Japan. I guess that impact we may also think about.

Japan's Impact on U.S.-China Relations

And then now, we look at Japan's impact on U.S.-China relations. Ideally, actually from the past hundred years, if we look at the Japanese foreign policy, the ideal position for Japan to play is a kind of a middleman, a kind of mediator. Actually, indeed in the economic field, Japan played an enormous role.

Even in the political field, Japan is trying very hard. For example, after the Tiananmen incident, Japan was the first country to resume relations with China. So what I'm thinking is that that kind of a role is not easy. Earlier, Michael mentioned what kind of role Japan could play and if we look at the Iraq war, with others who would like to play a kind of mediator in a way Tony Blair did, and like Ezra earlier discussed, whether Japan could play a similar role. It is a big question. That is in the future. How should Japan cope with U.S. unilateralism?

Finally, let me reach to my concluding remark. Ezra's report was really a comprehensive one that gives us a lot of ideas to think about. But I would like to push a little bit to ask you what you really think the U.S. role is in terms of Japan-China relations. What kind of a role may the United States play, in particular referring to East Asian community-building and major power relations? And of course, there is an old topic of whether we can have a win-win situation or still stay in a Cold War mentality, the sum game that was played during the Cold War time.

The Chinese of course also face this question. That is, Chinese foreign policy used to have at least two priorities: one is economic modernization and two, trying to get a peaceful environment and avoid confrontation with the United States' so-called *tao gwang yang hui* policy: low profile. So the next challenge is that China may have to move from economic-oriented foreign policy into a more security-cooperative policy with other powers. At the same time, it should also develop a more active policy just like what China did during the Korea crisis, of course with some pressure from Washington. So eventually we will continue to see the unfolding drama among Japan, China and the United States.

Vogel: First of all, I just want to say even when Mike was a student, he had learned so much about the Japanese Diet when he was there that I was already learning from him while he was a student, and then afterwards he spent a full year getting the nitty-gritty of security issues in a way that I never have. So I've always learned from Mike and admire his balance, and I know Professor Zhao is one of the few people who really handles all three countries and spends a lot of time working each one and is really very aware of the triangle.

I just want to respond to a couple of issues that Mike raised. First is that Japan is still very important in Asia – and why did I say they're no longer a driving force? Yes, I agree that because of the size of Japan, because of their role in international organizations, of course they are extremely important.

Let me give you my rationale for why I wouldn't say that Japan, despite the size of its economy, is driving change in Asia. Countries adjust to changes at the margin. In places like Southeast Asia, where is the new market opening up? It's opening up in China and hence it is, I would say, more of a driving force at this point than Japan, which is not really expanding.

Secondly, while AID programs were very important in the earlier eras when these countries were first getting started, now that their economics are fairly large scale, the role of aid from Japan is no longer as important as it was in those early eras.

Third, when I was writing my book, *Japan Is Number One*, the Japanese model was not only attractive, but it was used in many places with great profit. There are still many things these countries have to learn: from Japan, as in management of high technology and quality control and production efficiency. Does the Japanese model at this point serve as the main guide for how they want their economies to develop? Japan does not now play as big a role as it did.

Fourthly, in the days of the Yoshida school, Japan really thought big strategically. Those leaders already had a grand strategy, but in the last decade when Japan has had almost a prime minister per year on the average, the only person I can think of in the last twenty years who really has that

kind of strategic vision is Nakasone. Since then there has not been a strategic leader, even though they are democratic and we like it.

China is not yet a democracy and we're not very happy with that, but the Central Committee and the Politburo have the capacity to consider a national strategy in a way that Japan as a nation does not. It's not that all individuals don't have that capacity, but Japan as a whole does not have leaders who act on the basis of strategy.

Resistance to Nuclear Japan Is Very Strong

On the question of whether there will not be an arms race, I don't want to exaggerate. I think the resistance to be nuclear in Japan is very strong. If I were in the U.S. government I would probably be trying to persuade China to worry that if North Korea really gets nuclear, that Japan might go nuclear. But if you ask me as an analyst, do I think Japan is likely to go nuclear; I would say I think there are so many reasons why they don't want to go nuclear, so I don't see that happening very soon.

