

Between Bilateralism and Community: U.S.-Japan Security Relations in a Changing East Asia

Seminar 2

U.S. Approaches to International Institutions: Back to Hub-and-Spokes Bilateralism?

Inoguchi Takashi: Today we discuss “United States approaches to international institutions: back to hub-and-spokes bilateralism?” Our first speaker is Professor John Ikenberry from Georgetown University, and the panelists are Professor Thomas Berger of Boston University, Dr. Fukushima of the National Institute for Research Advancement, Professor Tsuyoshi Kawasaki of Simon Fraser University, Canada, Professor Michael Matsanduno of Dartmouth College, and we have discussants, Mr. Ralph Cossa of the Pacific Forum CSIS, and Professor Yoichiro Sato of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.

John Ikenberry: Thank you, Takashi, it’s great to be here and kick this off. We have had two wonderful days of discussion and what I have to say will be building on what we’ve been talking about, and our focus is really American power and the future of multilateral institutions.

One of the most famous books published last year was by a pundit, Robert Kagan, and the book was titled, *A Power in Paradise*, and that’s an appropriate title, because we’re talking about power in paradise, in Hawaii. It’s really the question about American power, and the way in which American power is being exercised today, post-9/11, and in East Asia, and the role of institutions in that mix of

American power exercise and grand strategy.

Let me start by saying that this issue has taken on new stakes and higher stakes in the last few years because, as the world has noticed, American power has become all the more salient, all the more provocative in its manifestation around the world. We call it, among political scientists, the rise of American unipolarity.

The U.S. is the most powerful country in the world, and is more powerful than any other country has been in world history. And that’s remarkable. We’re in a very different kind of international system, with a single superpower. That’s what we really mean by unipolarity.

The United States began the decade of the 1990s as the world’s only superpower, and it had a better decade than the other great powers. It grew 26 percent between 1990 and 1998, Europe grew 14 percent, and Japan grew 7 percent. It was showing this capacity to project itself around the world in military terms. It reduced military defense spending more slowly than the other countries after the end of the Cold War, and, of course, after 9/11, had a massive defense buildup. In fact, 85 percent of world R&D in military technology takes place in the United States, which suggests

there will be many, many more years, and perhaps decades of American unipolarity.

U.S. Military Is a Global Establishment in Many Ways

The American military establishment is, in many ways, a global establishment. The American system of alliances and institutions, of partnerships built up over 60 years, is a global, political formation. It's not just about alliances, it's a global, political order. It's not coterminous with the entire globe, but it spans the world as no other world system has. Not surprisingly, scholars are talking about empire, hegemony, unipolarity, and hierarchy as ways to grasp what this new system is, this single, superpower system. At the core of this power, of course, again is American military power.

There's a new book called *The Sorrows of Empire* by Chalmers Johnson, a new polemic following his *Blowback* book of several years ago, and one of the most evocative things he talks about is the American system of bases, something that is clearly evident in Hawaii. But he indicates at one point that the American military has 234 golf courses around the world, a massive system of American bases and support structures.

The system has been all the more evident to the world, this system of American power, post-9/11, where the United States invaded two Muslim countries in 18 months. It increased defense spending; the single, absolute amount of defense spending increased after 9/11 was equal to the entire amount spent by any one single European state, twice as much as Italy.

And, of course, the new doctrine of pre-emption, of unipolarity, of a single superpower world: the U.S. has said there will be no global, pure competitor to America, the United States will be the leviathan that will keep order in a world where no other country will challenge America. The price that countries will pay for this service is that the U.S. will stand above other countries, but we will provide the solution to the problem of Hobbes, the problem of order, through the imposition of leviathan power, although it will be a liberal leviathan, an open, tolerant one.

But this power, this unipolar system has unsettled the world. The question of American unipolarity—how it will operate, what it means, what the new rules of the game are, what's in it for me as a state here or a state there—is the not-so-hidden subtext of a lot of world politics today, including the tension over the last two years in U.S.-European relations.

It wasn't simply about Iraq, it was about how American power could be exercised more generally, and it was the subtext of many presidential elections recently in Germany, in Brazil, and in South Korea. I think it's fair to say that after 9/11, the United States has looked at the world in new ways, but I think it's also fair to say that after 9/11, the world has looked at America in new ways.

This worry about unipolarity and the new era of terrorism—and what America's new assertiveness in the year of terrorism means for world order—has created this kind of low-grade worry around the world, in almost every diplomatic corridor, the talk about how will American unipolarity be exercised.

Will there be a move from the kind of system of American-centered world order built around liberal characteristics, multilateralism, alliance-based partnerships, collaborative or cooperative security, and multilateral institutions, towards what might be called American order built around imperial characteristics, unilateralism, preemption, domination; we tell states what to do and they are either with us or against us, this kind of one-way street, using American power and the leverage that unipolarity allows the United States to have to run the world in this more singular way?

**Two Logics in Play in
New World of Unipolarity
Have Implications for East Asia**

My thesis is that there are two logics in play in this new world of unipolarity, two logics about how the U.S. might organize and run this system, and each has implications for East Asia. The most obvious way to run world order for a leading state is to build institutions and be a kind of benign leader. This is the caricature of America after World War II, particularly with regards to the Western world, of providing security protection, building multilateral institutions, operating within that system—a system of liberal hegemony, as some have characterized it—providing public goods, providing security, and in return other countries worked with America, rather than resisted America.

But America opened itself up to other countries to play diplomatic games, to consult with America, to be in a political process with the United States, where they might not always get their views turned into policy, but their views would always be in play, they would always be

partners, and there would always be an opportunity for the actual outcome to accommodate their interests, a kind of give-and-take reciprocity. That multilateral system of governance is one that the Cold War helped encourage the United States to pursue, but it lasted, really, through the 1990s, and now the question again is: is it the logic for the future?

The other logic, as I indicated, is a kind of hub-and-spoke bilateralism, which interestingly the prototype of which has already been built in Asia. This system isn't a multilateral, rule-based order, it's bilateral bargains. Countries have special relationships with the United States. They have, in addition to that, better relationships with Washington than they do with each other—that's the hub-and-spoke characteristic.

Special relationships, bilateral bargaining, and patronage politics—countries work with the United States and the United States gives them discretely, not in an indivisible format, but discretely, bilaterally, trade agreements, security agreements, partners on a bilateral basis ringing the world. And this hub-and-spoke image is precisely what some people have called empire. Alex Malto, the political theorist, has called it a rimless hub-and-spoke system, precisely what I'm getting at here.

Now, which of these two logics, the multilateral logic, or the hub-and-spoke logic, is likely to predominate in the coming era? It's possible that you'll have both of them because, as I indicated, in the sixty-year early Cold War, early post-Cold War system, you had both. You had one multilateral system primarily anchored in the Atlantic's order, and a public spoke logic anchored in the

Pacific order. Each had its own domestic constituency in America. The East Coast establishment, multilateral types, George Bush Sr., for example, was the kind of person that represented the mainstream American foreign policy tradition that reinforced this kind of Western multilateral order.

