

China-U.S. Relations Today: a Chinese Perspective

by
Mr. Wang Jisi

Wang Jisi: Thank you very much, Professor Ikenberry. I also want to take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation to the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA in Washington, D.C. My subject is Sino-U.S. Relations today but I will focus on the Chinese side of this subject. I think I will try to address three questions. First, where are we now in U.S.-China relations? Second, how have we reached this stage or why is it? And third, what should we do to further relationships.

U.S.-China Relations at High Point

Now the first question. I think it is not exaggerating to assert that U.S.-China relations today have been better than any time in history, in the PRC history or even in the long history between our two nations. Let me say a few things that will illustrate this point. I think the interdependence between our two societies has never been deepened before. I'm not talking only about economics. Of course, the economic interdependence is most important and most salient part of this deepening interdependence.

I was just informed by my friend Pei Minxin that China now is the second largest buyer of U.S. bonds, next only to Japan. Of course, the bilateral trade has also exceeded \$100 billion and everybody here I think knows Yao Ming, the basketball player. One of the most important things I want to mention to you is the Institute of American Studies, which I'm directing, has published the Chinese version for *Harvard Business Review*. U.S. publications, movies, and cultural things are also everywhere in China, penetrating deeply into Chinese society, especially Hollywood movies. And you also see a lot of Chinese things here and you cannot get rid of them. So whenever I travel here, I will try to pick up something not made in China. It is increasingly difficult to do so.

So I think this is a very important cushion against any kind of confrontation—political confrontation between our two countries. Two years ago, I wrote something that said U.S.-China relations are going into two different directions: in economics, deepening interdependence; but in politics, we are going in different ways, that we have more conflict than common ground. I'm afraid I was wrong at the time. And that's because I didn't have the confidence that theoretically the two tracks would come together or should go parallel. By now I'm more confident than before that these two tracks are converging instead of diverging.

No Crisis in Near Future

The second phenomenon is that we have no crisis in sight in the near future. In the recent history of U.S.-China relations, we saw endless conflicts ahead, for instance, MFN, Taiwan arms sales. Each year, you had the review and then the decision to make and the Geneva conference on human rights, although this is still a problem today, I don't think it will dominate the agenda.

And there are also cycles to mention in the past. For instance, people talk about per half-year cycle, the first half-year of a certain year, it would be dominated by tensions and the second half year, you would see more relaxation, and that kind of cycle is gone. I don't know if it will be gone forever.

And thirdly, there are more frequent summit meetings and high level official dialogues between our two countries and also, there are different forms and different levels of track two, track three dialogues on various issues like Korea, Taiwan, Southeast Asia on trade relations and so on. So there is increased institutionalization of the linkages between China and the United States.

And fourthly, there are more productive forms of international cooperation. Although we have different ideas and different projections on the Iraqi issue and the Taiwan issue, the two countries did not have an open quarrel on either of the issues and both countries are working together to counter terrorism. And quiet but also very important, is China-U.S. cooperation and coordination on Taliban in Afghanistan. In Central Asia, there are discussions that the United States might participate in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an observer or as a kind of partner.

And finally, I think the media has changed in mutual images. There are less mutual accusations. On the Chinese part, we mention less about U.S. imperialism and on the part of American media, there are also more positive reports on China.

Chinese Interpretation of Socialism

Now, why is that, is the second part of my presentation. Again, I will focus on the Chinese side. I think there are lots of noticeable domestic changes in China. The Chinese can welcome economic globalization and market economy is reaching into the Chinese software documents and party constituents and so forth and so on. Of course, the three representatives are very important in implementing the market economy policies and there are new assessments of capitalism at its vitality. There is also the realization that socialism is at a low ebb worldwide. And one story that is not widely shared in the outside is the Chinese interpretation of socialism.

I heard some authoritative person relates a conversation between Jiang Zemin and Deng Xiaoping about a few years ago when Deng Xiaoping was still politically active. And because Deng Xiaoping said “we’ll have dozens of generations ahead before we can complete socialist construction,” Jiang Zemin was somewhat puzzled about the exact meaning of this sentence. So he called or had a conversation in one way or another with

Deng Xiaoping and he asked precisely what Deng meant in saying that generation—dozens of generations.

Current Goal Is a Well-Off Society

“Do we literally understand that because if you are talking about thirty generations, it might mean how many years—750 years. That’s completion of socialism.” And Deng said “yes, precisely I meant that. I meant at least several dozens of generations.” So socialism, the ultimate goal of communism is still there, it’s still written into the Chinese national constitution and the constitution of the party but it is the ultimate goal, not the immediate future. And the current goal is that China should achieve the goal of a well-off society by the middle of the century. As a result, foreign policy should be consistent with these domestic policies.

My interpretation—I may be wrong but there are some Chinese here—is that the internal threats the Chinese government feels on a daily basis are no longer very much related to what we refer to as westernization or the schemes to split China up by the United States or by other Western countries although still these questions are relevant. Still some people are referring to *xi-hua* or westernization and dividing, or splitting China up.

China’s Problems Not Necessarily Instigated by the West

But if we look at China’s problems today, social unrest, the separatist movement in Xinjiang and in Tibet and elsewhere, some are related to foreign instigation but not necessarily instigation by Western countries or by the United States. So where are these threats? Certainly, personally I don’t think the so-called peaceful evolution towards capitalism is a clear and present danger although it is not completely removed from the political agenda or political rhetoric.

Social unrest comes from a number of

different directions, a number of sources of labor unrest, rural unrest, the gap between rich and poor, and the inefficient state-owned enterprises, unemployment, crimes, drug trafficking and so on and so forth. And also, terrorism is relevant. So if we put all these internal threats together, we don't see China today as we saw China ten years ago when the dominant political agenda was related to the fear of westernization. That was the post-Tianamen syndrome.

And also there is a conscious effort not to over-emphasize outside pressure because too much nationalistic sensation might backfire. There is also the sentiment of self-confidence in coping with the problems on the outside world. And that comes to another reason I want to mention—there is a reassessment of international surroundings that China is faced with. China's relations with Asian countries are satisfactory with two salient exceptions—Japan and North Korea.

For the first time in recent history, China is better off economically and in terms of social progress than any of the countries with which China has a national boundary. I mean from North Korea to Russia to Mongolia and the Central Asian states, Pakistan, India, Laos, Vietnam, China is better off.

This is a fact. So first, if there are threats from these countries, they are non-traditional threats and of course some of their threats are coming from problems that may link to the United States. But China does not fear as much as before about American mobilization of China's neighbors for containing China. The siege mentality is gone.

