

Koizumi's Diplomacy: New Developments in Japan's Foreign Policy?

by
Dr. Tanaka Akihiko

Tanaka Akihiko: Thank you, John, for your kind introduction. It's my great pleasure to have the opportunity to share my views on Japan's foreign policy with this very knowledgeable audience at the Asian Voices seminar. I'm both honored and somewhat intimidated to be commented on by such noted specialists as Kent Calder and Steven Clemons. I hope John Ikenberry, the moderator, actually moderates them if their criticisms to me are too harsh. Today, Prime Minister Koizumi dissolved the Diet and the general election decided to be held on November 9th. Given the current high approval rate of his cabinet, it seems fairly certain that he will be elected as Japan's prime minister by the newly elected Diet in November.

Since the term of LDP presidency, which he obtained last month, is now three years, Koizumi can serve his country as prime minister for the coming three years. In total, he could be the prime minister who will have served more than five years. His term could be longer than former Prime Minister Nakasone. Obviously, anything can happen in politics, so theoretically, the opposition parties can win the general election. The probability of the opposition's victory is much higher now than in the previous electoral system that existed until the mid-1990s. As the campaign proceeds, voters may increase their appreciation of Kan Naoto, the leader of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), as a potential alter-native to Mr. Koizumi. Mr. Kan, as you know, is an extremely articulate and very effective

debater. He could out perform Mr. Koizumi on the television debates.

Interesting Electoral Campaign

Given the increasing strength of the Democratic Party in the urban areas, I think this is going to be the most interesting electoral campaign in recent Japanese history. However, the LDP and Mr. Koizumi are a formidable opponent. The current approval rate is around 60 percent and more, an unusually high rate for a Japanese cabinet of all ages. The reshuffle of the cabinet and the LDP leadership he made last month was a, in my judgment, political masterpiece. The appointment of Abe Shinzo as LDP secretary general was both surprising and very clever. One could always be very skeptical about politics, and especially so about Japanese politics. Political reforms, including the change of the electoral system in the 1990s, have often been regarded as a failure.

Reforms Have Not Caused Significant Changes

Nothing significant has changed by the reforms, and politics became worse in some criticisms, especially when they observed the series of short-term cabinets from Murayama, Hashimoto, Obuchi and Mori. But, as I observed, the introduction of the single district system that took place in the middle of the 1990s clearly changed Japanese politics. As the last LDP presidential election vividly demonstrated, the LDP

factions failed to fulfill their traditional functions. The miserable division within the Hashimoto faction, largest faction of the LDP, was the undeniable evidence of this failure.

So even if the Democratic Party of Japan is not able to win the next general election, it could not become a second socialist party of the 1955 system. It could continue to function as a viable alternative to the LDP under the current electoral system. The Japanese, I think, are now enjoying an unusually interesting political moment. Now, what about Japan's external relations? That is my theme.

Is Koizumi's diplomacy changing Japanese foreign policy? If so, in what area and in what way? Has Koizumi made any innovations in Japanese foreign policy? What are the merits and shortcomings of his diplomacy? What are the prospects and challenges of his foreign policy for his next term as prime minister, if the general election gives him the opportunity? Well, it is the conventional wisdom that foreign policy does not count much in elections in any democracies. All politics are local. But on the other hand, it is sometimes said in Tokyo that, while Koizumi has done very little in domestic politics, he has performed well in foreign affairs and, hence, enjoys a high approval rate. Is this true? Obviously, his clear support of President Bush in the U.S. war in Iraq was his major decision, but, as far as the public opinion is concerned, the majority of Japanese were not in support of the Iraq War.

Along with Tony Blair and President Bush, Mr. Koizumi was thrown into a rather embarrassing position by the fact that weapons of mass destruction have not been found in Iraq after the major battles ended. Koizumi often maintained the fact that even though

Saddam has not been found does not prove that he did not exist at the end of the war. But this equation of Saddam's disappearance with the disappearance of WMD is not endorsed very much by the Japanese public. Nevertheless, his approval rate is about 60 percent and more.

His popularity rests not just on foreign policy. Now we come to my major theme. Is his diplomacy different from his predecessors? If so, where is he different? Let me consider three areas.

Transformation of Japanese Foreign Policy

One theme is policy substance. The second is style. Third, decision making. First, policy substance. In other words, the question here is: Has Koizumi changed Japan's foreign policy substantively? But then, what do I mean by the substance of Japanese foreign policy? Any introductory course on Japan's foreign policy of the post-World War II era starts with the policy line that Prime Minister Yoshida set at the time of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Professor Kenneth Pyle summarized Yoshida's line as the "Yoshida Doctrine," which consists of, first, dependence on the U.S. for Japan's security; second, minimum self defense on the Japanese part; and, third, concentration on economic development. Obviously, Japan's foreign policy since then made a transformation.

Japan's Self Defense Forces now may not be considered minimum forces, as conceived in the 1950s. Japan's foreign policy is no longer just pursuing Japan's economic development. But overall, the centrality of the Japan-U.S. alliance and non-offensive military posture have dominated Japan's basic foreign policy frameworks. Japan started such international activities as U.N.

peacekeeping since the 1990s, but they are mostly limited to logistics, developmental aids and humanitarian activities. Therefore, it may not be appropriate to characterize the recent Japanese foreign policy simply within the Yoshida Doctrine, but it consists of evolutionary additions to each element of the Yoshida Doctrine. I sometimes use the term Yoshida Doctrine Plus. Has Koizumi departed from this? In fact, in my judgment, what he has done so far is quite consistent with this evolution of the Yoshida Doctrine Plus. His support of the United States has been very clear from the beginning of his administration in 2001.

Koizumi's Cooperation with U.S. after 9/11

After 9/11, he was fairly quick to make a policy package to cooperate with the U.S. in the war against terrorism. He passed the legislation to enable to send SDF ships to the Arabian Sea to support countries engaged in the war against terrorism. He made a very clear statement of support for President Bush when U.S. launched military action in Iraq. He passed the special legislation to help the reconstruction of Iraq. It is unprecedented for Japan's SDF ships to operate in the distant seas. That's quite new.

But their missions were not for combat activities, and their missions are limited to the roles of, shall I say, gas stations. Japan eventually will send personnel to Iraq, possibly within this year, but their mission, again, is mainly for logistics, reconstruction and humanitarian activities. There are those in Tokyo who argue for acquisition of more offensive military capabilities, especially in relation to Japan's Korean Peninsula policy. But Koizumi himself has been very cautious. Also, Prime Minister Koizumi indicated that he would like to initiate full-

fledged constitutional amendments if he is re-elected as prime minister, but the constitutional amendments require tremendous efforts, and it is not sure if they could be realized within his tenure. In the meantime, he does not seem to change the constitutional interpretation of what is called "collective self defense rights."

In this sense, these talks of offensive things and constitutional amendments and others do not seem to adopt too much significant change in the substance. And, in any case, in my view, even if Japan changes its constitutional interpretation of "collective self defense," this does not mean that Japan becomes a military power with huge offensive capabilities. The change, in my opinion, simply normalizes Japan's legal framework so that Japan can perform the foreign policy activities totally consistent with Yoshida Doctrine Plus. If I may borrow from a previously stated comment, Koizumi's approach, in my view, is consistent with the approach of a global civilian power.

