

Japan in the Post-Cold War World

by
Ambassador Hisashi Owada

Hisashi Owada: Thank you, John, for your kind introduction. Ladies and gentlemen, I am so happy to be here to share with you my personal view about the situation of Japan in the present-day world, in particular, in the context of the demise of the Cold War. The time I have is about thirty to forty minutes. Of course it's not easy; it's not possible, in fact, to cover this vast subject in thirty or forty minutes. Therefore, I'm going to be very sketchy in my presentation, but I'm sure that in the question and answer period, which constitutes the substance of the session other than my preliminary introduction, I'm sure you're going to ask many questions.

I must disappoint you first of all, by saying that I'm not going to touch, in my presentation anyway, upon concrete issues surrounding Japan that you are most interested in, such as Japan's new initiative vis-à-vis the DPRK, or a position that Japan is going to take or not to take on the issue of a possible military attack by the United States on Iraq. I'm sure you all have come here with the expectation that those are the kind of issues that I'm going to talk about. That's why I have to disappoint you beforehand rather than disappoint you after my presentation is over. As I said, on the other hand, you are of course free to ask any question when it comes to the question and answer period.

My presentation is going to be a somewhat sketchy description about what kind of a world we live in and about what the role of Japan should be in that world. My presentation therefore could be somewhat abstract and conceptual rather than concrete. But I'd like to do it in a context which will be as concrete as possible.

Before getting into the substance, another point that I have to make is that I see so many familiar faces. When I came in and saw these

faces, I felt like running away. First of all, I'm sure those friends of mine who are here would know beforehand what I'm going to talk about, which would make my presentation very dull. But also these are very sharp minds, and they would know exactly how to attack me. But here I am, and there is nothing that I can do at this moment.

The Whole of Japan Is Confused

Now, the subject matter of my talk today is Japan in the post-Cold War world. I remember the discussion that I had quite recently with a number of Americans and some Europeans, who looked all puzzled and asked me what was going on in Japan. They all say that what they see in Japan from outside is very confusing. I understand that. But the fact of the matter is that it is not only confusing to outsiders, but it's also confusing to us in Japan. To my mind, the answer to that question is that the whole of Japan, the Japanese people as a whole, are confused. That is why it is so confusing when you look at Japan from outside.

Why is that so? My basic thesis is that what has triggered this confusing situation in Japan, and of which Japan is so confused, is primarily the demise of the Cold War. At least it is a trigger—I don't mean to say that is the cause, but certainly it has been a trigger.

The demise of the Cold War has brought about many things in the whole world. It has changed the framework of the basic relations between states. More than that, the whole global situation has changed, to many countries in the world or to many peoples in the world.

The disappearance of the bipolar confrontation has led many people in the United States and Europe and elsewhere to believe that we are no longer going to have the stability of the

bipolar world, the kind of stability which you may regard as immoral. Nevertheless, it was the factor which ensured the stability of the world. Yes, the stability was maintained on a very precarious basis, but it was nonetheless a kind of stability that came to exist because the two superpowers knew each other well enough that they could not really risk a major war.

Now that this situation has disappeared, some people say that there's going to be a unipolar order because one of the two superpowers has disappeared and there is only one superpower. They argue, therefore, that it is only logical that there's going to be a unipolar world. I don't believe in that. I think it's a non sequitur.

On the other hand, there are other people who feel, particularly in Europe, that we are getting back to the old order, the world of a multipolar order. Of course, they say this with certain degree of wishful thinking, like the Chinese for instance. I don't believe in that either, because the world has changed to such an extent that a multipolar order, in the sense of an order maintained on the basis of a balance of power, is no longer feasible.

A common point, however, is that whether you believe in a unipolar order or in a multipolar order, both of the protagonists of the two extreme views are inclined to think that we are getting back to the past, because the period of the Cold War, where a bipolar confrontation prevailed, was an interregnum and that when that is over, we will get back to the old framework of things. To my mind, both are wrong. The world has changed too much for us to go back to the world of the old order.

U.S. Tendency Towards Isolationist Unilateralism

In the case of the United States, the tendency is more towards unilateralist rather than unipolar. This unilateralism moreover tends to be more isolationist unilateralism than interventionist unilateralism. In this sense my prediction is that this unilateralist approach is

going not so much in the direction of establishing unilateralist hegemony, as in the direction of establishing unilateralist isolationism to issues. This in fact is in line with the whole tradition of the United States in the foreign policy arena, where the general trend has always been isolationist unilateralism in that sense. That is to say, the unilateralist trend of the Bush administration is not to force its own perception of order upon others in the sense of an interventionist approach, but "to go it alone, as I please" in the tradition of an isolationist approach. On the European side, on the other hand, many of the European countries, because of their historical experiences, feel that we are back to an order based on the balance of power as the only stable order that can work even today.

In the past, a basic framework of multipolarity worked, though in a very precarious way, because there was a power balance. In the old world, there was a degree of homogeneity in the group of major powers in such a way that even when they are behaving primarily in pursuit of their own national interests their relatively comparable strength cancelled out with each other and a degree of stability prevailed as the result. Eventually, however, such precarious equilibrium could break down. That was how the First World War started. That was how the Second World War started. There is an intrinsic danger, therefore, in such a system based on a balance of power.

My own view is that these people on both sides of the Atlantic forget about the changes that have come about in the whole world, namely the process of globalization, as well as the tremendous imbalance in power possessed by the United States. The result is that even when the Americans insist on their unilateralist approach in an isolationist mode and say "I will do it, alone, if others are not joining forces," this tends to become an interventionist, rule-ignoring unilateralism.

The difference between the two approaches comes to very little in a world where the United States is the only superpower. What it

does by way of unilateralist approach in the present setting, even when it is carried out in an isolationist mode, would inevitably become what I would call “global unilateralism,” going beyond isolationist unilateralism that she intends to practice. This situation makes a striking contrast to the situation of the immediate postwar period after the Second World War, where the United States was inevitably involved in an exercise of leadership, more in a benign interventionist mode. But that was a very different phenomenon in the sense that it was what I would describe as “unilateral globalism,” as distinct from the “global unilateralism” of today.

Unilateral Globalism vs. Global Unilateralism

There’s a basic difference between “unilateral globalism” and “global unilateralism” though perhaps you might think that this is a pun or a play on words; in a sense it is a play on words. But there is an essential difference as concepts between the two. “Unilateral globalism” is essentially a globalist approach to issues based on a global meeting of minds but carried out in a unilateral way because of the overwhelming power of the United States to implement such consensus. Thus her leadership role is accepted by everyone. The manner in which the policy is exercised may appear to be unilateral, but the substance of the policy is globalism.

By contrast, “global unilateralism” is essentially a unilateralist approach to issues where there is no meeting of minds on a global basis. The danger of such global unilateralism is that, in substance it is unilateralism. It is an approach to pursue a value as determined by the United States, which may not be shared by other countries. Nevertheless it is applied globally because the United States has the power to do that. This, to my mind, is a very basic difference between the two concepts.

Global Unilateralism No Longer Feasible for U.S.

The present-day reality, however, is that as

you witnessed in the Gulf crisis and as you are witnessing now in the Iraqi crisis, “global unilateralism” is in fact no longer feasible even with the unsurpassed might of the United States. You might think that these two examples prove the contrary. They might appear as the evidence that the United States has the power to exercise global unilateralism. I don’t think so. The Gulf War was fought with remarkable financial support of Japan, Saudi Arabia and other coalition partners.

