

# **Between Bilateralism and Community: U.S.-Japan Security Relations in a Changing East Asia**

## **Seminar 1**

### **Japanese Approaches to International Institutions: Beyond Bilateralism?**

**Inoguchi Takashi:** I am going to speak about Japanese approaches to international institutions, starting with what characterizes Japanese approaches to international institutions, how this has come about, and how this typical kind of Japanese approach can be placed in the evolution of Japanese foreign policy. In other words, I will talk about the impacts of Japanese foreign policy upon Japanese approaches to international institutions. And I will talk about the latest developments for the near future.

First, the Japanese approach to international institutions needs to be understood only in the contents of the evolution of Japanese foreign relations, especially after 1945. The important thing is that the Japanese were embraced by defeat, but they have transformed this embrace to something like an embrace by an alliance, and then the alliance as their destiny, that seems to be characterizing the Japanese approach to international institutions very strongly, even until today.

#### **U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Alliance Has Permeated Japan's Foreign Policy**

The occupation ended in 1952, but still this sticky bilateralism, this institution loyal to bilateralism called the United States-Japan Security Treaty Alliance has been permeating every aspect and dimension of Japanese foreign policy. Why, is a very important question, because basically it means that all the eggs are in one basket—not just security,

energy, food, but many other things. It should be redirected or modified. Many people have advised the Japanese to do so, but despite hearing this for more than half a century, still the Japanese have been sticking to bilateralism, and not just to the United States, but with other countries as well. My speech is basically to talk about why this is. I would say there are four factors.

The Cold War security structure started bilaterally by enabling countries to also stick with bilateralism. In the immediate post-1945 years, many countries didn't get along with each other very well along the East-West dimension.

The second factor is that the legacy of the past it is very, very important, because Japan is the only defeated country since World War II. We are the bad guys, and all the rest are newly emerged good guys with the United Nations. Some countries demanded indemnities, etc., and we had to deal with them one by one. And we still do not have even a peace treaty with Russia. With China we concluded one in 1978.

The third factor is diversity of economic development. Initially, in 1945, Japan was the least developed country in Asia. The per capita income level of Japan was the lowest in all of East and Southeast Asia; that of the Philippines was the highest. But somehow, from the 1960s, the structure of economic development changed enormously, and somehow this diversity made it very diffi-

cult to make regional groupings in this part of the world.

When APEC, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum was created, the principle was basically “open loose regionalism.” What does that mean? That means it’s all up to you, that institution’s power was non-binding. And that’s how not only Japan, but all other members of APEC wanted it, except for the United States.

The fourth factor is suspicion of international accords; it is important, but sometimes neglected. Japan is also a country in Asia that has emerged from difficulties after being coerced to go into contacts with Western countries in 1853 and ’54. 2004 is the 150<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the American naval visit, coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis Japan, and somehow Japan and many Asian countries are always apprehensive about the implications of international accords, whatever accord they go into, asking “Does this affect us negatively, or does it affect us in terms of revising domestic rules and ways of doing things at home?” And these things are still intermittently taking place in the thinking of Japanese policymakers.

This has made our bilateralism, which was especially reinforced by the alliance with the United States since 1952. But what about the foreign policy environment that has made us change for the last half-century? How has Japan come all the way in terms of its foreign policy direction?

Five distinctive periods can be identified in Japanese foreign policy since 1945. The first period is the one of domestic constitutions about the alliance with the United States. From 1945 to ’60, this was basically a domestic competition between the forces against the United States and the pro-United States alliance. And this was a very vi-

gorous one; the United States could not do much at that time, except to occupy Japan, more or less. And then the Korean War took place, but the United States basically was able to use all the facilities, including military bases, to execute the Korean War. But on the part of Japan, Japan did not do much.

### **Yoshida Doctrine: Free Rider Period**

The second period is the one of the Yoshida Doctrine, or the free rider period. The second period came in 1960, after the revision of the security treaty. Prime Minister Kishi did it, and then the period from 1960 to 1975 was a period when the Yoshida Doctrine prevailed. What is the Yoshida Doctrine? It is a free rider on the security treaty. And during this period, of course, the Vietnam War took place and the United States used the facilities enabled by the United States-Japan Security Treaty. The first and second periods saw bilateralism as almost the sole mechanism in the contacts of Japanese foreign policy. If the duties of the alliance with the United States are called unreciprocal from Japan's point of view, one can call Japan's approach “zerolateralism” or “nulltilateralism” in the sense of not trying to exert influence on other countries.

The third period is the one of Japan playing a supportive role to the U.S.-led international economic items. The economic miracle took place after the 1960s, and was interrupted by the oil crisis. Japan became a kind of supporter within the U.S.-led international system, especially the economic international system, and that was from 1975 to 1990. We did it nicely in many ways, and an important event was the Plaza Agreement of 1985 whereby Japan poured money into New York. Somehow the United States recovered from some difficulties

that Mr. Reagan faced in 1981; this period saw the supportive role of Japan.

The fourth period is the one of global power. 1990 to 2005 is a global civilian power kind of period, whereby Japan started to send troops to UN peacekeeping operations in Angola, Kosovo, Palestine, Cambodia, East Timor, etc. Political scientists coined this phrase, “global civilian power.” It is very popular in Japan as well, because even if you do not build military armed forces—because Germany and Japan are both anti-militarist—we can do something good, we can be liberated at least partially from the accusation that Japan is a free rider.

But this period was punctuated by difficulties, of course. In the mid-1990s, the Korean crisis took place, the Taiwan crisis took place, and then to that end, something took place on September 11<sup>th</sup>, the Afghan War, Iraqi War, etc., so although the period of global civilian power seems to have gone down, it is still going on.

The fifth period is the one of a global ordinary power. What I envisage to come is Japan as a global ordinary power. The governing party, the Liberal Democratic Party, announced that they would propose a revised constitution draft in 2005, and the largest opposition party announced they would do the same, in their own version in 2006, and the whole game is changing quite rapidly. Looking at the security treaty contents, it’s amazing to find a real operational realization of the security treaty that has been taking place for the last decade or so.

### **Sea Changes in U.S.-Japan Relationship**

It was in 1997, when the Japan-U.S. defense declaration was made, in which the most important sentence was, “Japan is primarily responsible for the defense of Japan-

ese territories.” This is quite revolutionary, given the past and previous practices of Japan and the United States, with respect to the Japanese territorial defense. But of course, in the Japanese language it is called *shutaitekini sekkyokutekini*. This concerns domestic politics. This is a major sea change, as far as the text goes.

And the second change comes from the Crawford meeting between Prime Minister Koizumi and President Bush that took place in May 2003, in which again another sea change took place. That is, the scope of the Japan-U.S. treaty used to be geographically limited, but now it has become global, it’s a sea change. Of course, not much in practice has changed, but one of the results of this sea change is that Japan is sending troops to Iraq, and associated actions and preparations are taking place.

### **Increasing Use of Multilateralism in Japanese Foreign Policy**

But what about bilateralism? We observe more multilateralism in Japanese foreign policy. The Asian Monetary Fund idea, or the sudden activation of the Japanese participation in the conference on disarmament, or the somewhat belated but still suddenly activated trade talks in East and Southeast Asia are now taking place. This is partly the result of the Japanese grand strategy of consolidating bilateralism first, by and through its bilateral relationship with the United States, and along with it, enhancing the scope of diplomatic and other kinds of space through which they’ll use multilateral institutions. And that is taking place in currency, free trade, disarmament and many other things.

But it is sufficient for me to say that sticky bilateralism stays, yet something more is being added, and that is coming with a very

quick evolution of Japanese foreign policy lines. Only in 1997 did we become primarily responsible for the defense of Japanese territories. In 2004 another development took place when sending troops abroad, when the pacification of occupied terrorism has not been completed. And the major item of promise in 1997, the task of transferring one American base in Okinawa to another place, is now being cancelled by the United States government, without this task being executed by the Japanese government at all.

Americans have become very, very global looking, and so have the Japanese. We are sticking to bilateralism, and so the development of Japanese bilateralism and multilateralism goes on in tandem, side by side, and the scope of Japanese foreign policy is being enlarged quite rapidly. Thank you very much.

**John Ikenberry:** Now we will have four short interventions by our additional panelists before we come to our two discussants.

**Victor Cha:** I, too, am happy to be part of this project that Takashi and John are doing. It really has been a very good project, and I have learned a lot in participating in this project with regard to institutions, as well as multilateralism.

I just want to make two quick points. The first is, as Takashi said, I think in this project we try to think about this notion of bilateralism and multilateralism not in zero sum terms. Often, when people look at the region of Asian security, there's a tendency to view these things as zero sum, in the sense that the United States established these bilateral alliances, and anything that moves in the direction of multilateralism necessarily takes away from those bilateral alliances. And I think the approach of the

project is that that's not the way to look at these things. In fact, bilateralism and multilateralism are mutually reinforcing in Asia.