Japan's Korean Peninsula Policy

What about his North Korean policy? He made a surprise visit to Pyongyang in September last year, and met with Mr. Kim Jong-il. But the point of the Pyongyang Declaration that Koizumi and Kim agreed on was perfectly consistent with Japan's previous Korean Peninsula policy. It indicated that Koizumi wants to achieve normalizations with North Korea on the terms exactly similar to those upon which Japan normalized relations with South Korea in 1965.

It further indicated that abduction and North Korea's WMD and ballistic missiles were the major concerns of Japan. In other words, we find very little substantive difference in Koizumi's diplomacy from the

basic lines of Japan's diplomacy that have evolved over the decades. Koizumi's diplomacy is following the same evolutionary path of Japan's foreign policy. What about style? As in any politics, in addition to substance, style also matters. I believe that Koizumi's diplomacy is most characteristic in this respect. In this area, Professor Kent Calder's article has always been a major source of reference. He once wrote in his influential article that Japan was a reactive state.

I just received his new article talking about the post-reactive state, question mark. I haven't read it, so I still pose the question: Is Koizumi posing a challenge to Professor Calder's old thesis? My answer is both yes and no. Yes, because when Mr. Koizumi decided to go to Pyongyang in August last year, he was not pushed by any foreign pressure. Some, including myself, even wondered if he had coordinated beforehand with the most important allies. Also, when Koizumi made the Japanese package in support of the war against terrorism, he did not wait until foreign pressure - in this case pressure from the United States - became overwhelmingly large. He declared his support of the U.S. and went ahead with the necessary legislation.

In the case of his support of the Iraq War, it was his own calculation of Japan's national interest, especially when the situation on the Korean Peninsula was quite dangerous. That was decisive. When France and Germany made the opposition to the Iraq War quite clear, when there was virtually no hope of a new U.N. resolution in March, and when most Japanese were against the Iraq War, there was no clear and visible foreign pressure. It seems that he does not follow a traditional and sometimes a caricatured pattern of a Japanese prime minister who could act only after foreign pressure

and often end up being accused of doing too little, too late. But then, is Koizumi sufficiently proactive?

Koizumi's Style of Diplomacy

In fact, diplomatic options that differentiate Koizumi from others, however, were not very proactive, in my view. His action immediately after 9/11 and his action at the time of the Iraq War both gave the impression of decisiveness and quickness, but they were made in response to events. They were reactive, not proactive. I said both yes and no to the question of whether he's denying Professor Calder's old thesis. I had this in mind: Koizumi's diplomacy is a reactive one, too. The difference from his predecessors is that he's good at it. This judgment may not be completely fair to Mr. Koizumi. His Pyongyang visit may be an example of his proactive attempt, which I highly appreciate.

But as the recent developments indicate, his initiative has not led to any breakthroughs. So where he is proactive, he has yet to show the result. So far, I have been talking about substance and style, and I have been talking as if Mr. Koizumi alone were conducting Japan's foreign policy. Obviously, any country's foreign policy is conducted by a huge number of people under one session. Decision-making takes place within organizational frameworks. Is the Koizumi cabinet's decision-making any different from traditional Japanese decision-making? This is my third question.

The first thing I have to point out was that Japan's foreign policy decision-making system was in terrible condition when Mr. Koizumi took office in the spring of 2001. First, the foreign ministry had already become the focus of public criticism, largely because of the scandal of embezzlement of

secret funds by an official. Second, and probably more importantly, the foreign ministry's decision-making process had become abnormally distorted by the undue involvement of ruling party politicians, most notably by Mr. Suzuki Muneo. The newly appointed foreign minister, Tanaka Makiko, openly declared to reform the foreign ministry. She was determined to get rid of Mr. Suzuki's influence from the ministry. But ignorant about foreign affairs and erratic in her behavior, Mrs. Tanaka, instead of reforming the foreign ministry, caused confusion in the ministry. By humiliating a number of foreign ministry officials in public and making diplomatically questionable statements, she created antagonism in the ministry.

Conflict Paralyzed Foreign Ministry

Confrontation between high-ranking officials and the foreign ministers created paralysis in the foreign ministry. Facing this confusion and immobility of the foreign ministry, Mr. Koizumi began to let Fukuda Yasuo, chief cabinet secretary, virtually take over the role of foreign minister. Foreign ministry officials, bypassing Mrs. Tanaka, began to consult with Mr. Fukuda. The negotiations between Japan and North Korea - secret ones - that eventually led to Koizumi's visit in September 2002 were conducted with the foreign minister knowing nothing about them. Prime Minister Koizumi and Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda were in charge of the operation. Prime Minister Koizumi, feeling that his foreign minister was becoming a liability, found an opportunity to rectify the mess surrounding the foreign ministry in early 2002.

When Japan was preparing the conference to help reconstruct Afghanistan in January 2002, newspaper reports told that Suzuki Muneo ordered the ministry officials to

deny participation of a few NGOs which Suzuki disliked. Mrs. Tanaka, infuriated by this interference by Suzuki, ordered ministry officials to give the seats to those NGOs. But her erratic statements in the parliament again caused huge confusion. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Nogami, denied some of her statements, which, again, infuriated Mrs. Tanaka. Koizumi, in order to resolve the confusion that stopped the Diet deliberation, decided to dismiss Tanaka from her foreign minister position, Suzuki from an important party position, and Nogami from the vice minister's position.

Well, in this particular instance, the initial reaction of Mrs. Tanaka to give access to the NGOs was a right intervention. In this sense, it seemed unreasonable for her to be dismissed. But from Koizumi's viewpoint, with this triple dismissal, he was able to normalize the workings of the foreign ministry. In addition to dismissing Mrs. Tanaka, who was the source of confusion in the ministry, Koizumi was successful in reducing the undue influence of Suzuki Muneo within the ministry, too. The first task of Kawaguchi Yoriko, the new foreign minister, was to reestablish the foreign ministry. She tasked her advisory groups to make a comprehensive reform plan, which was submitted to her in July 2002. Kawaguchi, a talented technocrat, performed her foreign minister's job impeccably, but not being a member of the parliament, she does not have her own political clout when she needs to persuade members of the parliament.

In other words, though more normal and more effective than Tanaka Makiko, Kawaguchi maintained a fairly low profile. The center of gravity of Japan's foreign policy decision-making remained somewhere between Koizumi and Fukuda. In this sense, the dominance of the prime minister's resi-

dence was first necessitated largely by the mess of the foreign ministry, but now seems to be political. Is this centrality of the prime minister's residence different from the normal pattern of Japanese foreign policy? I think so. The role of the chief cabinet secretary in the Koizumi cabinet is quite significant. Probably the only precedent was the Nakasone cabinet with Mr. Gotoda Masaharu as chief cabinet secretary. But exactly what Mr. Fukuda is doing is a bit of a puzzle. Knowledgeable about international affairs, always thoughtful, witty, sometimes even sarcastic in the press conference, Mr. Fukuda is very cautious and reluctant to appear as if he's making any decisions. He may be sharing the thinking part of Koizumi's diplomacy.