China's Increasing Confidence

I think that confidence is related to the general topic of the rise of China and so theoretically the rise of China will be beneficial to the bilateral relationship. And the Chinese see with some anxiety, with some dissatisfaction the preemptive strike or "axis of evil" and

other American rhetoric, especially preemptive strike. They are alarming tendencies but at least they are not directed at China at the moment. So that is why the Chinese feel some kind of reassurance that we would have a 20-year period of strategic opportunity. And this is also written into the Party Congress report given by Jiang Zemin and it is very often mentioned in the Chinese press in the recent months.

Lastly, when we try to look at the reasons why China is so confident, I think there is also reassessment of the Taiwan issue. These risk assessments I think are subtle and are not recorded anywhere but my interpretation is that, now most Chinese analysts that the United States' official position is not to support Taiwan's independence as they often say in public. Realistically, it is not in the United States' long-term interest to support Taiwan's possible desire for de jure independence because that kind of effort might result in U.S.-China confrontation.

Best Strategy for U.S. Is Status Quo

It is not in the interest of the United States to have a military confrontation with China, so the best strategy for the United States to conduct is to keep the status quo. This marks an important contrast with the Chinese conclusion many years ago, especially during and after Li Dong Qui's visit to the United States. At that time, the Chinese thought that the United States policy was meant not only to separate Taiwan from the mainland but also to support Taiwanese independence. So the logic there is that by improving U.S.-China mutual understanding and their relationship as a whole, China can deal with the issue better.

Another reassessment in the last year or two is that there is confidence that time is on the mainland side, not on the side of Taiwan independence movement because our economy is viable, China is much larger in size, and militarily of course the mainland is much stronger. I think there is less talk about the

timetable as the Chinese officials used to discuss a few years ago.

Finally, what should we do? I think you must be interested in the Chinese position on Korea, the North Korean nuclear program. I think this is the immediate topic we have to address and my formulation is that the United States is single mindedly pursuing a goal in Korea, which is non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the possible agreement with North Korea to deprive it of any nuclear weapon capabilities. But I think the Chinese have another call to pursue, that is the peace and stability in North Korea, South Korea and the Korean Peninsula as a whole. I'm not saying that the United States is not interested in seeing a peaceful solution but I think it is emphasizing the nuclear part and I think the Chinese are emphasizing both parts. So in that regard, China and South Korea share a lot of common interest.

The Taiwan issue is not removed from our agenda. There are still concerns that continued and enhanced arms sales to Taiwan and increased strategic military cooperation between Taiwan and the United States may again prop up those in Taiwan who are in favor of independence. So this is a long-term issue to be solved.

I think the most important thing between the two countries is more long term, which is the military distrust between our two countries. I think the Chinese are seeking some sort of a permanent removal of China from the enemy list of the United States and that is a very long term concern and also it warrants a long term effort.

Some Chinese Believe U.S. Is a Major Source of Threat

On the Chinese side, I cannot deny that many Chinese—I don't know whether it is a mainstream thinking but many Chinese will assert again that China should see the United States as the major source of threat. You are

looking at the outside world. If you are looking at North Korea, where is the source of threat? North Korea is creating some problems but China has lived with North Korea for more than five decades. Where do the Chinese see other threats? I think of course there are some non-traditional threats from its neighbors and from terrorism but if we are looking at the national and more strategic and traditional security, the United States looms still very large in China's overall security calculations.

There are many ways to address this long-term problem between our two countries. For instance, the Chinese I think will be ready to talk about possible participation in G8, some form of dialogue with NATO, and I think the Chinese will sooner or later realize that the U.S.-Japan security relationship is a fact we have to face and also to address. And there are also economic possibilities like free trade area including the United States and also there are Chinese who are thinking about some kind of agreement on China's nuclear capabilities, which should be related to NMD, TMD and other strategic stability issues.

Finally, I think there is a crisis management we are interested in. The Chinese are engaged in various forms of dialogue with American counterparts to try to find a way to improve crisis management between our two countries so that things like EP3 or Belgrade bombing would not be as much an obstacle or problem as when it happened.

I think I have already reached my time limit so I'll stop here and listen to how they criticize me.

Kurt Campbell: Frankly, not much to criticize there. First of all, thank you very much to the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA for the very important opportunity for Americans to get a chance to talk with visiting Asians particularly during this period of time. To hear what others have to say about what's going on in Asia, how they see the United States.

And also to my friend, John Ikenberry; if any of you have had a chance to read his most interesting recent piece on the travails of the Democratic party in *Foreign Policy*, I encourage you to take a look at it if you're feeling too optimistic about the world and you really want to see a downer. It's a very useful piece of work.

I'd like to say five things just to go quickly and some of those will deal directly with my friend, Mr. Wang, who I thought laid out a very sensible series of observations and recommendations about the next steps in terms of Sino-U.S. relations. I'd like to just imagine that we were all sitting here two years ago and I will offer you two possible worldviews from that point on. Let's pretend it's April 1st so it's April Fools Day, 2001. Okay, you have two worlds to choose from—one world is that you have the A Team back in power, seasoned professionals, strong pro-business, sort of very clear sense that globalization proceeds economic progress and the only dark spot is there is a real coming crisis in U.S.-China relations. There's a lot of suspicion particularly in Washington and we are gearing up for a global show down with China. That's vision one, okay?

Vision two is, the world is in flames, we've got conflict everywhere. The United States is living in a kind of a siege mentality. And the only bright spot, the only rock that we cling to in the rushing stream of our despair is the unusually good U.S.-China relationship which we are assured again and again is the best that it's ever been in history, okay? Let's imagine that we're having this meeting two years ago and we had a raise of our hands. Who do you think would be voting for number two. I don't think very many. So I think the simple reality is that we are truly living in very interesting times.

No one would have ever imagine the situation that we're living with today. Many of you have been traveling over the last couple of months to China, probably won't be traveling as much now. Thanks very much for covering

that up. I was struck over that course of about four or five months again, sort of in November, we were told that sure, U.S.-China relations were the best they've been in 10 years, then best in 15 years. Then I was there in January with another team, best in 20 years, then again there in February and we were told best in history.

So over a four-month period, like a rocket sort of into the stratosphere. It leaves you to wonder where we go from here. I have to talk just a second about atmospheric in terms of the U.S.-Sino relations. One of the things that I was always struck by when I was in government is that no matter how unpopular or how difficult the U.S. position was in, you can always be assured that if you were sort of in a bilateral meeting, that the Chinese visitor from the Foreign Ministry or some other would muck it up, would give you just a horrible screaming rant and in comparison, people would say, yes, I'll be with the Americans, right? I can remember a meeting in Monterey—I think some of our friends are here, like a good friend of ours from the Foreign Ministry was in Monterey and chardonnay and cheese were served, and it was a backhand and knocked a bottle of wine and several glasses—everyone is covered, without missing a beat, just going on. And I was thinking to myself, we can't lose in that environment.