### **U.S.-Japan Alliance Growing Stronger as Japan Becomes More Active in a Multilateral Setting**

And with regard to the U.S.-Japan alliance, the alliance grows stronger as Japan expands and becomes more active in a multilateral setting, just as Japan's activeness in the multilateral setting reinforces the U.S.-Japan alliance, because it makes Japan a more capable and autonomous partner within the alliance. And where you see that, for example, is in terms of Japanese participation in the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq.

What was most interesting there to me was that the Japanese contextualized their role in Iraq not as something that they're doing for the alliance. The Japanese talked about their role sending forces to Iraq because they want stability and democracy in the Middle East as something that's in Japan's interest. And framing it in that way, not framing it as a favor you're doing for an ally, but as something that's in Japan's interest, is something that is very good for the alliance, it's what makes the alliance even stronger.

And then finally, I'll comment on Takashi's point about Crawford and the building of the alliance to a global level. That, I think, is also something that shows the great resiliency of the U.S.-Japan alliance, because in my own understanding of alliances, alliances that succeed are the ones that evolve. Every alliance may start out as a short-term agreement to deal with one particular threat, but the alliances that move beyond that are ones that can expand to sort of a regional

capacity, such as the U.S.-Japan alliance for regional stability.

But arguably, the U.S.-Japanese alliance has moved beyond that now. It's not simply about regional stability, it stands for extra-regional issues, whether that's non-proliferation, counterterrorism, things of that nature. And now, with this talk at Crawford about the U.S.-Japan alliance as a global alliance, this is really talking more about what the alliance stands for now, rather than what it stands against, and I think that's a watershed step in the alliance relationship.

### **Japan Has Strengthened Its Bilateral Alliance with the U.S.**

**Fukushima Akiko:** Thank you. On the topic of this seminar, "Japanese Approaches to International Institutions, Beyond Bilateralism," with a question mark, I'd like to highlight three S's. Let me start with the first "S," that is, strengthening bilateralism through greater assertiveness. The Japanese government, without any doubt, regards its bilateral relations with the United States as the bedrock of its foreign and security policy. This has not changed since the end of World War II. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, despite initial debate on both sides of the Pacific over the need for a continued U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance, due to the disappearance of a clear cut adversary in the Soviet Union, Japan has strengthened its bilateral alliance, triggered by a series of events. These events include the 1993-94 tension over the possible development of nuclear weapons, the launch of missiles by North Korea, 9/11 and the current crisis over possible uranium enrichment by North Korea.

This was manifested in the Joint Declaration by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto in 1996, the agreement on

the Japan-U.S. Defense Guidelines, the Japanese dispatch of Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to support U.S. anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan, and the subsequent dispatch of SDF to Iraq. Those decisions made by Japan through the 1990's and thereafter exemplify Japan's increasing determination to assume greater responsibility in matters of international peace and security. This determination has strengthened the alliance further, perhaps to a level unimaginable a decade ago, at a time when Japan could not send the SDF to the 1990-91 Gulf War. Only a decade ago, the notion of engaging the SDF abroad aroused fury in Japan and in its neighbors.

Ironically, the North Korean threat, the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism have made Japan acutely aware that its support for U.S. forces was of crucial importance to the credibility of U.S.-Japan security ties. Japan has to explore the extent to which it would offer support activities to U.S. forces if hostilities erupted on the Korean Peninsula.

Today the Japan-U.S. bilateral alliance is contributing not only to the defense of Japan but also to the peace and stability of the region. The alliance has acquired the character of a regional public good. The regional security aspect has been included in the security treaty from the beginning, but has gained more prominence in recent years. In this sense, there has emerged a "bilateralism plus" in the U.S.-Japan alliance.

On a side note, I may add that I could not use the term "the U.S.-Japan alliance" a decade ago in my research report for my institution. I was instructed to use "the Japan-U.S. security arrangement," rather than "alliance." Today nobody objects, so this might be one reflection of the strengthening alliance.

I would also like to note that the so-called hub and spoke architecture of regional security remains. There is one change developing, however. That is, spokes that did not develop mutual partnerships during the Cold War have started to have more interactions, at least at the level of dialogue, and in some cases joint exercises. Spokes such as Japan, Korea, and Australia may develop into a “wheel” in the future.

### **Bilateralism May Be Harnessed by Multilateralism**

The Second “S” is supplementing bilateralism without supplanting multilateralism. Since the end of the Cold War, Japan has taken initiatives and has engaged in multilateralism in the region, from the track one processes of APEC, ARF, ASEAN Plus 3, etc. to track two CSCAP and NEACD. It was Japanese foreign minister Nakayama Taro who proposed an ARF-like framework at the ASEAN PMC. When these processes were created in the 1990s, some questioned whether multilateralism would replace bilateralism. However, soon came the common wisdom that these processes would form a multi-layered structure and supplement bilateralism, but not supplant it. As the first “S” noted, bilateralism remains the mainstay of foreign relations in Asia but may be harnessed by multilateralism.

Up until the early 1990s, many in the Asia Pacific believed that multilateralism could not solve problems, but rather would cause them. Such beliefs have not receded but many have come to recognize some utility in multilateralism. At the very least, as Professor Inoguchi pointed out, they have come to recognize that multilateral forums can offer an inexpensive venue to set up bilateral talks. Many bilateral summits are held at the APEC leaders’ meetings. Those who have tense relations may find it diffi-

cult to have reciprocal visits, but find it easier to meet at the fringes of multilateral meetings. For example, the Japanese prime minister finds it difficult to make official visits to China because of his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, but can meet with his Chinese counterpart at the margins of APEC or ASEAN Plus 3 leaders’ meetings.

However, security multilateralism in the region is limited to security dialogues and has not yet reached the stage of an institution for security cooperation. ARF, which is the sole framework for regional security, has a 10-year history, but still remains in the realm of confidence-building. Members agreed to proceed to the second phase of its evolution, i.e. preventive diplomacy, but its limited scope prevents ARF from fully implementing preventive diplomacy. In particular, as it defines preventive diplomacy as dealing with inter-state conflict, members can deny intervention by the ARF by asserting that a conflict is intra-state.

Mr. Ralph Cossa knows the debate inside out through his chairmanship of the CSBMs working group of CSCAP in developing the concept and definition of preventive diplomacy. ARF has been an effective mechanism for confidence-building and has helped to reduce tension in the region. They cannot be replaced as an effective deterrence mechanism to prevent the outbreak of hostilities.

### **Track Two Dialogues Blossomed in Asia**

Meanwhile, track two dialogues blossomed in Asia in the 1990s to the point that some argued for non-proliferation of track two dialogues. Initially, there was a sense of achievement even in holding dialogues as they were not common in Asia. Gradually, however, funders and organizers have come to question the effectiveness of track two

processes. Those dialogues which have been held regularly with quality participants have survived. Minilaterals with specific purposes have been created, such as the Japan, China and U.S. dialogue, or the Japan, Russia, U.S. dialogue. Track two dialogues have offered opportunities to test new ideas, as well.

The third “S” is surmounting obstacles to Japanese initiatives and its roles in regional multilateralism. In the mid-1990s, the Higuichi Committee, which was entrusted with the task of studying the long-term security policy of Japan, suggested that Japan should pursue the possibility of using a multilateral framework to ensure Asian regional security. This was the period when the ARF was established. Since then, it occasionally has been argued that efforts should be made to create in Asia some kind of multilateral organization, similar to NATO.

Asia has evolved its multilateralism with the milestones of the end of Cold War, the 1997 monetary crisis and 9/11. China, which denied multilateralism at the beginning of the 1990s, has made a 180 degree shift. Today, by proposing a new security concept, it not only proactively engages in existing forums like APEC, ARF and ASEAN Plus 3, but takes numerous initiatives in hosting the APEC Leaders Meeting, proposing a Security Policy Conference in ARF with high-ranking defense officials, and suggesting security be taken up by ASEAN Plus 3.

China’s active proposals for FTAs are well known. Its chairmanship at six-party talks has attracted attention from countries in the region and beyond. I would like to add my speculation here that it was not a Chinese initiative to host the six-party talks, but more likely the product of the U.S. urging,

which my American colleagues may wish to comment on later. Also, China has proposed that the six-party talks become a more permanent institution. In fact, it was reported two days ago that China has proposed a Northeast Asia Security Conference. I wonder whether this can include a mechanism for inspection of North Korean nuclear sites, which would be an essential element in the six-party talks. The substance of the proposal seems to be in the making.

Ironically, threats such as North Korea, terrorism and WMD proliferation have served the region by motivating countries to look anew at multilateralism for regional security. These common threats may lead to a framework for security cooperation, rather than security dialogues alone. Japan has been forthcoming in proposing and leading multilateralism, although it has been criticized as leading from behind. Multilateralism has been characterized as a path upon which Japan can play its security role without triggering concerns among neighbors about remilitarization. However, in my recent trip to the U.S. on NIRA’s project on population decline and Japanese power, everyone I interviewed pointed out adamantly that Japan’s history problem must be sorted out before Japan can take the lead on multilateralism in Asia.

