

# Indonesia and the War on Terror in Southeast Asia

by  
**Dr. Rizal Sukma**

**Rizal Sukma:** Thank you very much, Professor Ikenberry. First of all, let me thank the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA for inviting me to this distinguished forum.

The topic that I would like to speak about, I think, is not much new, because it's been quite well-reported by a lot of media. But to give you the sense of the extent of the problem of terrorism in the region, maybe I should begin, because I'm giving this talk to you, as you know, with a story. Some of you, I believe, have already heard this story: when the three heads of states of Southeast Asian countries, the Philippine President Arroyo and Malaysian Prime Minister at the time, Mahathir, and also Indonesia's President Megawati, decided to seek counsel and advice from God in order to deal with terrorism.

So, they were each given an opportunity to ask only one question, so the first turn was given to Prime Minister Mahathir, and then he asked God, "How long does it take for Malaysia before we'd be able to get rid of these terrorists?" And God looked at Mahathir and He said, "One or two years, because you had done well and the domestic environment is quite good in order to deal with it." But Mahathir felt that two years is quite long, and then he cried and left.

And then Arroyo was also given the same opportunity and she asked the same question: "How long will it take for the Philippines to get rid of this terrorism problem?" And God said: "Five years, because you are really in a mess and your economy is not

very good," and so on and so on. Of course, Arroyo was very sad because five years is quite a long time, so she cried and left.

And then President Megawati also asked the same question: "God, how long does it take for us, Indonesia, to get rid of this terrorist problem?" God look at her, cried and left.

So the problem is very serious. Let me begin with - this is a serious one now - Indonesia's election, after September 11; there has been a lot of disappointment, not only here in the U.S. but also around the regions, also in some parts of Indonesia's circles, about the confusing and rather puzzling direction in Asia to the event, to the tragic event of September 11.

## Indonesian Reactions to 9/11

Of course, a few hours after, many of us in Indonesia saw what happened on TV, and the stream of sympathy was also expressed, and also the government basically conveyed all this shared grief with the American people and government about what happened on that day. But you know, not long after that, two or three types of responses emerged in the country. One, of course, is quite visible: the degree of skepticism, and all those conspiracy theories were circulated in the country.

This was not unique to Indonesia, I believe, because we can also find the same conspiracy thinking circulated in other parts of Southeast Asia. There was this great dis-

trust of the explanation given by the American government about what happened, and then after the U.S. retaliated against Afghanistan and al Qaeda in that country, this skepticism grew stronger. And there was that perception that the war on terror that is being waged by the American government and his allies was, in fact, a war on Islam. So because of that perception, skepticism about the real perpetrators of the terrorist attack in New York and Washington was really widespread at that time.

The second type of response was, basically, a very strong sense of denial, and this actually was quite evident around and in the government circle. We are all familiar with all those stupid statements made by some politicians and leaders in Indonesia, including our vice president, when he expressed his distrust about what really happened on that day. That denial was also accompanied by the third type of the response from the society, which is “couldn’t care less,” basically because of all the problems that Indonesians are facing at the time and also until today. And then, usually among the ordinary Indonesians, doubt is also very strong about what really happened on that day and how that might have an impact on the world, and especially on Indonesia and U.S. relations.

Some people in the government clearly understood the problem and then also realized the impact it might have on Indonesia and also Indonesian relations with the U.S. and with the outside world. But again, those within the administration realized that the problem was caught up in the domestic reaction and domestic opinions at the time, so that’s why we witnessed a lot of confusion and also a puzzling response from different leaders making different statements of how Indonesia should respond to the September 11 tragedy.

All these reactions, in my view, should be, especially before Bali, either skepticism, denial or doubt, should be understood in the context of desperate attempts by these groups to save whatever was left of the reform movement in May 1998. And I think this goes both for the secular pro-democracy forces, NGOs and secret society groups, and also for Muslim groups in the country.

NGOs were quite worried at the time that the war on terror and also that the Indonesian government’s initial reaction to it would bring back this authoritarianism. They were quite worried that the government, the military and the police would seize that opportunity to reintroduce the authoritarian system in the country.

Some of the policies taken by the government at the time did give some kind of additional factors that raised the suspicions and beliefs on the part of many NGOs and civil society groups. For example, when the first draft of the anti-terrorism bill was announced, and then there were some provisions that would give more power to the intelligence and also to the police in trying to root out the terrorist network in the country, that of course brought back the memory of a very strong authoritarian state among NGOs in Indonesia.

And then after that, the government tried to strengthen the military again; that would create more fear and more suspicions on the part of non-governmental organizations in the country. And the latest move by the government, when they wanted to expand the network of the intelligence in the country, has also been taken as a sign that the government is really trying to use the issue of terrorism in order to make a comeback in the country.

## **Muslim Groups Feared Renewal of Suppression after 9/11**

For the Muslim groups, I think there was a fear of being suppressed and sidelined again after September 11. This response should also be understood from the psychology of living under an authoritarian regime for more than four decades, during which many Muslim groups were banned from participating in the political process. Of course, the radical groups have different agendas in trying to put pressure on the government, not to follow the trend to really make anti-terrorism the main priority in policy, because since the fall of Suharto's regime in 1998, these groups have tried to expand their space for existence and also influence in the political process. And that, actually, is quite evident with the proliferation of many radical groups since May 1998.

The government was caught in the middle and was confused in a way, how to react and how to respond to this problem, so that's why, at the time – maybe some of you still remember – President Megawati gave promises in Washington, and also gave a speech in New York, but back home she had to accommodate the domestic reaction by taking a more critical stance on U.S. policy against terror, especially the U.S. policy in Afghanistan.

### **Megawati Government Does Not Have Islamic Credentials**

Two factors, I think, can explain why the government was confused at the time. One, I think, was because of the nature of the Megawati government, which has no Islamic credentials at all, so she really did not know how to relate to the Muslim groups who were already on the streets protesting the U.S. attack on Afghanistan. In

fact, there was no attempt on her part to try to solicit the support from mainstream Islamic organizations and their leaders at the time, so she basically is quite fragile to the pressure from the Islamic groups because of her lack of credentials in the eyes of many Islamic groups.

The second factor, I think, is because of the nature of the highly competitive domestic politics following the fall of the authoritarian regime in May 1998. Megawati's party realized that they couldn't hold on to power with all the support from some Islamic political parties as well. So that actually prevented her from taking a very clear stance on this issue.

In such a domestic context and circumstances, I think we can explain why many Indonesians and many Muslim groups are also quite skeptical about the nature of domestic terrorism, especially on the existence of the Jemaah Islamiyah following the arrest of a number of members of jihad in Singapore in December 2001, because many thought that was an attempt also by Singapore and some other countries to put pressure on Indonesia to follow the pressure, and also to follow the trend to combat terrorism worldwide.