In fact, most advisory boards that Koizumi's cabinet created in international affairs are managed by Mr. Fukuda. But Mr. Fukuda does not seem to cause Koizumi to decide on any matter. He prepares many things for the prime minister, but he seems to wait until the prime minister wants to decide. In a way, this is an ideal style of a chief cabinet secretary. But because Mr. Koizumi does not seem to spend much time on foreign policy, especially long-term policy, many of the reports of the Foreign Policy Advisory Boards were simply put on the shelves of Mr. Fukuda, waiting to be read by the prime minister, if ever. The thinking part of the Koizumi diplomacy is not directly connected to its acting parts.

Koizumi's Foreign Policy Not Substantially Different from Previous Policy

After examining substance, style and the decision-making of Koizumi's diplomacy, what can we conclude? I think there are clearly new features in his diplomacy. His style is most different from previous Japan-

ese prime ministers. His decision-making is different from the previous prime ministers, but in terms of substance, his foreign policy has not been very different from the previous Japanese foreign policy. In many ways, he has strengthened the evolutionary process of Japan's basic foreign policy, which I call the Yoshida Doctrine Plus. What are the merits of his diplomacy? The most important one is, I think, clarity. He does not make reservations when he said he supported the U.S. during the Iraq War. When he said that, unless the abduction issue was not resolved, Japan would not normalize relations with North Korea, he meant it. The second merit is his quick action. His diplomacy, as I said, is largely reactive, but he is good at it. What are the shortcomings? The biggest problem, in my view, is the lack of long-term planning. Of course, lack of long-term planning is a shortcoming not unique to Koizumi's diplomacy.

It is quite common to previous Japanese governments and, for that matter, to many governments in the world. But if Koizumi is to strengthen his diplomacy, I think he has to pay attention to this aspect of foreign policy. For example, he delivered an important speech in Singapore in January 2002, in which he declared that, "our goal should be the creation of a community that acts together and advances together in East Asia." Important building blocks for the creation of such a community in East Asia include bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements between Japan and East Asian countries. Ideally, negotiations of such FTAs should have already been launched if Mr. Koizumi is serious about what he said in Singapore, but not much has progressed. This slow progress of this long-term goal is mainly caused by the domestic resistance against free trade from the agricultural sector.

After Mr. Koizumi returned from Singapore, the prime minister himself had not taken serious personal efforts to make groundwork to persuade his colleagues in the LDP in the agricultural sector. As a result, he was not able to make concrete and specific initiatives in the ASEAN Plus Three summit held in Bali last week. It is good for the Japanese to have a prime minister who can react quickly to international events, but it is bad for the Japanese to have a prime minister who is not good at groundwork to prepare for the long-term policy objective. I think much of the thinking of Koizumi's diplomacy has already been made by his advisory boards. Their reports are on the shelves of the chief cabinet secretary. If Mr. Koizumi is reelected as prime minister after the general election, he should start his diplomacy by reading these documents if he hasn't done so. Thank you very much.

Kent Calder: I thoroughly enjoyed Professor Tanaka's presentation. As you can see, we sort of have this all planned. We decided to ambush him by doing an article on the subject that he was to discuss, but not letting him read it in advance. My article on Japan as a post-reactive state had a question mark after it. And essentially, what I'm arguing there—it's relatively similar to what Professor Tanaka was suggesting—is that there are certainly important pressures for change in Japanese foreign policy, but that the institutional calculus that forces Japan back into a reactive mode basically still remains and produces outcomes which are continuous, certainly on the substantive side, with what we've seen in the past.

Maybe before getting into that, I should just say in preface that it seems to me Japanese foreign policy today presents a very, very interesting subject for analysis, both on sub-

stantive grounds, of course, because Japan, with close to 15 percent of global GDP is a nation that presumably—and 30 percent of global savings, and then very distinctive security policies, of course—is a nation, which, if it were to revise its policies significantly, could have a major impact on world affairs and a major revisionist impact. So substantively, it's important. Also, of course, theoretically, in terms of our conceptions of what motivates nations in international affairs and what the determinants of change in international affairs are.

Contrasting Interpretations of Japan's Behavior

Along those lines, the Japanese case right now is particularly important and interesting. Interesting theoretically. The reason I would say that is that it seems to me we have three of four important contrasting interpretations of how Japan—the determinants of Japan's or any nation's behavior, and in my article, in any case, I suggest four. And along three of the dimensions, namely historical attitudes, institutionalized norms and international environment, one has significant change, but, with the respect to the last of these institutions, one has only very, very limited and incremental change. So the case, the Japanese case, does present interesting tests for theory as well. So what do I make of this, and, in particular, how would I relate it to Professor Tanaka's remarks? Broadly speaking, I would agree with him that there is not as much policy, or change in policy substance, as the media, generally speaking, suggests. Certainly, after the anti-terrorist legislation, the deployment of Aegis cruisers and so on to the Arabian Sea, in some respects, is new.

I think his suggestion that this amounts to putting gas stations in the Arabian Sea is graphic and it may be a little overstated,

but, fundamentally, that's what's happening. Reconstruction aid to Iraq, from what I understand, will be there, but it'll be somewhat delayed, probably because of the general election. And it will also be incremental. It will probably be relatively small in terms of the deployment of forces. I've heard estimates around perhaps even 50, 100 SDF troops. And a substantial assistance, but not nearly so substantial as during the Gulf War or following the Gulf War on the economic side. So, fundamentally, I think continuity in terms of the substance—I would agree with him on that point. I thought, in terms of the other two—well, maybe I should preface my remarks in terms of where Japanese policy is moving by suggesting that the forces, I think, there, particularly in the economic side, are there for some major redefinition of Japanese policies.

Since the mid-1980s, Japan has moved from being fundamentally an exporting nation in relationship to the world to, of course, having huge investments on the portfolio side, a net creditor well over a trillion dollars. On the direct foreign investment side, a sharp increase in investment in Asia on the order of four to five times what it was in the mid-1980s. So, Japan has important new stakes in the stability of Asia, which are, of course, very new. And, to the extent that there's volatility in Asia more generally, it has incentives to neutralize that, or to play some sort of a stabilizing role, either independently or in alliance with the United States. My general belief would be that, insofar as the United States continues to play that stabilizing role, Japan won't feel it necessary to, in terms of the stability factor alone, to go ahead and play the autonomous role.

And, in that sense, it will remain largely reactive. But, of course, there are major

changes in the international environment on the security side, too, that potentially provoke change in Japanese behavior in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, with the rising economic power of China, particularly to provide a potential test for the traditional patterns of diplomacy. So, what do we see in terms of actual policy? I think Professor Tanaka pointed out, pointed very interestingly, to what both substantively and theoretically is the most important development of the Koizumi prime minister-ship. Not so much Iraq, not so much the Arabian Sea. Although strategically, in terms of a U.S.-Japan partnership toward the Gulf and so on—which, in the longer run, it seems to me, building on some of the work I've done on energy and so on—is perhaps quite likely. That's not a revision of the status quo. That's essentially an extension of the U.S.-Japan partnership.

Initiative Toward North Korea

But what's interesting, really, is the initiative toward North Korea and what actually happened, both how it came to be and the genesis of the policy, and then what ultimately happened as a result. I think he points out very interestingly the role of the cabinet secretariat, Fukuda Yasuo, and his role in relation to that. One thing I would add, of course, is that it wasn't entirely just a matter of the secretariat doing this. There were also, of course, important and conflicting strains within the foreign ministry, and the important initiative of Tanaka Hitoshi, in spearheading this initiative, in cooperation, of course, with the secretariat.