In order to guarantee members’ peace and security, any regional multilateral entity must be equipped with a collective mechanism for the use of force. Under the present circumstances in Asia, reconciliation and reduction of tension remains the first order of business. Japan has been working on its history problem over the years, but Japan needs to come to grips with this issue once and for all and has to be more accountable. Otherwise, the history problem will never go away, preventing genuine security multilateralism from taking root

and further preventing Japan from playing its role in multilateral institutions. Surmounting the history issue, Japan should build upon its past efforts and lead efforts on human security to supplement bilateralism, which will take us to a realm beyond “bilateralism plus.”

**Thomas Berger:** We’re a small, close knit group that has worked together over the years and in effect has formed our own—to use an IR term—epistemic community: a group of people that tends to see the world through the same set of lenses and share similar perspectives on what should be done. Therefore, I am tempted to agree with my colleagues here and just say, “Yep, ditto, they’re right.” For the sake of argument, however, I’d like to break away from the group consensus and raise a question for the group and for the audience.

Takashi says that the U.S.-Japan bilateralism, the “most important bilateral relationship, bar none,” or whatever you want to call it, has become so entrenched, so deeply embedded in the Japanese political system that there is no conceivable alternative to it. Tamamoto Masaru has put it very nicely, saying, “In post-war Japan, the Mutual Security Treaty has become the highest source of moral authority. It is the functional equivalent of the Emperor in pre-war Japan.” I think he goes a little bit too far, but his observation has a certain degree of plausibility for those of us who have studied Japanese security policy of late.

This makes sense to Japanese, it makes sense to me having studied it. From a comparative angle, it’s a rather anomalous situation. Whether you’re a realist in IR terms – i.e. you believe in the primacy of power, especially military power, as the driving force in international relations – or you are an IR liberal – someone who sees the con-

ditions for achieving cooperation as the chief issue in international affairs - there’s something very peculiar about this.

Rajan Menon wrote a recent, interesting piece in the *World Policy Journal* (Summer 2003) entitled “The End of Alliances.” In it, he makes an argument popular among many international relations scholars, especially those with a realist point of view, that America’s alliances in both Europe and Asia are bound to disintegrate. As he sees it, they are basically sort of holdovers from the Cold War, remarkably similar, in broad outline, to what we had built up during the Cold War. The international structure that gave birth to those alliances has completely changed. Likewise, domestic politics in many of the countries involved has changed. So it would stand to reason that the alliances are bound to change as well.

Menon argues that the first real evidence that this has happened can be seen in the crisis in transatlantic relations over the war in Iraq. It came later than many analysts – such as John Mearsheimer – had predicted in the immediate wake of the end of the Cold War, but it has come nonetheless. And Menon argues that we should expect a similar transpacific crisis in the alliance to come soon, with perhaps the North Korean situation as the trigger. And if you look at Korea, you might argue that it is happening already, yet our Japanese friends seem to draw closer to us, as opposed to moving further away.

While I do not have time to elaborate on this point, an IR liberal, likewise, might also find Japan’s emphasis upon this bilateral relationship—as opposed to multilateral frameworks for dealing with security issues—as somewhat anomalous, as well.

Now, I think there are some reasons why we haven't had a transpacific equivalent to the transatlantic crisis, and I think Akiko Fukushima has pointed out the one major factor, which is the North Korean threat. If you've been to Japan recently, it is amazing how palpable the sense of threat from North Korea is on all different levels of the Japanese public and political discussion. I think another fact that also is quite clear is that there is, at this point, no palatable alternative to the U.S. security arrangement. There are possible alternatives, but no palatable ones.

The Japanese fumbled around, looking for some sort of Asian collective security arrangement in the first half of the 1990s, but it didn't fly, as became quite clear by 1995 or 1996, at the latest. They have examined again, quietly, an independent defense option and decided once again – as they did in the 1960s and early 70s – that that's not the way they want to go. The recent Japanese discussion of the nuclear option, I think, is quite indicative of how the issue is viewed in Japan. For an interesting and readily accessible Japanese reflection on this issue, see Mataka Kamiya, "Nuclear Japan: Oxy-moron or Coming soon?" in *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 2003).

Again, this all makes all sense, but will this state of affairs continue? I think for the time being one has to say, "Yes." I wonder, however—and this is simply for the sake of discussion—whether we're not going to have some more serious problems in the alliance in the long run.

### **Japanese Officials Fear Entanglement in U.S. Problems**

I think one of the issues that has always worried the Japanese about their alliance with the United States is the issue of entan-

glement. They have a fear of being dragged into problems that would, in the end, hurt their interests more than serve them through this alliance relationship. In recent years, the debate over entanglement seems to have been temporarily suspended. The Koizumi government has committed itself very strongly to its alliance with the U.S. The fear of North Korea has created permissive conditions for this, and a number of other domestic political factors, I think, have played into it.

But I think in some ways the GSDF, the Ground Self Defense Force deployment to Iraq may prove a very difficult political problem for Japan. The deployment is tied quite clearly to the U.S.-Japanese security relationship, and as a result the outcome of the American occupation of Iraq potentially may have some serious implications for the kind of role Japan is willing to play in the alliance. Now, there may be a happy outcome in Iraq, or at least an acceptable one; I can see things going very wrong. This might become a case, not of imperial overstretch, but of tributary overstretch for Japan, of following the U.S. a bit too far. As Japan becomes increasingly integrated in U.S. grand strategy in the world, it may find itself in other such situations, and may well wind up not liking it. A backlash against the Koizumi policy of strongly supporting US policy around the world may well emerge.

The other area which I think is going to be in some ways even more difficult, which we haven't really talked about in our group yet, is that the Japanese are committing themselves through the ballistic missile defense program to begin with, and likewise through a number of other things, such as the Aegis dispatch, to a de facto potential integration of their military structure, with U.S. strategic designs, which are going to raise some very difficult questions for them.

## **Issue of Responsibility Sharing**

And again, I can see a lot of problems emerging from this. I happen to be all in favor, by the way, of the U.S.-Japanese strategic relationship. I think some of how these issues are going to play out in the future will depend heavily on U.S. strategic choices. It will also depend on the kind of relationship we forge with the Japanese. We cannot demand that the Japanese share the burden of international security without giving them a larger say in our decision-making. As the late Sato Seizaburo, one of my old advisors at Tokyo University, used to say, “The issue is not just one of burden sharing, but also of responsibility sharing.”

In addition to that, I think what is going to be very important is transparency within the alliance. There needs to be clarity about U.S. strategic intentions. There are some problems that rise strategically, at the structural level, in the context of the war on terror, which is going to make alliance management much more difficult than has been true in the past. And I think we really need to think in a more systematic way, both as a group, and as a profession of people who analyze security and alliance relations, about the implications of the war on terror and the particular nature of the threat that we are confronted with in that context.

The terrorist threat that we face is far more ambiguous and hard to define than was true during the Cold War. At the same time, to coordinate an effective response, a far broader range of domestic political interests and values are likely to be put at risk than were during the Cold War. Not only is the defense and foreign policy establishment involved, but so is the domestic policy and security system—so are judicial standards and notions about how to incorporate immigrant groups into society. A whole host of

topics that once were relegated to the realm of symbolic and low politics become suddenly far more salient than was true in the fight against Communism, making cooperation between alliance partners quite different, and potentially more difficult, than they were in the past.

I don't want to run over my time, so I'm going to simply stop there, and look forward to any response that my colleagues and members of the audience may have.

## **Transformation of the U.S.-Japan Alliance**

**Murata Koji:** Thank you very much. I'd like to briefly touch upon transformation of the U.S.-Japan alliance. During the Cold War period, the U.S.-Japan alliance was not well institutionalized. It is in sharp contrast to the U.S.-South Korean alliance. This comes mainly from two reasons. One is that Japan did not have a clear and present danger. Even the Soviet Union was not a direct threat to Japan for a long time. On the contrary, South Korea has had a clear and present danger, namely North Korea.

The second reason is that Japan has had serious domestic constraints from promoting the U.S.-Japan alliance. For example, politically, the Japanese Socialist Party, the largest opposition party, denied the legitimacy of the U.S.-Japan security treaty and the Self Defense Forces for a long time.

During the Cold War period in Europe the iron curtain was drawn, and in Southeast Asia the bamboo curtain was drawn, given serious disagreements about basic security issues among the public, major political parties, scholars, and the mass media. I would say a paper curtain was drawn in Japan for a long time.

The second reason is that Japan still has quite strong constitutional constraints for taking a pro-active security policy. But because the U.S.-Japan alliance was not well institutionalized, ironically speaking, the U.S.-Japan alliance could adjust itself to the changing strategic environment with flexibility after the end of the Cold War, and especially after 9/11.