However, on something like missile defense, if Japan gets an independent missile defense and China's main military comparative advantage is missiles, this still need not mean a full-scale all-out confrontation. The Japanese and the Chinese aren't as worried as they were in the mid-90's.

On Professor Zhao's comments: first of all, I must say that there should be truth in advertising. I really don't know Cantonese and I'm ashamed of that because I worked in Guangdong for a long time and it was hard enough just doing Japanese and Chinese so I got along with Mandarin. And

although my wife speaks Cantonese, I do not. I'm sorry.

The vision that Japan once had a long time ago, of being a mediator between the other two powers, is no longer realistic. Given the strength and breadth of ties between China and the United States, despite the disagreements, the direct communication between the two countries is so great that Japan's vision of being the mediator is no longer very realistic.

I argued first that these three countries should be a triangle and we should think of them as a triangle. The reason I didn't do more on that in that book and even in a succeeding volume is that there are many signs that they are not there yet. I would argue that we need to think of both at the same time. When we do China, we should think about Japan and vice versa.

When Clinton went to Japan, he should have thought more about China, and when Clinton visited China, he should have thought more about Japan. We need to think trilaterally, but we're not there yet.

Q & A

John Ikenberry: Let's open it up. Lots of questions. Just introduce yourself and ask the question.

Questioner: Ezra and others as well, if you are interested. I guess we could look at the features of Northeast Asian security over the last several decades as our two alliances there – U.S. alliances, and our cooperation or support of Taiwan. China has sort of been an outsider and a troublemaker for the most part. Are we seeing a change in that now as we look at the decades to come? Might there be a constructive role for China in Northeast Asian security, no longer

viewed as the troublemaker and the outsider?

Vogel: I think that's entirely possible. First of all, now you have a lot of Chinese knowledgeable about international organizations. When they joined the United Nations in 1971, they didn't have many people who knew a lot about the United Nations. Now in the WTO, they have quite a few trade officials who know quite a bit about it. There are, for example, a lot of Chinese who are up to speed in working in South-east Asia.

Some Chinese think tanks now analyze the transition from the revolutionary era, when Chinese and others thought of making revolution around the world, to a new era where they see themselves as a much more constructive power in the world. Now there's much more hope for that. At the same time, if I were in the government I would worry that after 2008 when China has done a successful Olympics – and after 2010 when they have done a successful Shanghai Exhibition and there will be much more confidence in Beijing. Some people who used to think that China was the center of the world might begin to get more confidence and might not be as sensitive as they are to other people's opinion now when they are on the way up.

U.S. Should Prepare for a Stronger China

If I were preparing U.S. policy for that era, I would try to be prepared for a stronger China. We need a delicate, complex strategy where we encourage them to cooperate on regional and global issues but where we have a few measures in our pocket so that they would want to keep on in a cooperative, constructive role and not engage in aggressive behavior.

Mochizuki: Ezra, thanks for your nice words about me. Mostly undeserved.

Vogel: That was an understatement.

Questioner: I have one thing to say about the present and then a question about the future. In this North Korean thing, China to me, in my mind, is playing an absolutely remarkable role. I have not seen China in this kind of active role ever, certainly not since the Chinese Revolution in 1949. Partly, of course, the U.S. vacuum has created and has played into that. But it was so rapid.

When Secretary Powell was in Beijing last February, Jiang Zemin was still saying, "Just handle this on a bilateral basis," and now, within just months, China has become the center of this negotiation with North Korea in a rather absolutely remarkable way. The question really is about the future. If this negotiation is a success, clearly that is going to enhance the position of China, not just in the region but I would think internationally.

So people wonder how serious or how difficult is this going to be, coming off your last statement on China. But if it is unsuccessful and you have bad results in North Korea, whether it's leading to some military action, or political, or a collapse, or whatever happens. Then not only will this be very serious for the region, but you wonder what kind of lessons that the leadership of China might draw about being active in this way, if that doesn't work and they end up having a much more severe relationship with the United States, in which everybody is going to blame everybody else if it doesn't work. They're going to blame us and we're going to blame them, and the Koreans are going to blame us both, etc.