This kind of attitude changed when the terrorists in Indonesia attacked Bali on the 12<sup>th</sup> of October, 2002, but not with dramatic skill. There was change, but I don't think that change was really dramatic, so I'm not really sure whether we can call that a wake-up call for Indonesia's government and Indonesia as a whole, because it is rather lukewarm, it is like when you don't have enough sleep, and then when you hear the alarm clock at four o'clock or five o'clock, you usually tend to turn it off again and then try to wake later. That's what basically happened after Bali, until another terrorist

attack hit Indonesia with a bombing at the Marriott Hotel.

### **Changing Indonesian Views Toward the Government**

But some changes can actually be noted. The government has more support compared to before October 12, the Bali bombing, in combating terrorism in the country. Many of them actually understood what impact that attack in Bali might have on Indonesia, especially on Indonesia's economic recovery and Indonesia's stability in times of crisis. And the Bali attack also provided very clear evidence of the existence of the "home-grown" terrorists in the country, but support from moderate Islamic groups had been more visible before the Bali attack.

I still remember when the U.S. attacked Afghanistan, the whole public discourse in the country was hijacked by the radical Islamic groups, where you can basically see their demonstrations on a daily basis on CNN and other channels, and not many voices were heard or expressed by moderate Islamic groups at the time. But that changed after the Bali bombing, where many moderate Islamic groups filled in the vacuum that was exploited by the radicals before, especially after the Iraq war.

So all the peaceful demonstrations that we saw during that period were basically organized by these moderate Islamic groups, so that's why it's more peaceful, more civilized, compared to the previous demonstrations organized by the radical Islamic groups, such as the last Laskar Jihad, the Islamic Defenders' Front, and so on.

When this mainstream Islamic group became aware that they needed to fill in the vacuum in order to save the faith of Indo-

nesia's Islam, and there was no room whatsoever for radicals to exploit that anymore, that's why during that time we really didn't see a lot of demonstrations. And in fact, I called one of the leaders in the mainstream Islamic groups and the moderate groups; I felt obliged to organize the demonstration because one of the *New York Times* journalists asked then, "Look, we have 500,000 in London, 300,000 in France, in Germany, but in Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world, we haven't seen any demonstrations. What's wrong with you guys?" And then some Indonesians felt compelled to organize a peaceful demonstration, at least for one day. And in fact, they were tired, they told me that, because Jakarta is too hot, so it's not too easy to organize large demonstrations.

The police have been quite good and remarkable in the Bali investigations and I think by any standard, we should really appreciate what they have uncovered. Thanks also to the support from the Australian Federal Police, they could really root out at least a significant part of the network of the Jemaah Islamiyah in the country.

However, problems remain. One, counter-terrorism. Now, I think all these initiatives, and also an attempt to really eradicate the terrorist groups are, in my view, detached from the wider political context. It has become mainly police work or even intelligence work. In fact, if we are to succeed in this work, the whole policy should get continuous support from mainstream Muslim organizations, because there is this dimension, the racist dimension, because those terrorists basically justified their evil acts in terms of religion.

## **Megawati's Government Should Seek Support from Mainstream Muslim Organizations**

And here, I think, not enough work is done by Megawati's government in order to get the continuous support from the mainstream Muslim organizations, and in fact, many of them, I believe, ignored or, at least, do not have knowledge about the extent of the terrorist network in the country because the police have never shared that with them. This is not the habit yet in Indonesia that the government authorities release, like white papers, in order to explain what they have done, what they have achieved so far. So, even many educated elites, let alone ordinary Indonesians, understand the problem through scattered information, through the newspapers, and so on.

But even though some advice has been given to the government to release a white paper on the Bali bombing and also on the terrorist network in the country, but there has been no follow-up whatsoever, I don't understand why; maybe government institutions are not in the habit yet to explain to the public what they are for and what they're doing. That's part of the unfinished democratic consolidation in the country. While on the other hand, the support, again I should stress, from the mainstream Muslim groups, is crucial in the war against terror in the country.

Despite the remarkable achievement of the Bali investigation, of course the police lack professionalism, and the capacity to counter terrorism is still weak, in addition to public relations, as I mentioned earlier. I think there is no attempt to involve the people more in this attempt to root out the terrorist network in the country. And in fact, some of the police work is really clumsy, which can also be understood because of the

nature of the problem. In some cases, usually the police will make arrests, but the way they arrest the suspect is like kidnapping, and then they send a letter of arrest or letter of warning, like three or four days later, to the family of the suspect.

That brings back old memories about the authoritarian ways of dealing with problems in the country, not to mention also the very high public distrust of the law enforcement and judicial institutions in the country. So the police, in my view, really have and are having a hard time getting support from the public. Because the legal institutions are also weak, that can really be seen from how the proceedings outside of Bali, the legal process, has been conducted – and law enforcement has always been a problem in Indonesia.

Looking ahead during this year of elections, because we are going to have the three elections: in April for the parliament, in July for the presidential elections, and then in September for the runner up, if no candidate wins in the first round. How will the issue of counter-terrorism be placed in the agenda? This issue will be low, not many people pay attention any more, because everybody is busy trying to face the election.

Elections in Indonesia since 1999 have become more difficult to do, because in the past Suharto, or even the ruling party, knew exactly what percentage they would get before the election, down to 90.21; but now it's hard, they had to convince the voters. So, in that context, we are moving closer to the U.S. system. Even more difficult, usually around 120 to 140 million people will vote, and this is really a direct vote – and then it's hard to convince 145 million people to vote for you.

### **Presidential Election Will Decrease Attention to Counter-terrorism Agenda**

So I think this election will bring, will push the counter-terrorism agenda even lower in the national priorities of each leader, not to mention that this is a hard issue nobody wants to touch when they need the support of all groups in the country. So that, I think, will even put more pressure on the police, who are already in a hard place at the moment, where the government basically leaves the police alone in dealing with this problem; so if they succeed they can get the credit, but if they fail, the police cannot blame not the government. I think there is that attitude on the part of the current government.

The credibility of the current non-theocratic state will also be put into question if the election fails to really consolidate democracy and also restore the economy and provide jobs for more than 40 million people at the moment. So in that context, the focus on the strengthening of the government institution, on the strengthening of the democratic consolidations, and also in reforming the legal and law enforcement agencies, become imperative. Otherwise, the ideology of radical Islam will gain more and more popularity if the government fails to deliver the political and economic promises after the election in 2004.

Let me move briefly before I conclude on the state of the Asian war on terror, ASEAN cooperation, and also how Indonesia actually contributes to that. I'm one of those who's quite pessimistic about ASEAN. The cooperation in this counter-terrorism has been constrained, like in cooperation by this notion of the very sacred term called non-intervention. And I think non-interference has blocked the ability of ASEAN to move beyond, I mean, issuing

treaties, decrees, accords and what have you. We're good at that. If you look at the ASEAN website, there are so many; even in 1992, we issued declarations to combat terrorism and trans-national crime, and also we issued agreements to deal with hate and other environmental problems. But until today, we're still talking about the same things because of non-implementation whatsoever.