Now Japan is, as many people have mentioned, sending Self Defense Forces to Iraq. For a long time, Japanese people have tended to regard security issues dichotomously: either defense or aggression. But since the Gulf War of 1990 to 1991, Japanese people are faced with a new challenge: how to cope with international security affairs, neither defense nor aggression. And in terms of the total defense issue, mainly because of the increasing North Korea threat and the concern about the rise of China, Japanese people now are reaching a wide consensus. But still, in international security affairs, we have some disagreement among the public and major political parties. In order to promote international security affairs further, we have to reconsider our domestic, political and legal settings.

Now our major political party, the LDP, is arguing to provide a draft of revising the constitution in 2005, and the Democratic Party of Japan, the largest opposition party, is planning also to provide a draft of revising the constitution in 2006. The Japanese constitution was drafted based on the United Nations as of 1946, and since UN reform is widely discussed, it seems to be almost inevitable for us to be discussing the revision of the constitution in Japan.

The Cold War is already over. Once the Japanese constitution is revised in the near future, then you will have the end of the

post-war period in Japanese society. Thank you very much.

**Ikenberry:** Thank you. We now have two very distinguished discussants, and the first is Mr. Ralph Cossa.

**Ralph Cossa:** Thank you, and thank you all for bringing your road show to Hawaii. I know we all appreciate the opportunity to see so many old friends. I also, in particular, thank Inoguchi sensei, because I have worked for many years on bilateralism and multilateralism and unilateralism and unilateralism, but zerolateralism is a new term, so now I've got something new I can start researching and writing on, and it's always fun to find a new topic.

I think just about everything that needs to be said has been said. I will try to add maybe a couple of different wrinkles, first to say that I think it's pretty clear, everyone agrees that bilateralism and multilateralism is not an either-or situation. You can have both and, in fact, Japan prefers to have both, and the U.S. does, and when we get to tomorrow, we'll build on that.

As I was sort of tinkering with the title, it seems to me the real title is "Japan's Evolution and its Impact on its Approach to International Institutions."

### **Japan Sees International Institutions as a Vehicle to Achieve Objectives**

In many respects, Japan has always seen international institutions as a vehicle for achieving its objectives. Japan's objectives have changed dramatically in the last couple of years. When Japan's final, real objective was "lay low, get the free ride," international institutions provided that. Japan wanted to buy in and use economics and subtle politics to get respect without having

to really pay its dues, and international organizations provided that.

Now Japan—or at least the current leadership in Japan—is seriously interested in Japan coming out, and it’s becoming, quote, unquote, a “normal” nation, however you define that. And international institutions will provide a vehicle for doing that, and support in international efforts like in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. So the real change is not so much in its approach or its attitude, but in Japan’s outlook itself.

Victor and I were at a conference a couple of weeks ago where we were talking about this, and I was asked to address the question of “Is Japan going to be the U.K. of Asia,” as Armitage and others have said. And the conclusion I came to is that Japan doesn’t really want to be the U.K. of Asia, and I’m not sure we want it to be. What Japan wants to do is become the Germany of Asia. Let me explain that, because you can take it a couple of different ways.

Ten years ago, during Gulf War I, Germany was putting its foot in. So what did it do? Germany sent ships to the Mediterranean so the Brits and everyone else could send their forces into the Gulf to fight the first Gulf War, and Japan wrote a check. Now Japan is sending ships into the Indian Ocean to allow U.S. and others to send their ships into play, so they’re feeling their way into the process. Germany is not a player in Iraq, but not for reasons that have to do with history or World War II. Germany is, however, a major player with forces on the ground in Afghanistan.

### **Japan Will Become the Germany of Asia**

And I think that as we’ve watched Germany evolve from being the pariah state to being engulfed in multilateralism, to cautiously

providing peripheral support, to now playing an active role in military activities, in Kosovo and in Afghanistan, I think we’re also seeing Japan evolve. And Japan will be on a faster timetable now, but ten years behind initially, becoming the Germany of Asia. And that, from a U.S. standpoint, is the good news. It also raises the potential for it to be the Germany of “Hell no, we won’t go,” if the U.S. turns out to be pursuing something that Japan doesn’t want.

I agree, in many respects, that not only is it not an either-or situation, but I think we also all agree that today Japan sees the alliance in its national interest and wants desperately to keep it and sustain it. I don’t think it’s just North Korea. I think there are other things in the back of the Japanese mind when they look at the threat envelope.

It’s also true that nothing lasts forever. Circumstances have changed, but interests and objectives have not changed. And I think the most important thing is that Japan looks out. To the extent that either the United States or Japan is capable of having a long-term vision, our visions coincide. But as we look at the other major countries around Japan, we’re not quite sure that their long-term vision coincides with ours. And until we’re comfortable doing that, the alliance becomes an extremely useful hedge to build multilateral cooperation on. So I’ll leave it at that.

**Ikenberry:** Professor Sato.

**Sato Yoichiro:** Thank you very much for inviting me to this prestigious group of scholars. Many of you have already addressed the very important points, and I agree with most of them, so I’d rather focus on just a few points where I tend to slightly diverge.

The first point is about whether bilateral and multilateral frameworks are mutually compatible or not. And there seems to be rather strong agreement among the panelists that they are not only compatible, but supplementary. I would take a different approach to view this matter, by focusing not on the military security kind of bilateralism or multilateralism, but also looking at the economic and the diplomatic arena.

### **Layers of Multilateralism and Bilateralism Are Forming and Decaying**

What's happening in the Asian Pacific to me seems that there are layers of multilateralism and bilateralism forming or, in some cases, decaying, in the three areas. And there are not necessarily the same patterns prevailing at three different levels.

Militarily, the bilateral ties between the U.S. and Japan remain very strong, and the evolving hub and spoke structures are supplementing each other. Japan is increasing, for example, anti-piracy cooperation with India, or multilateral ship inspections, presumably targeting North Korea's proliferation efforts, together with Australia, Korea, and others. But the same kind of pattern is not necessarily observable in the economic sphere.

Japan's trade ties with the United States are shrinking—although in absolute terms the amount is increasing—but proportionately, Japan's ties with China and the rest of Asia are on the rise. And if you looked at the more recent monetary cooperation, which Professor Inoguchi already mentioned, the United States is often standing outside, and Japan's cooperation with Asian countries and European countries seem to be on the rise.

### **Japan Shows Signs of Desire to Diversify Its Diplomatic Partners**

Diplomatically, Japan and the U.S. remain very close partners, but even here there are signs of Japan wanting to diversify its diplomatic partners. Japan is also trying to put itself in the position to mediate between the United States and countries which oppose the United States. And my example for that would be Japan's effort to pass a Security Council resolution prior to the U.S. attack on Iraq. So in sum, on this first point, I think that there are three different levels of cooperation – economic, military, and diplomatic – in which different patterns of alliances are being formed.

And the second point is about the things that are stable and are related to the so-called history questions. In my line of work, I talk a lot with security practitioners from Asian countries. And what I have so far observed in the past three years is that the so-called fear of rising militarism in Japan is probably the strongest in China, and pretty strong in Korea, but much weaker in Southeast Asian countries. Of course, there are some variances between different Southeast Asian countries, but that seems to be the general pattern.

But even among the Southeast Asian countries there is a kind of polite, sugar coated fear—I don't know if fear is the right word—a preference for Japan's participation, in conjunction with the United States, or within the multilateral framework, which includes the United States. So what I observed from these statements is that the so-called “cork in the bottle” aspect of the U.S.-Japan alliance still has some meaning in the post-Cold War period. Thank you.

**Ikenberry:** Thank you. Well, believe it or not, we've made it through our set of speak-

ers and have a rich set of issues. And I'm going to throw it open and let both those who have spoken react to others, and there are several in our group who haven't spoken tonight.

I might just make one comment to start the discussion, and then invite remarks from everyone here. It is striking for someone like myself, who spends part of my international travel in Europe and part in Asia, how different the two regions feel about post-war Iraq, or even how they felt during the run-up to the Iraq War. It's very difficult for an American to travel in Europe because of the animosity toward this new American approach to the world, whereas in China and Japan, at least, there's a certain level of comfort with the arrangement and that kind of Bush foreign policy.

I would argue that in some ways it's because the bilateralism and the unilateralism of the United States has violated norms that have been developed over all these decades with Europe, but they've actually reaffirmed norms that have been developed in Asia. The kind of unilateral American, sort of bilateral-unilateral approach, fits into the kind of Asian hub and spoke system much more readily than it does in the European multilateral system. So in some ways, the U.S. is simply doing what it has been doing for a long time.

