

# Japan's Relations With China Since the End of the Cold War

by  
**Dr. Iokibe Makoto**

**Iokibe Makoto:** Thank you very much for inviting me and for your considerate introduction. Ladies and gentlemen, it's a great honor and pleasure for me to have this opportunity to talk at such a meeting of distinguished intellectual leaders. Today, I'd like to discuss the development of Japan-China relations toward the end of the Cold War.

The term "end of the Cold War" should be used carefully. Europeans generally consider 1989 as the end of the Cold War. This year is less meaningful in Asia. At least with respect to the economic realm, China started the end of the Cold War ten years earlier. In 1979, China began developing a free-market economy under the slogan "reform and opening up." However, China's communist political vision has not undergone relevant change to its economic transformation. One-party rule is still alive; it is a combination of these two spheres that make up the China that we know today.

In 1979, after leading China out of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping brought forth his "reform and opening up" policy. Deng's pragmatic approach gave priority to actual economic improvements, rather than promoting the doctrine of the communist economy. He frankly said that, "A cat, no matter what color the cat, so long as the cat catches mice, it is a good cat." By opening up international markets, China wisely began to remedy her crumbling communist economy ten years before the end of the Cold War, one reason why China—unlike Soviet Russia and Eastern European coun-

tries—did not collapse in the late eighties.

## Japan's Early Cooperation with China in the 1970s

Japan was able to cooperate with the mainland very quickly. In 1978, one year before, just as Deng's new policies were being put into practice, the Fukuda cabinet signed a peace and friendship treaty with China. Then, in the following year, newly appointed Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi reached an agreement with Beijing on economic cooperation. However, pre-war relations with China were based on Japan's military quest and expansion of the empire sacrificing Chinese land and people. That was a zero-sum game.

Japan in the late seventies finally established relations on a trust basis in the economic realm, through trade, direct investment and ODA. Economic assistance and the ODA, given to China during the 1980s and 1990s, which consisted of two hundred billion yen in grants and two trillion yen in loans – what meant in one sense as quasi-reparations for Japan's actions against China in WWII. Mao Tse-tung and Zhou Enlai abandoned reparation rights in 1972 when the two countries normalized diplomatic relations. Japan used to offer economic assistance to those countries – the terminology of reparations is not adequate, still, Japan was responsible for the war-time act. In that case, instead of using a "reparation" framework, the economic assistance was done. It was usually called "quasi-reparation." And China abandoned reparation rights, but

China is the biggest country that made sacrifices for Japan's war. So Japan started ODA in 1980.

But there is another implication, another aim for the economic co-operation with China. Ohira started ODA at that time, and at that time he explained the reasons to the Japanese people: "We don't want China to export revolution, but rather we want a China that is economically developed, and stable, and friendly to neighboring countries, and a responsible big power. To induce such kind of great power, we should do whatever we can do," is what Ohira suggested. In order to be a responsible, good member of the international system, Japan started close economic relations through the investment phase and the ODA. In this sense, Japan's co-operation and assistance to China in the last two decades of the twentieth century were ways of pursuing an enlightened Japan's interest.

In Soviet Russia in 1985 Gorbachev started political reform called *perestroika*, but this policy, as we all know, did not bring about major reform, but instead the collapse of the entire communist system in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Deng Xiaoping in China was determined to fully suppress the growing democratic movement, in an effort to preserve a Chinese society when the movement grew stronger and stronger with the Tiananmen incident. Tiananmen Square was in fact an undeniable confirmation of Deng's policy that began ten years before. That is to say, China pursued both one-party rule and a market economy at the same time. This combination constructed the basic form of contemporary China. So the market economy was continued, and one-party rule also was continued.

The suppression of the democratic movement at Tiananmen Square was a great

shock for Japan and the wider world. Highly respectful of human rights, the Western block countries imposed economic sanctions against China in retaliation. A year later, however, Japan was the first country to lift the sanctions. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy Vice Minister Owada Hisashi visited Washington to gain approval from the Bush administration.

According to him, it was not easy. Bush was somewhat prepared to lift sanctions. Then he visited Europe across the Atlantic. But Western Europe was not easy to persuade. That "human rights is a universal value which is most important and we should continue sanctions," was the majority opinion of European leaders. But Owada tried to persuade them by saying, "For you, Europeans, Soviet Russia—which is hostile to Europe—is a nightmare for you. You can't sleep if Russia is very hostile. The same is for Japan in Asia. We want to have a friendly China, a responsible China. If we leave China as a wild animal, then the stability and security in the region, in the world, is not secure." So finally, European leaders agreed with Owada to stop the sanctions. At the July 1990 Houston summit the sanctions against China were lifted. This was Japan's effort to incorporate China within the international community.

### **China Nervous About U.S. Power**

But several years since the end of the Cold War, China was very nervous about the United States' single superpower status and its possible attempt of one power ruling the world, including the Chinese area. The year of 1995, when the world celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War, was a time for China of great anxiety over Taiwanese independence. China feared that Taiwanese president Lee

Teng-hui would move his country towards independence. After visiting the United States, Lee was really encouraged and he was going to have the elections all over Taiwan. China expressed its absolute refusal of Taiwanese independence by conducting missile exercises across the Taiwan Straits.

Facing this challenge, the Clinton administration, under the Secretary of Defense William Perry's guidance, signaled to China that the United States would not permit unification through force by sending two aircraft carriers to the waters surrounding Taiwan. In this way, both China and the United States communicated the reaffirmation of the 1972 Shanghai Accord. That is a package of two points: China demanded one China, and America wanted a peaceful solution. So, one China and a peaceful solution were the main package of the 1972 Shanghai Accord. And the '96 Taiwan crisis confirmed from both sides; in this way, both China and the United States reconfirmed that agreement. The Taiwan Strait crisis caused international wariness towards China. More importantly, it prompted a redefinition of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, something that had been planned before, but had not yet been enacted until the Strait crisis.

With the ending of the cold war, Japan and the United States lost its main enemy, the Soviet Union. Since the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance was designed to counter a Soviet threat that no longer existed, there was some argument in Japan over dissolving the alliance. I remember I had a discussion with my friends in the international relations association in Japan. The 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis, however, taught the Japanese that new conflict inevitably arose in the world. Although the North Korean crisis did not end in war, the

possibility that it could have resulted in war prompted Japan to realize the usefulness of the U.S.-Japan security treaty to cope with the various dangers and instability in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition to North Korea's nuclear crisis, China's possible use of force caused Japan to keep and extend the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. In April 1996, Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto in an agreement stated that the U.S.-Japan alliance would act as a security system for the Asia-Pacific region in the twenty-first century.