Atmospherics of U.S.-China Relationship Have Changed

I was at a meeting about three weeks ago—off the record so I can't name names—there was a person for the Defense Policy Board and he laid out sort of the American role—we're happy with our power (this is before the war), we're in charge, "the great thing," this is a direct quote, "about a super power is that we can have our cake, we can eat it and sometimes if we're clever, we can eat other people's cake off their plates and they won't say anything." And other Asians in the room are like this, right? And then the Chinese

friend stood up and said, “friends, it’s wonderful to see you; China is committed to a peaceful, stable Asia and we’ll work with all of you to bring that about.” And I’m thinking to myself, boy, things have really changed. The reality, the atmospherics cannot be just shunted aside. And I think the biggest change that we’ve seen in the last two years is not just power dynamics and the question of who’s rising. It’s who’s fun to go to conferences with, right? And the dynamic there is actually really troubling from our perspective of the American foreign policy.

Third issue—why I see people are starting to leave now. The serious part is over. Why? My friend talked about what to do now that U.S.-China relations are so good. I’m not content with that. I want to know why Sino-U.S. relations are so good, because I think there lies some really interesting things.

The first is in the one that we always talk about implied companies, new realities, post-September 11, recognition of the areas that we have to coordinate, and the threats that both of our societies face from the extremist Islamisist groups. So all those different things that we can’t afford to be at each other’s throats and that we really appreciate a complete new global order. I think that’s number one, that’s the one you hear the most.

The second would be which is I think more interesting that there is ballast in this relationship, that whether it be the advice that we get from business entities and groups, political folks or the advice from other countries in the region that we cannot afford to have bad Sino-U.S. relations and that the ballast of the relationship continues to bring us back into the center. And that’s a serious point. I think we tend to underestimate that generally and I think it is important for us to keep in mind.

Less U.S. Attention on Asia

The third is that in fact relations are not all that

good, but we want to talk about it as if they’re good. Both sides have a profound interest in talking about good relations but in fact there may not be that good a relationship. I think there is probably more to this as well. I think the reality is that many in China appreciate fundamentally that the United States is preoccupied and preoccupied dramatically away from Asia at a level that no one could ever imagine. Everyone thought that we would be shifting inexorably our attentions away from the Middle East and Europe more towards Asia but in fact, if anything, it has been the reverse. I think much less strategic attention to Asia than perhaps any other time in the last twenty years.

So one of the things that I think our Chinese friends appreciate is that it is good to have Americans preoccupied and I think the most interesting feature of the last two years is not how good Sino-U.S. relations are but instead the perception in Asia that China is on the rise. And if you ask most Asians who are the dominant power in Asia, privately they’ll say China. China is really where the action sets. So I think that’s the more interesting phenomenon and I think again our Chinese friends have played this extraordinarily well.

George Schultz Trick: Treat China Badly in Public

I think another reason that we’ve seen some sort of improvement in the relationship is that the old George Schultz trick worked even though everyone saw it coming, everyone could see it, and that is to treat China very badly, publicly. You don’t let them come in the parking lot of the State Department, you don’t have contact, you treat them badly, you don’t invite them to meetings, and they don’t get to Crawford, Texas, right? And then you get to see what that feels like, right? And after a year of that, then okay, I want to be back into the club. And you get to go to Crawford.

I actually was told by a member of the Chinese delegation that there was exultation, real

excitement about getting to go to Crawford. It was a big deal and I remember that after he came up to Washington, he was a little surprised because he said, “this is a really ugly place.” He thought it was some big deal to be able to go there but the fact is maybe it’s really good to be in the club. Maybe it just feels good to be a neo-imperialist like us. So there is that possibility as well. So I think for all those reasons, U.S.-China relations at least appear to be good. So that’s the third point—racing through here.

Fourth point quickly and I’ll be over in a second. I think we do have to talk about North Korea. I think the only quibble I would have with your excellent presentation is I quote what I think you said is that “the United States is single mindedly pursuing a goal in North Korea.” If that is the truth, please tell me what it is. I actually see—and we all have friends in this government—very little sign of anything. I’ve had people explain it and talk at me.

Overall Priority Toward North Korea

And I think what I understand are several sort of overall priorities. One is I think our preference would be actually not to talk to North Korea, that would be number one. I think probably number two, no one who has any aspirations to move up in government would like to get on the wrong side of the president. I think if at all possible, we would like China to do our heavy lifting for us.

And lastly, if we have to, if we can’t get all the other three to work, that we will try to live with the nuclear North Korea and just twist our rhetoric and our realities beyond all recognition. So I think that’s what I understand is happening.

And I think the most interesting element of our North Korean strategy has been the China dimension. I think we all understand how to try to imbed a word that we use much more regularly but in a different context, the bilateral relationship into a larger multilateral framework.

I think we’ve tried three strategies with China and North Korea. The first is to just overwhelm them with data, to show them as much as you can about rods, reactors, just get them a real sense of sort of alarm of what’s happening in North Korea. That didn’t work—that lasted about a month.

U.S. Strategy: We Could Do Anything in North Korea

The second was to appeal to China as a great power, that responsible countries need to act on these issues. I also think that did not work either. We are now heavily into phase three which is, we’re crazy, we the United States are crazy and we could do anything in North Korea and stop us before we do something really bizarre.

I know you guys are laughing, but I’m not making this up. This is really the truth—that we could bomb them, we could try to corral them in some way; we’re crazy and so you got to get in there and do something. We have friends who say things like, well, you know, since you won’t act on this, it probably makes sense that Japan builds nuclear weapons. That’s the normal consequence in order to try to make you alarmed so that you will do more on North Korea, which is sort of the more bizarre bank shot in strategic thinking that one can imagine.

Tremendous Opportunity for China

I actually believe that the North Korea policy of this third actually might work. I think our friends in Beijing are so worried, that between two Pyongyongs, as one Chinese friend said, one real Pyongyang and another Pyongyang who is also ideologically driven and struggling and China actually might have to step in. But the reality is we have set the stage perfectly for another example of Chinese leadership—for China stepping in and being responsible, which is really a tremendous opportunity that is being delivered to you by the Bush administration in a way that is

incomprehensible. In the sense that we have guys saying look, the whole point of the campaign was to destroy the concept of a constructive strategic partnership. What they've done is they've gone around and they've actually built one with China. And so this is a tremendous opportunity for China even though it is being offered to you and you're trying to figure out what the catch is.