And there is always a second kind of constituency in America for this bilateral, more rough-and-ready, bilateral, more imperial form, going back to Roosevelt—the first Roosevelt—or a MacCarthur kind of man on horseback, the Asia firsters, more of America running the show, not building a system of rules. What I'm saying is that both of those systems are anchored in American politics, in the body politic of America.

Which will predominate? In getting to this question of which will tend to be most evident in the decade ahead, I acknowledge that there is a kind of background shift that gives the imperial logic a little bit more wind in its sails. And this is the shift in the underlying structure of the international system that I wanted to talk about for just a couple of minutes, because I think it's terribly important to see this background condition that creates incentives, if you will, and opportunities for hub and spoke.

International System Has Been Primarily Organized Around the Westphalian Model

And you might call that shift the overturning of the Westphalian system. One could make a very sweeping argument—I'll make one—that over the last 500 years, the international system had primarily been organized around the Westphalian model, and that model had two

components. One was that international order was maintained by a diffusion and equilibrium of power among states, and domestically, each country was sovereign, where the state had a monopoly of the use of violence within its border. So the use of force internationally was by armies. It was called war, and the use of force at home was the government's domain. We call it police work and the court system. It was a system of states in anarchy.

And in many ways you could argue that in the last decade or so, we've seen an overturning of that 500-year model; we have now a system that is more hierarchical than anarchic, and the Westphalian system has flipped on its head. Now the United States has a quasi-monopoly on the use of force internationally—it's not a diffusion and distribution and equilibrium of power—and domestically, the sovereign state has become more contingent over the last 50 or 60 years, through the slow challenging by liberals and human rights movements, that what goes on inside of the state is more open to international—read American—scrutiny.

So we have this double shift. States are more vulnerable, if you will, to the intrusions of the outside system, and the outside system increasingly means America. That is a volatile brew. So it's a new system in many ways. It's a system where one superpower not only has so much more power than any other country, but the underlying state system of sovereignty—upon which sovereignty always was a protection of the weak, self-determined, sovereign authority—has increasingly been undermined.

And so we have the United States, in effect, looking more like a global police

system of what used to be the function inside the states. And inside the states you have increasingly war, at least in the failed states, the weak states, the collapsed states of the world, where violence is increasingly between armed groups where states do not control the use of violence. The system has flipped on its head.

And you add to that the aspect of a very toxic brew, and that is a world of terrorism, where the threat is no longer military forces that are deployed by other governments, but networks of shadowy terrorists who have found ways to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Those threats require you to increasingly look at the domestic situation in states. It's the new principle that is slowly emerging in world politics, that it's in the world's security interest to have governments baby-sit their territories to be sure there are not ungoverned areas where terrorist groups can inhabit. And consequently if they don't, their sovereignty is rendered more conditional, and the outside world can intervene.

So these are very dynamic changes that I think the world has not fully been able to internalize to figure out what the rules are and how we all operate in such a system. It's radically new. And everybody's kind of making things up as they go along. And the experiments have been played out during the Iraq war and after the Iraq war. How does the United States think about using its forces to attack threats? How does it bring the rest of the world along? How does the rest of the world think about how to either work with or resist American power? All of this is in play.

Unipolar State Still Wants to Operate in the World of Rules

And so we have, I think, on balance, these two kinds of logics that are in play. And to kind of wrap up, let me just say a little bit more about hub-and-spoke and multilateralism and the reasons why each might be an attractive strategy for the unipolar state. And then I'll finally end with my punch line, which is that in the end, I think a unipolar state still wants to operate in the world of rules, and that we are not leading, ultimately, to an imperial system.

But the hub-and-spoke system, to the extent that it is a kind of surrogate for an imperial or neo-imperial order, as I said, has this very special relationship, bilateral connections to countries. You give up the kind of multilateral, indivisible security and economic space, and economic and security space is now organized bilaterally, country to country.

There are three reasons why the unipolar state might want to organize international order this way. Number one, by operating bilaterally, you break other states apart. In effect, you divide and rule. There is no trade union of weak states. American power can be more directly applied and used for concrete outcomes.

Secondly, the United States is less constrained than it would be in a multilateral system, where it has to operate within rules—now everything's on the table. Bargaining is what creates the outcome, and power is what determines who wins in the bargain.

And thirdly, power, as I said, can be more directly employable; it's easier to reward and punish other states, it allows

you to engage in patronage politics—the Mayor Daly type of politics—where you give people things if they work with your system. So you’re kind of the boss, and other countries are your clients.

And the advantages of the alternative logic, multilateralism, is again also three-fold. Number one, it’s more functionally effective, transaction costs go down, and it’s easier to operate in a system where you are not having to bargain all the time, twisting arms to get your way. If you can get other countries to buy into a set of rules, it means that they will always be kind of operating in a predictable way, on balance, in a way that will benefit you. So for functional transaction costs, enforcement costs and these kind of reasons, multilateralism is, perhaps kind of counter-intuitively, in the interest of the leading state.

Secondly, legitimacy is easier for a leading state to achieve if there’s a multilateralist system, a sense of equity, and the rules themselves create legitimacy, because everybody is under the law, in effect.

And then thirdly, by building your order around a rules-based system, you are investing in the future, when your own power will decline. The wheel of power does turn and unipolarity will not last forever, although it may last for a long time, so there are reasons to think that even a unipolar state would like to operate in a system of rules.

So I would just end by saying that there is a system of geopolitical shake out going on, trying to figure out how this order works, trying to figure out which mode of government the system is likely to take on. And in the end, my bet is that

what is happening today is not what I’ve called the East Asianization of world politics—the movement towards a global hub-and-spoke system—which, as I said, there are reasons to think, given the structure, that that is where politics could go.

U.S. Wants to Renegotiate the Order It Created after World War II

But what’s really happening is that the United States is finding itself in a peculiar position where it is rising up, it’s a rising state in its own order, and it’s finding itself in the position where it wants to renegotiate the order that it, in fact, created after World War II.

And that’s a power change negotiation dynamic that the world has never seen before, because we’ve always thought that a rising state emerges, takes the opportunity it’s afforded by its new position to build an order to its liking, and then, over the decades, receives the common benefits from that order, only to be challenged later on by an alternative state that rises up as the older state declines and the rising state, then, has its own agenda and builds its own order.

But what’s odd about today’s system is that it’s the United States rising up, trying to renegotiate its own system, it is replacing itself as the leading state. And so what we’re seeing is a renegotiation of the rules of the game, not a state trying to take advantage of its structural advantages to disentangle itself from that system and tear up the rules.

So ever the optimist, I’m going to conclude by saying that if incentives matter, and if enlightened self interest at all holds sway in the councils of govern-

ment, there is reason to think that at moments along the way, smart policymakers will say, "Sure, we can take advantage of our position today to get short-term gains by bargaining with a single state, but in the long term we are better served by building a legitimate, rules-based order that serves our interest and others as well, because at some point in the future, we will be faced with states that no longer are as weak as they are today. And in the intervening period as well, we need them for lots of reasons that we perhaps have not appreciated, not just fighting the war on terrorism, but managing financial systems and dealing with global warming and all the issues that require functional operation, even in a unipolar system." So thank you very much Mr. Chairman, and I turn things over to my colleagues.