China, fearing that the alliance aimed to contain it, lodged a strong protest. The very definition of the treaty however, was not always intended to contain China. It is true that the alliance would stop any attempt to change the affairs by force, but would encourage each country to develop peacefully. The definition of the alliance would ask China to becoming a major responsible power in international society. Engagement, not always containment, was the ultimate goal.

In October 1998, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung visited Tokyo and took the initiative for a historical reconciliation. Prime Minister Obuchi apologized by document concerning colonial rule over Korea. And Kim Dae-jung said, "We do not condemn Japan for the past history. That is basically Japan's matter to overcome the past." And Kim Dae-jung suggested future-oriented co-operation for the two peoples. As a reason, he mentioned three points: First, a hostile Japan developed peacefully. Second, a hostile Japan achieved democracy. Third, a hostile Japan now is offering economic assistance to foreign countries.

### **Japan and China Reconstructed Relations Based on Common Interests**

And so, the following year of the security redefinition, Japan and China also started to reconstruct bi-lateral relations, based not on the emotion derived from the past, but on actual common interests. This was proposed by a group called “Japan-China 21st Century Committee.” It is an advisory committee for the two governments, consisting of private intellectual leaders. Indeed, based on this advice, the two governments prepared an agreement on thirty-three issues which consist of the mutual interests of the two countries. That was prepared before Kim Dae-jung’s visit to Japan the next month in November 1998. But during Jiang’s actual visit, the president’s focal point shifted notably to Japanese aggression on Chinese soil. On repeated occasions, including a reception at Paris, the Chinese president publicly condemned Japan’s war responsibility. Although the thirty-three agreements were signed during his visit it was almost forgotten and neglected by the public.

During the spring of 1999, however, Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi visited China during a period of unpleasant U.S.-Japanese relations caused by the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. After concluding an agreement with China to back its entry into the WTO, Obuchi sought President Clinton’s consent on China’s inclusion. Obuchi did not want to lose sight of the policy of engagement merely because of a temporary souring of U.S.-China relations. In May 2000 in Beijing, Jiang declared his commitment to improve government-level Sino-Japanese relations, clearly stating China’s intention to take special account of Japan. Thus, after a redefinition of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, on the governmental level, relations between China and Japan improved.

With respect to the U.S., the new Bush ad-

ministration was critical of Clinton’s effort to engage China and North Korea, aiming instead to distinguish clearly between the friend and enemies of democracy. By de-emphasizing U.S.-Japan relations and taking a sympathetic position vis-à-vis Taiwan, Bush expressed his desire to maintain a more rigid posture towards China and North Korea. And as the new Bush administration, it seemed as if the ship of U.S.-China relations would soon enter stormy seas.

The Bush administration, as a matter of fact, however, turned out to be quite cautious about maintaining relations with China. For example, when the U.S. reconnaissance plane went down in the south China coast, the U.S. and China were able to manage the affair peacefully. Then the 9/11 terrorist attacks brought about a new horizon in U.S.-China co-operation: China expressed its support for America’s war on terror. And the United States extended its understanding concerning China’s policies in the Xiangxing Ugyr Autonomous Region. With respect to U.S.-Japan relations, Prime Minister Koizumi made a visit to ground zero in New York soon after 9/11 and declared that Japan would stand by the United States in its fight against terror. The trips helped to deepen the friendship and trust between Bush and Koizumi. The cooperative relations among the U.S., Japan and China against terror effectively softened the discord between Japan and China, which resulted from Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine.

For Japan’s part in the war on terror, the Koizumi government passed the anti-terrorism special measures law and then dispatched marine Self Defense Forces to the Indian ocean to provide refueling services to American and allied forces engaged in operations against Afghanistan.

## **Japanese and Chinese Reactions to War on Terror**

Japan committed to the world-wide war against terrorism in the form of real support. China was always watchful of Japan's policy of pacifism, but it did not make special mention of these actions. So throughout the war in Afghanistan, Japan provided real support. More importantly, Japan gave emphasis to the efforts to reconstruct the society which was destroyed by war. So, post-war operations were what Japan would assume responsibility for. So, a kind of division of labor between the U.S. and Japan became very clear. The military effort to restore the peace structure in the world is America's responsibility, but Japan will make a good effort for economic reconstruction after the end of the fighting. Despite the world-wide anti-war demonstrations, Koizumi resolutely stated his support for the Bush administration's war against Iraq.

China seemed to send a muted message that although China does not agree with the war, it does not desire to openly oppose the U.S. war. For China, the war issue passed by quietly. China quickly acted on the North Korean problem and succeeded in setting up a six-nation talk on the nuclear crisis. This signals that China was willing to take the initiative to stabilize international relations in East Asia, and marks the beginning of China's efforts not only to cooperate with the United States, but also to play an important role in the formation of international order. This, along with its active work on the ASEAN free trade agreement, expressed China's interest in the East Asian community of nations. As Ohira suggested in 1979, this is a role that Japan decided that China should undertake. Japan should welcome and express satisfaction, but Chinese initiatives also had the effect of push-

ing Japan's very active Asian diplomacy back into the shadows.

## **Japan Should Develop Creative Policies to Lead East Asia Towards a New Order**

While strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan should develop more creative policies to lead East Asia towards a new order and to foster co-operation. One of the conclusions of the Obuchi Commission, which I wrote myself, was for Japan's future diplomacy; the most important point is to maintain and strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. The U.S.-Japan alliance and good relations in Asia are not mutually exclusive. That we can have both—and we should have both—was the main point of that commission. While keeping the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan should actively contribute to form a new community in East Asia. And history is moving a little bit in that direction. Most scholars employ a Cold War, analytical kind of framework when evaluating relations in Asia between Japan and China in the post-war period.