Actually, I don't think there is a catch because what we've seen is an improvement in South Korean-China relations that are unprecedented. We've sort of kicked the ball over and you're playing for the long term on the peninsula; we're moving our troops back, I just don't understand that. And so I actually think this is a tremendous opportunity and let's all hope that we can avoid a horrible conflict on the peninsula and you get another mark in the match.

U.S. Has Set Tone and Course of Relationship With China

Last point: Iraq. I think the most interesting thing about Iraq that we've not talked about is that ironically, over the last twenty years, it has been the United States who has at the very basic level set the tone and course of the relationship between the United States and China. Ironically, I think what may happen if things go badly in Iraq, is that it could play into a debate within China in which you folks at the very high level are saying, look, we can't stand for this. This is an example of American dangerous imperialism that we're warning you about and we can't sit quietly even if U.S.-China relations continue on a very upward course.

So I actually think that although many friends in Asia are profoundly mixed about this war, on one hand they'd like it over quickly because it hurts American standing. They're much more worried about what it means for the global economy, which I think we all should be worried about. But lastly I think there is a worry—I think this worry has been

dispelled—that if it went quickly, that it would embolden some in government who said Syria, North Korea are next, right? So I think the other worry now that we have to think about is that a longer term conflict actually makes it much harder for friends and others in Asia to say, look, we can support and stand for what the United States is up against in trying to promote in the Middle East.

With that, John, I turn it back over to you.

Minxin Pei: First I want to thank John and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA for having this event in Carnegie. It's always very hard to follow Kurt because after this insightful and entertaining discussion of the most depressing issues, it's very difficult to move back to the big picture and I will do my best to do that. I would like to look at the bigger issue, which Professor Wang tried to address. That is, does China have a strategy to deal with the American agenda.

Living With American Hegemony

A few years ago, when there was this big debate in this country about the Chinese threat, Ezra Vogel edited a book called *Living with China*. I think if we have to write a book today from Beijing's perspective, it might be called *Living with American Hegemony*. So I will deal with three issues. The first one is what does American hegemony mean to China. What does it mean in practical terms. The second one is, is American hegemony a mixed blessing for China. The third is, does China have a strategy to deal with American hegemony.

I think that in terms of the first issue, what does American hegemony mean for China, it's very clear that from Beijing's perspective, that two special issues really make Chinese policy makers very, very careful when they deal with the United States. Although the communist party does not have to fear any internal challenge to its power, externally it has to deal with this 800-pound gorilla in Washington, D.C.

The first set of issues is that huge bilateral disparity between the two powers, although we are talking about China, a potential peer competitor twenty or maybe thirty years down the line. When you look at actual balance of power between the two countries, if you are Beijing, you ought to be very, very nervous because in terms of military power, China is no competitor. In terms of economic power, China's economy is one tenth of that of the United States. In terms of diplomatic influence, China cannot really compete with the U.S. on a whole range of issues worldwide.

The other set of issues to look at when you try to understand what American hegemony means for China is what I would call structural Chinese vulnerability. It's not just bilateral disparity; it's lasting vulnerabilities that would impact negatively China's core national interest.

China Depends More Economically on U.S.

The first one is what I would term a symmetrical economic interdependence although there has been growing economic interdependence between the two countries. At the end of the day when you look at the numbers, you quickly find out that China depends a lot more on the U.S. that the other way around. And that gives the U.S. enormous leverage in influencing Chinese behavior. The second vulnerability is China's lack of secure supplies of critical resources to sustain its economic development. And nothing here is more striking than China's growing dependence on energy resources.

If you look at what can stop China's economic growth, it is the disruption in its oil inputs. Today, China imports about 30% of its oil; in seven years, China will import 50%. And if you look at where China gets its oil from, China really does not at this point have a secure oil supply. And as the world's only power that controls the ceilings, the U.S. is a critical factor.

And finally, at the final structural vulnerability

that balances the advantage for the U.S. The U.S. controls the premium balance in power in East Asia. The U.S. can readily, I wouldn't say easily but can certainly readily find strategic allies to balance against China's rise should U.S. national interests dictate the policy. If you look at what was happening two years ago and maybe happening underneath this aura of friendship and cooperation between these two countries, the U.S. continues to cultivate strategic relationships with India and also with Japan, both of which are profoundly disturbed by China's rise and will serve, I think, ideal partners.

U.S. Serves China's Interests

On the other hand, although China sees itself as being fundamentally a weak player in this relationship, China does not view this relationship as purely negative. That's because American hegemony also brings to China certain benefits that the Chinese people are beginning to appreciate more deeply. First one is American hegemony can make China a free rider in many areas. The U.S. is now patrolling the sea lanes; the U.S. is guaranteeing oil supply; the U.S. is keeping energy prices low; the U.S. is trying to do its best to maintain financial stability in the international system. And also the U.S. is one of the free traders in the world. All of these serve China's interests and the Chinese leaders. If they look around and say who could have replaced the U.S. in those areas, they cannot find anybody.

The other is our regional security issue. Both countries also see eye to eye on some issues—South Asia, a balance between India and Pakistan, and also in Northeast Asia, the Korean issue.

And, finally, even to the U.S., I think China's economic rise is not necessarily a threat, as Professor Wang has just said. China is now recycling its tremendous export surplus with the U.S. by buying U.S. treasury bonds. That's how we are able to obtain very low interest rates in this country.

But finally, I would say that China does have a strategy to live with the American agenda. And this strategy is built on the premise that this relationship will remain fragile for a long period of time because of the differences in both countries over a whole range of issues, the most fundamental of is and will continue to be the ideological differences with the Chinese per se, the differences in the societies between the two countries.

Conflict Avoidance Strategy

As I see the Chinese strategy now has four elements: the first element is conflict avoidance. Chinese leaders understand that at this point, when they are weak the U.S. is so strong, a conflict with the U.S. is clearly going to be disastrous for China. So I think over the last two years, although American policy towards China was very assertive, the Chinese response has been surprisingly mild. I think that's a reflection of this conflict avoidance strategy.

The Chinese leaders have undertaken the following measures: the first one is to adjust psychologically. It was very hard to take but they did especially after saying such a bombastic thing about the U.S. for so long. But they did, I think, make that psychological adjustment. As a result, that defined China's core national interest much more carefully and much more narrowly.

Secondly is that they were able apparently to build a domestic political consensus in order to maintain a league unity on this more pragmatic approach to the U.S. In policy terms, you will see that they have adjusted the policy toward Taiwan in order to avoid conflict with the U.S. and also I think they did not react negatively or at least in public terms to the American presence in Central Asia and on the Iraq issues, they took a relatively neutral stance.