Thomas Berger: I'm going to try to be brief. I find myself in the peculiar situation of being perhaps even more liberal than John Ikenberry, which is quite something. That doesn't mean, however, that I'm optimistic about the future, even though liberalism in IR tends to be viewed as an optimistic paradigm. Let me explain briefly.

I think what John just described to you about this unipolar world is absolutely correct. The United States is in an unprecedented position of power. It is a colossus astride the planet, and yet it is a colossus whose limits are becoming increasingly clear, from my point of view. And those limits of power have to do with the nature of the security threat that we are faced with nowadays, the intersection between radicalism and technologies of weapons of mass destruction, as it was described in the September

2002 National Security Doctrine of the United States.

To cope with that threat, we are slowly cobbling together a quite complex, multi-layered strategy, one that I don't think we can successfully execute by ourselves. Steve Van Evera at MIT and members of the study group use a nice metaphor to describe this strategy, a very American one. Think of the war on terror as a game of football. And in the game of football you need a number of different teams. You need offense, the ability to destroy or disrupt terrorist organizations, and the ability to destroy or intimidate rogue states who could provide support and, most importantly, weapons of mass destruction technology to terrorist organizations. On this score, the United States is in a pretty good position. We have the tools we need to undertake offensive action. We've got quarterbacks, we've got running backs, we've got a good line; we can do most of it on our own. We might need an extra tight end once in a while, the British are there for that, and maybe a couple of other linemen, but on the whole we don't need much help on offense.

But as every sports fan knows, you don't win championships just through your offense. You need defense as well. Here we're talking about intelligence coordination, coordination of internal security, customs control, all of these kinds of functions. And the U.S. can do a lot of defense as well, but we can't do it all. In fact, it becomes impossible, unless we really want to go into hunker down mode – greatly restricting international commerce and traffic in order to prevent terrorists from reaching our shores - and I don't think we want to do that yet; we need the cooperation of other countries.

That's not all. There are special teams, as well. For example, state building operations, foreign aid, a whole array of policies that are needed to stabilize parts of the world that could potentially become problems for us. And as we are seeing in Iraq today, special teams assistance is both very necessary and very costly. I believe the latest tranche of aid was reported at \$4 billion. The United States has already given a lot of money, but we're running into the limits of what even we can pay, and we need help from the international community.

And then, of course, we mustn't forget cheerleading. Cheerleading is far from unimportant. It may be even more important in the war on terror than it is in sports, because it legitimates your actions. And the cost of different types of things that we do—getting support from countries that we are operating in, as well as in terms of rallying domestic support inside the United States—requires some kind of mantle of legitimacy. While we can try to supply that to ourselves, teams have trouble cheering for themselves. A 250-pound linebacker just doesn't make an attractive cheerleader. But I shouldn't over extend this metaphor.

Now, when we look at Asia, we've got all of these kinds of problems. We've got an offense issue with North Korea, we've got defense issues in terms of dealing with al Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf, and potential North Korean agents—which is quite an issue, we don't talk about it much in the American press, but the Japanese and South Koreans are very well aware of it. We have a special teams issue, especially in regards to Indonesia which, if it goes bad, will go very fast up on our foreign policy agenda. And I

think more effective cheerleading is desperately needed in the region, vis-à-vis South Korea, obviously, and potentially in Japan, though right now we're doing pretty well on that. I'm also concerned about the Islamic parts of Southeast Asia, where the public mood is far from pro-American. So all of these things are necessary.

East Asia Lacks a Multilateral Framework

I think the problem in East Asia, in general, is that we lack some multilateral framework like that in Europe. Although many observers claim that NATO is dead, I see things rather differently. I think you're going to see a resurrection of NATO in the next year or two, which will be quite interesting, and quite necessary for the advancement of both U.S. and European security interests.

Of course, we are not going to create a NEATO, a Northeast Asia Treaty Organization—one of my favorite acronyms—the functional equivalent of NATO in Asia. But I do think that many types of minilateral and bilateral institutions are going to be critical in the coming years, including the U.S.-Japanese security treaty, TCOGs—the trilateral coordination group involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States—and PSI, the proliferation security initiative—which involves a number of other countries, including Australia and New Zealand.

We're not going to build a NEATO because we still need, in addition to our traditional alliance partners, the cooperation of the People's Republic of China. Creating a multilateral security organization will be bound to be seen in Beijing as being aimed against China, and this

would be highly counterproductive. But I do think that what we're seeing here, in the context of the war on terror and in the context of Asia, is a pressing need for a more multilateral framework. And while I think the hub-and-spoke logic may be attractive in a number of ways, precisely for the reasons you're saying—and I think it's particularly attractive to the current U.S. administration—it is going to run into big problems in the long run, in the context of the war on terror.

Unless the Asian countries feel that their strategic agenda is not being dominated by that of the United States, they are unlikely to give us the full measure of cooperation that is needed. We need responsibility-sharing, as well as burden-sharing, even if this means accepting some constraints on our freedom of maneuvering in the international arena. I throw this argument out to provoke a bit more of a debate on this topic.

Kawasaki Tsuyoshi: Thank you. I live in Canada, Vancouver, so I thought maybe I should give the Canadian, or more British Commonwealth perspective on what's going on now.

First, I want to elaborate on the definition of the current situation from the Canadian/British/Australian perspective. Then, I will try to discuss the implications of that definition in analyzing the current situation in East Asia. Some of those were mentioned by Tom Berger already. So let me continue on that line of discussion.

The first part is the definition of the current situation. We are experiencing virtual World War IV- a global scale military operation. This is a global scale war, because the United States thinks and be-

haves precisely that way. But this is a very peculiar global scale war because the enemies are quite elusive; they are terrorists and the three countries mentioned as the "Axis of Evil." We don't know exactly how these enemies are related to each other, but because of the bombings in Washington and New York City—and that was obviously the first bombing on the American homeland since the War of 1812—they became "the enemy," as one group, in the view of the United States. And given 9/11, you can understand the American reaction and why it's behaving the way it's been behaving.

In previous global scale wars, what political scientists call hegemonic wars, we saw victorious coalitions emerge. It just so happened that they were basically Anglo-American powers: the U.S., the U.K., Australia, and that's the core group. So-called Atlantist powers in NATO also belonged to this coalition.

We see a similar pattern now. Who are the primary supporters of the United States right now? The U.K., plus Australia, and then Canada. In addition, you have Spain and Portugal. In fact, it's Japanese strategy to join this elite club of Anglo-American powers which has governed the world order, basically since 1815.