Yet I believe that when you take into account the actual process of those relations it becomes clear that a more traditional framework, or a more diversified element, is not as important. The relations between Japan and China continue to reflect the pursuit of national security, national interests, and they are up in the shadows of past conflicts and dreams of a common future. Concerning China's relations with Japan: one striking fact is a considerable difference of opinion between the government and people. Because of Japan's past history of aggression, the Chinese people have come to regard Japan in the most negative terms. Whenever China makes overtures to Japan, such as when Mao Tse-tung re-established diplomatic relations with Japan, abandoning the Chinese right of reparations in 1972,

and when Japan's Nakasone and Hu pursued consolidation in the mid-1980s, Chinese public opinion has cried out angrily. Although a new way of thinking and love of Japanese culture has emerged in China that advocates a more positive stance towards Japan, this advocacy constitutes only a small minority within the Chinese public.

Anti-Japanese public opinion surfaces on various occasions, however; the stance of the Chinese government so far is such that even heated anti-Japanese sentiment can be restrained. And the position of the Chinese government moved it to the positive side. That was started in 1979 by Deng Xiaoping and affirmed after the Tiananmen incident, and in the late nineties it was finally determined. So that was Chinese determination: self-decision for Chinese civilization. China will give within the international system; China determined that. That was the opposite side of the coin: that China's foreign policy is basically cooperating with the United States, and keeping and seeking good relations with Japan.

Now Japanese public opinion concerning China has fluctuated from the positive to the negative. When relations were restored in the 1970s, there was a China boom in Japan. And during the 80s, a textbook controversy between Japan and China arose. Interestingly, Japan's public opinion criticized the Japanese government, not the Chinese government, for failing to adequately respond to China's criticism. Japanese public opinion turned critical of China during the Tiananmen Square incident. The forceful separation of Chinese students outraged the Japanese public. Contrary to some predictions, the Japanese emperor's visit to China in 1992 did not change this stance.

## **Wounded Japanese Nationalism**

Finally, Jiang's repeated condemnation of Japan's past aggression in Tokyo spread indignation among Japanese citizens. The 1990s was called a "lost decade" for Japan. The prolonged recession and the various crises injured Japanese pride, and wounded nationalism became stronger in the latter half of the 90s. And this wounded Japanese nationalism of the 90s was rather focused on China. Anti-foreignism is becoming popular, sometimes in the form of anti-Americanism or anti-Koreanism, but anti-Chinese sentiment is the most conspicuous.

Calls were heard requesting Japan to abandon its ODA program in China. However, quite recently, as China has placed a greater importance on relations with Japan on a governmental level, and to play a greater leading role in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, anti-Chinese public opinion has somewhat softened. The Japanese government's China policy has been a great deal more consistent than is commonly thought. Ohira Masayoshi, as I said, was a tireless proponent of improving relations with China. First, as the foreign minister of the Tanaka Kakuei cabinet, which is responsible for normalizing relations in 1972, and then as Prime Minister in 1979, Ohira formulated the policies for Chinese economic cooperation.

There is a personal and generational connection to the war. The reparations like ODA to China could be seen as a way of taking responsibility for past Japanese actions. And Miyazaki shared the same position, and Obuchi also. But more to the point, Ohira wished that China would develop friendly relations with foreign countries and become a more responsible member of the international community. Thus, in order to lead China towards that goal,

Ohira wisely offered the nation's hand to deepen relations with China, including assistance and economic development.

Japan's long-term strategic policy concerning China was one of engagement, hoping that China would graduate from being a revolutionary state and a poor, under-developed country, to become economically developed and politically stable, and friendly to its neighbors, and a responsible big power in the twenty-first century. Such a China has been a long-time Japanese policy for China since 1979.

As a constructive participant in matters concerning North Korea and ASEAN, China is now becoming more eager to be a central player in the formulation of a new East Asian community of nations. It is crucial that a framework of East Asian nations does not become like an anti-American union of the EAC, which was proposed by Mahathir. Nor should it center on the new Chinese order; it has to be open to the world and to pursue commonly-shared interests among the East Asian nations. Thank you very much.

**William Breer:** Thank you very much. It is a great pleasure to be here. I should start out from the beginning that I'm not an expert on China. I'm not really an expert on anything, but I'm here, so I'll try to say what I can. Professor Iokibe's lecture is a very hard act to follow. He certainly covered the field very thoroughly and very thoughtfully, I think. We all face an enormously changed China from what we saw before the Cold War, or even further back than that, before the end of the Cold War, or what Mr. Ohira saw when he was making his predictions that Professor Iokibe pointed out.

## Dramatic Changes in China

China now has now perhaps the world's most dynamic economy – certainly the fastest growth rate according to the figures we know. It's more open, it has a very high rate of investment, both from domestic and international sources. And this prosperity is leading to a huge demand for consumer goods and capital goods as well, and the demand is met by exports from both Japan and the United States. And at the same time, China has become an enormous exporter; it's now Japan's biggest source of imports. It's now the United States' third biggest source of imports, and as a result of that it's piling up enormous foreign exchange reserves which are helping to bolster America's spending habits and sustain America's spending habits.

So we very much appreciate that. And in a few years we will start to see, I'm sure, more Chinese trademarks and brand names on world markets, rather than Chinese goods being incorporated into American, or Japanese, or even European trademarks. China has also become more active, much more active, I think, than Mr. Ohira anticipated, diplomatically. Over the last – again I'm not a keen, but a regular observer of China, but it seems to me that its officials and diplomats have acquired enormous skills over the past couple of decades, partly from studying here, partly studying in Japan, of course. As a result, China is seeking, as Professor Iokibe pointed out, increasing influence around the world. More specifically, at first it saw an opportunity, and I think it felt a threat, too, and took the initiative to put the six-power talks together. They haven't succeeded yet, but I think it's a major step for China to take a major move forward into international relations in a way that China had not done before.

As pointed out, China has joined in the fight against terrorism, and it hasn't expressed huge objections to America's actions in Iraq. It's handled the U.S. reconnaissance incident reasonably well. I think they could have reacted a little bit more quickly, but communications may not be much better in their government than they are in ours. It's projected a friendly, non-threatening posture throughout Asia and really throughout the world in the last several years, and this is really quite remarkable. This is signified in many ways by the Sydney speech after the APEC meeting. And then you contrast that with our president's speech, which was tough and hard-charging and threatening, with a "you're either with us or against us" sort of attitude. And the Chinese—it was really reaching out and extremely well done and had made a huge impression, I think, in Australia and elsewhere in Asia.