Limited Cooperation Strategy: Interests of Both Countries Overlap

The second element in the strategy is what I

call "limited cooperation," that is where interests of both countries overlap, China would cooperate with the U.S. We see this in the war on terrorism although the Chinese contribution is rather modest, but also I think, hopefully, in North Korea. And third is hedging strategy or counter-hedging strategy because Washington strategy towards China is that of a hedging strategy. China counter-hedges, that is, China also knows that this relationship can go sour and it must have some ability to deal with this contingency.

Deng said something publicly, that when relationship with the U.S. is bad, look at the positive side. But when the relationship is good, let's not forget about the fundamental differences. And I think that kind of attitude shows a deep understanding of both the limit of this relationship, the downside as well as the upside. And the hedging strategy is reflected in China's military modernization program which is focused on a Taiwan scenario and also China's efforts to contribute to the emergence of a multiple world—to cultivate a relationship with Russia and leveraging its economic clout especially in the technology area, to try to avoid being hooked on America-only technology.

Reshape China's Regional Environment

And finally, the fourth element is to reshape China's regional environment. And I will concur with Kurt's observation that China understands that at this point when U.S. energy is distracted, China does have a window of opportunity to leverage its increasing economic clout to create a much more benign regional environment. And in this effort, I think it has identified the right tone, that is economic integration. Here you do not see Japan exercising any leadership. China is exercising leadership like in dealing with Taiwan. Whether this will work or not, I don't know. But I think as long as the blue team is preoccupied with Iraq, North Korea, Iran and God knows what, I think this strategy of living with American hegemony can at least

maintain this relationship on a stable keel for the next five or ten years.

Thank you.

Q&A

John Ikenberry: Why don't we pick a couple of questions and then turn the microphone back to Professor Wang for reaction and he can incorporate his responses to our two discussants when he does so.

Questioner: I just have a question for Dr. Wang. Since you mentioned that China has become more confident that time is on your side especially on the Taiwan issue, I wonder in the following years, will we see a bold initiative by the Chinese regarding the cross-strait talks? Thank you.

Ikenberry: We'll take one more question before we turn things back.

Questioner: Jisi, I know that the focus of your remarks was on China-U.S. relations but you said something that interested me a lot in your characterization of China's relations in the region. You said China has excellent relations with countries throughout the region except for two exceptions—North Korea and Japan. I'd like if you could elaborate a little bit on the latter—why you say that about Sino-Japanese relations.

My impression would be that in fact China's relationship with Japan has been improving significantly since its situation two or three years ago. And that this is a very deliberate effort on the part of China that recognizes certain changed realities in both countries and more common interests in certain areas and indeed, to a certain degree, the difference that exists between Japan and the United States on certain questions in the region that China sees could be worked to its advantage. If you could comment on that, I would appreciate it. Thank you.

Ikenberry: Go ahead, tackle both.

Wang: Let me first respond to Kurt and Minxin. I think Kurt doesn't really challenge me by saying all the interesting things but I was very impressed with his characterization of America's attitude towards North Korea—the North Korean issue. I agree with him that the U.S. policy today is, as he said, threatening words, expectations that China under pressure will do something, and I think we will see something happening in the near future. I mean, there might be multilateral dialogue in one way or another. At least I think, and I hope, that will happen.

And Minxin's characterization of the Chinese strategy is the most comprehensive thing I've ever heard about China's strategy to the United States. I think I will report back. But I would add to that one thing, that is, I think the Chinese have consistently been working on domestic forces in the United States to improve the relationship. I think the Chinese take seriously different voices and divergent views in the United States and divergent interest groups in the United States and they have been working quite hard and to some extent successfully.

For instance, I think they are not only working on the Bush administration right now, and I think people know that in four years or in six years there might be a change so we have to be very careful in relationships. We take seriously different voices in the United States.

Chinese Think Time Is on Their Side Regarding Taiwan

And to the question about Taiwan, my very candid assessment is, since the Chinese think that time is on their side, so why hurry. I don't see any bold initiative forthcoming in the near future. I think there is steady hardworking work on economic integration and I think the Chinese also are somewhat patient to see what will be the next stage in Taiwan's political development. And there, I might refer to Minxin's hedging strategy. I think the Chinese, the mainlanders, are ready to discuss

the unification issue with any people who are in power or who are going to be in power.

As to Japan, I don't know why Michael is so upbeat about the Chinese-Japanese relationship. I see more difficulties than progress in the near future or in the recent past. I think we are still faced with the fundamental misunderstanding or mistrust between the two countries. I think the Chinese are still seeing Japan as a stubborn and narrow focused economic partner or political partner and Japan has unfavorable feelings about China on the rise rather than on decline. So I think we have to work very hard and we have to look at the common interest rather than the differences, especially the historical differences.

I'm very hopeful because we have new generations in China and new generations in Japan who are both more pragmatic and both more forward looking than those who have experienced World War II. I'm not making any moral judgments there—think the older generations have a valid reason to look at the past and to make their own judgment of the future but I think we are hopeful that younger generations are taking control so we will be more practical in seeing the difficulties ahead.

Campbell: Not so much about Japan and China. I have not worked on Sino-Taiwanese relations or cross-Strait relations as long as many people in the room but I'm struck by . . . all you have to do is listen in a couple of years. Then you will have heard what I think I've heard which goes something like this—that time is on our side so it's the wrong time to engage in cross-Strait dialogue. Time is not on our side, so it's the wrong time to engage in cross-Strait dialogue. U.S.-China relations are good so it's not the right time, we don't need to have cross-Strait dialogue; and U.S.-China relations are bad so it would be in the interest to have cross-Strait dialogue. And then you can go on—we have leadership transition, bad time; stable leadership, other issues on the agenda, bad time; and so what's the common theme that runs through this.

Taiwan Is a Potentially Explosive Issue

I think what is in fact probably the case is that cross-Strait relations are—to use in America—has really become the only true third rail in both Taiwan and China. It's so dangerous, so potentially explosive not only for your society but for your role in it that to touch it really risks enormous damage. I wonder if that in fact is an accurate representation. I just can't imagine what conditions could exist—sincere conditions—that would actually embolden either side in the current context to say, yes, I'll reach out in a creative way, particularly since I've seen signs from Taiwanese friends. But I've not from PRC friends, subtle inferences in Chen Shui-bian's speeches but all artfully done but easily can be walked back from as well.

Questioner: A couple of questions, first for Kurt. One of the interesting, I think, kernels of information in your talk which I think is really the accurate picture, is that both the U.S. and China really do want to portray this relationship as making progress and improving, but that maybe deep down isn't really. And that suggests that this is all kind of a façade and reading into what you're saying, that is that the U.S. side really continues to suspect that the Chinese want to push us out of Asia. And that the Chinese side suspects that the United States really wants to contain the emergence of China. So if you kind of spin this out and elaborate on it, where do you then see this taking—is this really what the Chinese might say is a tactical improvement or a superficial improvement and has that changed the whole picture in the years down the road.