Politically, it couldn't have gone ahead without Fukuda's cooperation, but there were also, within the foreign ministry, some important interests that wanted to go ahead and, generally speaking, of course, a more proactive diplomacy is something that the

foreign ministry has wanted very much to do. So I think perhaps that has to be added, but his basic insight about the importance of the combo of the prime minister's office, I think, is important. And that is the one sort of marginal - I think it's consistent with what I was arguing about: Japan was a reactive state 15 years ago in world politics. But it represents an empirical modification that actually is creating a modification in policy, namely, as the policy-making becomes more centralized, as the prime minister has more resources and the combo has more political influence. To that extent, Japan has the capacity to become more proactive in its diplomacy, and actually North Korea represented that. However, what happened?

A month later, of course, Jim Kelly went to North Korea. The issue of nuclear capacity was raised rather explicitly. It was something that was, according to many analyses, understood before that. The discovery was not simply made during that one month. So the involvement, the particular involvement of the administration, of the U.S. administration, had a highly complicating effect on the initiative of the Koizumi government. Perhaps this is something that needs to be introduced, a nuance into the reactive state argument that Japan is in its policies reactive – generally speaking reactive, not only to the United States, but to ASEAN or some to China or to other nations. But also that international pressure: when Japan is proactive, sometimes a second iteration of foreign pressure can intervene and frustrate proactive departures. Just one final comment. I think in pointing to the problems with Japanese diplomacy today, Professor Tanaka made a very important observation about the lack of long-term planning.

Japan Lacks Fully Developed Foreign Policy Institutions in Some Areas

We might ask ourselves one step further why, in fact, this is the case and what can be done about it. It seems to me, once again, it has institutional origins that relate to the argument that I was developing some years ago. Namely, that Japan lacks fully-developed foreign policy institutions in some areas. And that just more resources, a broadening of those institutions, could have a substantial marginal effect in enabling Japan to be more proactive. I'm thinking of a foreign ministry, for example, of 5,000 roughly professional diplomats. This is less than half the size of Britain, for example, with an economy which is 15 percent of the world.

The political military element, of course, of Japanese diplomacy is much less developed. Certainly these are expanding, but yet they are still limited on the intelligence side. Of course, Japanese intelligence, independent intelligence capabilities, are as yet not well developed. So it seems to me - and also, finally, the integration of economic diplomacy and political military diplomacy. You've got the foreign ministry handling one part of this, and you've got METI and various other ministries handling others. In other words, once again, fragmentation in the policy process is intensifying the problem of reactive diplomacy. So I think that he has pointed to some very important marginal changes that are underway that, particularly interactive with crisis and turbulence – which could well be possible in Japan's foreign policy environment – will ultimately lead us incrementally away from reactive diplomacy. But I still think it's going to take a long time to come. Thank you.

Steven Clemons: Thanks very much, John, and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA. It's a great pleasure to be here with Kent and Akihiko Tanaka. We had a real treat this afternoon in hearing Tanaka-san's discussion. I realize that I used to be addicted to sumo and that addiction was bested by my addiction to the power games that went on in Kasumigaseki and Nagata-cho, and I had, finally in my life, gotten some distance from all of that. And I realize now, shaking up here, how that addiction still exists after listening to Tanaka-san's comments about what has gone on between Koizumi, Miki, Fukuda, Abe and others. I guess my role here today organized or instigated by John is to make sure that someone up here disagreed. And I guess where I profoundly disagree, in a friendly and hopefully constructive way, is that where I do think there is a major change is in substance, not just style or decision-making.

And the substance of the change is that, as I understand it, Japan was a kind of power that was trying to present itself, in terms of global governance, as a very different state than the United States, that Japanese superpower meant an integration into global networks and global institutions and leading in that kind of way. And I see the decisions surrounding Iraq and Koizumi stepping forward on the legislation on Self Defense Forces being sent abroad as very much a rejection of that very principled stand of Japan returning to normal nation status by leading in the U.N. I mean, you have had more Mother Theresa-types out of Japan in the U.N. Matsuura Koichiro cleaned up UNESCO. You never hear about it anymore. Ogata Sadako, high commissioner of refugees. Akashi Yasushi who led the way. And it was embarrassing and, I think, problematic for me on many fronts to watch Japan cede that important high ground that it had achieved about global governance,

about wanting a permanent role in the U.N. Security Council.

And during the great debates over U.N. Resolution 1441 and how the United States was going to pursue its interests and what-not, Japan was entirely quiet. It said nothing. And then when Koizumi actually did come around to finally supporting the U.S. government and its way, he read a statement that read as if Mike Green, my good friend in the National Security Council, had written it. It didn't come qualified. You didn't come to a sense that Japan had gone through its own internal calculations of national interest, and to what degree it could support the United States, under what conditions. And I think that one of the great ironies with the very interesting kind of politician that Mr. Koizumi is – and I do agree with most of Tanaka-san's presentation about Koizumi's success and about some of the other changes. But what's very ironic for me is that Koizumi – who set himself up in some ways to be the Churchill of Asia or the spear carrier for the American empire in Asia of sorts, kind of like Tony Blair in Europe – is that it contrasts dramatically, and I hope some of you will challenge me on this if you disagree. But it contrasts dramatically with what I see as the invisibility of Japan in Washington today.

Japan Not Treated As a Nation of Consequence in Washington

I don't sense in this town that Japan is treated as a nation of consequence, with weight and real seriousness in the major policy debates that are going on in this town. I'm thrilled to see so many people interested, but the fact is that Koizumi's foreign policy direction has taken Japan – that the notion that I hear from Ambassador Kato and Dick Armitage and others, that

U.S.-Japan relations, particularly on the security side, have never been better. That's because you can't identify the differences between them. Japan's foreign policy has morphed very much into what the U.S. administration is doing. And the danger of that is I believe that, to some degree, to be self critical about U.S. policy today, I believe that we're in kind of an arbitrary mode.

I believe that what George Bush has brought to foreign policy, whether you agree or disagree with it, is simply a very new set of vectors. And that means that what Japan has done is embedded itself in the affairs of a great power that may run one direction or another. And what I thought was always principled and I admired about Japan was it's willingness to collaborate with us on some fronts and confront us on others. And one of the great things that I think Japan had as an important responsibility during the mess we had, and one of the lost opportunities, if I were to critique Mr. Koizumi and the Japanese government, is to realize that the United States, in responding to 9/11 and trying to deal with many of the military and strategic decisions that had to be made, that what was needed elsewhere in the world was someone to figure out what Joe Nye has called the soft power problem. We needed somebody to think about developing economies.

We needed people to think about all the things that the United States was being accused of, which was a triumphant economic egomaniac that was running far ahead of the rest of the world. Obviously, these are issues the United States needs to struggle with, but there's nothing at all that inhibits Japan, particularly given its legacy in these areas, of being a nation very involved in other nations' aid and of even, I

think, having important commentary and challenges to the so-called American economic model. I disagree in a very soft way with the notion that Mr. Koizumi wasn't - I don't think he was pushed on the legislation. I think Mr. Koizumi, after 9/11, went racing towards it because it was such an easy way to distract the nation and his government from the more important role, which was to clean up Japan's economy, to basically put an end to some of the structural corruption that I think inhibited Japan.