These are all pluses, I think, and Mr. Ohira would agree with that. A richer China means better markets for everybody, and people with full stomachs tend not to make wars, as has been said in the past. And it should lead to better relations, and fortunately, to better relations between Japan and China, especially considering that Japan has been very generous with ODA over the years. But history lingers and it tends to raise its ugly head fairly frequently, even with this enormous amount of ODA in the last twenty years or so, and the repeated apologies that have been made by Japanese officials. Perhaps the apologies have not been quite specific enough—and the Chinese allege not sincere enough. But I think the intention of the apologies was to generally express an apology for what happened in the past.

### **Discord Remains in China-Japan Relationship**

I'm afraid if the Chinese people have unhappy attitudes towards Japan, these gestures and the ODA as well are probably little known in China outside official circles. I am not sure how well these things have been publicized among the Chinese people and in what manner. They tend to hear more about the few textbooks that are distorted.

Then, of course, the prime minister's political need or compulsion to visit the Yasukuni Shrine fairly frequently nowadays, plus careless or sometimes deliberate statements by Japanese political leaders, have given Chinese who don't have such friendly attitudes towards Japan repeated opportunities to scold, for lack of a better word. And this exacerbates the public discourse between Japan and China.

And on the downside of relations is Japan's movement towards the adoption of missile defense and the MST with the United States. I think China, for all of our claims that the MST is a mutual security treaty arrangement not aimed at China – if I were on the other side of the ocean, I would not take that totally at face value and it would be of some concern to me.

Missile defense, of course, can be argued as a legitimate policy move, a defensive move by Japan. Japan is not armed with nuclear weapons and it's faced with a power, a huge power nearby that does have rockets, and short of acquiring a nuclear deterrent capacity, missile defense is the next best thing.

And then there is Taiwan. Japan is not as engaged on the Taiwan issue as the United States is, but it is an issue that's out there

for all of us, both Japan and the United States, that we have to worry about over the next – forever I guess, I don't know. But it's better forever than just over the next week I think, so it kind of creates a vicious circle.

### **Generation Change Taking Place in China and Japan**

There is a generation change taking place both in China and Japan. I'm not sure which way it's going in Japan, necessarily, but I sense a younger generation of Chinese that are much more broadminded than those of several decades ago. But the bottom line is that over the longer term we have to learn to live with a new, growing China. It is a big country with a huge population, it has lots of resources, it has lots of shortcomings, but it also has lots of talent, obviously.

A couple of years ago, we were talking about Chinese labor doing assembly work, and now they're moving up in the technological scale very rapidly. But we argue we can't sort of straight-line China's economic growth. It is not necessarily going to remain at seven or eight percent forever. That's not a given, but I think over the longer term it will be at a fairly rigorous rate. And many Japanese businessmen and leaders have recognized this fact.

Several years ago, when I visited Japan and talked to a number of CEOs, they were really kind of worried about jobs fleeing to China, about whole factories moving from mostly Western Japan to China and displacing a lot of Japanese workers. More recently, speaking to some of the same leaders and others, the attitude has kind of changed, and it's turned into: "Well, let's get on the band wagon, let's invest in China, let's make the most of what business we can do in China." So I think maybe these guys

have got it right and the best thing that we can all do is to ensure that we are all part of the action in China.

**Minxin Pei:** First I want to thank the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA for inviting me to participate in this very interesting discussion on Japan–China relations. Again, there is a disclaimer I must say: I do not work on Japan as a professional interest. However, the Sino–Japanese relationship is something I care deeply about as a person, as somebody who was born in China and knows about this troubled relationship.

First, I want to make a brief comment on Professor Iokibe's excellent lecture tracing the development of Sino-Japanese relations. I was especially struck by the vision attributed to Japanese leadership at the beginning of China's opening to the world in the late 1970s, and basically the Japanese leadership had the same vision as the American leadership. That is, engagement with China will ultimately produce a politically stable and externally co-operative China.

And if we look at China today, obviously there are many faults that we can find with China, but we must admit that today's China is a much more pleasant country, both for its own people and for its neighbors. So, to a large extent, I would say that the objectives of the Japanese leadership and the objectives of the American leadership have been realized.

### **Japan's Use of ODA Not an Effective Way to Influence China**

But, there is a crucial difference. If you look at American influence in China—and I am a product of American influence on China—and Japanese influence in China, you will say, "What did the Japanese get for those hundreds of billions of yen that they

invested or they loaned to China?” The strategies adopted by both countries were quite different, although the goals were very similar. But the results are very different and I, just to be flippant, might say that the example of Japanese ODA to China makes a very strong case of how not to use ODA to influence the behavior of another country.

So let me just look at what really went wrong, because I will say that Japan, compared to the U.S.—which by the way gave very little in bilateral aid to China, practically negligible, practically zero. The amount of influence the U.S. has in China is way out of proportion to its economic expenditure. I was talking the late 1970s, early 80s: Japan was the model when China just opened up. But today, if you look at China’s industrial development, its main economic institutions, and, God forbid, its rising elites, they are not speaking Japanese, they are speaking English. And they are copying not the Japanese central bank system, they are copying the Fed system. And they are taking over, they are trying to imitate the American economic institutions. So, something is not quite right. So I did a very quick check to see what really went wrong with the Japanese approach, and I would list the following.

First of all, it is really a reflection of the Japanese checkbook diplomacy; it’s checkbook foreign policy. You try to influence the thinking of other countries and the culture of a country by building stuff. That’s not the way to do it. You try to set up examples where you apply your leverage in the way of the cultural realm, in the institutional realm; I think the U.S. has particular strengths in that area. And Japan is a statist country, by which I mean the government dominates everything, so it’s very

comfortable to deal with another state. America is really a civil-society-based country; it does not trust governments. So the U.S., when we look at how the U.S. has engaged China, the government does very little. But civil society, the American society at large, engages China in very comprehensive way. My first contact with U.S. society was not with the U.S. government, but was with American professors, with American tourists. So, if your interlocutor or if your main partner is another state then you can fall victim, you are going to be held hostage by the political needs of the state. That’s why the money is used by the state in China to build a lot of hardware, ports, roads that ordinary people use every day, but really do not know how these infrastructures were paid for.