And then you add another component to the changing pattern, the U.S. actually developing stronger relationships with countries that have minority Muslim populations—China, Russia, India, Israel—all countries whose relationships have been strengthened, post-9/11. So it's an interesting remixing of partnerships, and tightening of some, loosening of others, all really moving in the direction of bilateral relationships, and not

reaffirming or renewing a more global, multilateral structure.

My question really is to our Japan specialists. Japan does seem to be as boxed in by its environment as much as it ever has been. Through all these decades after the great economic rise of Japan, the end of the Cold War and all the shifts that you can notice, Japan still seems to be remarkably tied to the United States, as all of our speakers suggested. Ralph said maybe all these things won't last forever, but there really wasn't any discussion by any of our speakers about new wrinkles that might lead to an alternative logic in the security relationship with Asia.

Eight speakers, and not one glimmering of an idea that maybe five years, ten years, fifteen years from now it will be remarkably different. Tom did a little bit, but he didn't do it with great conviction.

I heard one idea in December—Ralph was there in Tokyo at the IIPS meeting with former Prime Minister Nakasone, whose vision of the region is clearly of a Korea-China-Japan trilateral relationship that will form the nucleus of a new type of order in Asia. So I just would ask: is there anything in the cards that might allow us to appreciate shifts away from this bilateral security alliance?

**Inoguchi:** I think this last point has been quite seriously enhanced in Tokyo, Seoul and Beijing, in many ways. The diplomatic coordination has been quite visible, tangible, and partly effective. This is something worth watching systematically, continuously. Whether this regional linkage will surpass the alliance with the United States in its importance is something which only time can tell.

**Berger:** I'm going to be skeptical for a second, and I'll even be skeptical about the European case—I study Europe, as well as Asia. I think the Europeans have got themselves into a situation where they imagine they can get themselves away from certain strategic dilemmas, which I'm not sure they can. Those dilemmas include things that Europeans, especially Western Europeans, like to think are problems of the past.

For instance, the dilemmas of nuclear strategic security remains. How will deterrence for non-nuclear members of Europe – such as Germany – be maintained? What happens if relations with Russia deteriorate, or a new strategic nuclear threat emerges and the Atlantic relationship has fallen apart?

Likewise, there is the dilemma of how to maintain access to important resources which Europeans need from the Middle East. What can Europe do to preserve order in the region?

Then there is the new dilemma of how to cope with terrorism and transnational security threats of a new sort. While the Europeans are quite capable of dealing with terrorists based in their own territory, they have only a limited capacity to deal with the breeding grounds of terrorism abroad. And while some Europeans would like to pretend that terrorism is a purely internal security or police issue, the truth of the matter is that it isn't.

I think that what we had in Europe in the run up to the Iraq War was a peculiar conjunction of factors that created an unusually severe alliance crisis. There were permissive factors, such as the receding of an apparent threat, including, by the way, Serbia. The disappearance of Serbia is a problem. A relatively quiescent, and a relatively friendly Russia means that all along the

European periphery there are, at least for now, no immediate security threats. As a result, the Europeans are less dependent on the United States and NATO than they were during most of the 1990s, not to speak of the Cold War. However, if any of those issues reemerge, then despite their efforts to cobble together a Rapid Reaction Force and a Common European Defense and Security Policy, I think they're going to have serious problems. Maybe in the long run the Europeans will develop an independent capacity to deal with large scale security problems, but they still have a long way to go.

I just can't imagine right now how Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo, in the next ten to twenty years, will be able to solve a problem which I think the Europeans are still grappling with. But in the European case, at some point, I think they're going to begin to come together with some idea, and I'm not sure if they can implement it of an alternative source, but right now it's the U.S. that provides the key to dealing with those strategic problems.

### **Asians More Concerned about what the U.S. Might Do in North Korea than in Iraq**

**Cossa:** A couple of quick points. First of all, I think Asians are much more concerned about what we might do in North Korea than what we did do in Iraq, and that focuses your mind. And that's why I think Iraq is not as high on their radar screens, although it certainly was back in March.

Secondly, I think it's interesting to note that while everyone complains about U.S. unilateralism, it was the U.S. that had to kick and scream and cajole to get a multilateral approach toward dealing with North Korea. So, in fact, we've been Mr. Multilateralism

in Asia, while others would have been very happy for us to handle it on our own.

Third, I'm not a European specialist, although I do try to get to at least one or two meetings there a year, and the death of NATO may be a little premature. The Europeans, as I understand it, are increasing their commitment in Afghanistan and they have signed up en masse for the proliferation security initiative, an ad hoc multilateral approach led by John Bolton, of all people. And if there's anyone that Europeans or anyone else would want to stay away from, it's him. So I think that there's maybe less there than meets the eye, in some respects.

**Fukushima:** A few points, if I may, on Korea, Japan, and China. I have read some articles written about a Japan-China alliance in the future. I don't think that is feasible for the foreseeable future, but it's an interesting discussion, as an academic discussion. Time doesn't allow me to delve into it, but let me put it this way: China, for Japan, is not France for Germany.

And my second point is that although we still have very strong hub and spokes in Asia, there is a new trend, and that is spokes talking to each other, like Japan and Korea, which didn't have much discussion in the past. They are starting to have a dialogue and maybe some sort of joint activities. And also the Japan, U.S., and Australia security dialogues: I don't know how these will develop, but these may develop into some sort of a wheel of spokes.

### **U.S.-Japan Relationship Is One of the Most Stable Bilateral Relationships**

**Questioner:** John mentioned he was struck by the apparent lack of alternatives to the U.S.-Japan security relationship. I'm struck

by that, but equally so, looking back at the last ten or fifteen years of the relationship at what seems to be a very unstable relationship, now seemingly being one of the most stable bilateral relationships.

If you look back to the early 1990s, there were a lot of people predicting, for multiple reasons, that if any relationship came out of the Cold War that was unstable, it was this one. You had all the economic frictions that had to do with American pressure on Japan, and the economic competition, some argued, was going to rip them apart, the Persian Gulf War was going to rip them apart. In 1995 and '96, in any of these meetings you went to people were talking about nightmare scenarios where the United States would be fighting a war in Korea, and the Japanese would be sitting by, and somehow the American Congress was going to just end this alliance if America were to shed blood, and so on and so forth.

Now we come to 2003 and 2004, and now all of a sudden we're talking about this relationship as a bedrock of stability. So the question that comes to my mind is: what's the best explanation of this, if it's true? Is it that the security imperative is so robust that all of these other problems are really tiny little blips, or is it that the two countries were very deft diplomatically at solving a lot of problems? And you see both of those arguments in the literature and in the policy debate. I think it would be interesting to talk about which of those two views people think was a stronger imperative, if you accept that this is now a much more stable relationship than it was, say, at the beginning of the 1990s.

**Sato:** Two comments. One is directly related to what Professor Mastanduno just mentioned. The post-Cold War U.S.-Japan alliance seems to have been enhanced, rather

than weakened, and this presents a sort of puzzle for many thinkers, especially the realists.

### **Japanese Public Fear U.S. Will Not Commit Itself Strongly to Japan**

But my counter argument to that would be that although it seems, on the surface, that the alliance has indeed strengthened, there seems to be a growing fear on the side of the Japanese people that the United States wants Japan at its convenience, rather than committing itself strongly to Japan. And this fear has definitely risen in the post-Cold War era, and that is one of the driving forces behind Japan's increased contributions to the military operations outside Japan's immediate domain, combined with Japan's own internal group of people who want to push Japan outward.

But I think this problem is very strongly related, not so much on the strategy level alone, but on the tactical level as well. For example, where the U.S. forces are stationed, and what kind of troops are stationed there, has a direct implication on the perception of the Japanese of the U.S. commitment to the alliance. I think in the case of Korea, in the U.S.-ROK alliance one of the controversies was about the U.S. moving their troops from the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel area. There seems to have been quite a strong fear among the Korean leaders that maybe, indeed, the U.S. commitment to the alliance is somewhat waning.

Now about my second point. Victor, who is an expert on this U.S.-Korea-Japan trilateral issue hasn't said much about this subject, so I kind of want to provoke him. I agree with most of the panelists that the current six-party talks and trilateral coordination among Japan, South Korea, and the United States is a kind of diplomatic test case for a

possible tripartite future alliance. And I agree with that statement, but I would add that they haven't scored very well on the test so far, observing what's going on in the current six-party talks.

And in Korea, the unification factor plays a very strong influence on its foreign policy, and that diverges from the Japan-American policy objectives on this North Korean nuclear matter. There have already been signs of strain between the U.S. and Japan on one side, and Korea flirting with the Russians and Chinese on the other.

**Murata:** As Mike pointed out, compared to the Gulf War period of the North Korean crisis of 1994, the current U.S.-Japan alliance is much more stable and strong, I would agree.