So looking beyond this, what is the potential impact of the end game – of whatever it turns out to be – of this enterprise that China is so deeply engaged in currently?

Vogel: For what it's worth, I'll throw out my view on this. I see the talent getting trained in foreign affairs in China, on a broad scale – think tanks, foreign ministry, elsewhere. Even if they should fail on the North Korean issue, in my own estimate that will be only a minor dent in the overall direction in which China is going to play a bigger role.

Constructive Relations Among Asian Countries in Coming Years

In the immediate years ahead I see China's role as overwhelmingly constructive. In Southeast Asia, in the multilateral trade agreements, in Central Asia the Shanghai Agreement, and such places, China is beginning to get more confidence about its ability in multilateral organizations. That's going to grow even if this particular role should fail.

This is not a sudden switch. The Chinese have been getting ready for it for over two decades. There have been plenty of people in think tanks in China, who have acquired tremendous breadth. There are many people thinking about these issues. So it's not as if somebody is suddenly thrust into something with no preparation. And already they have quite a broad base in China in which to draw to play that role.

Mochizuki: If I can just supplement that – first of all, if these talks become successful and China's role is seen as positive, I guess the possibility is one, that China has an ascendant role, even a dominant role, in Northeast Asian security. And the second alternative is that it becomes a crucible for

a cooperative security order for Northeast Asia. I feel that it's more the latter than the former, even if China plays this pivotal role that the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance would balance the ascendancy of China so that the outcome would be a more cooperative one.

In terms of failure, it really depends on what one means by failure. If it is a failure that provokes a serious military crisis and possible chaos, then I think everything is up for grabs. I think the stakes are extremely high and it could lead to a fundamental fissure in Northeast Asia, and for me a key question is which way Korea will go, but also I'm not sure to what extent the U.S.-Japan alliance would weather that kind of crisis. Right now, I think that bilateral relationship is relatively robust, but again, depending on the failed scenario, it could even affect that.

Ikenberry: I wanted to ask a question to Ezra about Korea. I was most taken by your argument about the underlying public changing public views and the polls about South Koreans rooting for the Iraqi regime in the last war – striking data. To what extent is this anti-Americanism driven by policy, to what extent is it driven by American power, and the changing structure of relations? That is to say, what can America do today or tomorrow to alter the new generation of young people in Korea and elsewhere in East Asia that have this new view of America, and yet remain consistent with a global security role where you do take North Korea seriously as a threat? How can you reconcile both that hard power role taking threat seriously dealing with North Korea and yet address these issues of changing public attitudes towards the United States?

State of U.S.-Korea Relations

Vogel: As I see it, the key problem in the early part of this administration is that they were so critical of North Korea and there was talk among certain officials in a very threatening posture about possibly using military solutions. If you ask South Koreans where the biggest danger is going to come from, they might say that the United States provoked North Korea into doing something. The artillery lined up on the other side within easy distance of Seoul is a very scary thing. They are upset that the United States on which they have been relying for fifty years, is not sufficiently sensitive to their condition. This had a lot to do with the polls. My guess is that this was underneath the tremendous public reaction when a truck driver accidentally killed a couple of girls, and they weren't turned over to Korean authorities.

There are other irritations that may not make the press that much, such as getting visas to the United States. After 9/11, the problem of getting a visa to the United States – just like when we go to the airports – is more of a hassle. But we threw lots and lots of people into airport security now so that it's not that bad. But for visas, we slowed down the process. Many people wait in huge lines and wait months. The frustration is high among those who want to become friends with the United States and come here. I think such things fuel the anti-American mood.

Many in Japan, where they've had troops over fifty years, feel that they want to be free, that they've grown up now and that the United States shouldn't be big brother pushing them around. Some Japanese fear that if the United States gets in a conflict with China they would be dragged in. They don't want to risk confrontation with China.

China has been behaving quite cleverly in dealing with South Korea. So the real world is out there, as opposed to the way some academics would like to make it clean cut.

It's hard to isolate which variables are more important, but if I had to come down on one, I would say that the long-range trends are very important. Without those, the anti-U.S. feelings would be less severe. But early in this administration, we were doing things that did not show sufficient consideration for people in South Korea who had put so much into our relationship. It's partly a question of style and attitude and considerateness, more than a specific policy issue.