So I think when we look back, then we will see that that part of the strategy was very wrong: going through the state and then focusing on developing China’s hard infrastructure. The U.S. understood, not necessarily explicitly, but maybe implicitly, that the problem with China was not that the Chinese do not have enough roads and power plants or ports, but that China’s economic political system needs to be transformed.

### **U.S. Strategy Was Focused on Elites**

So, the U.S. strategy of, to use the Chinese phrase, “peaceful evolution,” was focused on elites. So, if you look at the number of students coming to the U.S. versus those going to Japan, they are very different both in numbers and in quality. And as a result, looking thirty-five years back, the people who have returned from Japan to China are not in important positions. Some of them have risen to useful decision-making positions. But the key leaders in today’s China – and I would bet in tomorrow’s China –

were trained in the U.S. in the 80s and early 90s. So that is key. So, I would say that as a result the 80s were an excellent decade for the Sino-Japanese relationship, in comparison to others. The 90s was the decade of stagnation for Japan economically and for the bilateral relationship between Japan and China diplomatically. And I attribute several reasons for this, and at the end of my presentation I will say why I think things may be actually picking up.

I agree with Professor Iokibe that 1989 was a very important point, not in terms of the ending of the Cold War in the Japanese perception of China. The crack down in Tiananmen, if you look at the polling data, produced a huge decline in the favorable perception of China among the Japanese public. But also domestically for China, it's very important because 1989 saw the rise of a generation of politically conservative leaders in China.

Looking back at the Sino-Japanese relationship, I would argue that when liberal leaders are in charge in Beijing they are much more interested in reconciliation with Japan. They were willing to give up more and the best example here is Mr. Hu Yaobang in the mid 1980s. He was a big promoter of this reconciliation.

And there you can contrast Hu Yaobang with Jiang Zemin because they are very different. Jiang Zemin was much more politically conservative, and for personal reasons he was very hostile to Japan. In 1998 he made a strategic mistake for which he has not really paid politically. This is something that the Chinese people should know about, that he made a very strategic mistake there and he ought to be held accountable. So that's one reason. And another thing, in the 1990s the American engagement strategy was too successful. The Chinese elite

began to be obsessed with their relationship with the U.S., at the expense of their relationship with Japan.

And I think strategically there was this kind of reasoning. I think the best way of cutting Japan down to its size and assuming a leadership role exclusive with China in East Asia was to split the U.S.-Japan alliance. And then you can do that only by cozying up to Washington. This kind of thinking was fundamentally wrong because the more you do so, the more you're going to push Japan into the arms of the U.S. and then, of course, you neglect the fundamental difference between China and the U.S.

### **China's Reactions Resulted in a Closer U.S.-Japan Relationship**

So, after a decade of cozying up the U.S., what China has got is a much closer U.S.-Japan relationship that does not suit China's end. So I think for China, even though I think that Japan needs to do something especially on the history issue, I believe that only a fundamental shift in strategic thinking in China will be able to inject new momentum in the Sino-Japanese relationship. Just because China today is in a much more stronger position, China should not be militarily threatened from Japan, because I think that such a threat does not exist. Japan should fear a military threat from China because China is, militarily, a much stronger nation. And China can fundamentally improve its bargaining position with the U.S. with a real reconciliation effort toward Japan.

Fortunately, I think this kind of thinking is beginning to emerge in China today, especially among the younger foreign policy analysts. A year ago, China had this huge debate on where the new thinking towards Japan is headed. And I was glad to see that

there was a lot of resonance although, as expected, quite a few people were unprepared for that kind of suggestion.

I read those essays and discussions carefully. I saw the basic ideas as they are, because if you look at East Asia twenty years from now the most ideal world is a world in which there is a real fundamental reconciliation between Japan and China, because that will take much of the burden off the U.S. You're not going to see another hundred thousand troops in East Asia. The U.S. has no desire to dominate the region, but the U.S. troops deployed there are a tool to balance Japan with China, and if China can start on its course to reconcile with Japan, then there would be no such need. So I would say, as a start, maybe China and Japan should focus on the areas where their common interests really lie.

Energy: I think that's the most important area, because it does not make sense for Japan to offer Russia seventy million dollars to build a pipeline with China competing with Japan to offer another. So if there is one area where common sense would tell us that both countries' interests are almost identical, then energy should be it. Thank you.

## Q&A

**John Ikenberry:** We're going to open it up. I wanted to ask the first question. And it's really partly mentioned comments that provoke this, because I see a tension in all the comments here about where the forces of history are taking us over the next twenty years in East Asia.

One could tell the story based on all of the discussants here that China and Japan may have a kind of stable, relatively benign relationship going forward, but that China

and Japan both see the U.S. as an important partner. And so one could tell the story of the rise of China in some sense fitting into the current structural relations in East Asia, which see a kind of hub-and-spoke security model, where Washington has very good ties with Japan and almost good ties with Seoul, but with Taiwan, and then on down. And in some way Beijing says, "Well, I can integrate into that framework and, in fact, I can have an even better relationship with Washington than Tokyo can, because I'm a rising power and they're going to pay more attention to me."

So you could kind of see China accepting the logic of special relationships on a bilateral level, all going towards Washington. But you could also tell the story based on Minxin's last comment, that if each of these countries considers its own fundamental national interest, let national interests dictate a stronger regional tie with each other and with Korea.

And so when I was in Tokyo this December, I heard Nakasone give a talk and he called for trilateral defense minister meetings between Seoul, Beijing and Tokyo. He has a vision of more coherent and more cohesive ties in Northeast Asia that would be separate from a relationship with Washington. So, I could tell each of those two stories. One is a kind of a continuity, China absorbing itself into this transpacific, America-centered hub-and-spoke order, or tell the story of more profound interest leading to regional consolidation, overcoming these historical issues.

So anyway, I just think these are two—I don't know which is right, but they seem to be both plausible. And maybe we'll just let that comment sit on the table and let's open things up, and introduce yourself and then ask a quick question.

**Questioner:** I think that concentrating or focusing on the social scene today in Japan, I see many crimes committed by foreigners. And I believe those are referring to Chinese in Japan. How is this affecting bilateral relations, particularly the immigration policy of Japan? Is Japan really controlling foreigners coming into Japan, or is it making a more soft approach, inviting foreigners to come into Japan because of the birth rate issues?