### **ASEAN Cooperation Stumbling Block to Wider Counter-terrorism Cooperation**

So this nature of ASEAN cooperation is really a stumbling block to wider and deeper cooperation in combating terrorism at the regional level. The cooperation has not gone beyond information sharing, intelligence sharing – which in ways has been quite good because of the intelligence sharing, and then some of the top terrorists in Southeast Asia have been arrested, like this Singaporean terrorist who was arrested because of the information by Singaporean authorities, and so on. But it has also some drawbacks, like when Indonesian security agents became quite upset when they didn't know a thing about the arrest of Hambali in Thailand.

So, because of all these problems, Indonesia, I think, did try to rectify the problem when we, in December last year, proposed that ASEAN be transformed into the security community which gives more focus on cooperation on trans-boundary threats, especially on terrorism and the possibility of maritime cooperation in dealing with the maritime terrorism. Because we believe that we should also pay more attention to maritime terrorism, because this area is quite vulnerable. Until today, not enough attention has been paid to this possibility. This idea of an ASEAN security committee was proposed by Indonesia in

order also to bring ASEAN cooperation in the political and security arena in a more coherent framework.

But again, as agreed in Bali, this proposal only received very vague support from some Asian colleagues, and is still in a very infant stage. If you read the Bali declaration, not much is there because it still needs to be spelled out into a concrete plan of action in which I'm personally also involved in trying to make the plan of action, so that ASEAN can really move beyond the current habit of issuing concord agreements and joint declarations, and move beyond information sharing or intelligence sharing as the key elements in the regional cooperation in combating terrorism.

Despite this initiative, I think what happens at the ASEAN level at the moment clearly shows that national initiatives still are more important in dealing with this problem, because it's not easy, even though the nature of the terrorist threat in Southeast Asia is also trans-national in a way; but again, national initiatives and national efforts to deal with this are really paramount. The importance of it should be really paid attention to so that at a wider level it can really have a significant impact on the overall ASEAN resolve with this problem.

**U.S. Should Avoid Impression that Terrorism Is Only Defining Factor in U.S. Policy toward Southeast Asia**

Finally, what the U.S. can do to help Indonesia and also other countries in the regions to deal more effectively with the problem is to avoid the impression that terrorism is the only defining factor in U.S. policy or in this area. That will clearly make it imperative for the U.S. to help to facilitate democratic consolidation in the country, because I do believe that if the current non-theocratic

state system or non-theocratic political and economic system clearly shows benefits to many Indonesians, the idea of radical Islam would not be attractive anymore.

So in addition to dealing directly with this growing radical Islam in Indonesia, at the same time it is also imperative for us to show the current system is working; the current system can deliver an alternative world view to the one that is being offered by the radical Islamic group. And second, of course, it's also important for Indonesia's friends, especially the U.S., to encourage economic growth in the country and help with the education system.

I do believe that education is one area where the U.S. can play really a helpful role, as has been demonstrated by the promise of President George Bush when he was in Bali, to help with the education system. But again, I think it is imperative for us not to really tie this into only the terrorism problem, because we have to approach the problem in a much wider context, rather than focus on only one issue, because that will not be very helpful, especially for both the government in Indonesia and also for the mainstream moderate Muslim organizations in dealing with the problem.

So I think I shall shut up. I welcome all questions beyond the issue of Indonesia and terrorism that I just mentioned. So, I think we can have a more lively discussion afterwards if you also ask questions beyond the topic that was assigned to me. Thank you very much.

**Osman Bakar:** It's nice to be here today and to be a respondent to Dr. Rizal. He has presented his informative and enlightened presentation and, well, what I intend to do here is to respond to that presentation.

To those of you who don't know, I come from Malaysia and Dr. Rizal is from Indonesia. Malaysians regard Indonesians as our big brothers. There is a saying, that "When your big brother speaks, the younger brother should keep silent."

But anyway, since we are talking about something serious today, I hope the elder brother doesn't mind here, the younger brother wants to say something.

Having listened to his presentation, I just want to take up one point of interest. I really do not intend to dispute what he has said, but I want to say more about his last point – the issue of effectiveness, as where are we in this war in Southeast Asia, the so-called terror war.

Now, first of all, there is a feeling in the countries in the region that the momentum in the war has tilted in the favor of intelligence operations in the countries, that the security imperatives of the countries concerned are gaining the momentum. Certainly, Singapore thinks that it has crippled the JI, and Malaysia with a lot of arrests of both JI and KMM feel that they have the upper hand, and also the feeling in Indonesia that things are moving, especially after Bali. But there is the perception of critics on this; I would like to point out that it's the difference of how you perceived the war, what kind of war is to be fought. If it's just a concern of security, maybe a better grade can be given to the different countries. But it's not just a matter of arresting people, putting them in jail, bringing them to court. It's much wider, much broader: this is an ideological war.

### **War Against Terrorism Will Not Be Short**

Now, a war as far as the other side, regarding the militant groups, the radical groups, is a question of war defending certain ideological positions in relation to Islam. I think that is important, that gives, in a sense, the defining character of that war. This is not going to be a short war, even if a lot of suspected militants have been arrested. I think this is an important point.

In assessing the phase of the war, what about the dimension, the non-security dimension of the war, how have the various countries in the region been? I would say, much worse than in the field of security. But very interestingly, even though in terms of security, Indonesia seemed to be doing less, is worse than Malaysia and Singapore, but in terms of winning the hearts and minds of the people – which is the more important component – I would say that Indonesia is doing better than its neighbors.

As a comparison for example, between Indonesia on one hand, and Malaysia and Singapore on the other. In Malaysia and Singapore, hundreds of militants have been arrested and detained under the Internal Security Act. That is a so-called draconian law, introduced by the British, to fight against the communist terrorists. The weapons used to fight against communist-terrorists in 1948 – that was when it was introduced. And now it is being used to detain the JI, the KMM, and the rest. I would say that, for example, when Indonesia decided to put on trial those suspected of the Bali bombing, people see the difference already, between what is the determination of new Indonesia, and the determination of the people in Malaysia and Singapore.

### **Rule of Law in Indonesia**

The determination in Indonesia is rule of law. Yes, there is again in the rule of law

that even though people who we know may be responsible, may be doing wrong – in this case Abu Bakar Ba'asyir – the point is in the rule of law: those who have not committed crimes may be set free; those who have been innocent have been imprisoned and those who committed the crime are set free. But what is important in the long term, what is in the public mind, is that there is a new determination to ensure that the rule of law is going to succeed even though there are limitations, imperfections and other things – I think this is important.