A question for Jisi, one of the things that I hear a great deal of from Chinese experts is that this has been more kind of a one-way street as the relationship has improved over the last couple of years—that China is doing its best to work with the U.S. to meet our security concerns, to work with us in the war on terror but we're not doing enough to address China's security concerns. I think it was several weeks back

that you were quoted in *The Washington Post* saying that the U.S. really wants China to do more on Korea but what are you doing for us. And that message was missing from your talk today.

So I'm wondering whether you no longer hold that view. Do people in China now think that highlighting the fact that this is a one-way street really is not in China's interest? Because it kind of reveals how weak you are and how strong we are, or is it just that maybe now you think China is getting more and so there is really no reason to emphasize that.

Campbell: Actually, I was so intrigued by the question that I was moving over to let Jisi answer that I forgot mine. I had a good answer for that. I just forgot the question. Oh, yes. I think U.S. strategy in Asia can be summed up in two words literally, and the most artful sort of representor of American policy in Asia really is the vice president. If you look carefully at what he says both about China and North Korea—he's a huge fan of improved U.S.-Sino relationships which is a major achievement, I think—but in many of his preambles when talking about things in Asia, he has two words: "for now," we will try to deal with North Korea in this way; "for now," U.S.-China relations are really extraordinarily positive.

I think, ironically, the beginning of this engagement with China two years ago was profoundly tactical. And because government is about people, not just about huge historical forces, I think the reality is that for a variety of key people in this government, interestingly, it feels good to have good relations with China, right? It feels good—high level symmetry, you have good meetings, business leaders hail you, your friends in Asia breathe a huge sigh of relief. It may be part of what it means to be good in diplomacy right now, just like being able to deal with the Russians or the Soviets during the Cold War. It may be one of the guiding signposts of the post-whatever this new environment is, that being to effectively

handle in a hard headed and stable way Sino-U.S. relations.

So I think that ironically, what has happened is what began as really tactical, I think you have some sincere and clear converts within the Bush administration who want to preserve and protect strong U.S.-China relations as badly as Sandy Berger and Mickey Kantor did.

Wang: My response to Kurt's comment on Taiwan is that already there have been very interesting and effective dialogues between Taiwan and the mainland on a variety of political issues but there are more private discussions than any kind of so-called formal or official dialogues. And I think these discussions will pave the way for more meaningful formal dialogues in the future, and I think that is a very Chinese way to deal with difficult issues.

Chinese Method of Dialogue

For instance, I am told in the Chinese official bureaucracy that I should not submit any report making a request without previously consulting my boss' assistance about this, because then my superior will say, I don't know what you're talking about. You should have talked to me about your desires and things that you want to achieve before submitting that report. Either you lose face or I lose face. I think that's a very Chinese way, so before any formal dialogue begins, there should be more sensible and effective dialogue between the two sides.

To Bonnie's question, I still have those complaints. I think the United States has not done enough to meet the Chinese requests, the most important ones being related to Taiwan arm sales and also to Chinese intentions to talk about TMD, NMD and China's nuclear capability and so on and so forth. But those remarks were made before the war happened so I don't think it is the right time to address so many long term issues before the United States is going to have some more energy and

some more attention paid to Asia and China.

Ikenberry: I will just intervene with a question. I enjoyed Minxin's elaboration of strategy and even more Professor Wang's comment that he's going to report back to Beijing. Perhaps the record will show that Asian Voices is where China's next grand strategy is being hatched. Indirectly Minxin is feeding ideas back to the government.

My question is, is this shift in the Chinese strategy towards more accommodation, less trying to articulate a kind of counter-American hegemonic strategy, to what extent is Russia's role in moving closer to the West, Putin's decision to break off that counter-American role. There are really two aspects here that China sees that Putin's strategy is possible because the West accommodated Putin and integrated Russia into the western security framework surprisingly, really. And secondly, you lose a partner so to speak, which further isolates a more contrarian or soft balancing kind of alternative. So how much did the Russian example feed into this shift towards accommodation?

And then, secondly, is the primary tool for Chinese geopolitical maneuvering in the region this tool of economic integration? How much of it is truly as Minxin suggested, a strategy of integration providing as you suggested, 20 years of strategic opportunity to primarily . . . what are you going to do in those twenty years? Is it primarily this economic integration tool or is there something beyond that that is being debated among the new generation in Beijing or looking at America, looking at this opportunity. What are those ideas beyond economic integration?

Russia's Turn After 9/11 Shocked Beijing

Pei: One word about Russia. I think Russia's turn after 9/11 shocked Beijing. They were caught by total surprise. They were apparently thrown from that event or the change. It was not necessary that by turning, you get

accepted. I think they drew a conclusion, which basically says, now you don't have a chance of building a so-called multi-polar world with Russia on your side. By being more accommodating, you risk or avoid being isolated. There's a fine difference because they know they're not going to be accepted as a full member of the Western-led community. And I think they do not think they will be comfortable getting accepted, but the risks of getting isolated by being always the odd man out are so huge that they adjusted not necessarily in real policy but mostly in terms of rhetoric.

Wang: I think China drew a lesson from Russia's behavior even before September 11 and Kosovo. I think there has been some kind of disillusionment or at least a more practical thinking in Beijing with regard to Russia, to France and to other international players, which might call for China's cooperation with them against some American schemes.

Three Schools of Strategy

Going back to John Ikenberry's question about what China's political thinkers are conceptualizing for strategy, I think there are at least three schools of thinking, a very traditional Chinese way of thinking. That is, you do nothing and you don't make mistakes. I think that is somewhat consistent with China's behavior today. If you don't have a very clear-cut conclusion of something or you don't have a very reliable source of information on which you can act decisively and the questions are not very much related to your vital interest—I'm talking about Iraq, then the best strategy is to look around and to be somewhat neutral and you take a moral ground for instance, opposing war but you are prepared that the United States will pursue that war, and I think that is one school of thinking.

Another school of thinking is pro-active in the following way—since we are in favor of a multi-polar world, since Russia, France and some other countries are now resisting U.S. pressure, the issue of Iraq and some other UN

resolution and so on, China should side with them or China should be more assertive in making the world know that China also has a voice. And this is one kind of pro-active approach.

And the third school of thinking is that China should be more pro-active in a number of other ways. For instance, China should be thinking of a meaningful dialogue with NATO, China should be rethinking its policies towards Japan. China should do more to coordinate with the United States, Japan, South Korea and some other countries in achieving the goal in North Korea, to remove the possibility of a nuclear North Korea. Things like that.