Another question I would like to know is, you didn't mention much about Korea. I understand that Korean companies are going massively to China, and also many students are going to China to study, and then there is a tremendous interaction between South Korea and China. I wonder how Japan reacts to that particular aspect?

### **Immigrants in Japan**

**Iokibe:** Thank you very much. The first point you raised, the crimes by foreigners, especially Chinese. That's a big issue in Japan now. We have a deep dilemma on that matter. Japanese society is going to be an aging society and we had better accept many more immigrants from abroad. So we should soften the control of immigration, but on the other hand, such kind of crimes are a problem. For instance, the Tokyo governor Ishihara is always agitating at the Chinese foreigners for making crimes. And also we share this challenge of terrorism.

We should have stronger control. So we have a deep dilemma. So of course, even if there were no foreigners in Japan, Japanese society itself has become less safe. Japanese society is not what it used to be; unbelievable crimes occur almost every day. And some agitators tend to say, "It's all foreigners," or something like that. That's a very misleading way of thinking. So we

should try to get rid of these international crimes; that's very important. But to keep a basic healthy education in international society, we need to increase the number of foreigners working in Japan.

For instance, aged person's care was not sanctioned within Japan. So, little by little, we accepted Philippine helpers, and we also broadened Japanese companies to accept foreign workers and the expats who have a good knowledge about computers, or something like that. And we should not lose our economic vitality, we should not do that. So, it's a very two-dimensional effort.

And about South Korea–China relations. It's little known in Japan and it's a good thing that South Korea has deeper relations with China. As for South Korean psychology, we have sometimes a little concern. For instance, in South Korea's anti-Americanism and pro-Chinese sentiment, and the pro-North Korean sentiment: that's an emotional zigzag. If we were somewhat apprehensive, now we have deeper relations with South Korea, after the world cup soccer joint efforts. And according to a Korean friend, the anti-Americanism there is not a strategic one, but a psychological one. They know the importance of the American military presence, but the American attitude toward Korean people does not show they consider it to be a civilized society. Mutual respect is not seen. Some form of mutual, respectful relations is necessary, not only between the U.S. and South Korea, but between Japan and Korea.

**Questioner:** I am from Doshisha University in Kyoto, I happened to be here as a visitor. Generally speaking, I do agree with your observation about the Sino–Japanese relationship. As far as I know, even about Japan's dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces to Iraq, so far the Chinese government has

been very quiet. And having said that, I would say, as Chinese society is more and more democratized, Chinese public opinion must be more diversified and revitalized.

And given several issues, which are expected in Japanese politics – for example, upgrading Japan’s defense agency to the department of defense, or how to revise the constitution, and Japan’s decision to cut the ODA to China, and especially major political parties in Japan now talking about the possibility of the revision of the constitution. Considering all of them combined, what do you think about Chinese reactions and perceptions? Do you think the Chinese government can manage Chinese public opinion based on calculated and national interests? Thank you.

### **Effects of Abandoning Article Nine**

**Iokibe:** If the constitutional revision is on the line, we will abandon Article Nine; the world will be surprised and shocked. But if we amend the constitution, keeping the past part – namely, we will abandon aggressive war forever – I agree we should keep that, for self-defense is necessary for any country. No government is permitted to be without defending their people’s rights.

And also, the third category was not defined in Article Nine, that is, international security participation. Now, this is a hot topic, and Japan should participate in international security, although Japan should not make aggressive war. That is a very important distinction, and if the amendment is passed we will defend ourselves in war and we will participate in international security matters, if they are legitimate, hopefully under the UN.

But we will never wage an aggressive war. If that was the substance of the amendment,

no government can criticize it, as no government is more peaceful than with this kind of provision. So it depends on what is the content of the constitutional amendment.

### **Government’s Ability to Control Public Opinion in China**

**Pei:** Just a quick word on public opinion and the government’s ability to control it in China. Although China is becoming more open and the society and public opinion have growing influence on policy makers, I would say that if the government so chooses, it can still control it. And look at several recent incidents. Initially, public opinion had a profound impact on the government, but then after the government decided to crack down, it would even control the Internet in order to do so. So, I’m not that worried.

It really depends on how the Chinese government interprets these important moves. If the Chinese government perceives them as fundamentally hostile rather than symbolically useful for the Japanese government, in that case it will exploit Chinese public opinion in order to put pressure on the Japanese government.

**Questioner:** I’m an undergraduate of the George Washington University, and thank you very much for today’s lecture. I’m not an expert of anything either, but I have a few questions. Professor Iokibe, could you just elaborate on the idea of national interest a little bit more? I mean, I understand that there are many common national interests such as the economy and stability, and North Korea, but could you elaborate on if there are any sort of conflicting national interests between China and Japan, and how they can be overcome between the countries? And also, perhaps it’s going too far,

but if there are any kind of long-term deals to establish some sort of inter-governmental organization like the European Union, other than ASEAN – not right now, but in the future?

Like Dr. Pei mentioned, there are differences in generations, I think, about the perception towards the relationship between China and Japan. I think my generation has more and more in terms of people, culture, exchanges and education, humanitarian efforts. More and more people grow together but still the older generations have strong emotions towards past activities. So thank you very much.

**Iokibe:** Thank you very much. The national interests between the two countries do not oppose each other as sharply as before because, as I mentioned in my talk, the Chinese interests are peaceful development and economic development. And I mentioned the Twenty-first Century Committee that proposed redefining common interests. And a new round for the Twenty-first Committee started at the end of last year. And I'm a member of it. We discussed many of the problems between the two countries. They basically have good relations, but since last summer – when poison gas from the second world war was discovered, and the sex tour problem, and the incident at Xi'an University, where Japanese students did a stupid dance and it was criticized – the atmosphere of the intellectuals from both countries have been fighting against each other.

### **Koizumi Is Not Anti-Asian**

How to solve such unfortunate, serious problems jointly was discussed at that committee. And a Chinese friend asked me, "Why did Koizumi visit Yasukuni Shrine three times?" And I answered that it was a

very personal and domestic motivation of Koizumi. He's insensitive to Japan's Asian neighbors, but he is not anti-China or anti-Korea. He had a close friend who died in the war, and he read Kamikaze Kotokai's history and was very much moved, and he personally believed that post-war peace was based on such sacrifices from youngsters. So, that we should pray for peace is what he believed personally. And personally, he is not at all anti-Asia, but the visit was from a very private and domestic motivation. As a prime minister, a public figure, I don't think it's a sufficient reason. So I am sympathetic to the Chinese sentiment. This kind of discussion was exchanged, and the national interests are different, but we tried to jointly overcome that.