But in the case of Malaysia, nobody has been brought to trial, even though the opposition has been pressuring the government. There is a joke in Malaysia that if Malaysians have bombed the twin Petronas Towers, those suspected may be arrested but not be brought to court even though some evidence has been accepted. Perhaps Mahathir, at the time, would have arrested more just because the Petronas Towers have been bombed; maybe they would use that as an excuse to detain more people. In some circles that's how the argument goes.

### **Methods to Fight an Ideological War**

But anyway, my point is that, in fighting this ideological war, in order to win that war, there are a lot of things that need to be done. One is how to minimize the negative perception of the people in the region to America – I mean the negative perception of American participation in the war. What is the meaning and significance of this American participation in the war, from the sending of troops in the Philippines, to intelligence methods? And thus, the question of negative perception of the people towards their own government; and certainly here there's a perception that the local governments have been exploiting the subse-

quent war on terrorism as an excuse to stifle democracy.

That perception, right or wrong, needs to be addressed. I think in addressing that – the question of interpretation – there should be an openness now in those societies in the region to address the issue of Islam. And here I see the potential, the greater resilience of the Indonesian people. I'm impressed by what's going on in terms of the openness to discuss religion. I have been saying that in Indonesia, every school of thought in Islam is found in Indonesia. But there is a very energetic dynamic interaction between these ideas.

So I believe that in the long run, the Indonesians will be able to overcome, to address this issue of radicalization. Of course, in the transition period, following the fall of Suharto, what can we expect? Hundreds of schools of thought flowering in Asia, that should be expected. But I think, if the freedom is there, this different interpretation of Islam will just react and interact, and finally they will settle for what is good for Indonesia.

But in Malaysia and Singapore, things are very much controlled, especially Islam. Islam is very much controlled by the state. There are pros and cons, but here I think I'm looking at more negative things, that freedom is not given; for Islam to be expressed – not just certain departments and authorities can speak about Islam, but that anybody can talk about Islam – that is not the case. In Indonesia it is different: there is no single authority in Indonesia which is controlling Islam.

In the long term – this is a very, very important view I think – I believe that there is a concern in this country because of JI, because of Bali, that Indonesia has gone

radical. I would say these groups are on the fringes. As long as the mainstream Indonesian society is moderate, it is capable of maintaining this moderation, this mainstream Islam. And even if there is another Bali, I would still believe in the ability of the Indonesian people, in a sense, to finally win this war against radical Islam, especially because of the inner dynamics that are now being seen. I hope that “big brother” does not see that as anything other than as a kind of appreciation of how I perceive the situation in Indonesia right now, as for the longer point of view.

Of course, in the short run, I agree with him on the question of ASEAN having more teeth, more substance in the war against terrorism. He is quite pessimistic – I am not that pessimistic, I’m optimistic. The only thing is, that is the ASEAN style, doing the right thing, but slowly. It is not doing the wrong thing, I think it is moving in the right direction, but slowly. But what do you expect, between writing documents, having a cultural show, watching that slow dance, traditional dance – that’s the way we do things over there, and I think we are going in the right direction. Thank you.

**Daniel Benjamin:** I think very insightful things have been said here, and I’m grateful for the explanation of the Indonesian reaction in the post 9/11 period. I’d like to just underscore a number of different points that have been raised, most about what’s going on in Southeast Asia, but also the war on terror from an American perspective.

The first thing is, I think the point that the tension you described between the war on terror, and the consolidation of democracy and the necessity of consolidating the democracy as being so vital to the success of this struggle is, of course, absolutely right. Within that framework, your pre-

scription for the United States – although our own security interests are very high indeed, and we have a great interest in beating back jihadists, terrorists and the ideology, we would make a grave error if we narrow our entire relationship to this issue.

Already we have seen, as Professor Bakar has alluded to, too many regimes and too many parts of the world have used the war on terror as a political coverage to carry out their own agenda to beat the opposition domestically and to marginalize or put excessive pressure on groups that they view as threatening. And I think we are in, as Professor Bakar noted, an ideological struggle: that we should not fall into a trap of making the same mistake we did the last time on this ideological struggle, the Cold War, when we privileged one policy, one issue above all others, to the extent that it distorted our policy.

And there’s always going to be a blowback phenomenon and we’re going to pay a price for it, so it seems to me very important that we maintain our balance, that we not forget about democratization of human rights and in particular, the overall function of the state, because in Indonesia especially, but in many of the different countries, we have seen jihad’s ideology emerge, especially because of state insufficiency.

That, in turn, has led to an opening for radical ideology which is usually communicated to NGOs, which supplement or produce and supply what the state cannot, whether it’s healthcare or basic staples, education, you name it. If we’re going to see this battle through, it’s going to be because we’re wise and recognize that there are needs beyond policing.

## Development of Radical Ideology

I guess my questions here are: as important as it is to talk about the consolidation of the state and the democratization process, one of the aspects of the development of radical ideology that you did not address – and I'd really like to ask you to think about a bit – is exogenous factors, because a lot of what we have seen in terms of the spread of radical ideology is due to globalization, and due to the importation of alien thinking and to different environments. There's an element of – this is like the famous mussels clogging up the Great Lakes: they came from the Caspian, they didn't belong in the Great Lakes, and then all the pipes were closed up with them because they didn't have any natural predators.

The ideology of bin Laden and al Qaeda has - not through tankers or barges, but through the internet and through audio tapes and CDs - been imported with the kind of ruthless efficiency into regions where it was seldom known: in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. These are the primary cases, although we can also speak increasingly of it being important to the United States, South America, Britain and Western Europe.

I guess what I would like to know is what is really going on in that dimension of the struggle; how is the state dealing with it; what can the United States do a little more of? Importantly, what can, shall we say, the coalition of countries that have a great interest in winning the war on terror do about it?

I think one of the points we should take away from your remarks, particularly conspiracy theories and the like, is that we faced an enormous imperative to get the "Made in America" trademark off the war

on terror - that this is actually a civilization-al struggle. As long as it is seen as America having its way with the rest the globe, we are only halting progress when we play into our opponent's hands, particularly those who say the United States really wants to dominate Muslim societies as part of the strategy for destroying Islam.

So, I'm interested in that. I'm interested in what's going on in terms of the importation of ideas through NGO's, particularly from the Gulf and the establishment of boarding schools, the madrassas. What can we do in this area to come up with a more broad-based effort to win?

Another question I have about the appearance of jihadist ideology in Indonesia and the surrounding areas is that, it's interesting the way the ideology has worked. It flourishes in the periphery and has had a very hard time in the center of the Muslim world where the authoritarian regime has been very effective at repressing its proponents, and often as a result, exports the problem, either to the United States or to Southeast Asia, and increasingly to both coasts of Africa, and the like.