So, we now have another global scale war, led by the Anglo-American powers. In this kind of situation, you have only two ultimate sources of legitimacy: the United States, and the United Nations. The Americans say they don't like the United Nations, but the United States and the United Nations must go hand in hand. That is the approach that Britain is trying to pursue. For example, let's take

a look at what happened in the Security Council before the Americans went into Iraq. In fact, PBS had a wonderful program about Blair's dilemma. Prime Minister Blair tried to get close to George W. Bush so he could influence American policy, rather than taking the French approach, which is basically to confront the United States.

Of course, Blair had an enormous difficulty in influencing George W. Bush. But in the game of diplomacy, you need international authority in the form of the United Nations. And, in fact, the U.S. forces in Iraq now have to incorporate the United Nations in more fundamental ways, so that the reconstruction of Iraq would go more smoothly.

Countries Are Stratified into Three Groups in Global-Wide Military Operation

In this kind of global-wide military operation, furthermore, all other countries besides the United States are stratified into three groups. As President Bush would say, "Are you with us or against us?" The first group consists of supporters, primarily Anglo-American powers, plus Atlantist countries. Second, you have neutral powers. Finally, you have enemies. China and Russia are staying somewhere in the neutrality area. France, perhaps, is doing the same. Germany may be coming back to support America, but it started in the neutrality box.

If you take that picture and apply it to the Asian Pacific region in context of institutions, it's very interesting, because in a global war situation, as I noted earlier, countries are divided into three groups, and institutions appear to deal with each category or group. For ex-

ample, at the moment we have North Korea as an enemy. To deal with North Korea, we have the six-party Talks. Out of this new institution, nothing significant has emerged yet. And as Tom Berger mentioned, we have PSI to deal with North Korea. This institution is led by the United States, within the supporters' group.

In a war, you have to deal with enemies, as well as your allies. You need institutions to deal with enemies, as well as with your allies. That's exactly what's happening at the moment. The six-party talks are for an enemy, and PSI is for allies.

And the victims of this new process are the institutions like the ASEAN Regional Forum, CSCAP, and all other confidence-building institutions. Some of these confidence-building institutions are called track two institutions. In track two institutions, government officials participate in private capacity. Academics, like Mr. Ralph Cossa and Ms. Fukushima, are also heavily involved in track two institutions. We had many of those until quite recently, and their status may be declining in the current global war situation, precisely because these confidence-building institutions assume that all participants are not enemies. But in the war situation we are in, that assumption no longer holds; we know clearly who our enemy is.

New Institutions: Six-Party Talks and PSI

So, we now have new institutions, that is, the six-party talks and PSI. What is really fascinating in this context is the six-party talks, not because it's a North Korean issue, but because this is the first

equivalent to a concert of great powers in Asia. For a long time, Northeast Asia was characterized by the lack of cohesive security institutions. Now we have a good candidate, finally.

Southeast Asians have a good history of ASEAN, and Northeast Asia has had few multilateral institutions, but now we have one. It is still at the very early stage, but this is the only institution for now, and having such an institution is a very historic event. I think we ought to keep our eye on what's going to happen to the six-party talks. Even after the North Korean situation gets resolved, we may see a continuation of this forum to deal with all our issues among the U.S., Russia, China, Japan, and the two Koreas. Thank you.

Michael Mastanduno: Thank you, Takashi, and thank you again to the organizers.

A couple of points. Let me just begin by maybe raising a question about something that John Ikenberry said in what I thought was a very provocative presentation about bilateralism and multilateralism.

One issue that caught my attention is the juxtaposition between bilateralism as involving bargaining, and multilateralism as involving rule-based behavior. I don't think that distinction is as stark as it might have come across. It seems to me that in multilateral arrangements there's still a lot of bargaining that goes on, and in bilateral arrangements, such as the U.S.-Japan relationship over the last 50 years, you have a lot of what any political scientist would have to consider rule-based behavior, rules and especially norms being followed. So it's not clear

to me that you move starkly across this divide and move from the arena of bargaining to the arena of rules as sharply as John pointed out, but that's something I hope we can discuss later on. Let me just make a few brief points, observations, really, about the United States and international institutions, to add to what has already been put on the table.

The first point I would make is that I don't think there is a very sharp line in the mind of American policymakers between going multilaterally or bilaterally, or for that matter, going unilaterally. I think American policymakers always see this as part of a mix, as approaches that can be complementary and not necessarily in contradiction to each other. Even where the United States in Asia is primarily involved in hub-and-spoke, bilateral relationships, it still supports multilateral arrangements. And it still initiates and encourages unilateral arrangements, such as KEDO. Ralph Cossa, I think, has made a lot of good arguments about the layering of bilateral, unilateral and multilateral kinds of arrangements in American foreign policy.

U.S. Takes Pragmatic Approach to Question of Institutions

My particular view is that the United States takes a very pragmatic approach to the question of institutions. It sometimes uses bilateral, sometimes multi, sometimes uses a mix, and doesn't see them in sharp contradiction to each other.

The second point has to do with American power. John Ikenberry talked a lot about how much power the United States has, and he's right about that, and I think that power has profound implications for how the United States approaches inter-

national institutions. The United States has a tremendous amount of discretion as a result of its power, and it has the power to create international institutions and maintain them, if it so chooses, but also to defy them or to destroy them.

And when we talk about the United States preferring rule-based orders, we have to remember that in rule-based order, the United States is often the state breaking the rules, because it has the power to do that. I tried an example in the group earlier, and I'll just put it on the table briefly again to show both of these points, both the pragmatic mix for the United States, and its capacity for both creating and breaking the rules for international institutions. The United States and Britain bilaterally created the international monetary system after the Second World War.

During the 1960s, the United States worked multilaterally with the finance ministers of the emerging advanced capitalist states to manage that system, the exchange rate system and financial system. In August of 1971, as many Japanese will remember vividly, the Nixon shocks took place and the United States unilaterally overturned that system, only to recreate a system in the 1970s, under the aegis of the G7, multilaterally. In the early 1980s, the Reagan administration defied that and returned to unilateralism, and refused to cooperate with other advanced industrial states in exchange rate policy, until the Plaza Accord, when the United States once again said we must move back to a multilateral situation.

Now, this is just one example in one issue area. I think in many issue areas you see the United States moving back and forth, between unilateral and multilateral and bilateral kinds of arrange-

ments, and having the luxury to do it because it's so powerful.

And that raises another important question that I think we need to talk about. What are the costs of moving the way the United States does, in this fashion? There is an implication in a lot of scholarship and a lot of policy work today that unilateralism—or anything other than multilateralism—raises important costs for the United States. We're about to find out, I think, in the next few years, just how costly this kind of behavior is. I'm not taking a position on it, but it's just not clear to me that it is as costly as the critics of unilateralism seem to think it is. To me, it's still an open question, and I think it's a great question for both political scientists and policymakers to try to figure out.

Bilateralism Will Be the Primary Emphasis in Asia

The final point I want to make is about my sense of where we might be going. Both John Ikenberry and Tom Berger talked a little bit about where we might be going, and I think both lean toward thinking multilateralism was the more likely path, for different reasons, in the years ahead. I'll put a different argument on the table. I think especially if you're looking at Asia, bilateralism is still going to be the primary emphasis, keeping in mind that there's a mix.