And I would argue that, yes, I think from the Japanese identity perspective, maybe it is important to send gas stations out to the middle of the Indian Ocean. But the more important contribution that Japan could have made substantively was getting itself growing, taking pressure off much of the world, getting away where you could basically de-couple the U.S. economy from being the consumer of last resort in the world and beginning to move other developing economies into Japan. So Japan, in many ways, if it wanted to contribute to global stability, should have pursued what Koizumi had always talked about, which was the reformer, the economic – involved with economic reform and structures – and when Dick Armitage said, “Show the flag,” Mr. Koizumi raced as fast as he could to do this.

Koizumi a Brilliant Politician Within Domestic Political Arena

I happen to think that the name that hasn't come up, and you know, maybe it shouldn't, is that Mr. Koizumi is one of the most brilliant politicians within the domestic political arena that Japan has seen in many, many years, and his direction on the security and defense items has done a lot to carve away much of the support that Ishihara might have. And what I hope is

that, in my friendly criticism of Mr. Koizumi, that as he further develops this, Mr. Koizumi thinks very much about what I think is important. I think normal nation status in Japan has got to give rise to some kind of nationalism, some understanding that national identity, national interest and nationalism, of a more liberal sort, in my view, than what Mr. Ishihara represents, is extremely important. What I fear is that Mr. Koizumi is actually far ahead of the Japanese public.

I've just returned from Tokyo. I spoke at NIRA. I was at METI. I talked with lots of senior government officials, and I talked with people that work in restaurants. I talked with very different people - I had a hard time finding people who thought Koizumi's decision on Iraq or the foreign policy decision of Japan was good. I found tons of people who like Koizumi, so the popularity ratings are real. They seem to be disconnected, however, from these other questions. And I think that the right strategy for Mr. Koizumi to consider is one that the Europeans - well, before the Iraq mess, what it was doing to us in trade of basically confronting and collaborating with the United States, demonstrated a sense of weight that Europe had, and the stock, Europe stock, in American eyes was clearly on the rise. I think it's strange that Japan - as I said, Ambassador Kato keeps saying that it's the time to be below the radar screen in Washington. It's crazy when the only highly visible thing that you can see Japan in the press for confronting the United States on is whaling.

Japan Should Be Perceived As a Strong Nation

I mean, if you looked at the cover of the *Wall Street Journal*, the *New York Times*, and the *Washington Post* around the

whaling conference, the stridency of the Japanese position was unbelievable. And then to see absence anywhere else is not a healthy situation. We need Japan to be perceived as a strong nation with interests that will collaborate with the United States, when it's in Japan's interest to do so. And those should come with terms, and the terms that you have are the ones that represent the strength and power of Japan. And I think that is something that, despite this ironic fact that Koizumi looks strong and lion-like, and has this popularity, and has George Bush coming over and is passing this legislation, I think that Japan's identity, particularly here in Washington, is radically low and is not necessarily healthy. There are a lot of other - we talked about style and decision-making, and I largely agree with Tanaka-san's discussion in these other areas of Koizumi.

I think the biggest question, as I look forward with the Japanese government and how it proceeds is: long-term, I think that Koizumi, to a certain degree, is playing with fire, in the sense that, to the degree that Self Defense Forces get over to something that is being described as a post-conflict arena. And I don't know after the U.N. disaster in Baghdad whether you can call it a post-conflict situation, but what I do worry about is it's very important for Mr. Koizumi to begin challenging Mr. Bush in a friendly and constructive way, because I think the Japanese public needs to see itself as a nation with weight and consequence in these important matters. I think Japan should revisit its previous - that it should be at the forefront of making the United Nations work. The United States won't do that.

We need Japan to do it, or we need Europe to do that. And Japan has been incredibly quiet in these important debates. And I

think that, if this does not happen, then those people who are euphoric and triumphalist about how close American and Japanese defense coordination will see a Japanese public eventually rise in reaction, where the legitimacy of future Japanese leaders is not determined by whether George Bush lets them into intelligence briefings. It's going to be determined by how anti-American they are. This is the blind spot that I think is facing both the United States and Japan. We need to create space in the relationship for Japan to become a more important and a more enhanced part of that partnership. I look at Koizumi, if you step away, as highly sycophantic and highly obsequious to American prerogatives; that American prerogatives are less predictable than they used to be, that that is not a good scenario for long-term U.S.-Japan relations. So I'll conclude there.

Q&A

John Ikenberry: Well, I think we've got some issues on the table. Professor Tanaka, do you want to respond just very briefly to maybe one provocation from either of our discussants? And then we'll open it up and you can respond to the others as we go forward.

Tanaka: Thank you very much for both your comments. As to Professor Calder's comments, I mostly agree, and then I think - well, I thought I had some difference from Professor Calder's view, but and then his positions are more or less similar. I realize that. For example, I said in my presentation that the centrality of the prime minister's residence is increasing, but I didn't say that they are becoming more resourceful. That's the reality of the problem. Mr. Fukuda is, in cooperation with Koizumi, trying to centralize and then organize. But then, in fact, quite a number of ministries, as Japanese

traditional ministries go, they don't listen very much.

And so, in order to create a more unified policy, I think there should be more resources at the center of Japanese decision-making. In that sense, the problem continues to be the same - so not much different under Mr. Koizumi's administration. And then another problem I probably failed to mention in my presentation is that, well - or the point that I didn't fully emphasize is that the prime minister, I think, like the president, is very busy. And the time that he can spend for foreign policy is very limited, and so if he is determined to do something using the bureaucratic apparatus maybe ministries may listen. But then, you know, unless he does, each ministry makes their autonomous decisions.

About Mr. Clemons' profound disagreement about my position on the substance. As I listen to his comments on the problems with Japanese foreign policy, I'm more than convinced that I'm right. Because what he said about the shortcomings about Japanese foreign policy has been the problems from, to me, time immemorial. And so Koizumi didn't change this, and so subsequently I think my position still stands.

Clemons: That's fair.

Ikenberry: Well, let's don't get too cozy now.

Clemons: No, we won't.

Ikenberry: Let's keep the debate going.

Questioner: I totally disagree on some of the points that you made. First, the fact that prior to 9/11 and prior to the Iraq War Japan was very United Nations-oriented and so illustriously active - and you have to

understand that these activities by Akashi and others within the context of the close U.S.-Japan cooperation – and, to that extent I think that our contribution and activities within the framework of the United Nations was possible. At 9/11 and the Iraq War, I think Koizumi did the right thing, that is, to side with the United States. And I think, to that extent, I think Professor Tanaka is absolutely right, that this is a Yoshida Doctrine Plus.

Japanese Government Has Been Vocal

The question is whether it's plus, plus, plus or plus, minus. And you have to understand that this is a continuation, not the cutting of the tradition. Number two, because of the fact that we sided with and supported President Bush, I think, in my view, and based upon my information from Ambassador Kato and others, that we have much more leeway in criticizing the United States government and suggesting some alternative methods of dealing with the United Nations.

At Crawford last May, I understand that Prime Minister Koizumi was quite vocal in criticizing the United States in a friendly way. That's exactly what you're saying. Actually, you sound like some of the Japanese press here who criticize Ambassador Kato and cause me to be quiet. But the truth of matter is, that behind the scenes, I think that the Japanese government has been more vocal, and because of the fact that we support the United States we have been much more effective in feeling freer to suggest more contributions to the United States, more alliances with the European nations, and that sort of thing.