I wonder if you could speak about the specific qualities on being on the periphery, even if Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world that makes this possible. Is there something going on that has to do with the Indonesian ideology, the Indonesian sense of being Muslim and belonging in the larger ulama that is at work here? And I guess, the final thing I would just ask for is what we are woefully uninformed about – the progress that the ideology is making in virtually every country in the world. If we're talking about Egypt, both American intelligence and American scholarship is very, very poor on this issue; we don't know how – we know that anti-

Americanism is thriving, but to what extent is that anti-Americanism couched in jihadist terms?

In Saudi Arabia, where I was just visiting, it's well and good that the government seems to be turning around and taking things much more seriously, but I think there are probably only a handful of people in this country who really have any idea of what's going on beneath the surface. Now, Indonesia is a country that is much more open to scholars and journalists, and I think we can do that better.

I particularly would like to know what your assessment of it is, and the extent to which, in particular, the feelings that are circulating in much of the Muslim world – that, as you pointed out, the war on terror is the war on Islam, that the invasion of Iraq has under-mined our efforts to convince others of our sincerity in this struggle. And one of the interesting things in Indonesia that it's really been in the last decade or so – that the Palestinian issue has become as prominent as it has. So I guess what I'm asking is: what kind of expansion is the ideology, what kind of inroads is it making, if any, and what is the danger that the Middle Eastern sense of grievance is also becoming an Indonesian sense of grievance, based on the country's Muslim identity?

**John Ikenberry:** You want to make a couple of quick reactions now, and then we are going very quickly turn to the audience, so perhaps just a couple of quick reactions.

**Sukma:** Let's proceed to the number of questions by Daniel. The growing radicalism in the country, I think, mostly is the response to the negative regime, and also to the development problems in the country, rather than part of the wider al Qaeda network like in other parts of the world. And

also, because the radicalism of course is not new in Indonesia, because we had that in the 1950s and also during Suharto's era, we had also a number of radical groups who sought to undermine the government at the time, but they couldn't stand the iron fist of the authoritarian regime at the time. But again, the extent of the external influence on some groups is there, but we are not really sure how big their influence is. But, of course, there is one interesting fact, actually, if you look at the characteristics of the radical groups in Indonesia, one usually is that the movements are in the urban centers – only in big cities like Jakarta and Solo – and then it's basically a non-issue outside of Java; it's basically a phenomenon in Java.

And second, actually the Arab-led – you see all of these groups and it's all led by Indonesians of Arab descent. And, of course, within the mainstream, Islamic or social, there is this degree of discernment toward that because this kind of ideology seems alien to the mainstream – also to the belief in Islam in the country.

The problem with the ability of the state institutions to track money laundering activities and also to track money from the outside that's coming in to these radical groups actually also prevents our ability to really understand the external support to these groups.

But, again, this is mostly a response to the internal problems in Indonesia that can also be seen from the fact that after Bali bombing, some of these groups, the most notorious ones, had to disband themselves. That also suggests that they did have internal support, and now with the changes in circumstances and the changes in the strategy environment, maybe there are no internal supporters – we don't see that going well

with their agenda in Indonesia's domestic politics.

### **State Should Not Interfere in Battle Between Moderate and Radical Islam**

Of course, again, this ideology of Islamic radicalism is still there, but your questions about how the state should deal with it – I think the state should stay away from it. I think that should be left to the Muslim community itself, as far as Osman Bakar just described. And there is this vibrant debate within the community itself regarding this battle for not only the heart and mind, but also the soul of Islam in the country. And that process, I think, is really working at the moment, as long as the state can really stay as an honest arbiter over all of this debate – that is what we really need. So, the state role should only be in the law enforcement arena.

So, once one group goes beyond an acceptable boundary and then resorts to violence, then the state should step in. And I think, in a number of cases where the radicals have submitted a lawsuit against some moderate groups, when the court and legal institutions need to respond to it – and then now they have the chance to do something about it.

And recently, one of the moderate groups published a book on what they call “trans-allegiance idealism,” which tried to bring harmony into the interreligious relationship in Indonesia. And then this organization, led by Ba'asyir, actually is not happy with it because they realize that taking the issue through the court will not work. They said they would challenge the author to have a public debate.

So I think that's one good development where all of these ideologies can be debated

and, of course, as predicted, they lost in the debate because their understanding of Islam is quite low compared to other groups in Indonesia. When we got to the U.S. – and I think on this particular issue of the ideological struggle, I think there's not much that the U.S. can or should do.

### **U.S. Involvement Will Undermine Moderate Muslim Groups**

And, in fact, the U.S. involvement by helping even the moderate groups will basically undermine these moderate groups in dealing with the radical groups. I think no moderate Muslim groups in Indonesia would welcome the direct support to them because once they are accused of following the American agenda, they become irrelevant in the whole debate.

So that's why I mentioned earlier: I think the support from the U.S. in a wider international context of helping Indonesia proceed with the democratic session and proceed with the economy recovery would be more useful, especially in the context of the public perception. And that support, through the law enforcement agencies, to the legal reform process, I think will also bring about more positive results. As Professor Bakar also mentioned, I'm not worried about the resilience of the mainstream groups. That can also be demonstrated in the result of the election in 1999 and, again, in the coming election in 2004. I think these mainstream groups will continue to prepare Indonesia as long as the state doesn't inform itself on this issue.

On the issue of the status of Indonesia as in the periphery in the Muslim world, I think this also relates to what I just mentioned about the role of external factors in the rise of the radical Islamic groups. And there, I think there is great resentment in the

country that we are a free people as it is perceived by the Middle Eastern countries; they're very free in Islam. So there is now, I think, a new movement also in Indonesia to basically export all of those right things, those thinking on Islam to the Middle East. So a number of groups are already planning to translate all of the Indonesian works into Arabic and then trying to send all of those books to the Middle East, rather than the other way around.

But, again, what really strikes me all of the time is if you go to the bookstores in Indonesia, especially in the big cities, you can find all of these works by some Middle Eastern scholars, which have a very radical content. The problem is that they can sell them very cheap and there are things that we have to really respond to in trying to win this battle for the soul and for the heart and mind of Islam in the country.

So we are not happy with that status on the periphery, and I think now there is this great determination from these mainstream groups to be at the center, so Islam is not Arab and Arab is not Islam. And, in fact, there is this new movement that they call a "big boom" in Islam, and it's not this Islam which is being launched by indigenous thinkers, it's being launched by some young intellectuals within the Nahdlatul Ulama group. This is the largest Muslim association led by former president Abdhurrahman Wahib.

On anti-U.S. beliefs within the jihad ideology, I think it is not strong, because all of these problems in the Middle East usually only come into the form of a core religious solidarity when the domestic groups need to put pressure on the government in order to get domestic political concessions. So you don't see this expressed all of the time, so usually that will be expressed, honestly, be-

fore the election or before the parliament sits or before the debate on the constitutional amendment, because the agenda is basically domestic; but this has only been used to put pressure on the government in order to listen to what they have in mind.