And I think bilateralism will be the primary emphasis for a number of reasons. One, the United States might have preferred, after 9/11, for there to emerge some kind of grand, multilateral coalition on the war on terrorism. It didn't emerge. Others simply don't see the problem in the way the United States does.

So, whether the United States wants to or not, it does not have the kind of multi-lateral consensus, for example, to meet the Soviet threat that it had in an earlier era. It has been forced to maintain a very workable hub-and-spoke arrangement in Asia, and, in fact, to try to expand it: a special partnership with China on the war on terrorism; a special relationship with Russia; a reaffirmation of special relations with Australia.

U.S. May Shift Emphasis From Certain Spokes to Other Spokes

If anything, I think what we might see down the road is the United States shifting the emphasis from certain spokes to other spokes in this hub-and-spoke relationship. It may be, for example, that the U.S.-Australian relationship—given that a lot of the action in the war on terrorism is in Southeast Asia, not Northeast Asia—may become more important than the U.S.-South Korean relationship. I would not find that to be all that surprising in the decade ahead, and obviously we're seeing all kinds of rumblings now that might suggest the early stages of such a move.

I also think that if we look at America's international economic policy, we also see some incentives to move the United States to a greater emphasis in the years ahead on bilateralism, as opposed to multilateralism—not a stark change from giving up on one and going to the other, but just a matter of emphasis. It seems to me that the multilateral trade negotiating round, the Doha round, is going to be very, very difficult to complete, even more difficult than the Uruguay round was. America's heart just isn't in it. There are also all kinds of incentives in the war on terrorism to use free trade

arrangements as ways to reward those states who are being loyal and cooperative. Free trade arrangements with Australia and free trade arrangements with some states in the Middle East may be examples of this.

U.S. Will Try to Have It Both Ways

And we have our old friend from the 1980s returning: huge bilateral trade deficits with Asian states, and with China, in particular. The United States has always been tempted to deal with these kinds of bilateral balances bilaterally, not multilaterally; the Japanese will remember that well from the 1980s. So down the road, I think there are a number of incentives for the United States to move bilaterally. But keep in mind, for the United States to place greater emphasis on bilateralism does not mean that it will abandon multilateralism. The United States has, throughout the postwar period, tried to have it both ways, and I think it will continue to do so. Thank you.

Inoguchi: Now I invite Ralph Cossa.

Ralph Cossa: Thank you, it's a great pleasure to be able to add my comments to this very learned group. I have both the disadvantage and the benefit of not being an academic, so I don't really understand terms like liberal, and realist, and constructionist and all of that, it just gets me very confused. My favorite definition, actually, of an academic is someone who sees something that works in reality and wonders whether it will work in theory or not, and I think we need to be very careful not to get caught up in that as we look at some of this stuff.

My own sense is that, first of all, all countries are by nature unilateralists when they can get away with it or when they feel they have to be. China didn't take a vote before deciding to build 496 missiles facing Taiwan; countries don't do that. Instead, they essentially deal with their own national interests. I think all of them look at the world, first and foremost, with a hub-and-spoke mentality, with themselves as the hub—that's who you are, and you're looking at how you interact with the rest of the world. And yet all, to varying degrees, see a certain benefit to multilateral cooperation as a vehicle for satisfying your unilateral objectives. So I don't think it's, as we said, an either-or.

As I hear particularly John's characterization of the Bush administration right now, I think back to my one big academic experience over the last couple of years, when I suffered under Michael and a few other scholars in trying to do some serious research for a book on American multilateralism, and I was doing the chapter on Asia. And in typical academic fashion, we struggled and struggled, and we put together what I thought was a very good product around 1999, 2000, and of course, by the time it got through the review process and got to the publishers, there was a new administration, so we had to go back and update the chapters.

So we went through that process, and of course, when it got to the publisher, 9/11 had happened, so we had to go back and update it again. At that point, I sort of erased Michael from my e-mails and refused to take any more e-mails from him, but the book is actually now out. The reason I bring this up is that my preconceived notion going into my chapter on

American views of multilateralism in Asia was that the U.S., under the Clinton administration, was gung-ho about multilateralism.

And what I concluded at the end of the first draft was that Clinton came in at about a nine on the scale of one to ten on multilateralism, but by the time he left, he was about a three or four; multilateralism was out. Clinton skipped half of the leaders' meetings, or a couple of the leaders' meetings that he created with APEC. Madeline Albright missed more ARF meetings than she attended.

President Bush Sees Some Value to Multilateralism

When I had to update it with Bush, I figured, well, Bush is going to be low. But in reality, Bush was around five or six, much less enthusiastic than Clinton had been when he started, but actually seeing some value to multilateralism. And after 9/11, that went up to a six or a seven, because it became a very useful vehicle. APEC has transformed from being strictly about economics, to being about economics and security—the things that people were throwing stones at Bill Perry for, who had said that maybe there ought to be a security dimension to APEC. Now you have comments coming out about a lot of security issues.

The ARF has become a useful vehicle for creating cooperation between the U.S. and ASEAN on terrorism. We have a document that has Colin Powell's signature on it, as well as the foreign minister's of Burma. Now, imagine trying to do that bilaterally; you couldn't. But ASEAN plus a U.S. counter-terrorism statement was signed by eleven foreign ministers, including the Burmese; multilater-

alism, at least in Asia—and that’s the area that I study and know about—has actually gotten some new life breathed into it. And it started, actually, before September 11th. There was a lot of work being done in order to try to make APEC economically relevant, and we’ve sort of forgotten the fact that it has somewhat tried to do that, despite some serious setbacks.

**Real Debate Is Institutionalized
Multilateralism Versus
Ad Hoc Coalition of the Willing
Multilateralism**

So I think that there is actually some—it’s not as we said, an either-or, but it’s also, I think, unfair to characterize this administration as being anti-multilateralism. More important to me, the real debate today, the crucial debate, is not hub-and-spoke versus multilateral or bilateral versus multilateral. The critical debate that we don’t know how is going to turn out is institutionalized multilateralism versus ad hoc coalition of the willing multilateralism, because that’s where things have changed, that’s been the real dramatic change.

And it didn’t start, again, with the Bush administration, though I was very critical of the fact that he waited six months too long to go to the U.N. in the case of Iraq, but at least went to the U.N., and we played through that process until it became hopeless. The Clinton administration bypassed the U.N. completely with Kosovo; we assumed it was going to get vetoed by other countries, so we said, “Let’s just forget about it, and let’s just go and do what we want to do.”

I think it’s more of a continuing trend toward great suspicion to these institutions.

During the Cold War, everyone was saying, well, if we could only get past the Cold War, then the U.N. is going to be really useful. Well, what happened is, we got past the Cold War, and the U.N. proved itself totally incapable of being useful. It still is. Australia had to put together an ad hoc coalition to rescue the Solomon Islands from anarchy. Why? Because the Solomon Islands recognize Taiwan, and therefore China wouldn’t allow the Security Council to send peacekeepers for exactly what the U.N. is supposed to be doing. So the end of the Cold War hasn’t created the opportunity that was there.