So I think an overall consistent world strategy is not very much forthcoming in China's strategic thinking. I like Beijing's preparation but there are some things better than the reasoning of conflict avoidance and limited cooperation, counter-hedging strategy and reshaping China's environment, these are all elements in China's strategic thinking but I think China is learning from other countries how to respond to international crisis and they have more skillful players.

I think there are some people in China who can play in that China has a long way to go before China can really reach the state of playing games with other powers like France, Britain, the United States, Russia. You know, we are in a learning curve. But I think in due time, China will be more proactive. But not now, not when China is focusing on many, many domestic issues and those issues, except Korea, are not so pressing on time.

Questioner: I have two quick questions. I'm from Georgetown University. I'm sorry. I forgot because Jisi and I have known each other forever and I want to go back to the side of Jisi that is the historian, not just the commentator on contemporary policy. Kurt was talking about the current feeling about how good U.S.-China relations are. As a historian, my sense is that contrary to what

you were saying about this being the best it's ever been in history, that perhaps you as I know that there is a sort of pendulum swing that happens. Things are always either really wonderful or really terrible in U.S.-China relations. At least, that's true here in Washington, D.C.

And so I wondered if you could say a word about perhaps the debates in Beijing among the America watchers who may be a little uncomfortable with the characterization that things are the best they've ever been. Is there a discontent with this and is there any concern that it has policy implications that perhaps are not good for China?

The second question I have is, Kurt also mentioned the resurgence of the Schultz view of U.S. policy towards China—that being tough on China works. I wondered also what the feeling about that is in China, because it does seem to me that if everybody thinks U.S.-China relations are the best they've ever been, then there certainly are people in the White House who think, yes, that has worked and being tough on China is a good idea and we should keep doing it.

Wang: These are very good questions and especially the second one. That depends on how you interpret the past events. I think even before the United States took any strong measures to press China, there had already been efforts on the Chinese side to prevent these things from happening. Chen Shui-bian paid a visit to Washington, D.C. immediately after GW Bush took office. And then I think EP3 happened and I think the Chinese have learned lessons from such crises, that is, to say it probably is not what the United States did that changed the Chinese behavior but also self reflections of the past events and so on. That's traced straight to China's new policy orientation.

Of course, I want to relate again to China's domestic politics. In Jiang Zemin's several speeches especially the speech on July 1st,

2001, in which he emphasized a number of things that China should accomplish, among them about U.S.-China relationship. And what is your first question?

Questioner: The concern about the sense of euphoria that U.S.-China relations are great.

Historical Moment Not Good for China

Wang: Oh, yes, yes. I think the pendulum may go back at some point. I cannot be over-optimistic looking at the U.S.-China history. That's why I talk about the strategic dialogue on the stability of mutual trust that is still in the wake of a meaningful bilateral relationship. There are people in Beijing who are much less optimistic than I am. If they look around the world, this administration has been conducting a policy that is probably most detrimental to world peace than any previous administration. This is a historical moment that is not good for China. And if you look around our neighbors, that U.S. military presence has entered Central Asia.

As Kurt pointed out or made mention by I don't remember whom, the United States is improving its relationship with India and Japan and that has negative implications for China, and look at Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian is supported by the United States, one way or another. Arms sales to Taiwan had been unprecedented and especially the military to military dialogue and cooperation is very alarming. And then North Korea, some people in China are alarmed by the U.S. hesitance in not talking to North Korea.

And I think one reasoning is that because the United States does not want to withdraw from East Asia at all. It wants to keep its military presence in South Korea, and that's why it's creating more problems in North Korea and that is an excuse. It is not the reason why the United States has this problem but it is the excuse. So if you look at these issues, you cannot be very optimistic. My reasoning is that you have to look at China itself.

Limited Leverage on Taiwan Issue

The strategic balance is in favor of China because China is rising up. And if you look at the domestic priorities none of the issues can be solved by confronting the United States. Of course, these issues are there. Of course, you prepare for the worse but practically, what can you do. That is the problem. That is the fundamental question. If you don't like the shape of the U.S.-Indian relationship, what can you do? If you don't like to see a more assertive approach in North Korea, what can you do? You have to talk to them. And Taiwan—we notice that, but our leverage is limited. That is my response.

Campbell: I like your analysis, but we all try to have, I think, a worldview that we try to fit facts in to sort of make sense of how things work. I would urge you on the Korean Peninsula. I think that your sort of assessment of how this is proceeding within the U.S. government is just wrong, frankly. There is a substantial group, mostly in the Department of Defense that actually wants to take U.S. forces out of Korea for several reasons. I think one is that the South Koreans are ungrateful, whatever that means, that they do not sufficiently show vigilance about the threat posed from North Korea. There's a view that if U.S. forces are stationed too close to the North Koreans, that it reduces our flexibility to be able to respond, and other completely nonsensical sort of strategic rationale.

Pentagon Has Plans to Reshape U.S. Presence in Asia

But I think one of the abiding principles that combine most Democrats and most Republicans was that the presence of U.S. forces was stabilizing and should be sustained, even in the face of some indigenous local unhappiness associated with status of forces agreements and other inconveniences associated with young men and women who are promoting alien culture living in your land. But in the Pentagon, there are major plans in

the way to actually completely reshape U.S. presence in Asia, moving substantially away from U.S. forces bases. I understand that there are transformative reasons behind this. And I appreciate some of the interesting strategic thinking. I think it completely misses the point about unintended consequences. But you would be mistaken to think that what we're trying to do is create problems with North Korea so that it makes South Koreans want our troops to remain in South Korea more because in fact it's completely the reverse.

South Koreans are extraordinarily alienated from the United States, I think, at a very general level. And many Americans—the civilians don't want to be in a situation where we're not respected. So I think we can easily be in a situation in three or four years where there is a very good shot that U.S.-South Korean strategic relations are irreparably changed in a direction that in just a couple of years ago with President Kim, I thought we had a shot at a very long term strategic relationship that had security elements. I think that's completely in question right now.

U.S. Does Not Have Sensible Reasoning on Korea

Wang: What I laid out is not my own analysis but the analysis of some other people. I don't have an analysis because I'm confused after a few days of discussion with my American colleagues, including some government officials, because I don't think the United States has a very sensible and logical reasoning of the North Korean issues. I think I hear too many different voices within and without the administration—from the possibility of withdrawing the United States completely from the region to a military strike that will cause some regime change in North Korea. What is the objective there and what is the approach to achieving these objectives, I'm not very sure. And that creates a problem for China to cooperate with the United States. We have to figure out what the U.S. position

really is before China can take any sensible action in cooperation with not only the United States but also Seoul.