Having said that, still, I would say some anti-American sentiment is not negligible, even in Japan, and in this sense, some Japanese people are feeling again the fear of being entrapped by the American global strategy, which is not necessarily related to Japanese national interests. So in this sense, a dichotomous view of the security affairs is easy to understand for the Japanese people, either defense or aggression. It's easy for the Japanese people to understand the necessity of cooperation with the United States for coping with the North Korean military threat. But it's quite difficult for the Japanese people to understand the international context of the Iraqi War, for example.

### **Japanese Public Have Trouble Forming a Clear Identity in International Politics**

And I would say that Japanese people are still having trouble forming a clear identity in international politics. We have two different identities: a weak Japan and a strong

Japan. Under the weak Japan image, if you look at the Japanese small territory and very low self-subsistence of natural resources and energy—an overpopulated country, in these aspects—Japan is quite a vulnerable, weak country. So even if Japan does not do something, it will not have a significant impact on international politics. That’s the small Japan image.

If, on the other hand, you look at Japan’s economic capabilities, the GDP, Japan is a great country, so Tokyo must have a significant impact upon Washington. And once Japan decides to dispatch its Self Defense Forces to Iraq, it must do a significant job in Iraq. So on the one hand, we tend to underestimate our not doing something, which has a negative impact in international politics. On the other hand, we tend to overestimate when we do something, that we have a significant impact on international politics. We still have two completely different self-images.

**Questioner:** I come from South Korea, so I would like to express some of the South Korean perspectives on the role of Japan. It is my impression that Japan is satisfied with its course of relations with the United States. Also, because the United States is a global power and is mainly concerned about global issues, Japan pays attention to global issues.

On the other hand, there is some sense that even though Japan is the second largest economy in the world, Japan pays the most attention to its immediate problems, so I’m wondering: what is Japan’s identity as a regional leader? That’s the real issue. And in Korea, there is an old saying that Korea is a student between waves, and now some Japanese are just saying South Korea is closer to China than to Japan, but for South Koreans, China is rising day by day, and Ja-

pan is not playing at all. So for South Koreans, it’s natural that South Korea has to look at China. So it is, of course, partly South Korea’s responsibility, but Japan is also partly responsible.

And a second point several people mentioned is about Japan’s historical problem; after 50 years from the end of World War II, Japan is unable to absorb this historical problem. In South Korea, one or two decades ago, the Japanese dominated the issues, but now nobody talks about Japan, only about the American empire. So this means, actually, that Japan overestimates its historical issues in Korea and China, and the Japanese politicians are using these problems, saying that during the colonial period we contributed to the development of Korea and China. Why are Japanese politicians doing this? So I would like to see Japan have a bigger role in the region, which would bring a balance in Asia, and it would contribute to the interests of the United States. Thank you.

**Ikenberry:** That’s an interesting argument, that Japanese weakness is partly responsible for the Korean tilt toward China. I had not really thought about it that way. Mike, did you?

**Mastanduno:** Still on this question of what could change the seeming stability of the alliance, I’ve just been collecting people’s thoughts, and to me, on the Japanese side, there are two possible problems. One is the problem that Tom raised with more conviction than I think you gave him credit for, and it’s a version of the entrapment problem, that Japan is now sort of reaching out and playing more of a role. Right now it hasn’t seen the cost of that, but at some point down the road it could see the cost of that—casualties in Iraq, or if for some reason it gets dragged into a future conflict in

Korea—so one argument is the entrapment argument.

### **Japan Expects to Be Treated as a Special Partner**

The other argument, though, is implied by Sato sensei, and that has to do not with abandonment, but with disillusionment. And this is an interesting psychological problem developing within the alliance today, which is natural for the Japanese, that the more they do, the more they expect to be treated as a special partner. And it seems that in the United States, there's the reverse—the more Japan does, the more American officials are tempted to take it for granted, because Japan is actually sort of in our camp and we don't have to worry as much about it. And I think that issue potentially, down the road, could be a source of conflict for them.

On the American side, the interesting thing is that two concerns that are always raised in the American debate about why there's friction in the alliance and why the alliance could unravel seem to have been at least mitigated, if not eliminated. One of them is Japan as economic challenger, and the other is Japan as free rider. The more Japan does the kinds of things it's doing now, the less it looks like a free rider, and clearly, over the last decade it no longer looks like an economic challenger.

So the conclusion I would draw is that it used to be that the impetus for what could unravel the alliance was going to come from the United States; America was going to get so upset with Japan's free riding, or was going to be so anxious about Japan's challenge, that it might do something foolish, like Congress might want to pull U.S. troops out. In the future, it may be that the place to look for potential instability in the

alliance is in Japan's perception—either Japan's disillusionment or Japan's concern about entrapment.

### **Regional Identity**

**Inoguchi:** Just some answers to some of the points that were raised. One is about regional identity. I did a survey in a number of countries, including Korea, Japan, and China, about national identity and regional identity, and the results are as follows. Basically, Korea is number one in terms of pride in their national identity—nationalism, patriotism, everything. Japanese are the least proud of their nation. And with respect to China, China is very high in national identity, but slightly lower than Korean national identity, by some 5 or 10 percent.

With respect to regional identity, that is, Asian identity, Japan is, of course, the lowest. And one-half of the respondents say, "We are not in Asia. We are not Asians." But half of them say, "We are Asians. We have to consolidate our ties with Asia."

The Koreans are highest in terms of a strong regional identity, along with Thais. Among the Koreans and Thais, 86 or 89 percent say, "We are Asian." And the Chinese are difficult, because they have no strong concept of Asia; they are simply culturally Chinese, the Chinese versus the rest.

So these two neighboring giants are kind of difficult, they fail in terms of fostering and nurturing and consolidating regionalism, at least in the minds of ordinary people. But of course, in terms of economic ties, just like Korea has been strengthening its ties with China, Japanese do the same, and it is surprising, it makes people apprehensive. If you look here at the figure of Japanese direct investment in manufacturing in China, it's not a huge amount. Ninety percent of

Japanese direct investment in China in the manufacturing sector is not insured. There's no insurance. They just go.

What will happen after the Beijing Olympic games? What if something goes down, and then we are unprepared? But still, my point is that we are trusting Chinese partners, somehow, in a very strange fashion, a dangerous fashion. But still, my point is that ties are very steadily enhanced among these three countries, as well as the rest. So I don't think things are moving in a direction opposite of your fear, but we are moving in the same direction. Of course, given the way things are handled by different Oriental inscrutables, sometimes difficulties arise.

**Ikenberry:** I wanted to jump in on Mike's question. For me, what I see as the biggest, deeply buried contradiction that could rupture the alliance is this contradiction between what I think several view as the entrapment piece: will the Japanese really go on these adventures that the Americans may take them on in the war on terrorism?

The entrapment problem—which makes them resistant to signing on and strengthening the alliance—is in contradiction to the other tendency, which is to deal with the increasing contingency of America's commitment to Japan by trying to strengthen that relationship with the United States, to actually sign on in a more intensive way. So you have these kind of contradictory impulses to avoid entrapment, but to deal with America's tendency to think increasingly of alliances as coalitions of the willing, to try to bind even more closely to the United States. Those two are in contradiction, and they clearly will be contingent upon changing Japanese views about the alliance and about what happens in the world of terror-

ism—whether there are more attacks, or whether there are more Iraqs.

### **Bilateral Relationship Seen as a Huge Hedge Against China**

But on balance it seems to me that between the ledger of factors loosening the relationship and finding substitutes to it, and the ledger of factors that reinforce it, the reinforcement side seems to be overwhelmingly greater. The declining Japanese position clearly has taken some of the antagonism and competition out of the relationship. There is a rising security fear that China tomorrow, more than today, and today, more than yesterday, is a concern for Japan. While the way in which Japan and the United States think about the a rising China may be different, on balance both see it as something where the bilateral relationship is a huge hedge.

As we mentioned before, as America rethinks the nature of its own security threats and makes fixed alliances less important to those security missions, Japan needs to find ways to bind itself increasingly to the United States to make sure that relationship isn't lost in this reorientation. The history problem doesn't seem to go away, and that continues to make the identity aspect of Japan augur in favor of a relationship with the United States that suppresses the identity issue, because without the alliance Japan is going to have to engage in a much more systematic engagement with China and Korea over that history issue. The alliance has always been a way to put aside and not deal with that question, because you don't need to, because you don't have to intensify your ties to China and Korea. And so the history issue can be postponed, the resolution can be postponed.

## **Japan Knows How to Live in a Hierarchical Power Structure**

And then finally the hierarchy—if we are living increasingly in a one superpower world where we really do have a hierarchical power structure, it seems to me that Japan knows entirely how to live in that kind of world and operate in that kind of world, and they don't see it as a psychological problem of operating below another country, as some other countries do. They often don't define it as operating below the United States; they see it as an opportunity to free ride or protect themselves so they can retain some security and internal space to remain Japanese and do Japanese things. It has a certain advantage to them.