A lot has been made of Kofi Annan’s speech this past September at the U.N. General Assembly, and this was, as you may recall, just before George Bush spoke. In his speech, he made a comment about countries that feel like they can work outside of the U.N. process, that the pre-emptive unilateral, etc., run the risk of losing legitimacy etc. And that was the big headline, that Annan takes a slap at Bush and tells him, “You need to cool it.”

Nobody read the rest of his speech. The next three lines say, to the rest of the Security Council members and the General Assembly, on the other hand, that if our institutions are not prepared to deal with security challenges that other countries consider to be legitimate and urgent, then our institutions are going to become useless, they’re going to be rendered useless. There was a very strong message.

Bush, in his speech, in addition to trying to justify Iraq and all of the rest of this stuff, challenged the members of the General Assembly to start taking steps to

counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, essentially to institutionalize, to have a Security Council regime and a U.N. regime that would render things like the proliferation security initiative irrelevant or unnecessary. But he also made it clear that he wasn't going to wait until the Security Council got its act together.

By the way, the U.S. has introduced several non-proliferation resolutions that have gone absolutely nowhere on this issue. The proliferation security initiative represents like-minded countries acting as a "coalition of the willing." This initiative is based on the premise that there is something seriously wrong when it's okay to cooperate to stop drug shipments, but not to stop shipments of fissile material. International protocols exist to fight the war on drugs; we need the same ability to fight the spread of weapons of mass destruction. There's a new challenge out there, and we need to address this challenge, and if the institutions aren't doing it, then these ad hoc institutions are going to come to the fore.

Now the real question—and John, this is where I would ask you to dig a little deeper in what you're talking about—is how does this square with bilateral security alliances? To date the allies, at least in Asia, have been part of the coalition of the willing. Even the Japanese now in Iraq weren't there during the first part, but they were playing the Germans, they went into the Indian Ocean and allowed our ships to come in. We've seen in Europe that some of the NATO allies did not, although NATO is still playing a lead role in Afghanistan, so you can make arguments either way.

But how do you balance ad hoc multilateralism with the alliances if the U.S. goes in the direction that all the allies aren't going to sign up for? Can alliances withstand not being a member of every coalition of the willing? And that could be the thing that could put the alliances at risk in the long term. Thank you.

Sato Yoichiro: Thank you very much. These two days have been very exciting for me because of these very stimulating discussions.

First, I think I'd like to point out what I think is the most important point in this discussion—first brought up by Professor Mastanduno, and followed by the comments by Mr. Cossa—which is that this kind of assumed dichotomy between bilateralism and multilateralism doesn't have many practical implications, and in reality, it's more diffused in a very mixed way. And at the same time, the important distinction within the institutionalized multilateralism and ad hoc multilateralism has been somewhat overlooked in earlier discussions. I completely agree with these assessments by the two observers, and I'd like to follow on that.

First of all, Professor Ikenberry pointed out a couple of reasons why the United States is moving toward the side of unilateral direction, or a kind of hub-and-spoke bilateralism. And those reasons included the divide-and-conquer strategy—which will work for the benefit of the United States—which constrains U.S. actions much less than more rule-based multilateralism. And this type of model makes it possible for the U.S. to play patronage politics by rewarding its bilateral allies through such means as bilateral free trade agreements, and so forth.

Why U.S. Prefers Hub-and-Spoke Model

However, on this list, I was not necessarily disagreeing with these advantages of the hub-and-spoke model, but I would also like to add a couple of points why the U.S. also prefers this model. And it's not only for the U.S. interests, but sometimes the bilateral hub-and-spoke models can be of interest to America's allies as well. And the reasons for cooperating on security issues with the United States are based on rather unique, local conditions.

The security conditions regarding Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines are not necessarily the same as the conditions of security in Indonesia, or the Islamic rebels on the southern Thai border. So, because of the divergence of local situations, each country would prefer to cooperate bilaterally, and the multilateral, over-encompassing rules are not necessarily in their interest.

And the second point related to that is by creating a large, multilateral body and generalized rules, which apply to all of them, you could possibly invite unnecessary participants into discussions whose presence would rather complicate a quick and effective solution to the problem at hand.

Let me talk specifically about the current six-party talks. Nobody but Japan cares so much about abduction issues, and I would rather emphasize that even the Japanese foreign ministry did not want to discuss the abduction issue at the six-party talks. And they have tried to keep this issue off the table for a long, long time in the past, but of course the failed Pyongyang summit between Kim and Koizumi resulted in very negative public

opinion in Japan against North Korea, which necessitated that abduction be discussed at the six-party talks. This is a clear example of how broadened participation can be very harmful against quick and effective resolution of the more important problems, such as nuclear proliferation.

So in that context, I disagree with Professor Berger that because the counter-terrorism operation is not only about bombing terrorist cells, but also about border security, reconstruction of failed states, building political coalitions and sharing the cost of reconstruction, etc., that multilateral cooperation is needed here, and the hub-and-spoke model may not work very well. I think that is a little bit oversimplified, and I think you can use the same argument to support the idea that ad hoc multilateralism is probably the best way to deal with counter-terrorism operations.

The rest are some minor points. Dr. Kawasaki included Canada in the supporter camp of the United States; I'm not so sure if Canada was a supporter. And in regard to Anglo-American countries as a core coalition, New Zealand was not a supporter in this Iraq case, although New Zealand was a strong supporter in the Afghanistan case. So those are just minor points.

And I was fascinated by this idea of the six-party talks as the first multilateral attempt in Northeast Asia. I think you're right in the post-World War II context. But if you look more historically, maybe it's a return to the pre-World War II system, in which the concept of the balance of power among Japan and colonial powers who were in China and the rest of

Asia set the rules of the game. Thank you very much.

Inoguchi: Professor Ikenberry, you are given the opportunity to strike back

Ikenberry: I agree with the point that the two ideal types that I proposed as competing logics of unipolarity are just that, ideal types, and that it is likely that you could have a mix. And Mike's point is well taken, that the United States is not, in any philosophical sense, wedded to one or the other; it's more a pragmatic, seat-of-the-pants kind of choice about what works, as opposed to more philosophical commitments to multilateralism or bilateralism.

In that case, I think Mike is making an argument different than Ralph's. Ralph is really arguing that if you can, you want to go bilateral, or even want to be unilateral, in the sense that they don't want to be tied up in these institutions unless they really have to and can find advantages to do so.

I do think there are very different logics of order at stake here though, and the ideal type helps you clarify change over time, differences between regions, and it helps you see what the impact of background structural changes may be, even if it's not so much the replacement of one order with the other, or the replacement of multilateralism with bilateralism. And I was trying to say at the very least that during the Cold War era, both co-existed. One was, in terms of security, the core logic in East Asia—bilateral hub and spoke—and the other was the core logic in Europe.