Ikenberry: That's our hidden strategy, by the way.

Questioner: On this Korean business, Kurt is quite right. There are people who think it's time for the U.S. to get off the peninsula to reduce our proximity to North Korea and gradually leave it. But there are a lot of people who think it's time for the Chinese to get involved with the North Koreans. They're the neighbor. By the time they become a true nuclear power, the Chinese will, as one of your famous generals says, have 5500 kilometers of countries surrounding it with nuclear weapons, the success of the non-proliferation policy. The question is whether the Chinese should invest some political capital for a change in North Korea rather than dumping the issue on the United States.

Questioner: China supposedly in the past few weeks has started to exert some pressure on North Korea, cutting off oil for three days, and chewing out the ambassador and supposedly chewing out a few other people. It's unclear what's happening, why would they be doing this finally now.

China Put Informal Pressure on North Korea

Wang: I think I agree that China has already put some political capital, a lot of political capital invested in North Korea. As I said, China has to fathom what the real policies are of other countries and also China's practice is different from open pressure like the United State is doing on North Korea. China's pressure is private, informal, steady and quiet. I think this relationship with North Korea will be more normalized in a way.

There are people who think that China and North Korea still have ideological affinity. I think if there is any one, this is much more

insufficient to have a special relationship. In the future, you might see more openness in Chinese discussions with North Korea, especially in the multi-lateral setting. You cannot simply say whatever you'll say doesn't make sense or doesn't make us worry. I think some of the discussions have already been going on between the two countries. And then in the future, there will be more public discussion of the North Korean issue between China and other countries. I think time has been too short for China to make a very decisive strategic decision as to what to do with North Korea. I think that as time goes by the Chinese will have to find out what is in China's best interest to act.

Ikenberry: One last question.

Questioner: Dr. Wang, I was happily surprised when you referred to the possible participation in the G7 summit of China. And I wonder whether you would elaborate about this thing because conventional wisdom in 1990s was that China was so reluctant to join any of the international architecture including the G8 scheme because China is so fearful to get some peer pressure from the big guys. My question is, what drives China to now think about this fresh idea or China still may have that influence or peer pressure from the other seven guys. Thank you.

Campbell: And your answer can avoid the question or the first answer which you don't have to give is that China's very interested to see how Bush and Chirac react to each other at their next meeting.

Wang: I think it is not a one-way role; I think China needs invitation also to get into these organizations. And China cannot just offer China's own participation without being invited. The crucial part of that G8 or anything is the United States. I remember several years ago, Clinton himself responded to a question like that and his reply was that G7 is an organization for democratic countries, not for a country like China. I don't know whether

the United States has changed that idea. But I think the Chinese also were reluctant to offer or to show willingness to talk about this but I think they are floating ideas among some Chinese and between Chinese and some other international players to think of this possibility, but it will not happen in the near future.

Campbell: I think the interesting thing is that if you look at least from the past, APEC, the dynamic or at least the potentially dynamic economic dynamos and the G8 and the culture of the organization, APEC is essentially the right countries talking about the wrong issues. And the G8 fundamentally sends the wrong countries talking about the right issues, right? Italy is important but it's not in the same scale of integrating China into the international community. I think the reality is that the big voice here is not going to be the United States.

People are very comfortable to let the United States—I think you're right, President Clinton did say these things. But what would be most interesting like in trade negotiations is the role of other countries behind the scenes publicly saying, wouldn't it be great to get China, but privately saying, we'll do everything we can to stop it, but then make sure that the blame goes to the United States as the country that is behind it.

Questioner: Quick question related to the last question. Do you think the value or the political regime is important in exercising regional leadership? You talked about democracy—G8 is just for democracy so we're not invited—but at the end of the day, Korea also started to enjoy liberal democracy and then I think in Asia, as well. If you want to exert regional leadership, you have to have some value or vision that other countries can sort of aspire and then it's ready for that kind of change.

Face Reality of Communism's Existence in China

Wang: I think that's why China has refrained from asking for a leadership role in Asia. I

think the Chinese take it very seriously. I think the Chinese are very conscious because Chinese system is very different from the systems in Japan and in some South Asian countries—in South Korea, especially in other parts of the world. But it will take a long time for China to adjust itself to that kind of situation. And it also takes time for other countries to see China continuing this political system in which the communist party is the dominant party forever. So we have to also face this reality in China that the communist party is there. I cannot say forever because I

don't know for sure but I think they will be there for a long, long time, maybe 20 years or 30 years or 100...generations.

Campbell: Five or seven years more.

Ikenberry: Long time—five years. Well, on that note of either pessimism or optimism, however you want to look at it, we will adjourn and I hope you will join with me in thanking our distinguished speakers today. We have a reception out front so please join us for some additional conversation. (End)

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Main Speaker **Mr. Wang Jisi** is Director and a Senior Researcher of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. He is also director of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at the Party School of the Central Committee. In addition, Mr. Wang is a founding member of the Pacific Council on International Policy in Los Angeles. He has taught at Peking University, was a visiting fellow at Oxford University, and most recently taught at Claremont McKenna College. Mr. Wang received an M.A. from Peking University. His articles in English include “America: Rogue Superpower, But Needed Economic Engine” (2002), and “China’s Response to G.W. Bush: A Tactical Move, or a Strategic Orientation” (2002). In Chinese, Mr. Wang published a volume entitled *Lonely at the Top: U.S. Global Strategy and Position in the Post-Cold War World*.

Discussants **Dr. Kurt Campbell** is Senior Vice President and Director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Before joining CSIS, he worked at the Department of Defense as deputy assistant director of defense, at the White House as deputy special counselor to the president for NAFTA, and as a member of the National Security Council staff. Dr. Campbell has also been an associate professor of public policy at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He received a B.A. from the University of California, San Diego, a Ph.D. in international relations from Oxford University and a certificate in music and political philosophy from the University of Erevan in Soviet Armenia. Dr. Campbell’s publications include *The Power of Balance: 100 Strategic Insights into the Pacific Century* (forthcoming, 2003) and *To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign against Terrorism* (principal author, 2001).

Dr. Minxin Pei is a Senior Associate and Co-Director of the China program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Before joining the Carnegie Endowment, he was an assistant professor at Princeton University. He has received numerous awards, including the Olin Faculty Fellowship, the National Fellowship of the Hoover Institution and the Robert S. MacNamara Fellowship of the World Bank. Dr. Pei received a Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University. He has written *From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union* (1994). He is completing a book, *China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy*. Dr. Pei also has published articles in *Foreign Affairs*, *The New York Times* and *The Los Angeles Times*.

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