Our dear friend Masaru Tamamoto waxes eloquently about this: that we don't see this as a junior partnership, we see this as an unbelievable, brilliant stroke of luck that enables us to not have to deal with the unwashed in our neighborhood. He puts it in such ways that you can't believe that up is down, but up is down.

In this case down is up, should I say, in the hierarchy. So there are a lot of different reasons that don't seem to suggest that the alliance is going to be a casualty of the forces of history.

**Cossa:** I'm not sure I would disagree with anything you said, and I certainly would agree with the point that there are more positives than negatives. But one of the things that concerns me about long-term visions—because my argument about the solidarity of the alliance was based on common long-term visions—where I think we may diverge that is of concern to me is on nuclear strategy. And if the U.S., as at least some people in this administration seem to think, suddenly becomes fascinated

with the need to move outside of the test ban, and weapons in space, and mini nukes and all the rest of this, I think this could put a very serious strain on U.S.-Japan relations.

And when I sit and talk about the long term with Japanese governing officials over cocktails in the evening, that's what we talk about. It's a concern that we're sweeping under the rug but we shouldn't be, and that's an area I think we need to look at as a possibility. Because the nuclear allergy in Japan I think is a serious one, and if we reverse our views on that as some people look like they're doing, I think it could create a great strain.

**Questioner:** I'm particularly interested in that history question. As you know, history does not simply sit there. History is not something that just happens and does not change.

In the case of Korea, there has been a continuous struggle throughout history about the role of the U.S. after World War II, during the Korean War, during the Kwangju massacre, and nowadays, of course, about U.S. policy towards North Korea. So there is a very continuous struggle with that, and it certainly affects Korea's relationship with the U.S. and the rising anti-Americanism these days.

And I'm just wondering why Japan somehow hasn't struggled with history as much as other countries did, and why history has operated in a constant way in maintaining the remarkable stability in the U.S.-Japan relationship, as you mentioned. Why hasn't history had the same constant effect on the relationship? That is really puzzling to me.

**Inoguchi:** I think writing history is a complex thing. Basically, the mainstream line is to justify history. Let's start with the Japan-

ese interpretation of modern history. First, in the 1850s and 60s the Meiji restoration and modernization was correct, it was good. Somehow Japan was modernized by that policy. But somehow, according to Professor Reischauer and others' line of interpretation of modern history, Japan digressed greatly in the 1930s and 40s for a number of reasons.

But thanks to the United States coming to Japan, Japan started again in the 1940s and '50s on the right track of modernization that was basically trying to come to the line of the mainstream world, focusing on enlightenment and entrepreneurship based on free markets and liberal democracies.

And this is the line of justification taken by the Japanese government on history since 1945. This is different from the German kind. But compared to the German government's line of interpretation, there is a sharp difference. The German government basically interpreted the German history as follows: the old German history led to the Third Reich, the empire, and then it ended there, and a totally new German history started in 1945.

### **Many Japanese Have Positive Interpretation of Meiji Restoration**

So they put the blame for everything, all the blame for German history, onto the Third Reich. So they castigated, criticized, and they continue to criticize it even now. But after that it's totally new, so it separated.

But the Japanese interpretation connected, which was adopted by the occupation forces and Professor Reischauer of Harvard University, as well. And that makes things a little more complicated. In many of the Japanese minds, basically, the Meiji restoration and every effort of modernization was

not so bad. Then if we think it is continuous to the current endeavor of the '40s, '50s, '60s, etc., it makes sense. Our sense of history, our national identity is rewarded somehow, and that links to the prime minister's statement that he prays for peace at Yasukuni every year in a strange fashion. When the Chinese ambassador asked the prime minister not to visit the Yasukuni shrine on August the 15<sup>th</sup>, he visited August 13<sup>th</sup>.

When asked not to encourage militarism by visiting the shrine, his response was, "We are praying for all the world peace," kind of thing. But it has to do with this kind of interpretation, which has prevailed in Japan for the last half a century and is supported by two-thirds of the people.

And so we act like Germans, but Germans have an internal law which would punish those persons who did some killings outside of the combat area, as well as inside. But we don't have anything which punishes for activities during wartime. And what happens in August or summer? All the private, individual remembrances of the past, during the war time, burst out in Japan, whereas nobody in Germany talks about war time activities. Even internally as well as outside, nobody talks, because they can be punished.

At the top, elite level, Japan is making intermittently stupid comments on the war or history. Germany steadfastly has been aligning its statements into one uniform position since 1945, whether voluntarily, or whatever. But nothing comes out from the private level in Germany, or is bursting out of their sentiments about war activities, miseries, terribleness, and hostility to war and hostility to the United States. So this is what makes things very complex and difficult to deal with.

**Berger:** We have very few minutes left, and there's still lots to talk about, and of course we can take up these things tomorrow.

I have two points, and one with regard to history. I've been looking at history in a comparative context — history problems, and if you like, the politics of historic representation, in a number of different contexts. And I guess the very short answer to the question is that nobody apologizes without reason, and I've become very cynical about this. And I think if you look very closely at Germany as well, there are more structural political interests, both the German domestic political interests and international political interests, which led to a very different politics of historic representation in the German context than in the Japanese case. And some of it has to do with domestic politics and the nature of the post-war German regime. Many more people were themselves victims of Nazism than was true of Japan.

A lot also has to do with international context and the fact that the Germans had to first reconcile themselves with the people in the immediate Western camp, beginning with the state of Israel, France and Holland on this issue, and the Japanese were not put in that context. So multilateralism in that sense was the European multilateral context in which Germany found itself compelled to deal with on this issue.

I would like to add that the Japanese are quite correct in saying, "But we've been apologizing, we've been doing things," and it's actually true. If you remember a few years ago, Iris Chang said that Japan is the country that never says sorry. Well, it's not quite true. I mean, there are a lot of problems with the way the Japanese deal with this, but they have been trying, for over a

decade, to deal with this trouble, and there has been a certain degree of success.

And I think that Victor and Kim and others who know Korea better than I can respond to this with greater authority and perhaps object to what I say. But I think there has been some limited success with the Korean context. There has been greater success in the Southeast Asian context. There is not just one history problem, there are multiple history problems, I should add, and there are also problems that don't just involve Japan. The United States has a whole set of issues which we haven't had yet to deal with, except we're beginning to have to deal with them to a certain extent with the Korean conflicts, whereas Professor Kim pointed out quite correctly there are a lot of things kicking around. But the Japanese have made some progress in certain areas, and part of the reason there has been some progress is because of certain common interests, material interests.

What shows you, though, that the history problem is not epiphenomenal, that it's not simply a question of material interests, is the continued presence of this problem, because I think the Japanese, partly because of domestic political reasons, partly just because of bad decision making, haven't been able to push forward on it. I'll stop there.

Can we imagine some kinds of alternatives? The current situation is good, it's happy. I can think of a happier situation and a less happy one. The less happy situation, we've already indicated, is that through some problem of engagement or entanglement—and there can be a severe and less severe form. The severe is that some sort of disaster happens, and America takes some really aggressive diplomacy. Let's take the most obvious scenario, with regard to North Korea, and we start to have some very nasty things

happen, perhaps some terrorist event in Tokyo because of North Korean agents or people who might be connected with them as a result of American policy. And that can then create an entire new debate, which can go in very unpredictable directions, I think, depending on how it's framed in Japan.

The other problem which I think is a little bit more realistic is that we have a series of relatively small disappointments, disillusionments. The Americans don't pay attention to us despite what we do. We are being pulled into things that we don't like. And then we're going to see intra-alliance problems, which will then feed back, the Americans are going to be kind of unhappy, and then we're going to go back to a kind of early '90s scenario—it wasn't a figment of our imagination, we had a real danger in the alliance, and we could find ourselves there again.

The happier thing is if the United States, through enlightened self-interest, I'm thinking in the kind of John Ikenberry pro-institutionalist position, sort of understands or feels that we need to do a new kind of bargain, at least with our Asian allies, and try to integrate, in a multilateral way, with increased sharing of decision making, a sort of recast Asian security environment. That is a sort of happier scenario, but I don't know how likely that is.

### **Japanese Apologies**

**Murata:** A couple of things. There are some misunderstandings and exaggerations. One is, as Tom pointed out, that some people argue that Japan has never apologized, and it is not true. Prime Minister Murayama and Hosokawa and many high officials have repeatedly apologized. And secondly, recent issues are very controversial. The history textbook issued several years ago is

another example. The adoption rate of those history textbooks in junior high schools in Japan was 0.07 percent or so, which is almost nothing, but it created a very big controversy all over Asia.

And as far as the comparison between Japanese and German history, generally I agree with Professor Inoguchi's observation: Germans lost the war twice. That's quite important. But in the case of Japan, in modern history, Japan lost only one major war. In the modern history of Japan, there are quite positive aspects and quite negative aspects. Some Japanese people feel that the entire denial of modern history is unfair. Some people think so, and economic and social stagnation and frustration with Japan's situation also causes national sentiment among Japanese.