Ikenberry: Question in the back please.

Questioner: There's another play of some significance in the Far East and that, of course, is Russia. How large or how significant a role do you think Russia is playing or is likely to play, perhaps especially in the context of American unilateralism?

Russian Role in East Asia

Vogel: I'm sure you know much more about this issue than I do, but I see Russia playing several key roles: one is as the supplier of advanced military equipment to China. In ten or fifteen years time, China will want to make a lot of these things themselves, but in the mean time, they acquire certain modern military equipment from the former Soviet Union. The cost of energy will continue to go up around the world. People will be rushing to Siberian oil fields. The Japanese and others will want to invest in that. As a supplier of energy, Russia will become increasingly important. Does oil basically go through China, or towards Japan?

These are already important issues. I don't think Russia will play a large political role in East Asia.

Of course, we have to be concerned about Russia for the weapons it possesses. We want Russia's goodwill and cooperation. But in an era when economics are very important – and Russia is not a major economic power in that part of the world except as a supplier of energy – I just don't see that they are likely to play a large role.

Ikenberry: In the back? One more.

Questioner: My question is about shocks. There was some reference I think by Dr. Zhao about shocks back in the 70s and of course there were three in those days. One was Nixon in China, one was the soybean embargo to Japan, and the third was the surcharge, which President Nixon put on imports coming into the United States.

My question to you is what the possibilities are and what the implications might be of a similar type of a surcharge that is being discussed with regard to goods from China coming into the United States. This is obsession on unilateralism and I can't imagine one that would be more unilateral; it's happened before and I'm wondering what you think about the situation today.

Vogel: The people who ask questions probably know a lot more about these issues than I do. But my take is this: Some years ago, America lost a tremendous amount of industry to Japan as Japan was becoming an export power. But in the case of China, only a very small portion of its increased industrial power comes at the expense of American industrial power. Much of it is coming from industries from Japan, Taiwan, South Korea. The direct impact on

American industries is not as great as they were in the case of Japan.

Secondly, from what I understand of the mood in the Congress – I know there are people here who know this much better – trade issues are now becoming a source of focus for other issues with China, whether it's human rights or whatever. Now the hot new issue on which to tag these is the trade imbalance and the intellectual property rights invasion. So the trade issue is becoming a focus for anti-Chinese attitudes from other issues.

If U.S. behavior toward Taiwan or other issues annoys China, one can't rule out certain reactions from China. But it's my understanding that the leaders of the administration, while pushing China, are not yet to the desperate point. For example, on the yuan-dollar exchange, it is my understanding that we're encouraging China, as quickly as possible, to float the yuan. But we are not about to shock them suddenly as we shocked the Japanese in 1971.

If we took arbitrary action, that would be scary. I just don't think we're very close to that now.

Arthur, you watch these trade issues fully. Would you say we're there on this issue?

Arthur Alexander: It's brewing.

Questioner: Dr. Vogel, you said the concept that Japan played a mediator between the United States and China is no longer realistic. I agree. Well, in fact, the Japanese government has a bigger and broader expectation or desire to be mediator or bridge between the industrialized West and the developing world. My question is, do you think this desire is also no longer realistic,

and is your thinking related to your latest assessment that Japan is no longer number one?

Vogel: As you know, I never argued that Japan was the number one political or economic power. Japan still has an important role, especially in AID. Japan is a rival of the United States as the biggest aid donor. I was just talking to the president of a university in Cambodia a couple of days ago. He said Japan is by far the biggest donor in Cambodia and in Asia in general. There are many places that don't get a lot of publicity where Japanese are operating in a very quiet, effective way. In terms of aid programs and technical assistance, Japan – JICA – will play perhaps an even bigger role than it has been playing. The United States is now so preoccupied with terrorism and proliferation that Japan may play an even more important role in aid and development.

Questioner: I'm very curious about your comment that Japanese leaders now recently don't have strategic thinking, compared to the Yoshida, and I agree with you. And I'm curious to hear what are the major reasons the Japanese leaders lost this kind of strategic thinking, and also I'm curious why the Chinese leaders have retained strategic thinking now?