Whether we are invisible here has a lot to do with our economic situation, and I completely agree with you that, first thing first,

we have to resurrect our economy. But, other than that, I totally disagree with you. Thank you very much.

Clemons: Because I don't know what occurs other than what they issued in the press on Mr. Koizumi having intelligence briefings, it was not clear to me, and it continues not to be clear to me, that Japan is weighing in those substantive ways, because I think it's important. You know, I'm not a critic of Japan broadly. I think that it's very much in America's interest for Japan to be perceived as strong as possible. I actually think that Japan's economy is far stronger and more durable than most critics argue that it is, but that the combination of this sort of Japan and its economic deathbed story, combined with, I think – maybe you are not out there pumping all of the points of disagreement, but I'm saying to you, in my view as a political observer in this case, it undermines, to some degree, Japan's interests by not finding some safe areas to show what the terms of your engagement on this war are. It would be far more in your interest to do that, and it would actually be in America's interest for you to do that.

Questioner: First of all, every time I hear about what Professor Tanaka is up to, I'm convinced he must have an identical twin somewhere because no man can be doing as many things as he appears to be doing at any one time.

The second thing I'd like to say is – and this kind of works a little bit off what Steve Clemons was talking about. And when I listened to Steve Clemons' comments, I was thinking, “So where's the problem?” You know, for the state department that's great, and everything is hunky-dory. But, in fact, we do see some reasons for concern, and I think – and I'd like to tie this, I think,

particularly to Japan's concern about North Korea, and I'm particularly interested in what Professor Tanaka thinks is the general mood in Tokyo over the North Korea threat. Because, certainly in the last half year or so, we've seen a lot of official pronouncements to the effect that Japan's support for the United States in Iraq and on other issues has something to do with concerns about the North Korean threat, and, again, what I'm interested to know is, is there a sense that you don't trust the United States to defend Japan if you don't make alliance contributions? Is it more an honorable sense of wanting to live up to your alliance obligations? Is that part of it? I'm just kind of curious what your sense of that is.

And I'm also interested in the reaction to this because, again, sort of working off what Steve Clemons was saying, certainly in Tokyo you sense a feeling, and there's always been this undercurrent, of Japan being the U.S. lapdog. What is it? *Puchi gaiko* I think is the phrase that comes out quite often. And you see that right now. I mean, to some extent, that's to be expected in a situation like this. You know, Japan - you might word it this way - Japan feels under threat. It has to do more to make sure the alliance is solid, but, as a result, to critics it appears that Japan is kind of giving up on its own national interests, giving up on its own foreign policy. So I'm curious how you might respond to or what sort of insights you might share on Japan's concerns about North Korea. How much of an imminent threat do you feel, and how much is that driving Koizumi's foreign policy?

Tanaka: About this, Japan's view of North Korea. Of course I don't know what the real logic of Mr. Koizumi's support is, but my sense is that he - well, on the one hand, I think there may be some fear of the danger from North Korea that was behind his

decision to support the United States. But I think, more importantly, it's not much more to do with distrust on the U.S. or the fear that U.S. might not defend Japan if North Korea erupts and attacks Japan. But rather, I think the basic concerns of Japanese - many Japanese I think, including, I think, Koizumi and the foreign ministry and others - is that peaceful resolution of the North Korean Peninsula is essential. And if Japan - I think it's a judgment - is to have credibility to give Japan's opinion of the desirability of peaceful resolution in the Korean Peninsula, then it is better for the Japanese to stand up with the U.S. in other areas.

And so I think, as Mr. Clemons said, in order to give Japan's view a more credible issue, more critical to Japan, Koizumi, I believe, felt it was in Japan's national interest to support the U.S. action in Iraq, even though a majority of the Japanese dislike the Iraq War.

Ikenberry: And one could say that the South Korean government is making the same calculation, aren't they? We will support in whatever way necessary, up to the minimal amount necessary, to position themselves in a way so that they have some voice over U.S. policy towards North Korea and hopefully gain some voice over it - the same kind of logic. I was wondering, Steve, how do you respond to that? That is a Japanese national interest calculation that maybe they are going to get something in return.

Clemons: I think this is, again - Agawa-san was talking about things that are not known, but one of the areas that's not broadly recognized that I think is absolutely critical in this debate is that we apparently now have isotope readings showing North Korea's reprocessing. This was the line in

the sand for the Clinton administration and every other administration for strong, invasive, confrontational action if this happened. And now, in this climate, just coming back from Japan and talking to other friends, both in the press, they are shocked that there's very little coverage paid to this. My Japanese friends are, in a way, outraged by the lack of attention. I thought that North Korea was a much more serious problem than Iraq.

President Bush acknowledged that in his State of the Union address, and I worried about the mystique of American power and the confines and limits of that being so evident after an Iraq engagement, which it now turns out it is – that this very much limits our hands and our ability to confront North Korea from a position of greater strength. And I think the Japanese ironically, through the strong support of Bush on the Iraq War, have undermined their interest because we are in a weaker position to confront North Korea today.

Calder: Just a contrasting perspective in terms of the tactics that Japan should pursue. I think many of us disagree with certain aspects of the lines of administration policy, but the broad objectives ultimately, both with respect to Korea and in the Middle East, it seems to me, ultimately serve Japanese interests quite strongly. Namely, dealing in North Korea with the nuclear threat; of course, there's the tactical issue of how overtly one wants to confront the North. But in the Middle East, the whole question of Iraq, of neutralizing the Iraq – the sort of force that they play, also the political, economic implications of an Iraq which is oriented toward the West in terms of OPEC, in terms of the energy equation.

Ultimately, in the long run, especially if you think about how much and how rapidly East Asia's interdependence with the Middle East is going to deepen in the coming decade – of course, if it doesn't work out, if this just produces an inflamed Middle East that's not stable, that's separate. But if the fundamental notion of changing the regime in Iraq – and I don't like the way it was done, many of us don't – but in terms of the ultimate end, of a change in the regime there and the changing dynamics in the Middle East that would result from that, it seems to me that energy consumers throughout the world probably will benefit from that in the long run. They don't want to have their fingerprints on it, but they'll benefit. And it's probably better for them to be out of the crossfire and to be quiet in their diplomacy, rather than to side with the French.

Ikenberry: Let's take a question or two on Iraq, U.S.-Japan-Iraq, that issue we've been talking about here. Anybody on that question?

Questioner: I'd just like to get back to the Japanese public for a minute. And, Professor Tanaka, do you think that Koizumi is going to suffer any real political fallout from sending troops to Iraq and, I mean, even just 50 troops – obviously if anything happens to them that would be really something. But just that it's yet a further step away from Japan's constitution, in many people's view, and is he going to suffer at all from this? Thank you.

Tanaka: I think if he decides to send troops in Iraq, and if there are casualties, victims, then that will increase criticism against Koizumi for his decision to send troops to areas of the mess which was originally created – in the Japanese view, the viewpoint of the many Japanese public – by the

decision of the United States. So I think his popularity ratings would decline if that happens. But then I think the dispatch itself is not, in my view, a constitutional issue. It's legalized by the law, and then, if something happens and there are victims, that's not because of the Japanese violation of the Japanese constitution, it's because of the conditions there. But, I think whether you agree with the war against Iraq that started in March – but to many, I think, Japanese too, the disability of Iraq is in Japan's national interest as Kent mentioned.