Again in the present crisis, the Bush administration, in spite of its rhetoric, seems to be trying to avoid a unilateral action, shifting more towards the policy of cooperation within the United Nations, as long as the United Nations can function properly. It suggests that the present U.S. administration is conscious of the fact that the United States has to exercise her power, however mighty she may be, in such a way that this exercise of power can be accepted as an exercise in unilateral globalism rather than in global unilateralism.

On the other hand, the problem with the present situation is that because one of the poles in the bipolar confrontation, the Soviet Union, has disappeared, some of the major players are tempted to feel that they are now free to pursue their own power game, in very much the same way that they were doing so in the 19th century Europe or in the first half of the 20th century in the world of a multipolar order. Paradoxically, in this new post-Cold War order, many major powers may feel that such danger as existed in the balance of power system no longer exists, because there is the United States who, at the end of the day when worse comes to the worst, will take the whole situation in her hands to settle the matter. In the meanwhile, they can afford to pursue their own parochial interest, while leaving the final responsibility of maintaining the world order upon the shoulder of the only superpower.

I feel that this is exactly what is happening in the present Iraqi crisis. I was at the United Nations until several years ago. When, in

1998, the first major crisis surrounding the issue of Iraqi non-compliance with the Security Council resolutions imposed upon Iraq at the conclusion of the Gulf War came to the focus of attention in the Security Council, I was witness to the behavior of some of the major powers in the Security Council who were acting in such a way as if there were nothing wrong or dangerous about the behavior of Saddam Hussein when he was evidently trying everything to evade compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

At the same time, these major powers were in effect counting on an eventual intervention by the United States to redress the situation, if worse should come to the worst. I believe that this is the kind of temptation which can come into play also nowadays in relation to the behavior of some of the principal members of the Security Council. That is the kind of danger that the present international system has to face, as long as it has to work on the basis of an imperfect system of *pax consortis*, which can stand only on the premise—not always guaranteed—that every major player will cooperate in unity.

Where is Japan in this whole picture, especially against the background of such a world situation and in the present state of international order? The demise of the Cold War has brought about a new situation also to Japan. It has offered an opportunity to Japan as a candidate for this *pax consortis* to act more proactively in the field of foreign affairs. When I was Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs in Tokyo and later Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations, I personally tried to move Japan in this direction, so that Japan could be a useful partner in our joint efforts for constructing and consolidating a new order based on what I have described as *pax consortis*, i.e. the coalition of the major countries which are willing and capable to work for maintaining international order in this new situation. I felt in those days that it was the only viable way of maintaining the precarious order of the post-Cold War situation.

Japan's Unique Challenge

Unfortunately for Japan, however, the period of the Cold War has left a special legacy to Japan, which presents a challenge when Japan tries to carry out this task in being proactive in the field of foreign affairs—a challenge unique to Japan which no other country in Europe or the United States had to face at the demise of the Cold War. This is the main theme I would like now to turn to.

What is this unique challenge? For many countries in Europe or for the United States, the period of the Cold War was a period of transition, which came in by way of "an aberration," to interrupt the main current of history running through the periods before the Cold War and after the Cold War. By contrast, however, for the postwar Japan, the Cold War period provided an essential framework in which a new Japan of the post-World War II was forged and in which the basic stance of her foreign policy was shaped. With the demise of the Cold War, Japan has come to cope with this legacy of the past.

Let me try to depict three salient points. The first is that the Cold War came about as the framework that forged the basic posture of the postwar Japan in the world, coming as it did immediately after the shattering defeat of Japan in the Second World War. The impact of the defeat of Japan in the Second World War is something which has not been fully appreciated in the outside world. In fact, the end of the war created a situation in which the whole nation had to suffer from a psychological trauma. It was not only a political trauma, but also a psychological trauma of the first degree. The defeat meant a total collapse of the whole system of governance, together with all the values that had supported this system of governance in which people had laid their total faith and devotion, which came to be shattered to pieces. Out of the blue, the whole nation was told that the entire value system that they had believed in as the spiritual pillar of the nation had been false and that they should now disown it.

It would not be difficult to understand that under such circumstances, the whole generation that formed the nucleus of Japanese society in those days became nihilist in a basic sense. They could not believe in any value system anymore. As a result of this nihilistic outlook, some became cynics, while others became opportunists. Even now, you could point to some older politicians belonging to this generation who typically exemplify this legacy of the past. Thus the period of the Cold War, which coincided with this shattering experience of Japan, left an indelible imprint upon the national psyche of Japan, from which the present-day Japan cannot as yet be completely free.

“Mini-Cold War” Within Japan

Secondly, the arrival of the Cold War in the world arena produced in the Japan of that period, which was still suffering from a spiritual vacuum that I have just described what I would describe as a “mini-Cold War” within Japan. The fact that the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 coincided with the outbreak of the Cold War was decisive in this respect. The peace of San Francisco—in itself a very wise decision from an overall point of view—was a very controversial decision in the societal context of Japan of the day, in the sense that it had the effect of throwing Japan into the camp of the free world.

Against the background of the prevailing national psyche as described above, the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which brought Japan into the alliance relationship with the United States, inevitably led Japan into a state of confusion, dividing the whole country into mutually hostile camps. Thus the Cold War came to be “internalized” in the form of a “mini-Cold War” within Japan.

As an integral part of this whole picture, it was inevitable that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty should become a highly controversial issue. While the conclusion of the U.S.-Japan

Security Treaty at that juncture must have been a very wise decision from an objective point of view, it was seen by some in Japan as a tool for the United States to force her will upon an unprepared Japan. The government did not really try hard to achieve a degree of national consensus. This probably would have been difficult in any case, but this absence of national consensus at the starting point had its after-effects for a number of years. You will recall that the occasion of the revision of the Security Treaty in 1960, which in effect was a great improvement over the original treaty, developed into a riot, resulting in the downfall of the Kishi government which forced the ratification of the revised treaty.

This mini-Cold War, or the ideological struggle between the East and the West, went on within Japan throughout the Cold War period. Uncompromising confrontation in the Diet between the LDP, which always managed to remain in power and came growingly to get degenerated by savoring power, and the JSP, which never came to power and thus never grew up to a responsible opposition, did not provide a fertile ground for the political maturity which was badly needed in this nascent nation. In this situation, there was little room for a genuine policy debate. The Socialists were constantly raising objections to all the things that the government was doing, while praising all the things that the Soviet Union was professing.

At the same time, the Liberal Democrats were defending all the things that the United States was doing, including the Vietnam War. In this situation of the mini-Cold War fought on the domestic front, one would expect that the political debate in the Diet, where confrontation and unilateral action was the rule of the game, was completely futile.

It would be easy to see in this situation that when the Cold War framework disappeared in the world, the framework for the mini-Cold War in Japan had also to go. But more importantly, together with it, the whole political

structure had to undergo a radical change. That was the basis on which the 1993 political upheaval came, when the LDP rule fell for the first time in the postwar history of Japan, being replaced by the new Hosokawa government, putting an end to the “1955 Regime.” It was very much the same kind of development as the one that the demise of the Cold War brought about in Europe. In effect, the change in the world situation brought about the demise of the mini-Cold War within Japan.

However, this change in the world political scene not only destroyed the Socialist Party, which had to disintegrate itself in very much the same way as the Soviet Union disintegrated, but also shook the LDP, which had been relying heavily upon the traditional strata of society and taking for granted the political framework of the Cold War. Through the long years of staying in power on a continuing basis, a triangular coalition among the political circle in power, the bureaucracy and the big business is said to have taken firm roots as the hotbed for the monopoly of power. All this has had to change in the course of the process for societal transformation taking place in Japan under the impact of the demise of the Cold War.