## Q&A

**Ikenberry:** Excellent. Let's open things up. Introduce yourself, your name and rank and serial number and then your question; please.

**Questioner:** Thank you. Dr. Rizal, you mentioned the question of American aid possibly in education, and Daniel mentioned the question of madrassas.

Let me ask you to comment on a sensitive aspect of this, which is that three of the very pro-war party forces in the U.S. have addressed this directly, including Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld, and recently CNN, which I think you can sort of lump together with that crowd. And they both called for an intervention into the madrassas in the Islamic world, and even admitted that to do so would require overthrowing the laws against that kind of activity that took place in the Cold War in the 50s and 60s, when they intervened in education against communism, supposedly.

But this was made illegal and they're openly saying that it's time to overthrow that and allow what obviously they intend to be covert activity in the madrassas. And CNN and their show, which you probably saw or heard about it, was openly attacking the Islamic education in Indonesia. So the issue is, would this not be a major offense to the population, and to the government and to its sovereignty? And how do you deal with the question of an honest approach to edu-

cation, as opposed to those who might try to use it as a subversion?

**Sukma:** I think that is not helpful at all to really win the heart and mind of Islam in the country, because if you look at the characteristics of the madrassas, it is very different from what you have in Pakistan, for example. And, of course, financial assistance in education is mainly to support education in Islamic schools, and it is difficult for many groups in Indonesia to accept that.

### **Muslim Groups Do Not Want Outside Support for Madrassas**

The leaders of NU have already said they are not going to welcome any support to their madrassas because the NU basically owns 95 percent of the madrassas in Indonesia. And they have already said that they will accept the support as long as that support doesn't touch the curriculum issue because that is going to put them in a very difficult position in explaining it to the constituents, to the Indonesians at-large.

But the way the program has been done in Jakarta has been excellent because the whole program will be targeted to support the new education system, both in the public sector and also in the private sectors, like in the Islamic schools, such as in providing facilities and so on. But, of course, if you look at this particular case of al-Mukmin owned by Ba'asyir, it's quite tempting for us to think that the madrassas are the real problem that gives rise to the radical ideology in Indonesia.

But I think that is a very dangerous approach to take, because by trying to get rid of this kind of madrassa, you offend a lot of other mainstream madrassas organized or owned by the Nahdlatul Ulama, which is the most tolerant and the most moderate

group in the country, which has completely different characteristics than Islam in the Middle East.

So I think if we focus more on trying to reform the madrassas, that already defeats the very purpose of helping the Indonesians to deal with the problem. So it is, of course, taken as an offense, not so much by the Muhammadiyah, but by the NU. But Muhammadiyah has a different perception on this because when Mr. Wolfowitz said that this needs to be given to help reform madrassas, Muhammadiyah thinks, "Well, that means we don't get anything," because Muhammadiyah doesn't have pesantrens, so that is also seen as a one-sided initiative.

**Questioner:** Just a point to add to what Dr. Rizal has said regarding Mike's question. I agree; I think there shouldn't be any interference from the United States in the organization of religious education curriculum in Islam; that defeats the purpose. What the U.S. can do is provide more opportunities for intercultural discourse. I think that does embody – in terms of a meeting of minds between the people in the religious establishment and their counterparts in the West - I think that in the long run it is better.

Another thing: there is a wrong perception of the pesantrens, and that is your point. In the Muslim world, there is such a great variety of religious boarding schools that the madrassa system under Taliban rule in Afghanistan is so far different from the one in Malaysia and the one in Indonesia.

Even the one in Malaysia is not the same as the one in Indonesia, the pesantrens are not the same as those in Malaysia. I will say that the pesantrens are more progressive, generally speaking, more progressive than in Malaysia. This is only because they have

the opportunity to learn the English language, the level of discourse of religion in the pesantrens is far higher than in Malaysia. So we cannot generalize, I think, that there was a tendency among certain circles to approach the pesantrens as if they are just another extension of the madrassas, and they're going to stand very strong.

**Ikenberry:** Daniel, any comments on that, the issue of education?

**Benjamin:** I confess that when I heard that proposal, I thought it was a little off-the-wall and would put us in a sort of Gary Powers U-2 situation. Why intervene in your schools, what are you talking about? We would never do that. But I'm not sure that I see any objections to support to state schools and that certainly, particularly in the Pakistani context, would be quite useful.

I don't know enough about Indonesia to know whether it's something that would be welcomed or not, but there are few countries in the world, our own included, that would not like to have more money for their public education systems.

**Questioner:** I want to pursue Mr. Benjamin's question, because I don't think it was addressed. A few months ago, I stumbled across an article in the *Jakarta Post* online by a professor at Georgetown and I think he was visiting from Indonesia in which he said, for Indonesian Muslims, the situation in the Middle East, the Palestine-Israel struggle, the status of Jerusalem – those are the most important issues, and I was quite startled by this.

I was thinking, is that true? When did this begin if it is true? Because if it's true, that suggests there's very little that local governments in Indonesia and maybe elsewhere

can do about radicalism if it is now being associated with the situation in the Middle East.

### **Anti-Americanism Used for Domestic Political Battles**

**Sukma:** As I mentioned in my earlier response, the Palestinian issue is, of course, always in the center of the discourse among the Muslims. As a matter of fact, they talk about the state of affairs in the Islamic world or in Indonesia's relations with the U.S. But the extent that this problem influences the wider domestic debate on the issue of radicalism and on whether this issue can be used in order to raise anti-Americanism is still limited, in my view, because it's no more than an expression of solidarity that you can find quite often in any mass mobilizations of politics in Indonesia.

So, of course, you will see it and everybody will talk about it in that context. But, again, the demonstrations off-site are these same radical Islamic groups and it's become an issue that we talk about whenever it is raised. And, of course, there is a feeling of solidarity there, but whether that becomes a determining factor that will shape the way in which Indonesia relates to the outside world, is still limited. And that issue has been there even during the Suharto era, since the early 70s, where a lot of Islamic groups expressed their disappointment with the situation there again and again in a series of events, especially if there are dramatic events that are taking place in a Palestinian land or in Israeli-Palestine relations.

So I don't see that it is moving beyond that road in the current discourse.

**Questioner:** In conjunction with the last question, I think the issue is the concept of

justice, because as a Muslim, we've been brought up to internalize the concept of justice. Justice was part of us, our vocabulary. How does this concept of justice play in relation to the issue of the anti-terrorist campaign in Indonesia?

You've already mentioned about how the Palestinian issue has become the central discourse in intellectual circles in Indonesian radicals and also among the moderates. But I think the perception is basically on the issue of justice. But can you explain how that concept plays in this particular issue? Thank you.