Also, in a more broad humanitarian viewpoint, with which many Japanese would agree, it is quite important to reconstruct Iraq. And so, if Mr. Koizumi decides to send troops there, and if he's convinced of his decision, then he could risk, I think, the decline of popularity. I think Koizumi has experienced at least several cases of declining popularity. You know, first his popularity rating declined about 20 percent when he sacked Tanaka Makiko. And his popularity declined about 10 percent when he agreed with Mr. Bush in supporting the Iraq War. But then his popularity rating came back, and so I don't believe he's the sort of person that doesn't do some of the things simply because of the possible decline of popularity.

Ikenberry: Yes, the gentleman over here. We'll take about three questions.

Questioner: I want to make two points. First, I was very glad when Steve mentioned three Japanese names who had three played a prominent role. Now, let me add two more international bodies which have been aided by Japanese from the very beginning, up until now. One is the Asian Development Bank in Manila, the other is MIGA, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, here in Washington, D.C., and the

World Bank. The second point will be quite contradictory to what I just said, and this is for Mr. Tanaka and Kent. That is, what's wrong with being reactive? Well, things were quite different during the Cold War period, but since the end of Cold War, which government has not been reactive?

The current U.S. administration, U.S. invasion in Iraq, I think, happened in response to what happened on September the 11th, 2001. The Middle East peace process road-map was devised in reaction to events on the ground in the region. The only exception I can think of is when there was one government who exhibited and demonstrated clever, amazing creativity and proactiveness. It was the government of Saddam Hussein when it invaded Kuwait in August 1990. So my proposal is, let's go back to the original Yoshida Doctrine and let the United States worry about world affairs. Let them be world policemen, and we go back to the checkbook diplomacy. Later in Madrid this month, why don't we pledge \$5 billion dollars, which will please U.S. policy-makers? I appreciate your comments.

Ikenberry: We'll hold that. A couple more questions, one over here, then one in the back, and then we'll open it up.

Questioner: I have a question regarding the future scenario. Professor Tanaka laid out a very beautiful, clear cut anatomy of Koizumi diplomacy, and then, based on that analysis, what kind of scenario would you have in mind in which Japan will someday start thinking about the long-term vision or a long-term scenario? And then what kind of process do you think will put pressure on Japanese political leaders to think in those terms? I mean, do we have to just wait for enlightened political leaders, which seem to be a scarce resource, according to some

critics? Or do you think forces of economics or the security crisis – what kind of forces, if any, would change Japan's course? Thank you.

Ikenberry: One more question, back here.

Questioner: I would like to ask Mr. Clemons, is it really in Japan's national interest to be visible in the global arena? Do we really want to pursue a bigger role now? With this declining economy – the lost decade, is it called – would we not want to be a little more isolationist as a Japanese population?

Ikenberry: Okay, why don't we open it up.

Tanaka: Well, first, what's wrong with reactivity? Nothing. Nothing's wrong. In my presentation, I didn't say it's wrong. I said it is regarded by Professor Calder and others as an academic analysis, that Japanese tend to be reactive. And so I simply examine whether this tendency continues, and then Koizumi continues to be – continues the Japanese tradition, and he's only good at it. That's good. If you are reactive, you have to be good at it. And so that's my point. And I think the point about a future scenario, well, first, despite whatever I said, I think long-term planning is very difficult. You know, as Miyazawa-san said, that the proactive diplomacy is very few and sometimes like Saddam, so long-term planning is very difficult.

Japanese Should Not Be Ashamed of Lack of Long-term Planning

And so I think Japanese should not be particularly ashamed of being not in a position of long-term planning. Many countries don't have long-term planning. But, as a citizen of Japan, I feel it is a good thing if we have long-term planning, and for that

reason, assuming that the administration of Koizumi continues – as I do repeat what I said – I would really like the prime minister to give some time to the long-term planning and preparations. And under the current Japanese system, we're very weak in the center. Unless the prime minister is really determined, you cannot pursue long-term planning. I think that's my hope.

Ikenberry: Kent or Steve.

Calder: A qualification, I think, needs to be made to what Professor Tanaka said. Generally speaking, yes, reactive policies, particularly for a nation like Japan that doesn't need, in all circumstances, to be the leader – in such circumstances, it makes sense to be reactive. Where it doesn't is where the leader doesn't serve your interests, and I don't think in either of the cases before us here, Iraq or Korea, that is the case. But there have been important instances where it was not true.

For example, finance and the configuration of the international financial system: I don't think either perfectly serve Japan's interests or Asia's interests. It has over half of the world's reserves. If we have stability in the international exchange markets, fine. But if the United States, for example, purposely depreciates the dollar in the reserves that the other nations have, or if we get instability as we had in 1997, then that system and reaction doesn't serve the interests, and neither does reactive diplomacy. One other point: you said, “Aren't all nations reactive?” To some extent, I think that's true. That's an important observation about the international system today. It's volatile.

It's hard for decision makers, especially in areas like finance, to be ahead of events, to be proactive. Being reactive is natural. A political fragmentation in the major nations

also creates that tendency. Some nations are more so than others. The strong executive presidency nations. Well, France may be more proactive than the United States occasionally, but the U.S. and France, to cite two, tend to be proactive. And, of course, they get themselves in trouble occasionally as a result. So broadly, yes, it's not so bad to be reactive, but it depends on the circumstance.

Japan Should Be Visible and Engaged in World Issues

Clemons: On the last point: I feel that nations need to feel like nations, and I think that it's very much in Japan's national interests and American national interests for Japan to be visible, engaged and fighting for a share of the control of the helm over the great global governance debates today. I think that Mr. Agawa, to come back to him, may be arguing that that's going on. I don't think it's very visible. I've seen Japan far more visibly engaged in that process in the past than we've seen now.

One of the things I'm struggling with – I'm going to overstate it for effect, and I'm not sure I really agree with what I'm going to say – is that I think the United States is not a good exporter of our kind of democracy or of a shareholder view of democracy. If you look at Europe – not that it's necessarily exported, and you can certainly find cases where I'm clearly wrong – I think the question of nation-building and the question of building a society where there's greater shareholder or stakeholder culture is exactly what Iraq needs, what most Middle Eastern states need, and what African states need.

And, you know, I happen to think that Japan and some European allies of ours have greater competencies in these areas

than the United States does, that the winner-takes-all sort of style of democracy we have is a really lousy example for building civil society or trying to set up institutions within a country where you get the politics right. I think our kind of democracy maybe matures too – it's the wrong word, but it's too far developed. It's sort of the crack cocaine of democracies. It's very hard to jump from the developing world. I would like to see Japan compete with the United States in a friendly and constructive way and say, you know, in Iraq, you guys get the military stuff done. Rather than, I think, engaging in what – I mean, I don't want to disparage what Mr. Koizumi is doing from a psychological, national viewpoint, in terms of the nation trying to put military officials abroad or defense forces abroad, but that, you know, honestly, it's trivial.