Japanese Were Living in a Dream World

The third point is that during the Cold War period, the Japanese got accustomed to live in a dream world—or if you like, in a world of virtual reality. Through the combination of a number of factors, the Japanese people had succeeded in creating for themselves what I would describe as a psychological cocoon, secluding themselves from the realities of the outside world. It was a very snug, comfortable environment to be in, because the people of Japan did not have to think about the external threats to Japan as real threats.

The typical mantra went like this: we the Japanese are a peace-loving people; we are praying for peace; we are resolved not to disturb peace of other people; thus, “all is right

with the world.” On the basis of this litany, cynicism and opportunism born out of the postwar nihilism that I was talking about became very strongly rooted in the minds of the people throughout this postwar period of Cold War confrontation.

In this situation, quite inevitably as its result, a new cult came to develop in the postwar Japan—it is interesting to see that something similar also happened in Germany to a certain extent—the cult that the only thing you can keep, in your nihilism born out the total collapse of your own value system, is the belief in what you can lay your hands on, i.e. a belief in material prosperity. It was natural for the Japan of those days to believe in material prosperity, if only because it was necessary for recovering from the devastation of the war and for reconstructing a new Japan. However, it was much more than that; it was the only thing that you with all your nihilism could believe in as something tangible: *tango ergo est*.

Pursuit of Economic Prosperity

Thus the pursuit of economic prosperity became the only clearly identifiable value for Japan to pursue on which a national consensus came to be forged. I still remember vividly the time when I was a junior member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, my colleagues in the ministry—and these were not people in the media who could be much more affected by that mood—used to claim that the whole of diplomacy in the postwar Japan could be characterized in one word, i.e. “economic diplomacy”—the pursuit of economic wealth. There was nothing else in the minds of these young elites of the foreign service establishment of Japan as the goal of diplomacy of Japan.

This psychological cocoon in which the Japan of the Cold War period smugly secluded herself from the outside realities of the world, came abruptly to an end with the demise of the Cold War. It would be easy to see that this new situation came as a shock on the minds of many Japanese. In a sense, the Japanese were

thrown out into the harsh environment of the real world, with no clear sense of orientation. I am obviously exaggerating in saying this, but figuratively speaking this was more or less what people felt when the Cold War came to an end. People have since been confused as to what exactly to do.

Perhaps a word of caution is needed here. To be more precise, it may not be quite accurate to say that all of this did come about all of a sudden with the demise of the Cold War. I talked about the mini-Cold War that had been going on in Japan for many years. However, it was also like the East-West confrontation in the real world, where the West gradually came to overwhelm the East. The Cold War in Japan was also somewhat like that. In the immediate postwar period, the whole country was totally polarized, in the societal sense and especially in the intellectual domain. In the field of education, for instance, the whole educational system of Japan was dominated by the influence of the Japan Federation of the Teachers Union (*Nikkyoso*) which was primarily controlled by Communists and their affiliates, who were the outgrowth of the postwar nihilism that I mentioned earlier.

Negation of Past Values

The so-called “pacifist education” was practiced everywhere all over the country, and the government could not do much about it. The whole thrust of this education consisted in the rejection of the past in its entirety. In fact, somewhat paradoxically, this new ideology of total negation of all past value system came to gain the place of orthodoxy as the only valid system of the postwar Japan.

However, in due course, as Japan restored her sense of balance, such a total negation of the past of Japan could not but create a counter reaction to it. Gradually people began to wonder whether the teaching of history that consisted in the total rejection of everything of the past of Japan was truly the right approach to history. It was a reaction to this excessively

revisionist postwar education that led to an emotional outburst of the “neo-revisionists” who started to raise their voices against the so-called “masochistic historiography” (*Jigyaku shikan*) that we now witness in the post-Cold War Japan. I believe it is this “*resentiment*” to the postwar revision of history that lies behind the phenomenon of what appears to be rising tide of neonationalism in Japan as we witness in the textbook issue.

This neonationalism which is rising in Japan is thus essentially an emotional reaction to the tendentious approach to the history of Japan that had been going on in the postwar period, and as such basically defensive in nature. It can be described as “wounded nationalism” as some would put it. It may not be a healthy type of nationalism which should reflect a newly found national pride in what Japan has achieved. Nevertheless, it is nothing more than a reaction against what has been distorted in the postwar Japan through the postwar revisionist approach to the past.

As I stated, the textbook issue is a typical manifestation of this emotional reaction. Let me make it clear that I am not a protagonist of this neo-revisionist school of history which tries to engage in the praise of the past of Japan. While I am in principle against this attempt to rewrite history, which could fall into the same pitfalls that the postwar revisionist school of history had fallen to the detriment of postwar Japan’s credibility in the world, I can understand why this new wave has had to come about and why this can get such a strong support among a broad segment of the public in Japan now.

It is not that people are embracing *in toto* what some of the authors of these neo-revisionist textbooks are trying to advocate; it is primarily a normal reaction to the distortion of the past that had gone into the works of the postwar revisionists in the form of a total negation of what had been the orthodoxy, a total rejection of everything that Japan has done in the past. People justifiably question that such approach

has indeed been one true to history. In their search for a new national identity of Japan, people in Japan feel that certain legitimate aspects of the past have to be restored back in a more balanced way.

The problem here is that a very interesting alliance has developed as a result between those who have a legitimate claim to restore a balance by trying to be objective without intending to revive the old prewar ultranationalistic values, and some of those neo-nationalists who try to revive the old prewar values *in toto*. They have come to form a common alliance, to the extent that the postwar revisionists who were engaged in the total rejection of all the past values have been wrong. That is the background against which this textbook issue has come to be entangled with politics.

If you understand all these complexities created in the aftermath of the war, you will better appreciate that Japan at this moment is in a very difficult situation, as far as the national psyche is concerned. Of course, the economic difficulties that Japan is experiencing is no help either; it is in fact an added aggravating factor to this confusion, in the sense that if the economy were going well, people could feel a little more confident about themselves and their own future. As long as you can have faith in your future, all these difficulties—societal, political and psychological—that I have talked about may be something that can be easily overcome or at least set aside. But when the economy is going down, it aggravates the psychic situation of the people.

Looking at the present situation of Japan in this overall context, I believe that there are three factors that have been critical in creating the present confusion of Japan at this moment. One is the demise of the Cold War and its impact. On this I have already described in some detail.

Arrival of the Age of Globalization

Another is the arrival of the age of globaliza-

tion. It is not sufficiently well appreciated to my mind that this factor is affecting the economic scene of Japan in a much more fundamental way than the impact of recession in the business cycle. In fact, I would submit that this problem is much more fundamental and difficult to deal with, as it is inseparably linked with the way in which Japan has been carrying out her process of modernization in a much broader context of history. What I mean to say is that the whole process of modernization of Japan, starting with the Meiji Restoration and the period which followed since that time, may have been “a miracle” only in a mundane sense.

It is true that the process of modernization of Japan since the Meiji period has succeeded in making Japan a modern state. All this process of modernization since the late 19th century, however, has been taking place in the context of a constantly growing Japan in a benign environment, except perhaps for the period between 1930s and 1940s, when the world depression of the 1930s involved the nascent economy of Japan in the whirlwind. It is well-known that the economic havoc which hit Japan was at least one of the major factors which brought Japan under the influence of reactionary fundamentalism and led her to the sway of totalitarianism and eventually to the Second World War.