Vogel: There is something about people who've gone through a world war that makes for big thinking. I think of the magnificent book that Don Oberdorfer wrote on Mike Mansfield. The generation of Mike Mansfield in the Senate – Humphrey, Fulbright, Mondale, Mansfield, were very big people who went through World War II and thought about really big international strategic issues. The Yoshida school members were overwhelmingly people of World War

II who had that kind of broad thinking about fundamental issues.

Some people who do business organization analysis have commented that the founder of a business organization often has a very broad vision but a second or third generation leader who grew up within that company who knows the routines of that company, is not prepared when things happen that are out of the ordinary. They've grown up thinking in a narrower parameter. Many Japanese now have grown up in that narrower parameter than leaders in the 1940s and 1950s.

It reminds me of southern seniority in our Senate in the days when you could be sure if you were a democrat you will be re-elected to the senate. The seniority system made things predictable. One could plan ahead. But when you have a very competitive situation, you don't know who's going to be next. Things are constantly changing. It's hard to have that broad planning. In Japan now, since the collapse of the LDP a decade ago, there has not been a stable structure. It's hard to think of the big picture.

Because the Chinese are insulated from democratic pressures, they can operate relatively independently. They can think about the good of the country. In recent years Chinese leaders have gone through so many basic changes that it's almost like a little after the war period where the elders have greater breadth. Even the younger generation has been trained at the party school and elsewhere in broad strategic visions. People who grow up in the current competitive era in Japan start as an assistant to a politician, or get their own little district, or are the child of a Diet member. Somehow they don't get that kind of broad training with a vision. We ought to help find some

mechanism so they can get a broader vision.

Ikenberry: Mike, would you like to add something?

Mochizuki: I would just like to provide an alternative view, and I disagree with the notion that there isn't much strategic thinking in Japan today. When we look at Yoshida we tend to project by hindsight that it was some kind of well-thought out or articulated strategy. There was no Yoshida doctrine except only after historians looked at the choices that were made and that elevated Yoshida to this incredible strategic thinker. But when one looks at what happened, it's not clear to me that he had that incredible strategic vision. Secondly, what makes Yoshida seem so powerful is that his vision – to the extent that there was one – was a policy choice, was essentially in conflict with an alternative strategic course, and Yoshida won out.

What I think exists in Japan today is that you don't have a particular prime minister with the Koizumi doctrine or the Hashimoto doctrine, but there is, what is amazing, a pervasive strategic consensus, so you don't need kind of one prime minister providing the mindset. And I think one document that reflects the consensus on strategy is a recent report that was published last November, which is the Strategy of Japan for the 21st century. And I think there is virtual consensus in Japan about that, and Japan is methodically pursuing that strategy.

Questioner: I want to build on what Mike was saying. Well, I usually stand second to none in my condemnation of my Japanese friends' inability to think outside of their own bureaucracy. I think we need to look at something that is clearly a thought out strategy. When it became obvious a year

and a half ago that the Bush administration's policy on North Korea was at some risk of not working because it wasn't a coherent policy, I had a discussion with somebody here in the embassy about "My god, what's Japan going to do?" And he said, "Listen, we've been thinking about this, and it's pretty clear that there cannot be any daylight between our two governments on either North Korea or, for that matter, Iraq in the Middle East." I said, "Yes, but why?" He said, "Because when the crunch comes on North Korea, we have to be able to influence you, to work with you, and to make sure that you are not simply doing whatever the hell you want and we have no influence. So unless it just gets absolutely insupportable, we're going to be with you on these things whatever it takes."

Now, whether that was genius thinking by the leaders, or Koizumi himself figured it out, I don't know. But that's what they've done, and as I say, it was explained to me very clearly almost two years ago. So somebody somewhere at least is doing some pretty good strategic thinking about what Japan's interest will require in order to at least to try to head off disaster. Small footnote.

Ikenberry: Let's take a couple more and then we'll wrap up. The gentleman at the back.