### **U.S. Factor Important in Palestine Issue**

**Sukma:** With regard to the Indonesians' strong solidarity feeling to the Palestinian cause, I am not sure whether this justice is really an issue because the Islamic groups in Indonesia never raise the issue about what's happening in Chechnya. They don't even use the issue of Bosnia during that massacre in the former Yugoslavia, and even the massacre of Muslims in India was a known issue, even among the radical Muslims. So this kind of cruel solidarity issue will come up whenever there is the U.S. factor in it. So this is quite political rather than social, in the sense of justice.

Again, if you look at when this issue was expressed, you have to look at it in the very specific context of when the issue was expressed, usually before the parliament sits, because that depends on when they have to debate on either the constitution or other bills, and then the issue will come up again – or, after serious problems occur in the Middle East, especially in the relationship between Palestine and Israel.

So beyond that, I don't see that this issue of justice has really become the defining fac-

tor that pushes a lot of Muslim groups in Indonesia to express their displeasure against the U.S. or Israel in that context.

But in terms of this terrorism, it's a bit difficult to say that injustice really drives people to become terrorists. I think it's more complex than that, but radicalism – at least it's become a very convenient reason for these radical groups to justify their acts and also the violence that they did.

For example, the Islamic Defender's Front, always uses the injustices in the society in order to send a point. But the core of the problem, I think, is two things: one, there is this need to be recognized, and that's so they can try to influence the policy process, which has been long denied by the authoritarian regime of either the father of the current president, and also during the period of Suharto – that's number one.

Number two, of course, there will be some hard core groups as well, who really believe that they are given this mandate by God to rectify the social illness they see. And then the distrust of state institutions, of course, leads them to take other matters into their own hands.

And that, I think, is also part of the phenomenon in Indonesia since the breakdown of the authoritarian regime and also because of the inefficiency of the current government in dealing with those social issues in the country.

**Questioner:** I have a question that relates to something that Mr. Benjamin said. I believe you said that we should be careful in this new ideological struggle not to repeat mistakes made in the last ideological struggle. That is to say, prioritize one policy concern, security, over other policy concerns: promotion of democracy and human rights. In

that context, I wonder if you could react to the policy debate now in Washington about whether or not the U.S. should begin to assist the Indonesian military as it did in the Suharto era.

**Benjamin:** Well, let me try to refine my point a little bit. It's not that we're not going to privilege one issue over another; it's a question of balance and it's a question of judgment. Undoubtedly, the need to protect Americans against a catastrophic attack in all of the different ways we do that is going to continue to be the top priority of the American government. The point is not to throw over all of our other values as well, because ultimately that will not lead to our success in the different theaters that we're operating in. I don't have a strong opinion on the issue of military cooperation, mostly because I don't consider myself to be an expert right now in the state of the Indonesian military.

There are certainly enough charges of improprieties stemming back to East Timor, and the like. But I don't really feel like I know right now what the state of the leadership of the military is, or what kind of safeguards have been put in to deal with human rights issues and the like. I defer to others on that one.

### **U.S. Support for Indonesian Military Should Be Part of Wider Democratization Process**

**Sukma:** If I can respond to that one: why do you want to assist Indonesia's military? If the objective is to help the country to deal with a terrorist network, I don't think the U.S. military is the agent to do it. At least in the context of Indonesia, you don't need tanks to deal with a terrorist organization; you don't even need M-16s to really route out this terrorist organization, but more in

the capacity of the intelligence area I think is more critical on that one.

So if the U.S. would like to support the Indonesian military, that should be done within the wider context of the democratic decision process in Indonesia – on how to make the Indonesian military be more professional and also submit to civilized supremacy which, at the moment, we are having this difficulty with because it seems that military reform is going backwards rather than going forwards.

All of the talk that the U.S. military should support the military to help them deal with terrorism more effectively – I think that will create a new problem in the current context because that will heighten the tension and also the rivalry between the military and the police.

Even now, the military already actually expresses their displeasure with the support by the U.S. government of our police because some in the military, including the Army Chief of Staff, really believe that there is this great conspiracy outside, trying to undermine the Indonesian military, and the military can really be destroyed and disappear from the map.

So this kind of approach is really, I think – whatever the purpose is behind it, at least the public face of this program should be much broader than only targeting or focusing on the issue of counter-terrorism.

**Questioner:** I work in the state department on counter-terrorism in Southeast Asia. One of the things I wanted to ask about, looking at it from at least the U.S. government perspective, that there are two countries where we are extremely careful about how we react to our perceptions of what's happening in terms of counter-terrorism.

Indonesia is certainly one - there are a number of people in Washington who've been, perhaps, a bit more upset that that has appeared in any sort of public way. And the other one, although I don't know much about it, is Saudi Arabia. And I'd like to have Mr. Benjamin and Professor Bakar talk about perceptions in Saudi Arabia and in Indonesia about American pressure on counter-terrorism.

**Benjamin:** Well, I can't talk about Indonesia but I can talk a little bit about Saudi Arabia. I guess in some ways, I wouldn't narrow it just to counter-terrorism. I have an article coming out in a newspaper next week that recounts how every conversation that I had with the Saudi government officials or Saudi members of the business elite began with having my colleagues asking about radical Wahabi clerics and followers. And five or 10 minutes later, the Saudis would turn to us and say, "Can you tell us anything about these neo-conservatives?"

There is a real sense of embattlement in Saudi Arabia, but I think there's also a real sense that they've got a serious problem on their hands. And so, at least at the higher levels of the government, they're focusing very heavily on the problem and they've, I think, shrewdly used the attacks of mid-November as a pivot on which to turn the country, in a sense, against radical ideology.

And, at least, according to the country team at the embassy in Riyadh, the U.S. is very satisfied now with the efforts that the Saudis are making. I think that we're actually in for some rough sledding because the Saudi's record and the Saudi's sincerity in all of this is going to be scrutinized and I think criticized heavily during the election season.

The Saudis historically have always wanted to keep Americans and all others out of their business in a way that I think probably exceeds that of any other country on the globe - and they've been pretty effective at doing it. I think they now realize that their future depends on working more closely with us and I think convincing us as well that we're both on the same side.

### **U.S. Has No Idea of Developments Beneath the Surface in Saudi Arabia**

I'm somewhat encouraged. The problem is, as I mentioned before, we have no idea what's going on beneath the surface in Saudi Arabia. And while they may be very good on counter-terrorism, narrowly defined, what is going on in the larger sense in terms of reform in the country - which is an essential part of the whole program - is hard to say. And frankly, I'm not even sure we really know what kind of outcome we can get for this that's desirable through their reform process. There is no question that they felt very beleaguered and, in fact, the reason that we were there was because they felt that the relationship was in great peril and that the old *modus avendi* was in real trouble.