Except for this brief period, however, the whole process of modernization of Japan, including the process of its postwar reconstruction, has been achieved smoothly in the context of an uninterrupted linear growth of Japan in economic terms. This, however, may have been a “blessing in disguise” in the reverse sense. It could be argued that because of this benign environment, many of the fundamental characteristics of the pre-modern Japan, which Japan would have had to tackle as unfit remnants of its pre-modern society in the process of modernization, have not been seriously addressed and have been left essentially as they had been in the pre-modernization Japan.

The essence of this pre-modern Japan as society consists in the fact that it is a society built and brought to its perfection on an entirely closed circuit system. The process of modernization of Japan since the Meiji period was no more than an attempt to graft a new olive branch of modern technological civilization on to the traditional pine tree firmly rooted in this closed circuit system, rather than an attempt to replace the old pine by a new olive tree.

Perhaps this statement is a little too abstract. Let me give you some example. There is a famous Japanese traditional institution called *dango* widely practiced in the area of economic activities. *Dango* is a conspiracy in economic activities in the anti-trust sense, where the parties who are involved in a competitive situation conspire with each other to work out a common understanding in which all of them share some profit, to the exclusion of those who are not included in that conspiracy. This clearly is against the basic concept of fair competition. But this conventional practice had been going on for many years in traditional Japan, in a closed circuit system that had been Japanese society.

Closed Circuit Society

The basic premise for such an institution to work is that the society in question forms a closed circuit—closed circuit as the term is used in electrical physics. In physics, a system which operates on 100 voltage can constitute a self-contained system that can function perfectly well, as long as it is not connected with other systems which operate on a different voltage. As long as it forms a separate self-contained circuit, operating independently with other circuits, it can coexist side by side with other systems without causing any problem. In fact, it is difficult to say that a system operating on 200 voltage is a better system than a system operating on 100 voltage. However, the moment you try to connect this system operating on a closed circuit system of 100 voltage with another system operating on a different principle, say 200 voltage,

the problem arises. Unless you take care, there will be a shortening of the circuit, resulting in the explosion of the system.

Japan for many years has been a secluded island country, not just during the 200-odd year period when Japan literally closed herself to the outside world through the official policy of *sakoku*. Even before that, Japan had long been a society having a harmonious life of its own as a self-contained unit, more or less secluded from other neighboring societies. In that sense it formed a closed circuit. As a closed circuit, Japan had succeeded in creating a remarkably equitable society, putting societal priority to the maintenance of “harmony” (*wa*) of society as a whole. When you have society of this kind, it is natural for each constituent member to live together as society on the basis of harmony, trying to adjust his/her respective interests subject to the general welfare of that society.

The institution of *dango* comes right into this picture. It is a device to achieve “harmony” in the process of deciding on the question of who gets a contract among the competing bidders by making a prior informal arrangement among the participants in the tender, so that they may have a lion’s share in the profit through the mechanism of *dango* among all the participants. To the extent that you could work out a solution which would satisfy everyone’s desire by half, so the argument goes, it could be a better system than a system where a certain member of the group would get a full satisfaction, while other members would get nothing. As long as everyone gets a certain share on an equitable basis, everyone is happy.

“Harmonious Society” Before Modernization

To sum up, this is the essence of “harmonious society” that used to prevail in Japan before its modernization. The modernization process based on its belief in rationalism would have dealt a fatal blow to this institution, because it

would go against the rule of rationalism in the western sense, in as much as it would kill the spirit of free competition. In Japan through the process of modernization it has not, because the economy has constantly been growing. While the pie is growing, there is no urge for dealing with that problem. It is only now, that all of a sudden you are faced with a totally novel situation. It is the reality of globalization, in which the pie may still be growing, but in which you have to compete in the open, on a level playing field, in the presence of outsiders in a global market.

The Americans used to criticize Japan for keeping the market closed to the Americans or to the foreigners, in order to favor the Japanese. That was not quite accurate. Yes, Japan may have been closed to those Americans who asked for equal opportunity for competition, but they were shut out not because they were Americans, not because they were foreigners, but because they were outsiders. Japanese outsiders in Japan were also excluded in this kind of a system.

It is clear that globalization forces Japan to face this new situation squarely and engage in her structural reform as society, in order to survive and prosper in this new environment. The challenge of the structural reform in the economic area to my mind lies precisely in this point. I do not share the conventional view held by many in Japan that the economic reform that Japan has now to tackle concerns the technical question of how to overcome the impact of cyclical economic recession that is currently hitting Japan, through such measures as the rationalization of the production lines, the revision of the salary scale, the introduction of the lay-off system, or the abolition of the life employment system, although this last point may be very much a part of the problems that come with the closed-circuit system.

While all these issues clearly have to be addressed by the Japanese business as short term measures to be taken in the context of

the recession now hitting Japan in business cycle, it is my view that there is a much more fundamental problem that we have to face in the context of globalization. It is that we can no longer maintain the remnants of a closed circuit in Japan with all that it implies. Otherwise you cannot compete on the global market.

This is an extremely difficult task. You cannot expect the change to happen in a day or even in one year. It may take years, because it has to involve the fundamental mindset of people and society. I'm sure that eventually the Japanese will succeed in overcoming this fundamental problem as well, but it will take time. The critical question is whether they can compete with the speed of the changes which are taking place so rapidly in the global market.

Japanese Are Prepared to Adapt Themselves to a New Situation

When you look at all these things, inevitably you may become pessimistic about your future. That, to my mind, is the source of the present confused state in which the Japanese find themselves. Maybe I have been sounding more pessimistic than I should be, because I have been focusing on pointing to the problem areas. Naturally, there are certain bright areas also. For instance, the demise of the Cold War has brought about a new situation where the Japanese have finally been exposed to the outside world in the true sense of the word. They have become keenly conscious of the problems they have. They are no longer secluded in the psychological cocoon. With the ability of the Japanese, as it has been demonstrated in the past, they will be prepared to adapt themselves to the new situation. The basic problem, however, is whether there is time enough for the necessary changes and whether there is a political will to go through with them with resolve.

Let me state by way of a conclusion that this last point is the most difficult problem that Japan faces at present. The political system,

or to put it more precisely, the political culture that we have in Japan is the most problematic part of the whole picture. And the mindset of many of the people in the political world of Japan is so hopelessly outdated, being tied with the vested interests of the past and insensitive to the new problems that globalization is posing by way of a gigantic challenge. I am convinced that it is this political factor that forms the critical factor on which the future of Japan will hinge.

Q&A

John Ikenberry: We have a little less than an hour for discussion. If I may take the first question, you're clearly worried about Japan and sketched a picture of a kind of national identity crisis. The shock of the end of the Cold War, the cocoon that Japan was in is no longer a way of existing without the Cold War, globalization, economic malaise. Your very interesting discussion of kind of neonationalism. You see a kind of national psychological kind of process that's going on in Japan, searching for a new identity.

My question is, can that new post-Cold War Japanese identity be discovered and fashioned in a way that does not entail a rupture of relations with the United States? Or to put it differently, does in fact Japan need to radically reshift its relationship with the United States, to assert its independence, to carve out a national identity and a foreign policy without playing this junior role with the United States, to succeed in discovering that new post-Cold War national identity?

Secondly, can that new national identity be what I think you would want it to be—can it be a kind of liberal internationalist, a nontraditional nationalist identity? Can it involve attaching notions of human security and a multilateral international role for Japan? Or does that new national identity need to be more traditional?