Questioner: Professor, I enjoyed your description of the evolution of anti-Americanism from the Taft-Katsura Treaty, but I think today we are all being left sort of with the impression that political anti-Americanism in Korea, as opposed to cultural Sino-phobia, began with the "axis of evil" speech, and I would argue that we haven't mentioned yet the number one premier issue in South Korean-American relations in the last fifty years – and that's the

Kwangju massacre and the perception left in South Korea that the UN command was somehow involved in the dispatch of the paratroopers to what was the Tiananmen Square there.

And today I would argue that the leadership in South Korea and the teachers' unions – Roh Moo-hyun himself got his start as a human rights lawyer in Pusan defending students who were tortured by Chun Doo-hwan, the butcher of Kwangju – that we are reaping what we sowed in the streets of Kwangju over twenty years ago and the misperceptions that we left there. So my question would be: how can you reach this 30 and 40-year-old generation through public diplomacy, or whatever, to convince them that America did not betray democracy and human rights in Kwangju?

Ikenberry: Let's take one more and let our speakers chew on this.

Questioner: For more than twenty years, we have had the so-called revisionist thinking, that Japan is so unique, so different in terms of social structure, that's why Japan is number one. And then Dr. Vogel, would you think the U.S. should need to use the same policy to reach China in the sense that the Chinese are so unique, so different from other countries, then China needs to be applied to the same policy? Another question to Dr. Zhao: I wonder whether you think the same side of the question from the China side; do you think that China needs to have the regionalistic approach to the United States – yet it is so unique, so different from other countries in applying the unilateralism and preemptive policy?

Vogel: I agree with the point that he and Mike were making, that there is an awareness of strategy among some Japanese people, and there is a large consensus about

basically working within the U.S. alliance and in trying to keep some leverage within that alliance.

Japan's Strategy toward China

But how does Japan develop a strategy to work with China? When Nakasone was prime minister, he had a broad strategy: we have to convince China that we're not a cork in a bottle and that we're not going to become militaristic, but we do have our own pride. We do have our own concerns and we will be sensitive to your concerns. Koizumi believes that visiting Yasukuni shrine is more important than good relations with neighbors. On this issue, he does not have a good strategy for Japan.

Mochizuki: But Nakasone did that too.

Vogel: No, no. The second time, Nakasone didn't visit Yasukuni. Nakasone went the first time and then the second time he said he would not go again because of the concern of his neighbors. He did not say "I'm giving in." He said in effect, "We have our concerns and we have our pride. I am proud of what people did in World War II. Many wonderful Japanese sacrificed for their country. I want to pay homage to them. But I don't want to offend our neighbors." For me, that is a broad strategic way to respond to that issue.

Some individual Japanese are brilliant strategic thinkers. But they do not display broad overall leadership.

On the question of the Kwangju massacre, you're quite right. I should have mentioned that. It is a terribly important issue and many South Koreans feel that America had the leverage and power to stop that.

I think Bill Gleysteen's book is as good as an attempt as I know of of an American trying to deal with and explain the issue. He showed that our power was limited and why we couldn't have done more. If Bill Gleysteen's book doesn't convince them, I don't know how one could convince them. There are many people who feel that America had a joint military operation, that we should have stopped them somehow, even though Gleysteen and others explained that we don't have that leverage.

On the question of uniqueness, we need a more complex view of China. Many Americans see China as a battle between the Communist Party and the market. Issues are far more complex.

U.S. Does Not Have Sufficient Understanding of Forces in China

As a country we don't yet have a sufficiently complex understanding of the different forces in China. There are changes that encourage local initiative, without going through formal voting procedures, that encourage inter-Party democracy. Since we are a democracy we need better public understanding of the complexities of Asia.

As for Chinese attitudes toward the United States, China is run by an elite, and the elite has made great progress in the last two decades in understanding the United States. The students who have come here are very talented group. They're quickly getting a more complex view of the United States. Chinese views five years ago are not the same as they are today. And I think once these students go back – because things are not centralized and controlled - word gets out about what they just learned. There is a very rapid increase in subtlety in Chinese discussions of the United States. Thank you very much.

Zhao: According to Oriental philosophy, the best way to show your respect to your teacher is to keep your mouth shut. So I was thinking, I'll sit down and relax after my discussion – but thank you for that wonderful question. I guess U.S. uniqueness is every country treating the United States as unique. It's simply because the United States is a unique superpower. If we look at Russia and look at others, every country treats the U.S. as the number one important country, and China is no exception.