For instance, Chinese crime is terrible for Japan, but Chinese society has some knowledge about that. So why don't we consult those who are experts in deterring Chinese crime and then we can work together? And also, Dr. Ikenberry talked about defense ministers talking with each other. Why don't we have a summit meeting? The U.S., Japan, China have many of these kinds of programs and many important matters to solve, so to have such kind of dialogue is very important and, of course, civil society relations are the very basis for sound relations. So I basically agree with your statement.

**Questioner:** My question is related to the Japanese role in the post-Cold War situation for the benefit of peace and stability in Northeast Asia. How can it make a contribution to a world of peace and stability, politically as well as militarily, in the future? Since the China communiqué was announced in 1972, the regional situation in Northeast Asia has been dominated by the U.S. and China: the U.S. wants to remain the dominant power in the Pacific region,

and China would like to remain the dominant power on the East Asian continent.

But at the time the regional situation in Northeast Asia was overshadowed by the global confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union in the Cold War. But now that the Soviet Union disappeared from sight, we're expecting the rise of China backed up by economic power. So we're expecting some kind of role of the Japanese government and people.

### **Japan Should Accept China's Role in International Society**

**Iokibe:** That is a very big question. At present we do not have such a situation. When we had a security issue in 1996 China felt isolated; the U.S. and Japan were trying to contain China. When Clinton visited China in 1998, that was Japan passing, Japan was isolated. In Beijing, two presidents said something bad about Japan, and Japan felt very lonely. Such kind of relations occurring in tri-lateral relations are very common in history, but now it is not happening. The China- U.S. relation is the best in its history, as someone pointed out. It's probably true. U.S.-Japan relations are very good – and between Koizumi and Bush. And China – Japan relations are not very good, but not too bad. The three relations are all ok. Why? Because of 9/11? Because they are against a common enemy of terrorism? That's partly true, but more than that, as I mentioned in my paper, China is now trying to grow in the international system, not as a challenger, but as an important member that makes such kind of relations possible. And Japan should enhance this kind of structure. That's very important.

I mentioned about Tiananmen; I don't agree with the suppression in Tiananmen, but

still, the too-long-lasting sanctions were not good, because China should not be a wild animal outside of society. But within society China should become a great power and also be invited to WTO, as was Prime Minister Obuchi's policy, which I strongly recommended to Obuchi as part of an advisory committee. And such an effort is very important; the relation is fluctuating and Japan should try to keep somewhat sound relations with China.

**Questioner:** I'm also an associate at the Institute of Studies for Diplomacy at Georgetown. I have two comments on Professors Iokibe's explanation. The first one is on immigration. I think these days Korea has the same experience that you have. We have more than a hundred thousand foreign workers, basically from Bangladesh, Pakistan or the Philippines. So our social problem is the poor treatment of foreign laborers. My former diagnosis on the problem is that it is basically derived from the mentality of a homogeneous Korean society.

I think that Japan almost has the same problems, but it is a very sensitive one, so I used to avoid directly answering it. So my comment is that the basic problem is the xenophobia and the racial discrimination of Korean society and Japanese society. We have to be more frank. That is my first comment.

The second was that anti-Americanism – since I am a Korean, I have to answer that comment. You are right, but nowadays if someone asks about the anti-American sentiment in Korea, I do not know. I do not know what Korea is today and I do not know where we are moving to. Korea is a diversified and divisive society now. I could say that the relationship between Korea and the United States is like an uncle and the nephew relationship, where there is

a son who became an orphan all of a sudden, and then there is a generous uncle, who helped him to go to college, he helped him to buy a good car, or something like that. But all of a sudden the nephew graduated from a good college and got a good job. And then he is well recognized by his friends—but the uncle didn't know about the growth of the nephew, and he has not recognized what his young nephew has achieved. But basically in Korean society may be the new generation of the media. So it is not so serious, as far as I know.

**Questioner:** I need both a contrast in U.S. and Japanese opinions on the new political dynamics setting, especially the last election and the disappearance of ideological parties, except for communist and socialist parties. So how would this affect Japan's attitude toward China, especially as Dr. Iokibe mentioned of personally touching base with the other country's politicians, which is probably disappearing as such? So I'm very curious to know how you view this direction.

### **Advent of Two-Party System in Japan**

**Iokibe:** The older generation is gone and what is important in Japan is now the LDP government is coming to its end. Last year's general election told us that we now have basically a two-party system. Minshuto has the same ground as LDP, and if something happens with the LDP government, despite Koizumi's popularity, there will be a change in government. I am advising Chinese intellectuals that China is only focusing on the LDP leader, which is not correct. The party out of power will be the next government, so the Chinese government should have close relations with Minshuto's leaders. A wider channel is very important to cope with such dynamism in each society.

**Breer:** I will comment on that: that's what I've been telling my Japanese colleagues. Thank you.

**Questioner:** Picking up on the question raised by Professor Ikenberry and Mr. Pei at the beginning, I'm wondering whether it's valid to ask the question: what will happen to the position of the United States in East Asia when finally Japan and China resolve their differences and feelings, and finally there is peace and stability – or actually, the relationship between Japan and China and other countries in the region is resolved? Mr. Pei said that that will eliminate the need of the U.S. to keep a hundred thousand troops, but would that be really what the U.S. wants?

The U.S. has been used as an honest broker for resolving the regional problems up to now. And if you look at the recent past history of events in the last couple of decades, for example, you can see that when there are conflicts between the regional powers and regional nations, the bi-lateral relations with each of the nations and the U.S. get strengthened. So, from the U.S. point of view, would that be what we want?

**Iokibe:** That is a very huge question. It's a new stage we are confronting, a new stage that implies challenge. If some country dominates Asia and excludes other countries, that is against American interests in Asia, which started from the Open Door policy of the late nineteenth century. In that case, America tried to find a junior partner in Asia. But the world is getting smaller and smaller and we are finding that the three countries, the U.S., Japan and China, co-exist without excluding any countries. That kind of situation should be institutionalized. America is not happy to be excluded from Asia if Japan and China solve their problems and become close and act like they

don't need America anymore.