It's a substantively trivial contribution. If you want to make a contribution that matters, it's not just what Mike said on checkbook diplomacy. You need those trappings of civil society, of a court system, of thinking through the many other dimensions. And competency-building in that area, which the United States is not good at, would be such an enormous way for Japan to find its role and weight and identity in these important intractable problems. And so, I mean, I have great respect for Tanaka-san's view and I agree with much of it. What I'm trying to put on the table today is, let's not be too satisfied with the lousy performance and the under-performing assets of both Japan, Europe and the United States because, in my view, the world is not wired very well, and it deserves better in terms of the competency-building that we can do. And for us to sit back and say it's all going great because U.S.-Japan relations have never been better seems to me to be intellectually lazy.

Ikenberry: Can I just ask a question that follows on that to Professor Tanaka? Wouldn't you agree that Tokyo lost an opportunity in this last eight-month crisis, really beginning with the debate last December in the U.N., to really speak forcefully on the global stage about the U.N.? As Steve said, there is a kind of tradition of Japanese attention to the United Nations and being a kind of - talking about its enhanced role, not just in peacekeeping. But it fits with the notion of a civilian great power, that it's part of building structures that, in the long-term, Japan needs because America, as the bilateral relationship, is fine, but it's this larger web of institutions centered on the United Nations that Japan has a 50-year interest in developing.

And an opportunity came along in the last sequence of crisis and debate where your leaders could have spoken more forcefully about the centrality of the U.N. on uses of force, weapons of mass destruction, Article 51 and the rest.

Tanaka: Thank you. I think there are problems of constraints on nations. The biggest constraint that all nations in the world are now facing is the United States. There are things that you cannot control, and often, I think, one of the biggest for many countries in the world is U.S. domestic politics. The U.S. decision of war and peace you cannot control, or you can rarely control. We hope we can control it, but then the fact of the matter is that it's very hard to control the U.S. It is hard to influence the U.S. decision from our side. I think that's the difficulty facing not just Japan, French, Brits, others; all are facing this uncontrollable superpower. Hopefully, uncontrollable, but responsible.

I think the last several months from October last year to March - I think I might, again,

agree with some of you that Japan might have lost the opportunities. But I think - well, in retrospect, the Japanese diplomacy might have made two misjudgments. One misjudgment was the tenacity and rigidity of Jacques Chirac. Many of us think, me included and others, that the French president could have made a deal in the final moments in saving the United Nations, but he didn't. And so, that's one mistake that the Japanese diplomacy could not anticipate. And the second misjudgment that the Japanese diplomacy might have is the failure to understand how clumsy the U.S. diplomacy could be with respect to Europe. From January to February to March, you know, in retrospect, the U.S. made such a mess in forging friendships in Europe. That's just clumsiness.

We cannot control U.S. war and peace decisions. We cannot, again, control the clumsiness of the superpower's diplomacy. And so, we might have lost the opportunities, mainly because of these two misjudgements.

Questioner: I am from the Embassy of Japan. Also, I'm a former staff of the Koizumi administration, actually of the prime minister's office. So, I enjoy very much the discussion, and I sort of, in retrospect, I enjoy very much what I experienced in that administration. My question, unlike my senior colleagues, is more of a theoretical question. What I missed during the discussion was that the sort of large trend among the general public of theology against international military contribution - I think that many of us probably would have thought it quite unimaginable to realize those international military contributions that we are trying to make right now in Iraq, say 10 years ago.

So I think that the whole ongoing sort of a long trend, or tsunami, I should say, of sort of a trend of general public allows, actually, Prime Minister Koizumi to make various decisions with regard to international contributions. And I would just appreciate everybody's comment on that sort of inference or impact of the general public trend.

Japanese Reluctant to Use Military

Tanaka: I think there is a reluctance in anything military in the Japanese public. But I think the public's understanding of the necessity of participating in international humanitarian contributions have progressed. The experiences in Cambodia and others have been showing to the Japanese public that it is a good thing to do that. And, incidentally I think, as Steven said, that what the Japanese could do is to give some alternative models of development, more alternative models of introducing democracies to countries in the developing world. But then I think the difficulty is that, because of their reluctance to sending troops in areas that are dangerous, that creates the impression that the Japanese are

really reluctant to send anybody to dangerous places. But, you know, if you really would like to create democracy or introduce Japanese-style democracy, sometimes you have to go to areas, dangerous places.

And so that requires, I think, the understanding of the public. But, I think one country that the Japanese should be proud of is Cambodia. Cambodia became quite invisible on the world scene, and its democracy proceeds slowly, but steadily. And the last general election was conducted more or less peacefully and more or less fairly, and then the Japanese have been contributing in sending specialists, in writing civil code and criminal code, and introducing legal systems in the countries and in Cambodia. And so I think credit might be given to the Japanese foreign ministry and other agencies in Japan in doing that in Cambodia.

Ikenberry: Well, on that note, join with me in thanking our panelists for a terrific session.

(End)

About the Panelists

Main Speaker

Dr. Tanaka Akihiko is Professor of International Politics and is currently the Director of the Institute of Oriental Culture at the University of Tokyo. He has also been a member of various advisory organizations such as the East Asia Vision Group, the Asia-Europe Vision Group, and the Council on Japan-U.S. Economic Relations. Professor Tanaka was an Ushiba Fellow, a recipient of the Suntory Academic Prize (for *Atarashii chusei*), and a recipient of the Yomiuri Yoshino Sakuzo Prize (for *Wado Poritikusu*). Professor Tanaka obtained his B.A. at the University of Tokyo and his Ph.D in political science at MIT. He is the author of numerous books and articles in Japanese and English, including *Fukuzatsusei no sekai: tero no seiki to Nihon* (The World of Complexity: Japan and the Century of Terrorism, 2003), *The New Middle Ages: The World System in the 21st Century* (2002), and *Wado Poritikusu: gurobarizeshon no naka no Nihon gaiko* (World Politics: Japanese Diplomacy under Globalization, 2000).

Discussants

Dr. Kent Calder is the Director of the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies and is Edwin O. Reischauer Professor of East Asian Studies at the School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University. He has recently served as special advisor to two U.S. Ambassadors to Japan, as Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and for twenty years (1983-2003) as a faculty member of Princeton University. Previous to Princeton, Professor Calder was executive director of the Harvard University Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, and lecturer on government at Harvard. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard. Professor Calder is the author of *Crisis and Compensation*, recipient of the 1990 Arisawa and Ohira Prizes, *Pacific Defense*, recipient of the 1997 Mainichi Asia-Pacific Prize, and *Strategic Capitalism*, as well as co-author or editor of several other works.

Mr. Steven Clemons is Executive Vice President of the New America Foundation. Previously he served as executive vice president of the Economic Strategy Institute and senior policy advisor for economic and international affairs to U.S. Senator Jeff Bingaman. Mr. Clemons was also the first executive director of the Nixon Center, a public policy center linked to the Richard Nixon Library. In addition, he was executive director of the Japan America Society of Southern California, and in 1983 he co-founded the Japan Policy Research Institute with Asia specialist Chalmers Johnson. Mr. Clemons received a B.A. and M.A. from the University of California, Los Angeles. He writes and speaks frequently on domestic and international economic policy matters, and on U.S.-Japan and Asia Pacific economic and security issues. His articles have appeared in the *South China Morning Post*, *The Japan Times*, and *The New York Times*, among others.

Moderator

Dr. G. John Ikenberry is the Peter F. Krogh Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice at Georgetown University. In addition, he was a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. Professor Ikenberry is the author of numerous publications, including *State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy* (2002), *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (2000), and *Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government* (1988).