To give you an example, when Lee Teng-hui visited Cornell, of course China had a huge reaction, but after that there was some others like Chen Shui-bian who passed through New York, which is okay – well, not okay from Beijing's perspective, but it didn't make noise. But then when Lee Teng-hui wanted to have medical treatment in Osaka, that of course caused strong opposition in China. Some Japanese friends asked me, "Is that because China treats the U.S. and Japan differently?" I said, "Well, this is the reality."

So I would also come back to this gentleman's first question regarding the security arrangement – whether China should be part of that. I would say that this is not a unilateral issue; it's a bilateral or multilateral issue. It's a result of interaction. Let's say if China wants to join a certain security arrangement, let's say U.S.-Japan security, U.S.-Korea; I don't think those organizations would like to accept China.

China Has Concerns about Multilateral Security Arrangements

Also, by the same token, China has its own particular concerns. For example, Taiwan: China would not want Taiwan to be part of a multilateral security arrangement. Recent-

ly, there was a discussion about the G-7, G-8 or G-9, when Hu Jintao went to Paris. So the question in China is whether China would like to be a part of G-8 or G-9. I was asked that question when I was in Tokyo, and my answer is it's not really up to China. It's also up to G-8 whether they would really like to include China. So in other words, this kind of security arrangement is very important multilaterally, and

China should be part of that, playing a certain role. But it's just a question of how to deal with that.

Ikenberry: Well, on that note, I think we'll draw this to an end. Would you join with me in welcoming and thanking our panelists for this afternoon's session.

(End)

About the Panelists

Main Speaker

Dr. Ezra Vogel officially retired as professor from Harvard University in 2000 and is now Henry Ford II Research Professor in the Social Sciences. His research and teaching have been concerned primarily with Chinese and Japanese society, industrial development, and more recently with Asian international relations. Professor Vogel has served as director of Harvard's U.S.-Japan Program, the Fairbank Center, the Asia Center, and the undergraduate concentration in East Asian studies. From 1993-1995 he served as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia in Washington. In 1996 he directed the American Assembly on China, and in 2000 co-headed the Asia Foundation task force on Asia Policy. Professor Vogel holds a B.A. from Ohio Wesleyan, a Ph.D. from Harvard and ten honorary degrees. He is the author of *Japan as Number One* (1979), *Japan's New Middle Class* (1963), *Is Japan Still Number One?* (2000), *The Four Little Dragons* (1991), and a number of studies on China.

Discussants

Dr. Mike Mochizuki is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Sigur Center at the George Washington University. He holds the Elliott School's endowed chair in Japan-U.S. Relations. Professor Mochizuki came to the Elliott School from the Brookings Institution, where he was a senior fellow. He was formerly with RAND where he served as co-director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Policy. He has taught at the University of Southern California and at Yale University. Professor Mochizuki received his Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University. His most recent publications include *Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear Korea*, (co-author, 2003), *Japan Reorients: The Quest for Wealth and Security in East Asia* (2000), *Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations* (1997), and *Japan: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy* (1995).

Dr. Quansheng Zhao is Professor and Division Director of Comparative and Regional Studies at the School of International Service, and Chair of the Asia Council at American University. He is also associate-in-research at the Fairbank Center at Harvard and guest professor at Peking University. He has taught at many universities, including the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Old Dominion University. He is currently chair of the American Political Science Association's Conference Group on China Studies and a member of the editorial advisory board of various journals. He has served as a member of annual peer review advisory panels for fellowships for the Fulbright Program and the National Security Education Program, among others. Professor Zhao received an M.A. and Ph.D. from U.C. Berkeley, and a B.A. from Peking University. He is the author of *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy* (1996) and *Japanese Policymaking* (1995), and is the editor of *Future Trends in East Asian International Relations*.

Moderator

Dr. G. John Ikenberry is the Peter F. Krogh Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice at Georgetown University. In addition, he was a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. Professor Ikenberry is the author of numerous publications, including *State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy* (2002), *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (2000), and *Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government* (1988).