**Iokibe:** The world is not in this situation. The American role is very important in Asia and the Asian countries should not try to establish a closed community excluding the U.S. and other countries. So inviting American influence or roles in Asia is a very important element of consideration – and how to manage it.

America should not be too nervous about the Asian countries establishing a new community. When the EAC was proposed by Dr. Mahathir, Secretary Baker got mad. And when the Asian Monetary Fund was proposed by Sakakibara from the Japanese Ministry of Finance, excluding America, Secretary Summers got mad. That's insensitive from the Asian side. But keep Americans informed, and America should welcome the Asian community, like when America encouraged the European Union after the Marshall Plan. So that's a very important effort.

**Ikenberry:** One more question and then we're going to call it quits. And then we'll have a more informal discussion.

**Questioner:** I've been interested in the fact that nothing has been said about North Korea today. Certainly, the North Korean situation has resulted in military buildups in the area. And are you all just assuming that this is all going to go away in five years and we'll all live happily ever after—and that it really doesn't affect Japanese–Chinese relationships? Maybe because the discussion was just about China and Japan, we don't want to talk about North Korea.

**Iokibe:** In 1979, when China under Deng Xiaoping's leadership departed from its revolutionary attempt at economic development, East Asia basically became a healthy

society, especially compared with the Middle East, where in the same year of 1979 the Khomeini revolution in Iran occurred and fundamentalism was encouraged. East Asia is enjoying a common effort to develop its economy, which will lead to democratic societies sooner or later because economic development produces a middle class and diversified society. The problem with North Korea in East Asia—can we solve this peacefully or not—is very important for the Pacific region.

In the case of Iraq, my impression is that the American government is attempting to prove its military strength by resorting to power. American military power is enormous, but the government should not use such powers easily. The wisdom of using it in limited cases and diplomatic and not military efforts is what people respect and follow. Fortunately in Asia, America asked China to organize the six-nation talks and China is willing to assume this responsibility.

A new, favorable framework is in making. All of the participants are trying to make economic and cultural developments. And that's what post-war Japan – when the Yoshida Doctrine started, it emphasized not military power, but economic and non-military state development. In East Asia as a whole, that is becoming true. Solving the North Korea problem is very important.

### **Japan Needs Missile Defense Capability**

And missile defense is necessary, but rather than Japan having strike capability against North Korea, having missile defense power is more important. And China is very nervous about that. If it might be adapted to Taiwan, if that is done, China would be very much frustrated. That's a very focal and delicate problem. But the missile de-

fense against North Korea is necessary for Japan and a defensive effort is better.

**Pei:** Just a brief comment. The North Korean outcome and how it will affect the China – Japan relationship. I think that the outcome will affect the China–U.S. relationship much more than the China-Japan relationship. Because on this issue the U.S. is going to see whether China can actually deliver, whether China can be cooperative, and if things do not work out, whether China will take the wrong side or take the right side. If there is Korean re-unification following a regime collapse, where will the united Korea fall? In other words, will it be close to China, or closer to the U.S.? Japan will be a player, but I think where Japan stands will depend on how the U.S. and China resolve the end game.

**Breer:** I would like to comment on the question about the inevitability of America remaining in East Asia. I don't think it's totally inevitable, and I don't think that we

would find some excuse to stay there if all the problems were resolved and the nations were getting together. Some people might attribute those tendencies to a great empire to the United States. But I don't think that that's necessarily true and particularly as we're going to be facing difficult problems elsewhere. We may be – who knows how long we're going to be tied up in the Middle East. I don't see the utopian view coming right away, so we don't really have to worry about that too much.

But in addition to the North Korean situation, there is also Taiwan, which has been sort of left out of the last few minutes of the discussion. And that's another key issue for the United States that we believe—and I think a lot of others do as well—requires some American attention.

**Ikenberry:** Well, on that note, will you join me in thanking our panel.

[End]

## About the Panelists

### Main Speaker

**Dr. Iokibe Makoto** is Professor of Political and Diplomatic History at Kobe University's Graduate School of Law. Prior to joining the faculty at Kobe University, he served as a lecturer and then as a professor of political and diplomatic history at Hiroshima University. Professor Iokibe has been a visiting scholar and visiting professor at many institutions, including Harvard University, the London School of Economics, and the Japan Institute. He is on the board of directors of several Japanese academic and research associations and foundations in addition to serving as Chairperson of the Subcommittee on "Japan's Place in the World" - the Prime Minister's Commission on "Japan's Goals in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century." He received his Ph.D. from Kyoto University. Professor Iokibe has published many books and articles, including (in Japanese), *The Pacific War, the Occupation, and the Peace, 1941-1955* (2001) and *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan, 1949-1999* (1999).

### Discussants

**Mr. William Breer** is Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He joined CSIS in 1996 after a 35-year career in the foreign service. Prior to joining CSIS, he was a senior adviser at the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State (1993-1996). Mr. Breer devoted the major portion of his career to the management of U.S.-Japan relations. He spent 18 years in Japan, serving at the U.S. embassy as political officer, political counselor, and deputy chief of mission with Ambassadors Michael Armacost and Walter Mondale. In Washington, he served as country director for Japan, the most senior position dealing exclusively with U.S.-Japan relations, and as director for Northeast Asia in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Mr. Breer is a graduate of Dartmouth College, and attended Columbia University and the National War College.

**Dr. Minxin Pei** is a Senior Associate and Co-Director of the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research covers Chinese politics, economic reform, U.S. relations with East Asian countries, and democratization in developing countries. Before joining the Carnegie Endowment, Dr. Pei was a faculty member of the politics department at Princeton University. He has received numerous awards, including the Olin Faculty Fellowship, the National Fellowship of the Hoover Institution and the Robert S. MacNamara Fellowship of the World Bank. Dr. Pei received a Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University. He has written *From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union* (1994). Dr. Pei also has published many articles in *Foreign Affairs*, *The New York Times* and *The Los Angeles Times*.

### Moderator

**Dr. G. John Ikenberry** is the Peter F. Krogh Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice at Georgetown University. He also has been a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. He earned his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago. Professor Ikenberry is the author of numerous publications, including, *State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy* (2002), *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (2000), and *Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government* (1988).