Owada: Thank you, John, for your very

incisive questions. Both are extremely important questions, and difficult ones to answer, because they relate to the future and I cannot predict what's going to happen to Japan with any degree of certainty.

The first point I would like to make on your first question, though, is that as President Reagan said, it takes two to tango. I think that the point you make is a function not only of what Japan is going to evolve into, but also a function of how the outside world, including the United States, is going to behave vis-à-vis Japan.

I think it's very important, from that point of view, for the United States to take two approaches. One is to take an enlightened outlook towards the world, especially toward the problem of the management of the world, in a way which would be in consonance with what I described as *pax consortis* rather than the world of global unilateralism. If the United States were to go in a direction of global unilateralism, she will antagonize the whole world including Western Europe, although I have my own reservations about the somewhat irresponsible way that some Western European countries are playing their own games on their own narrow national interests. Thus, I think it's going to be counterproductive for the interests of the United States for her to go in that direction. But it is more than that. To limit the discussion to our bilateral relations, if the United States behaves in an unfortunate way, and if that kind of global unilateralism is going to be applied to Japan, I think the Japanese reaction to it is going to have negative impacts upon our bilateral relations.

On the other hand, there is a problem on the Japanese side also. I think that it's very important for the people in Japan to be made more aware of the realities of the international environment in which they live, that is to say, the environment in which not just the pursuit of your national interest is going to be the rule of the game, but in which the very concept of national interest should include a much

wider area of cooperation with the outside world. That is going to be very important to Japan.

Young Turks Support Recognition of Japan in Return for ODA

If you look, for example, at the problem of ODA (official development assistance), there's a growing outcry against it in Japan, particularly among the young Turks in the political circle. And this is very worrying, because they claim that Japan is spending a lot of money, more than any other country—although quite recently the United States has overtaken Japan—in the official development assistance area, without getting any quid pro quo. By quid pro quo, they mean something in return for the money. They claim that ODA should serve the enhancement in the national power and prestige of Japan in the political area, like the United Nations Security Council, and that a greater degree of appreciation should be forthcoming from the recipient community for what Japan is doing.

I think this is a dangerous trend, although I am certainly a protagonist for the view—and not only a protagonist, I have been campaigning for it—that Japan should get into the Security Council on a permanent basis. Nevertheless, my point is that getting into the Security Council on a permanent basis is important for Japan not as a goal in itself, but because it will give Japan a forum in which Japan can do things that Japan would like to do in the area of maintenance of world order. The seat is not to be sought for the purpose of satisfying her vanity to be recognized as one of the great powers in the world and of demonstrating Japan's prestige in the world. Unfortunately, there is a lot of that element in the argument of opinion leaders in Japan, including some young political leaders.

In the official development assistance area, the tendency in Japan is twofold. One is the argument that we in Japan have been paying too much, where others are not doing enough.

When Japan herself is in a very difficult economic situation, why should we spend our own money to help others? After all, we the Japanese ourselves are suffering from economic difficulties.

The other argument is that if we offer assistance, it should be made more visible. Figuratively, they claim that the Japanese flag should be more visible. Again, this is a very short-sighted argument, because what you are doing should not be for the purpose of demonstrating that this is done by Japan, and that the flag is there. I think we should do it because Japan believes it is a good thing. The reward that you will be getting in terms of the gratitude expressed to Japan is a vicarious product of that process. I believe the present thought process in Japan is upside-down.

Need for Further Reflection and Education on Part of Japanese People

So on Japan's side, quite clearly there is a need for much further reflection and education on the part of the people. But what I worry about is not so much the people in general. I'm very much heartened by my experience in teaching at Waseda University, where young students I am exposed to are much more idealistic than their older generations. The people who now dominate Japan in their fifties and forties and even sixties, on the other hand, are more affected by the postwar education that I talked about. By comparison, the younger generation, the students that I meet at the universities, are the kind of people who have some ambivalence and even skepticism about the way of life that they have been brought up with during the period of high affluence. I think this is an encouraging sign.

I'm not too much worried about people in general, but I'm more worried about some vocal politicians. I take exception to some in the United States who say that young politicians in Japan are more vocal and more articulate and more proactive and that therefore they are more to be relied upon. I don't dispute that.

But being vocal, being articulate and being proactive do not necessarily mean that they are moving in the right direction. I have my worries that some of these young politicians are getting more nationalistic in the narrow sense of the word.

Questioner: Thank you very much, Ambassador Owada. It's good to see you again. I have a question about how you're going to view the world if the United States attacks Iraq. The reason is simply that many people, including Henry Kissinger, pointed out that changing the notion of the principle since Westphalia. You are an international legalist and how the probable U.S. attack on Iraq and the Bush administration's new doctrine, preemptive strike, the reason for the regime change or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, would affect. It's a very difficult question, and I'm very wondering and puzzled, I appreciate if you could share some insight with us.

Owada: Thank you for your admitting that it is a difficult question. I don't have to say that since you have said it.

It's not a difficult question politically, but it's a complicated issue from a legal point of view. First of all, let me say that the simplistic understanding that the use of force is prohibited by Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter with the exception of Article 51 of the Charter, could be quite misleading if it were applied in a very literal, static way.

The whole question of the relationship of Article 2, paragraph 4, and Article 51, has evolved in the context of a long history of the development concerning the doctrine of the use of force. Up until 1928, when the Kellogg-Briand Pact was concluded, the use of force had not been illegal. It had been accepted as the last resort for settling international disputes. As Clausewitz said, war was an extension of diplomacy through different means.

That situation changed with the growth of the

consciousness of mankind that war is immoral and, that—and this is an important point—it should be replaced by an effective system of collective security. In other words, this development is based on the notion that international society should be organized more like domestic society, where the central authority takes the power to employ force into its own hands and monopolizes the use of force in order to maintain social order. Within this framework of such institutionalization of power by the central authority, private revenge and the individual use of force have come to be prohibited in domestic society.

The development of the international community also has been going on in that direction. The prohibition of the use of force except in self-defense has been promoted in the same context of the growth in an effective system of collective security, as exemplified in Chapter VII of the Charter. During the Cold War, however, this system of collective security did not work, because of the existence of confrontation between the two camps.

Essential for Major Powers to Cooperate to Maintain International Peace

Now, that situation is over. The new situation brings us back to the point I made earlier, that in order for this system to work, it is absolutely essential for the major powers, especially the permanent members of the Security Council, to cooperate with each other for the maintenance of international peace and security, in the context of the maintenance of international order. That is the basis of *pax consortis* that I talked about.

However, when some of the members do not try to cooperate on this basis and use their veto power for reasons which are totally alien to the need for the maintenance of international order, like the pursuit of their parochial, national interest, then the whole system collapses. Therefore one has to keep in mind the point that the degree to which the effectiveness of the non-use of force is to be implemented is

functional upon the effective functioning of the system of collective security.

Of course when the Bush administration people say that they are not going to the United Nations, and that they are going to do the work by themselves because it is a case of self-defense, it is difficult to accept this in the sense that they are not really trying to make use of the collective security system which could work, or at least might work. To say that this is not going to work without first testing is not appropriate. This is my basic criticism about the Kosovo intervention by NATO in 1999. NATO said as the justification of its unilateral use of force that there was going to be a Russian veto in any case and that therefore they were not going to the United Nations.