So I think that's true, and if you take the kind of hub-and-spoke argument a little

further than I did, there's a kind of concrete, specific bargained relationship about security and economic relations individually, state by state. That's a very different order than one that says a set of rules governs the system. Again, it's the difference between going into a town that's run by the mob and one that's run by a kind of police and rule and court system. In one town when you go in and try to figure out how to operate, you have to ask the question, who's powerful? Who do I have to bargain with, who do I have to pay off or make happy? What is the kind of racket that I need to run? It's not to say that I'm any more endangered; I may even like that. It may be that as a person coming into that town, that may serve my interests, so it's not to say that that's necessarily less desirable for everyone. But it's a very different argument to say that it's power, not rules that run the system than saying its rules, not entirely power that runs the system.

Mix of Power and Rules Run the System

I think there is likely to always be a mix; I take Ralph's points about bilateralism very seriously; I, too, think that there's going to be more pressure on the system to move that way, to disaggregate, to do specific security deals. And economically I think he's also right, partly because—as has been remarked for almost 20 years now—the multilateral trade system arrangement, the WTO system, is increasingly unresponsive to the real economic challenges ahead, which are these non-tariff barriers that are better tackled by very concrete, specific trade negotiations that really require lawyers, so you're not trying to balance tariff reductions, which is conducive to multilateralism. But you're trying to say, "We

will get at our buy America clause, if you work on your health standards that allow us to have trade flows open up.”

So I think that Mike’s comments reinforce my view that there can be shifts in the balance between the two. And I guess I would also somewhat resist Ralph’s view that it’s not the difference between unilateralism and multilateralism that’s most important, but between formal, institutionalized multilateralism and informal, ad hoc multilateralism. I do think that the latter is, basically, a kind of coalitional bilateralism; I think the firebrick is between one and the other.

To sharpen this point, the coalition of the willing is a radical shift away from a kind of formal, multilateral system. Or to put it in the vernacular of the administration, when Rumsfeld says the mission will determine the coalition rather than the other way around, that is a radical shift from the post-war system, where the coalition will determine, we will consult together and agree together what the threats are, and then we will march out together to address them.

It may or may not be the case that we can continue that system because of the objective reality that we can’t all agree on threats. We can debate that, but it is a difference, and I think that maybe it’s best, as a good political scientist, to look for both those distinctions between bilateral and multilateral, and informal and institutionalized each; you’ve got all four of those possibilities.

Q&A

Questioner: Well thank you, I was listening yesterday for most of the time

and most of today. I’d like to pick up on something that Tom Berger said yesterday in his lead-in, that we’re all part of the same epistemic community, and perhaps there’s something to that. Maybe I’ve missed something here, but I haven’t heard an answer to Victor Cha’s question as to alliance for what? Or the opposite, against what? It was a pregnant question put out there, but not picked up and not addressed.

Secondly, I haven’t heard once about the invisible elephant in the room, and this is related to the first point I’m making, and that is China. And the invisible elephant that may be just outside the room, Russia, in reference to its exercise of two weeks ago simulating a nuclear war, and its introduction of a new weapon in that device.

I also wanted to address a couple of things Ralph Cossa said. He spoke of continuity and the attitude towards multilateralism between the Clinton and Bush administrations, perhaps a wavering different process within each. But I would like to argue that, in fact, the two administrations have rather different attitudes towards multilateralism, in terms of the approach to it, and in terms, perhaps, of their definition of it.

And I would argue that the Clinton administration took a more give-and-take approach, where it actually seemed to listen, at least in regards to Asia, to some of the things that were being said. The Clinton administration was proposing a series of initiatives that were, in my view, genuine multilateralism among equal, or at least sovereign nations, versus the Bush administration’s multilateralism which is, as far as I can see, “We’ll tell

you what to do, and if you do it with us, that's multilateralism."

And then finally, the example of the PSI as being somehow a successful model of an ad hoc multilateralism. There is a very, very good reason for countries to be extremely cautious about the PSI proposal. This is not just about fissile material, the example that Ralph mentioned. This is about a wide range of possible ingredients of WMD, equipment to manufacture them, means of delivery, such as zodiac boats, for example, which delivered against the Lindbergh and against the Cole. And it also, frankly, is an attempt to go outside of existing international law—that is, the law of the sea, which the United States negotiated over many, many years—and, in particular, the clauses on freedom of abrogation and on innocent passage.

When you talk about the ingredients, you're talking about dual use materials that many countries need for insecticides or fertilizers or for other things. So I can give you papers and a long discourse on PSI, but there's very good reasons for countries to be very cautious about its goals. Thank you.

U.S. Unilateralism Started in 1998

Cossa: I have been critical of Bush's definition of multilateralism, which is "Get on our bandwagon and we're going to continue to steer," so I don't take full exception with that, although I do think it's probably a little harsh. My own view was that Clinton started out listening, but that that's not the way it ended, and again, you're welcome to read our chapter, or buy Mike's book, and you can learn all about that.

But I think all of the complaints about U.S. unilateralism really started in '98, under the Clinton administration, and I think there was this mood that has sort of carried on.

I think the PSI is an excellent example of how people are going to come together to solve a problem if the institutions don't do it, and that was my point, that this was what it's an example of, not whether it's a good model or not. But I will say that everything I have read about the PSI—including the statement of principles that came out of the Paris meeting—and every speech that every American has given on it, including my least favorite friend John Bolton, has always started off by saying that all of its activities need to be in accordance with international law and national law.

And one of the things that Bush was stressing at the U.N. was that countries need to look at their laws to make sure that they are relevant in these areas, and look to countries to agree. And I think one of the big breakthroughs on the PSI was a couple of weeks ago, when Liberia agreed that it would open its vessels to inspection on the high seas, if there was a suspicion about them carrying weapons of mass destruction. This is a very cooperative effort, which then makes it legal, and I think this is exactly what they were trying to do.

The one example that predates the PSI but I think is still illustrative, was when the Spanish stopped the North Korean ship in the Indian Ocean, a ship that was sailing without a flag, with its name painted over, and with a false manifest. Once it was determined that the cargo actually had a legitimate owner, it was allowed to go on; the rule of law actually

did prevail. The only laws that were broken were the laws broken by that ship by not having what was in the ship on that manifest, and the various other things it was doing, trying to essentially get itself caught and try to create an international incident.

I think it goes back to something, which I guess Mike had said, when he talked about the U.S. being willing to break the rules. True. But you don't have to be a unipower to do that. The country that has broken, as far as I know, the most rules in the last couple of years is, first of all, North Korea, who has cheated on every international agreement that it's had, and that's not even talking about human rights.

And then, by the way, Burma. Talk to the junta in Burma about who follows the rules. It seems to me that you don't have to be a unipower to do it, or to get away with it; it depends on who's protecting you, just like in the good old days.

Policy of Preemption

One of things that concerns me, going back to some of John's comments, and you had said it earlier, is the policy of preemption; it disturbs me, and I've written on why it disturbs me. But the problem is that if you play word association, and you say national security strategy to 100 people, 50 won't know what it is, but for the other 50 who know what it is, the immediate word they'll say back is "preemption." But for those who have actually read the national security strategy that's on one page, there are a couple of paragraphs dealing specifically with an imminent threat posed by weapons of mass destruction.