**Cossa:** I'm not a European expert, but I'll tell you that I haven't met too many Brits or Frenchmen that particularly like the Germans. But the British government and the French government saw that it was in their national interest to cooperate with the Germans, first because of the Soviet threat, and now for other reasons. When the Japanese go and apologize in Southeast Asia, the Singaporeans and Malaysians say, "Get over it. We have, and we want you to do other things."

Japan doesn't have a history problem; China and Korea have history problems. And the reason they have history problems is that it is in their national interest to keep playing the history card. And as long as every time Japan was insulted the response was to write a bigger check, they were going to continue to get insulted.

Now Japan is starting to stop writing the checks, and the Chinese are starting to re-think it. And essentially, Japan needs to

stop apologizing, and China and Korea need to get over it and understand that it's been 60 years, and that they want to move forward. But that requires Japan to take a harder line on it.

**Cha:** I have always been of the view that when we think about the history issue, you can't measure the history issue by the number of complaints, because you can always find complaints. You can always find someone to complain about Germany or Japan. The way you really measure progress on history is in the absence of complaints. And I think one very good example of progress on the history issue is the absence of major complaints, at least from South Korea, on Japan's deployed forces in the Iraqi occupation and reconstruction effort. You really didn't hear anybody complaining about that, and that, to me, is progress on the history issue. So you have to measure it that way instead of looking for complaints.

**Questioner:** When it comes to the history question, it quickly degenerates into the apology question. I didn't have that in mind when I raised the question. I was interested in when Takashi mentioned the fact of the defeat and how it affected Japan's policy options, that kind of thing.

So, the history question is a very broad question, and I think people's preoccupation is with this apology question. It must be understood much more broadly, and it is ultimately related to internal politics, and that's what I'm curious about: what kind of internal politics or power relationships within Japan prevented from it tackling the history question more broadly?

**Questioner:** I'd like to bring the discussion back a bit to bilateralism and beyond bilateralism. I'd like to hear some of the panelists talk about this a little bit. Some of the factors that have contributed to the stability of the U.S.-Japan alliance, at least as I see it, have to do with balance of power in the region and with instabilities in the region. Unlike some who think that North Korea is unstable, I think that situation is actually quite stable. It's been that way for over 50 years. It might change, but it will require that something different be done than what is being done right now at the six-party talks.

I think what's much more unstable is China, with the rise of such things as the house church movement and Eastern Lightning—some of you China specialists may be familiar with that. With the Chinese-Russian border in the northeast area, you've got very great instability there because the Russian side is virtually empty, as far as population goes, and the Chinese side is virtually full. You've got a serious problem there.

So it seems to me that if I were a Japanese strategist, I'd be thinking that I could certainly use major power support and involvement in my relations with these countries. Not to mention of course, as has already been mentioned, the Japanese dependency on the whole global system.

**Ikenberry:** Thank you. Thank you all for coming, and thank you for all of our fine comments by our panelists.

[End]

## About the Panelists

### Main Speakers

**Dr. Thomas Berger** is Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at Boston University. Previously he taught at the Johns Hopkins Department of Political Science. His primary research areas include international security, international migration and the politics of memory and historical representation. He has held a number of post-doctoral and research fellowships. He received his B.A. from Columbia University and his Ph.D. from MIT. Dr. Berger is the author of *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (1998). His articles and essays have appeared in numerous edited volumes and journals, including *International Security* and *Review of International Affairs*.

**Dr. Victor Cha** is Associate Professor of Government and D.S. Song-Korea Foundation Chair at Georgetown University. He is a former John H. Olin National Security Fellow at Harvard University, two-time Fulbright Scholar, and Hoover National Fellow at Stanford. Dr. Cha serves as an independent consultant to the U.S. Department of Defense, and has testified before Congress on Asian security issues. He holds a Ph.D. from Columbia University and an M.A./B.A. from Oxford University. He is the award-winning author of *Alignment Despite Antagonisms: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (1999). His articles on international relations and East Asia have appeared in *International Security*, *Foreign Affairs*, and *Journal of East Asian Studies*, among others. He most recently published *Nuclear North Korea; A Debate on Engagement Strategies* (co-author, 2003).

**Dr. Fukushima Akiko** is currently Director of Policy Studies and Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA), a semi-governmental think tank. Previously, she was adjunct professor at Keio University and visiting professor at the Center on International Relations, University of British Columbia. Dr. Fukushima has been appointed to numerous committees of the Japanese government including the Committee on International Economy of the Cabinet Office since 1998, the Defense Agency's Council on Defense Facilities since 2000, and the Defense Agency's Study Group on Defense Diplomacy since 2001. She received her M.A. from SAIS and a Ph.D. from Osaka University. She has written *Lexicon: Asia Taiheiyo Anzenhosho Taiwa* (2002), *Japanese Foreign Policy: The Emerging Logic of Multilateralism* (1999), and contributed chapters to co-edited books, including "Multilateralism and Security Cooperation with China" in *Alliance for Engagement* by the Henry L. Stimson Center (2002).

**Dr. Inoguchi Takashi** is Professor of Political Science at the Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo. Previously, he was a professor at Sophia University, and held visiting positions (research and/or teaching) at the University of Geneva, Harvard University, and Australian National University. His professional activities include the positions of Senior Vice Rector (Assistant Secretary General of UN) at the United Nations University Headquarters (1995-1997) and President of the Japan Association of International Relations (2000-2002). He received a B.A. and M.A. from the University of Tokyo and a Ph.D. from MIT. Dr. Inoguchi is on the journal editorial board for numerous journals, including *Japanese Journal of Political Science* (executive editor) and *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* (editor-in-chief). He has published many books and articles in English and Japanese. His most recent books in English are *Reinventing the Alliance: U.S.-Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change* (2003), *Japan's Asian Policy: Revival and Response* (2002), and *Global Change: a Japanese Perspective* (2001).

**Dr. Koji Murata** is Associate Professor of Diplomatic History in the Department of Political Science at Doshisha University in Kyoto, Japan. Prior to his current position, he was Associate Professor of American Studies at Hiroshima University. Dr. Murata's specialties include the U.S.-Japan security relationship, Japan's defense policy, and U.S. foreign policy towards East Asia. He is the recipient of many prestigious awards, including the Suntory Academic Prize, the Yoshida Shigeru Award, the Yomiuri Merit Award for New Opinion Leadership, and the Shimizu Hiroshi Award from the Japan Association for American Studies. Professor Murata received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Kobe University and was a Fulbright scholar at the George Washington University, where he earned his M.A. in International Affairs. He has published extensively and is the author of books on President Carter's troop withdrawal policy from South Korea and on the first U.S. Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal.

## Discussants

**Mr. Ralph Cossa** is President of the Pacific Forum, CSIS. He manages the Forum's programs on security, political, economic, and environmental issues. He sits on the steering committee of the Council For Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, serves as Executive Director of the U.S. Committee of CSCAP, and is a board member of the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies. Mr. Cossa has over 25 years of experience in formulating and implementing U.S. security policy in the Asia-Pacific and Near East-South Asia regions. He is a retired USAF Colonel and a former national security affairs fellow at the Hoover Institution. Mr. Cossa holds a B.A. from Syracuse University, an M.B.A. from Pepperdine University and an M.S. in strategic studies from the Defense Intelligence College.

**Dr. Sato Yoichiro** is an Associate Professor at the Asian-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii. He joined the center in 2001 after teaching at Auckland University's Department of Political Studies. He has also taught at the University of Hawaii and Kansai Gaidai Hawaii College. Dr. Sato is a member of the Japan Political Studies Group of the American Political Science Association and the International Studies Association. In Auckland, he has served as the branch vice-president of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. Dr. Sato received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Hawaii, an M.A. in international studies from the University of South Carolina, and a B.A. in law from Keio University. His research writings have appeared in such journals as the *Asian Perspective*, *Asian Affairs*, *Japan Studies Review*, *Japanese Studies* (Australia) and the *New Zealand International Review*, as well as in numerous edited books by others. He co-edited a book (with Akitoshi Miyashita), *Japanese Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific* (2001). His op-ed articles on international fishery issues have appeared in *Asia Times*, *Canberra Times*, *International Herald Tribune*, *Japan Times*, and *New Zealand Herald*.

## Moderator

**Dr. John Ikenberry** is the Peter F. Krogh Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice at Georgetown University. He previously taught at Princeton University and the University of Pennsylvania and held posts at the State Department (Policy Planning) and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Senior Associate). Dr. Ikenberry has also been a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution (1997-2002). He is also the reviewer of books on political and legal affairs for *Foreign Affairs*. During 1998-99, Dr. Ikenberry was an international scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., which is part of the Smithsonian Institution. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. Dr. Ikenberry has published many books, including *State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy* (co-author, 2002), *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (2000), and *Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government* (1988). He has published in all the major academic journals of international relations and written widely in policy journals.