But how do you know without trying? If they went to the Security Council and Russia did exercise the veto, then they might be more justified in going to strike Kosovo by themselves. But they did not even try. My guess is that if they tried hard, they may well have succeeded in carrying the Security Council. I have some good reasons for saying that. But setting Kosovo aside, I am glad to see that in this present situation the Bush administration appears, as of now, to go in the direction of using the Security Council. If they did not succeed in the Security Council, then the rationale of Article 51 of the Charter could be more persuasively pursued.

Legality of Pre-emptive Attack

It has been declared that a pre-emptive attack is illegal under the doctrine of self-defense. However, what constitutes a pre-emptive attack in this sense is something much more complicated than its simplistic formulation suggests. Each case has to be judged in its context. For example, in the League of Nations Japan tried to justify her intervention and invasion into Manchuria in 1931 on the basis of the doctrine of self-defense, but this was not accepted by the League of Nations—I believe quite justifiably. It is in principle true

that a pre-emptive attack, when it does not involve an imminent danger that leaves no choice of means to avert it, cannot be justified.

But what is an imminent danger in this sense is something you have to judge in a concrete context, in a concrete situation, keeping all the factors in view. After all, the classic doctrine of self-defense developed from what came to be known as the “Caroline incident.” This was a dispute in 1837 between the United States and Great Britain involving a vessel called the “Caroline,” moored on the U.S. side of the river on the U.S.-Canadian border, on which rebels were getting together to attack the Canadian territory on the other side of the river. The British forces embarked on an attack on them to destroy the rebels on the vessel in the American territory. The U.S. government protested to this as an incursion on its territorial sovereignty.

The then Secretary of State Webster defined the justifiability of self-defense on the basis that the coming attack is so imminent as not to leave any choice of means. He did not use the word “pre-emptive,” but in this case an attack before the other side actually initiated the process of launching its attack was thought to be justified. We have to judge the application of the doctrine of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter in its proper context of the “Caroline” case, particularly taking in view the degree of development of modern weapons.

Role of Self-Defense Forces in Post-Cold War

Questioner: I have a question for you about the role of the self-defense forces in the post-Cold War context. After all, the Cold War is over. It is often said that the intensity of regional threats to the Japanese has intensified, coming from the Korean Peninsula in the form of WMD as well as missile threats, and also from uncertainty and instabilities in the Taiwan Straits. With the self-defense forces being a military tool for self-defense for

Japan, I would like to hear your opinion about the role of self-defense forces for the future.

Owada: I think there are two different questions to answer, or two different areas to deal with in answering that one question. One is the policy question of what role or what possible role of the Self-Defense Force of Japan (JSDF) should be in the maintenance of stability in East Asia in general. The other is the legal question of what is the permissible role assignable to the JSDF, not from a military point of view, but from a legal point of view, i.e. the question of what the JSDF can do within the domestic legal framework of Japan as the Constitution stands now.

The answer to this first question is obvious. There is a very important potential role that the JSDF could play, in particular in the area of participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations especially in East Asia, or of cooperating in the situation of an international coalition for action authorized by the United Nations to maintain international peace and security. This would be the case, for example, with the situation in East Timor or in Afghanistan, etc. Incidentally, I believe that the activities of the JSDF in the recent Afghan crisis have been a laudable undertaking, but they should be distinguished from the roles that the JSDF play in the implementation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty has its own limited scope of application in that it is an arrangement for the defense of Japan and the maintenance of security in the surrounding area, namely the Far East. It cannot extend beyond that, however desirable that may be. So what has happened in the Afghan situation is something different from the implementation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. This should not be confused with the activities under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

Coming back to your question, I think the activities of the JSDF in the Afghan situation have been legitimate activities on the part of

Japan, in the sense that Japan has been cooperating with the decision of the Security Council of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace and security in that part of the world against international terrorism. That is my first point.

The second question is a more delicate one touching on the limit of constitutionality of the JSDF. Some opposition parties and particularly the Socialists have long questioned such activities of the JSDF on the ground that they were contrary to Article 9 of the Constitution. This is an argument that is separate from the argument *de lege ferenda*, namely the question as to whether it is desirable or undesirable to enable them to engage in such activities by revising the Constitution. On the other hand, the present question is one which belongs to the area *de lege lata*, i.e. the question of interpretation of the existing law.

The government has taken the position, endorsed by the Supreme Court in the Sunakawa case, that the existence of the JSDF cannot be said to be a violation of Article 9 of the Constitution. But on what ground the Court based its judgment is not quite clear, inasmuch as the Supreme Court simply stated that the issue of constitutionality of the JSDF was a political question to be left to the realm of the political branch of the government. The argument was that since the Diet approved the creation of the JSDF, it would be inappropriate for the Supreme Court to get into the constitutionality of that question.

On this logic, if the legal basis of the role of the JSDF is strictly confined to the defense of Japan when Japan is attacked, then there is very limited room for the JSDF to play an international role which would go beyond the one that is strictly confined to the mission of the defense of Japan as such.

On the other hand, if on this logic another possible interpretation is accepted that the rationale of the restriction on the use of force under Article 9 of the Constitution is the use of force

by Japan for pursuing her own national policy, as it was prescribed in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, or as it is the case with the Charter of the United Nations, then the JSDF can legally operate in a much wider field, particularly in the field of cooperating with the United Nations acting for the maintenance of international peace and security. If such interpretation were accepted, wider activities of the JSDF could be envisaged without requiring the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution. Naturally, this point could be made clearer by revising Article 9, provided that there was consensus or a necessary majority to do that.

Questioner: I'd like to ask about Japan's relations with other countries in East Asia. You didn't mention it in your opening remarks, but that's another effect of the end of the Cold War is there's a new opportunity for Japan to have different relationships with countries in its neighboring region. Do you feel that relationships such as the ASEAN Plus Three is perhaps a new international or regional context in which Japan could play a greater role and there could be some sort of greater involvement of Japan in developing a sense of regional community in East Asia?

It seems like if that type of direction were to develop in the region, and with participation by both Japan and China, the U.S. might not find that to be a particularly—would not find that direction to be something that they would oppose. I wonder if you would like to comment about that sort of general trend.

Owada: I said at the beginning that today in my initial remarks I was not going to talk about concrete situations. That's why I did not touch upon such aspects of the topic that you have raised. Having said that, of course I have no disagreement to what you have said, i.e. that the demise of the Cold War has affected the East Asian region politically and economically. Your point is legitimate in the sense that there are areas where Japan's new roles are going to be extremely relevant.

In my discussion of what I regard to be the challenges that Japan faces—and I have listed here three areas—I did not go into the problem of overcoming the past because of the time factor. Overcoming the past may sound like a hyperbolic expression, but I think that it is the basic premise for enabling Japan to play a constructive role in this part of the world—East Asia.

I raised the issue of the textbooks, and I tried to explain the background of it. Although people in this country, as well as in Japan tend to mix the two issues of the textbooks and of the Yasukuni Shrine, the question of the textbooks and the question of the Yasukuni Shrine are two altogether different issues.

While I'm not at all a protagonist for the revision of the textbooks, nevertheless I had to point out that the textbook issue has its own very complicated background to it. The issue is becoming a national issue at this juncture in history, more as an emotional reaction on the part of many people in Japan against the tendentious revisionist history that they have been taught through the postwar period. As I said, there is an understandable reaction to the fact that everything in the past history of Japan was rejected and denounced. By contrast, the Yasukuni Shrine issue is a very different issue in the sense that it is linked with the problem of what kind of soul-searching exercise the Japanese people have gone through on the issue of the last war. I am talking about the Japanese people as individuals, rather than the government of Japan.