The real important chapter from the other standpoint is an entire chapter on concert of powers, on the major powers' cooperation in the post-Cold War world. What's going to be required is essentially this coalition of the major powers, who now have an opportunity to have the same basic objectives moving forward, which is somewhat visionary.

Now, whether or not we're going to see it through, whether reality allows that to happen, it's in some cases sort of like being in search of the new world order, and we're still searching. But I think that's the flip side of the preemption debate, so read the rest of the book.

The other 33 pages are not about preemption, they're about the continued importance of deterrence and, most important, about this concert of powers. And I think that provides a little bit of balance, where we at least provide the vision of where we want to go. Thank you.

Inoguchi: I perhaps should mention, in response to Ralph's comment on this, that in 2000 John Bolton gave a lecture at the American Center in Tokyo in which he mentioned multilateralism about a dozen times. Why? If we read his article in the *Journal of International Law*, before he entered the government, he mentioned unilateralism a dozen times. And I asked him the question: "Why in 2000 did you mention unilateralism a dozen times, and why do you now mention multilateralism a dozen times?" He said, "Well, I was not in the government!" But at any rate, I would like to thank all the participants for this wonderful, very lively, but not easy to tackle subject. Thank you very much.

[End]

About the Panelists

Main Speakers

Dr. Thomas Berger is Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at Boston University. Previously he taught at the Johns Hopkins Department of Political Science. His primary research areas include international security, international migration, and the politics of memory and historical representation. He has held a number of post-doctoral and research fellowships. He received his B.A. from Columbia University and his Ph.D. from MIT. Dr. Berger is the author of *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (1998). His articles and essays have appeared in numerous edited volumes and journals, including *International Security* and *Review of International Affairs*.

Dr. John Ikenberry is the Peter F. Krogh Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice at Georgetown University. He is also the first Director of the Mortara Center for International Affairs at Georgetown University, which was inaugurated in January 2003. He previously taught at Princeton University and the University of Pennsylvania and held posts at the State Department (Policy Planning) and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Senior Associate). Dr. Ikenberry has also been a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution (1997-2002). He is also the reviewer of books on political and legal affairs for *Foreign Affairs*. During 1998-99, Dr. Ikenberry was an international scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., which is part of the Smithsonian Institution. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. Dr. Ikenberry has published many books, including *State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy* (co-author, 2002), *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (2000), and *Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government* (1988). He has published in all the major academic journals of international relations and written widely in policy journals.

Dr. Tsuyoshi Kawasaki is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Simon Fraser University. His scholarly interests include Japanese foreign policy and the international relations of the Asia-Pacific Region. Previously, he was a visiting professor and Japan Foundation Fellow at Osaka University, lecturer at the University of Victoria, and a research associate at the University of British Columbia. He reviews manuscripts for such academic journals as *Asian Perspective* and *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*. Dr. Kawasaki received his Ph.D. from Princeton University. His most recent publications are "Japan's Geopolitical Imperatives: A Fresh Look," in *Understanding Japan in the 21st Century* (forthcoming in 2004), "Kokusai Kozo to Sengo Nihon no Anzen Hosho Seisaku" in *Posuto Wesutofarian Shisutemu no Yukue* (forthcoming in 2004), and "Formulating Canada's Grand Strategy in Asia," in *International Journal* (Winter 200/01).

Dr. Michael Mastanduno is Nelson A. Rockefeller Professor of Government and Associate Dean for the Social Sciences at Dartmouth College. His areas of research and teaching specialization include international relations, United States foreign policy, and the politics of the global economy. Dr. Mastanduno lectures widely in Europe and Asia and has been a guest faculty member at the Graduate School of Economics and International Relations at Milan, at the University of Tokyo, and at the Geneva Center for Security Policy. He has been awarded fellowships from the Brookings Institution, the Council of Foreign Relations, the East-West Center, and the Salzburg Seminar. He served during a sabbatical from Dartmouth as a special assistant in the Office of the U.S. Trade

Representative. He is a member of the Council of Foreign Relations and Phi Beta Kappa. Dr. Mastanduno served as Director of Dartmouth's John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding for six years. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Princeton University. He is the author or editor of numerous books including *Economic Containment*, (1992), *Unipolar Politics* (1999), *International Relations Theory and the Asia Pacific* (2003), and *U.S. Hegemony and International Organizations* (2003).

Discussants

Mr. Ralph Cossa is President of the Pacific Forum, CSIS. He manages the Forum's programs on security, political, economic, and environmental issues. He sits on the steering committee of the Council For Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, serves as Executive Director of the U.S. Committee of CSCAP, and is a board member of the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies. Mr. Cossa has over 25 years of experience in formulating and implementing U.S. security policy in the Asia-Pacific and Near East-South Asia regions. He is a retired USAF Colonel and a former national security affairs fellow at the Hoover Institution. Mr. Cossa holds a B.A. from Syracuse University, an M.B.A. from Pepperdine University and an M.S. in strategic studies from the Defense Intelligence College.

Dr. Yoichiro Sato is an Associate Professor at the Asian-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii. He joined the center in 2001 after teaching at Auckland University's Department of Political Studies. He has also taught at the University of Hawaii and Kansai Gaidai Hawaii College. Dr. Sato is a member of the Japan Political Studies Group of the American Political Science Association and the International Studies Association. In Auckland, he has served as the branch Vice President of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. Dr. Sato received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Hawaii, an M.A. in international studies from the University of South Carolina, and a B.A. in law from Keio University. His research writings have appeared in such journals as the *Asian Perspective*, *Asian Affairs*, *Japan Studies Review*, *Japanese Studies* (Australia) and the *New Zealand International Review*, as well as in numerous edited books by others. He co-edited a book (with Akitoshi Miyashita), *Japanese Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific* (2001). His op-ed articles on international fishery issues have appeared in *Asia Times*, *Canberra Times*, *International Herald Tribune*, *Japan Times*, and *New Zealand Herald*.

Moderator

Dr. Inoguchi Takashi is Professor of Political Science at the Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo. Previously, he was a professor at Sophia University, and held visiting positions (research and/or teaching) at the University of Geneva, Harvard University, and Australian National University. His professional activities include the positions of Senior Vice Rector (Assistant Secretary General of UN) at the United Nations University Headquarters (1995-1997) and President of the Japan Association of International Relations (2000-2002). He received a B.A. and M.A. from the University of Tokyo and a Ph.D. from MIT. Dr. Inoguchi is on the journal editorial board for numerous journals, including *Japanese Journal of Political Science* (executive editor) and *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* (editor-in-chief). He has published many books and articles in English and Japanese. His most recent books in English are *Reinventing the Alliance: U.S.-Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change* (2003), *Japan's Asian Policy: Revival and Response* (2002), and *Global Change: a Japanese Perspective* (2001).