**Sukma:** The perceptions about the American pressure in Indonesia, I think, do not come only with the issue of terrorism. I think if we hear the history of Indonesia, Indonesia has been a very nationalistic country. And then we are the only country in the world which left the UN in 1963 and tried to build our own UN at the time; this is ridiculous, but that's a fact.

There is a very strong sense of a nationalistic issue and, of course, that's a feeling; that perception is really there. But now I think that it's not as strong as it was before the Bali bombing, especially with the UN

Ambassador that we have at the moment, so that kind of feeling is fading away – as long as the government can really demonstrate to the public that Indonesia is doing the Indonesian way, if you like, in dealing with this problem.

So I think that's typical in a very highly competitive domestic political system also where these external issues are obviously used by the competing domestic forces, and anti-U.S. sentiment or even anti-foreign sentiment will always become a very sexy issue, which can bring together radical Islam on one hand, and then the radical left at the same time, to go to the streets and stage a demonstration together. I think that's one unpleasant fact that we have to face, but again, let me comment very briefly on the wider issue of this American image in Indonesia.

### **Indonesians Know Little about the U.S.**

I think one of the problems with American diplomacy is that now, because of the democratization in Indonesia and also because of the changing nature of the American programs in Indonesia, Americans know more about Indonesia and then we know a lot less about the U.S. – that begins with the closing of the U.S.I.S. offices in Indonesia.

Indonesians cannot go to the library anymore to understand what is going on in the U.S. And, in fact, very few people know the fact that Islam, for instance, is the fastest growing religion in the U.S., and also how the rights of minority groups are much more respected here rather than in other parts of the world. And, in fact, Muslims call us who fled their country and escaped the persecution by their own regimes, actually are given more freedom in trying to advance their knowledge, and also in

having this interpretation of Islam in a much more democratic context. Not many people, as you understand, know this information, precisely because of the change in the public diplomacy in the U.S. foreign policy over the last maybe six or seven years.

**Questioner:** Dr. Sukma, I actually think that you may have answered my question, to some degree, when you answered the last gentleman's question, but I'm going to ask it anyway and find out if you have anything additional to add. You mentioned, obviously, that radical Islam within Indonesia is more a result maybe of domestic pressures and internal issues, rather than maybe a larger jihadist attitude.

Over the holidays, the terrorist level was raised higher here in the United States, and in our media it spoke about the possibility of terrorist attacks, not only in the homeland, but also Americans' interests abroad. And I'm wondering to what degree is there the perception or the misperception here in the United States that attacks abroad have, in some way, a relationship with terrorism acts against the United States?

Along those same lines, I know that when people were investigating Mohammed Atta, they spoke about the possibility that he had fought in Chechnya as well. And there seems to be this perception that al Qaeda is everywhere, that maybe the United States does not appreciate internal domestic issues regarding terrorism. And to what degree does this affect the American policy and the American perception on terrorism?

And to what degree can we work with other countries to add our assistance, where necessary, but also let other countries deal with their own issues concerning terrorism? And lastly, I think this also refers to Mr.

Benjamin's comment on the problem of the U.S. trademark on the war on terrorism.

**Sukma:** If the American interests or American buildings abroad become a target of a terrorist attack, I don't think it's the exclusively internal problem of the host country – that becomes the problem of both Americans and the host country where the attack occurred. And this perception, I think, is justified by security issues, because nobody, including the Indonesia security apparatus, for example, can guarantee that similar attacks cannot happen in the country.

Jemaah Islamiyah clearly is down, but definitely not out, because nobody in Indonesia's intelligence services has kept the record of how many there are of these guys in the country, and how many have returned

from the war in Afghanistan during the occupation of the Soviet Union at the time.

And then it's very difficult to tell, even within Indonesia itself; because I'm not knowledgeable about other countries, this warning has been repeatedly also raised by the police. Before Christmas and before the New Year, there was also a warning by Indonesian authorities about possible attacks, not only on American interests but on other places in Indonesia. So, with such uncertain threats, I think this attitude from any government should be justified.

**Ikenberry:** Well, with that, we'll call that the final word and I would invite you to join with me in thanking our panelists today for a stimulating discussion.

[End]

## About the Panelists

### Main Speaker

**Dr. Rizal Sukma** is Director of Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta. He also is the Secretary to the International Relations Bureau, Central Executive Board of Muhammadiyah (the second largest Islamic organization in Indonesia), member of the board at Syafii Maarif Institute for Culture and Humanity, a visiting lecturer at the Post-Graduate School of Political Science, and a member of the National Committee on Strategic Defense Review, Indonesia's Military of Defense. Dr. Sukma has worked extensively on Southeast Asia's security issues, ASEAN, Indonesia's defense and foreign policy, and domestic political changes in Indonesia. He received his Ph.D in international relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science. Dr. Sukma has written two books and published many articles, including *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy* (2003), *Indonesia and China: The Politics of A Troubled Relationship* (1999) and "Indonesia and 9-11" in *Coping with 9-11: Asian Perspectives on Global and Regional Order* (Han Sung-joo, ed., 2003).

### Discussants

**Dr. Osman Bakar** is Malaysia Chair of Islam in Southeast Asia at the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University. He was formerly Chair, Professor of Philosophy of Science at University of Malaya, Malaysia, where he had served as Deputy Vice-Chancellor/Vice President in charge of Academic Affairs. Professor Bakar also was the former President of the Malaysian Islamic Academy of Science, which he co-founded, and was a Fulbright Visiting Scholar at Harvard University. He received a B.Sc and M.Sc in mathematics from London University, and a Ph.D in Islamic philosophy from Temple University. Professor Bakar has published 12 books, including *Classification of Knowledge in Islam* (1999) and *Islam and Civilizational Dialogue* (1997, ed.), and more than 100 articles, including *Islam and Political Legitimacy in Malaysia*.

**Mr. Daniel Benjamin** is a Senior Fellow in the CSIS International Security Program. Prior to joining CSIS, he was Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He has served on the National Security Council staff, where he was director for transnational threats. From 1994 to 1997, he was a special assistant to the president and National Security Council director for speech-writing. Mr. Benjamin also was Berlin bureau chief for the *Wall Street Journal* and is a frequent columnist for *Time* magazine. He received degrees from Harvard University and Oxford University, where he was a Marshall Scholar. Mr. Benjamin co-wrote *The Age of Sacred Terror* (2002), which was selected as a "Notable Book of 2002" by the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, and has published articles in *The New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Los Angeles Times*, and *Financial Times*.

### Moderator

**Dr. G. John Ikenberry** is the Peter F. Krogh Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice at Georgetown University. He also has been a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. He earned his Ph.D at the University of Chicago. Professor Ikenberry is the author of numerous publications, including, *State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy* (2002), *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (2000), and *Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government* (1988).