Unfortunately, because of the circumstances of the postwar period that I tried to sketch briefly in my earlier presentation, the Japanese did not really get into this process of genuine soul-searching on the nature of the last war. I must caution my audience by a caveat that what I'm saying is not to echo some people in this country who claim that while Germany has done everything necessary on that score, Japan has done nothing. I reject this claim as totally misguided.

Japan's Postwar Reconciliation Efforts

The case of Germany and the case of Japan are two very different cases, where comparison is not always easy. For instance, some people claim that Germany has offered compensation to the victims on an individual basis, while Japan has not. On the surface, that is true, but the basic difference is that Japan concluded the Peace Treaty in which all the war claims were settled, in a final and definitive manner, while Germany did not conclude a peace treaty. The fact is that Germany did not have the opportunity to conclude a peace treaty, because of the postwar division. In any case there was thus no settlement of the war claims in the case of Germany.

By contrast, Japan concluded the San Francisco Peace Treaty as well as some bilateral peace treaties with her former enemies, by which Japan offered a considerable amount of reparations, one way or another to settle all the war claims. These reparations were meant to be used for the benefit of those victims which had suffered from the war. Hence the difference between the two cases.

I'm not suggesting that in the case of Japan that has been enough. I am keenly aware that there is a moral dimension to this question of responsibility, which should be the real issue here. As far as the legal side of the problem is concerned, however, one has to make a clear distinction between the case of Germany and the case of Japan, and to try to avoid getting into the pitfall of saying that while Germany has carried out all that was required in full conscience, Japan has not done anything.

Having made this point clear, however, I have to be critical of the mindset of many in Japan, as far as the moral side of the problem is concerned. I do not think the Japanese have really done enough in this respect. This was of course partly due to the immediate arrival of the Cold War situation, where Japan was involved in an environment of confrontation between the East and the West. Thus the

Japanese people lost the chance of going through the process of genuine soul-searching reflection on the past. One might say that, in this respect, the situation must have been not so different with Germany either. One difference to my mind is that in the case of Germany, people could find their salvation in the unique situation of the division of Germany in the postwar period, which allowed people in West Germany to engage in a thorough soul-cleansing process without the fear of being involved in the internalized mini-Cold War within Japan.

Also it is often said that there was another point that may have made a difference between the two cases. The thesis roughly goes as follows: in the case of Germany the German people in general were innocent; it was the Nazis who drove them into such an atrocious action as holocaust and the aggressive war; in the case of Japan, people could not identify the equivalent of the Nazis in Japan. I personally believe that the situation could not have been very different in both cases, in that the whole nation was carried away in their madness which was promoted by the propaganda of the government, amplified by mass media which fanned this emotional outburst and exploited by those who used this situation for the pursuit of their goals. The process must have been essentially the same both in Germany and Japan.

But the point I'm trying to make here is different. The point I'm making is that throughout the postwar period, whatever the background, the people in Japan have not been engaged in serious reflection upon the last war and their own behavior in that war as a problem that engages them on their own existential level as human beings. The claim that the Yasukuni Shrine is a place where your fathers and brothers who have given their lives for the sake of the country and for the defense of their families are enshrined, and that therefore there should be nothing wrong for us to go and console their souls is an entirely valid argument as far as it goes. But it may not be a valid enough

argument *erga omnes*, that is to say, for example, as against the victims of this war and of the atrocities committed in the name of the state of Japan.

As long as people in Japan do not squarely face this problem, I don't think we can really play a truly constructive role in this area of East Asia and in the world on the basis of the full confidence from the peoples surrounding Japan.

Japanese Should Consider Wartime Actions by Themselves

There are two other points that I have to add. One is that this aspect of the problem is primarily one that is incumbent upon us as Japanese. It is primarily the Japanese problem in the sense that we the Japanese have to think about this problem very seriously by ourselves. From this angle, it is not appropriate that we should allow this aspect of the problem to develop into a case on which others outside Japan point to us with accusing fingers. The external side of the problem has been dealt with, even if it was ineffective from the emotional point of view, by the Treaty of Peace. On the other hand, the internal side of the problem has to be squarely dealt with by us in Japan as the problem of our own, without inviting others outside to intervene. If this internal problem for own soul-searching should be exposed to external elements, it could become counterproductive, through nullifying the formally established process of reconciliation, which the Peace Treaty is meant to be.

The second related point is that there could be a temptation on the part of some countries to use this issue as a wedge to constrain Japan from acting more proactively in the international arena. I look with serious concern at this danger, since such temptation, if put into practice, could be extremely counterproductive to our efforts for reconciliation, to the extent that it would invite an emotional counterreaction which could nullify the genuine efforts for the internalization of serious reflec-

tion and contrition over the past on the part of the Japanese.

With the exception of one or two countries, I think the majority of the countries in East Asia have come to terms with the past as far as they are concerned, while my own reservation about the Japanese side still remains. I feel that many of the countries in Southeast Asia have achieved reconciliation with the past as something that by now belongs to the past. The miraculous economic development which has come about in the demise of the Cold War has also helped in moving them in this direction.

Japan's Proactive Role in Diplomacy

In the new environment, Japan has been trying to move to act more proactively in the diplomatic field. Take for example the case of Cambodia. Japan's contribution to the peace process in Cambodia in fact was the decisive factor in bringing about peace in Cambodia. There are naturally many countries who claim their own share of contribution to this process for peace in Cambodia; I don't dispute that many of them contributed much to that process. But my own conviction as someone who has been personally involved in the process is that the role played by Japan was clearly decisive.

Also, Japan has been promoting the ASEAN Regional Forum, which had its origin in a Japanese initiative to engage countries like China and North Korea into a common regional forum for dialogue. Japan has been playing a major role to promote the APEC process, as well, not just as a process for economic cooperation but also as a process for creating a community of nations in this Asia Pacific region sharing common interests. What is significant in all these cases is that Japan is trying to bring countries like China and North Korea into an arena where they could be made aware of their roles and responsibilities as important members of this regional community. I believe China is moving in that direction, slowly but nevertheless

steadily. The case of North Korea is still an open question.

The new initiative by Prime Minister Koizumi to start a direct dialogue with DPRK has been a laudable one in this respect, although I'm totally agnostic as to whether this initiative is going to grow into a successful process or not, since the process is not going to depend exclusively upon Japan. The significant point about this new initiative with North Korea is that it is different from similar past attempts of Japan. In the past similar Japanese initiatives for starting the negotiations for normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea have been tried, but they have been tried by politicians often with some ulterior motives, or without clear strategy. Many of them were acting with naiveté by going to North Korea with a one-sided request to DPRK to open a dialogue with Japan, thus putting themselves in the position of a *demandeur*. I don't think that's the way things would work with North Korea.

What is critical is to have a clear strategy for engaging North Korea and to seize the opportunity for bringing North Korea into this framework of strategy. It is crucial not to put yourself in the position of a *demandeur*, as it would result in a situation where the other side will manipulate the situation on their terms, and to have a strategy and wait for the opportunity to arise for putting that strategy into operation.

The opportunity has arisen this time, thanks paradoxically to the very firm position taken by the Bush administration vis-à-vis DPRK. The North Koreans may have come to feel that they also have an opportunity to put their strategy to the test, with Japan for economic assistance, and with the United States for political recognition and finally with South Korea for consolidation of their position on the peninsula for the survival of the regime. This is the critical phase. To put it bluntly, for the first time, the North Koreans are prepared to put themselves in the position of a *demandeur*.

While I'm not at all optimistic about the outcome of this process which is starting, I am comforted by the thought that so far as the initiative taken by Prime Minister Koizumi is concerned, it has been a good one.

Questioner: Over the last several years in Japanese society there's been a growing questioning of the role of the United States forces in Japan. For the impact, as you say, of the demise of the Cold War as well as some unfortunate incidents that have occurred in Japan. How do you see the development vis-à-vis Iraq as well as the new national security strategy announced by the administration affecting that consideration, that debate, internal in Japan? What do you see the role of the government being in affecting or influencing that societal discussion?

U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in the Post-Cold War Era

Owada: In general, I'm not too much concerned about the impact of those new developments that you describe upon the status of U.S. forces in Japan. Having said that, I think there are a couple of points about the U.S. forces stationing in Japan that one should be sufficiently sensitive to. First, the government of Japan has to engage in a much more vigorous effort to try to define and elucidate to the public the significance and the role of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in the post-Cold war era in a language that is more understandable to the general public.

At this moment, there is a misperception prevailing in Japan—presumably in this country also—that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is very much the product of the Cold War, designed to cope with the situation of confrontation with the Soviet Union and the Far East, just as NATO was created to cope with the Cold War confrontation in Europe in the post-WWII era. Thus if NATO has lost much of its original significance with the demise of the Cold War and is now in the process of changing its philosophy with more emphasis to

outside-the-area missions, by the same token, so the analogy goes, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty must have lost much of its mission.

It is important to recognize here that the background of the two institutions are quite different. Yes, chronologically the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was created at the initial period of the Cold War. I do not deny that this fact had its marks on the operation of this treaty. In a more basic sense, however, the treaty was primarily an answer to the dual requirement of the Allied Powers to create a Japan which was peace-loving and which was no longer a threat to the surrounding nations, while ensuring the security of the disarmed Japan against an armed attack from outside, wherever that might come from. In this respect, it was a very different kind of arrangement from NATO. The validity of this basic philosophy of the treaty still remains very much as valid.

An alternative to this arrangement for ensuring the security of Japan against an unspecified threat from outside, in the absence of an environment as it exists in Europe, where the European Union as a political community can internalize this problem as the problem of the community, would be for Japan to be equipped with her own defense capability that would be sufficient to defend herself against any attack, including even an attack by nuclear weapons.

I believe that there should be a much more serious debate to elucidate this essential nature of the problem, from the viewpoint of what would be the best alternative. If the government engages the people in this debate, they would better understand the essential virtue of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

Another important point to keep in mind in evaluating the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is that the presence of the United States in East Asia under the treaty is an essential stabilizing factor for the area in general. I think that point is much better understood now by the people in Japan, but there should be more elucidation

of this point as a reinforcing argument for the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

The third point is the one to which we all have to be more sensitive. It is that much more attention has to be paid to the issues relating to the implementation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, in particular in relation to the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan under the treaty. In this connection, it must be admitted that quite clearly there is a too high concentration of U.S. bases on Okinawa. This is not desirable. Not only is it militarily unnecessary after the demise of the Vietnam War, but politically dangerous, since Okinawa with its tragic history is a very sensitive area.

It's not just the excessive concentration of U.S. bases in Okinawa that makes the case of Okinawa so vulnerable. Okinawa and the Okinawans have had a very unhappy history of mistreatment by mainland Japanese. First it was virtually colonized by the Satsuma Clan of Kyushu in the Tokugawa period, then it was incorporated into Japan proper after the Meiji Restoration but treated as a second-class citizen for many years in Japan, as it were, somewhat like Puerto Rico in this country. Finally with the Second World War, it became the only battleground in Japan during the bloody battle of Okinawa. Throughout the occupation period after the war, Okinawa was administratively separated from the mainland Japan and treated, at least in the perception of the Okinawans, like a virtual colony of the United States and served for many years as "an unsinkable aircraft carrier" of the United States, to use the famous expression of a former prime minister.

The reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 finally should have wiped out all those legacies of the past, as the islands were restored as an integral part of Japan. Instead, the Okinawans feel that little has changed in this respect, as people on the mainland have been closing their eyes to the hardships that the Okinawans have been suffering, because a fully-fledged review of the whole situation of

Okinawa in relation to the U.S. bases would mean that the mainland would have to share part of the burden that the Okinawans have been bearing singlehandedly. In that eventuality, people on the mainland would have to accept some of the U.S. bases to be moved from Okinawa. They just don't want that. Therefore they have continued to keep the whole burden on Okinawa, continued to leave the situation as it had been since the occupation period. It is understandable that this situation should be resented by the Okinawans. It is not simply a U.S. problem. Indeed it is primarily a Japanese problem.

Questioner: I hesitate to ask my question, because it's rather amorphous. At the outset, speaking of the United States, you mentioned a reversion to norms of inward-looking isolationism, which is not necessarily incompatible with unilateral actions abroad, at least in the minds of the administration. Speaking of Japan, you talked about attitudes toward ODA as representing a kind of nationalist trend.

The question I have to ask is, in a very broad general way, do you see in Japan in the post-Cold War era increasing or decreasing interest in being internationalist? That goes beyond government actions, I'm speaking of a mood of a country.

Greater Inward-Lookingness in Japan

Owada: My answer is very simple. Quite clearly, the answer is yes. There is a much greater degree of inward-lookingness and a tendency away from an internationalist mode is visible. In fact, it was in order to avoid

sounding too pessimistic that I tried to qualify my conclusion by saying that one hope is that there is a new trend emerging in the younger generation. By this I do not necessarily mean the younger politicians.

As I stated, I hold much greater skepticism about the behavior of some of the younger politicians—though not all—than many foreign observers of Japan, including some American political scientists, who seem to see much bright hope in the articulate posture of many young Japanese politicians. To me, most of them are much more aggressive nationalists, but not necessarily internationalists. By contrast, when you go to universities and talk to young students, they are different. Many of them are idealistic and much more internationalist in outlook. They are much more serious about the issues like the future of Japan and the possible role that Japan should be playing as a member of the international community.

The general mood of the country as a whole, however, is that clearly exacerbated by the economic situation, the whole country is totally inward-looking, including, to my regret, the mass media which seems to be amplifying this trend. This is my major concern about Japan at present.

Ikenberry: On that note, I think we will end the formal part of the proceedings. If some of you would like to talk informally for a few minutes afterwards, that would be fine. But I would hope that you would join me in thanking Ambassador Owada for a very delightful and insightful seminar. Thank you very much. (End)

About the Panelists

Main Speaker **Ambassador Hisashi Owada** is President of the Japan Institute of International Affairs and is Professor of International Law and Organization at Waseda University. In October 2002 he was elected as a Judge of the International Court of Justice. He also is Senior Advisor to the President of the World Bank and Advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Ambassador Owada has lectured at Tokyo University for more than 25 years and is on the faculty of the New York University Law School. He has had a distinguished career in the Foreign Ministry. Among his many high-ranking posts were Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and, as Ambassador, he was Permanent Representative of Japan to the OECD and to the United Nations. Ambassador Owada graduated from the University of Tokyo and undertook post graduate studies at Cambridge University. He is the author of numerous books and articles on international legal, economic and political issues, including *Diplomacy* (1996) and *From Involvement to Engagement-New Foreign Policy Directions of Japan* (1994).

Moderator **Dr. G. John Ikenberry** is the Peter F. Krogh Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice at Georgetown University. In addition, he was a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. Professor Ikenberry is the author of numerous publications, including *State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy* (2002), *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (2000), and *Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government* (1988).