

“Anti-Americanism” in South Korea

by

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Katharine Moon: “Anti-Americanism” gets a lot of headlines in the press. Last February, you may have seen reports of young college students who had broken into and occupied the American Chamber of Commerce offices. They are part of a radical contingent but they are a small minority, but they do get the headlines and attention.

Specific Causes of “Anti-Americanism”

There are some specific causes of “anti-Americanism.” Some specific causes of discontent have been murders, both alleged and in some cases proven, and other forms of violence against Korean civilians, particularly women who work and live around the U.S. military base towns. Koreans call these women *kijich'on* women. They're women who work in the sex industry that caters to the U.S. military. It's been around for the last 50 years or so, and it's no big news to the people in Korea or to the U.S. military.

Other causes, in very recent years: allegations of environmental accidents by the U.S. military on Korean soil or into the Korean air; complaints about noise and property damage coming from U.S. bombing exercises; President Bush's “axis of evil” speech toward North Korea was a big hit in terms of galvanizing and intensifying popular and organized “anti-American” sentiments in February, 2002.

Most recently- two girls who were run over by an armored U.S. military vehicle in June. The deaths of these two girls in a U.S. military camp town have galvanized and excited a lot of emotion, a lot of activism and complaints against the U.S. military as being violent and predatory towards South Koreans, rather than there to protect South Koreans.

Some of these issues are new and very recent,

like environmental issues, a 1990's phenomenon, but allegations and other charges of murder, violence, and other abuses date back to the 1950's and 1960's. We have cases both alleged and proven way back to the 1960's and 1970's – so, some are old news and some are new news.

Three points I want to make in my talk. First, “anti-Americanism” in Korea, particularly around the issue of the presence of the U.S. bases is not a new phenomenon. Contrary to popular thinking, especially in Washington, it is not a new phenomenon. It has quite deep historical roots and in a lesser sense political roots.

The second point is that “anti-Americanism” must be understood in the context of Korea's democratization and globalization efforts of the 1990's. Many people like to use Korean nationalism as a way to explain these current outbreaks of “anti-American” protests and activism. There is nationalism, of course- Koreans have been very nationalistic but then nationalism as an explanation doesn't get us very far. I don't think nationalism is the right way to shed light on what's going on. I prefer to look at democratization and globalization as ways to explain that structurally things are changing in Korean society.

The third point is that “anti-Americanism” is not just Korean-made. It's part of a dynamic between internal forces and factors in Korea coupled with regional and international factors and forces, and on top of that, an interaction with U.S. actions and inactions. These three points will serve as guidelines for my talk.

“Anti-Americanism” Is Not a New Phenomenon

First, “anti-Americanism” is not new. When I mention “anti-Americanism,” even in uni-

iversity classrooms in South Korea, I've met students from China who were studying in Korea who asked "why is there 'anti-Americanism' in South Korea? South Korea is not supposed to be 'anti-American.' The U.S. and South Korea are supposed to be very close friends and allies."

If any of you have gone through some of the English language press in Korea, often Americans will write in the letters to the editor section, and often they will complain. These are civilians, sometimes retired military folks. And there's a sense of surprise, hurt and a little cluelessness as to how to explain this and why it is going on—these "anti-American" sentiments. As some note in these letters, why did South Koreans live with the U.S. military presence for about 50 years but all of sudden in the last few years decide this is a problem? In my view, it's not so hard to understand—many people in Korea have been complaining for a very long time. It's just that political, social, and economic conditions didn't allow them to be heard within their own nation and by the United States.

Daily Matters Upset Korean Citizens

From a perspective of the "common people," especially those living around the U.S. military bases, there has been pent-up frustration, embarrassment, humiliation, resentment, and anger against the U.S. troops. Very often they were not in the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's about big geo-political issues. Very often, in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, they were not about big geopolitical issues. Rather, they were about GI's not paying for taxi rides they'd taken; GI's beating up on Korean women they had slept with; not paying for sex when they hired a prostitute; GI's having fights in the local nightclubs and breaking things in the stores and buildings; petty crimes; and petty theft in terms of stealing a little of this and that from the local vendors.

These may seem like trivial issues to us and they seem like trivial issues to the elites in

Seoul and the middle class in Seoul. But if you go to these camptown areas and you hear the stories of the different generations and how they've interpreted them, they've piled up over the years. There's a sense of collective rage, a collective anger that has accumulated from individual incidents of slights as well as personal losses, if it's property or income.

There's also the fact that Koreans have felt quite a bit of racism from the presence of U.S. military soldiers, particularly in the early days—1950's, 1960's and 1970's. It is much less an issue now, but again, these kinds of slights, hurts, frustrations, resentments have built up enough over time so that they are galvanized and they can be ignited when particular issues explode.

Reactions of Koreans Not Simply Emotional

What I want to emphasize is that I don't think these things should be dismissed as simply emotional reactions by local Korean residents. This is a common response by Seoul elites as well as folks in Washington – "it's nationalism and emotionalism." Deaths of people are very emotional issues, bottom line- you can't get around it. For the families who've lost their children, they're highly emotional issues. For the small vendor who relies on income earned from petty commodities, having a few things stolen over a 10-15 year period is not a petty issue. It's an emotional, economic, and psychological issue.

We need to acknowledge that there is a foundation for these kinds of grievances that have accumulated over time. And perhaps more importantly as analysts to admit that they have not been addressed over time by academics, activists, and policymakers in South Korea and in the United States for most of this 50-year relationship.

Protests Began in the 1960s

We actually have documentation of local

camptown residents protesting against certain things that the U.S. military did or didn't do dating as early as the 1960's and 1970's. They held protests when they felt that they weren't able to voice their opinions or when there was some sense of injustice incurred by U.S. actions or inactions. There are accounts of numerous protests staged by Korean women who worked as prostitutes in the 1960's and 1970's.

If you look at some of the documentation, it would be safe to say they were probably one of the first groups to make "Yankee go home" signs and raise them in public. Almost every time, their anger was prompted by the lack of information and attention by U.S. troops and the Korean government regarding the death of a colleague or friend. It was their way to get out their anger but also to voice their thoughts. They would call for investigations, they would call for accountability, and most of the time, neither the Korean government nor the American government would hear them out. There are only a few cases where these things ever came to public notice.

In the 1980's, many of you know we actually witnessed radical "anti-Americanism" enacted by student demonstrators. It's important to keep in mind that they were ideologically oriented, left-influenced and much more dangerous and serious "anti-Americanists" than this current crop in the 1990's and early 2000's. They were also heavily nationalistic in their rhetoric and their protest behavior, but they were a very small minority, in contrast to a majority in the 1990's and early 2000's in South Korea who espoused some kind of sentiment or criticism that is negative regarding the United States.

Common Myth That U.S.-Korea Friendship Is Close

Not just common people, but also, Korean elites over the last 50 years were not easy to deal with for Washington. It is a common myth that the Korea-U.S. alliance, the Korea-U.S. friendship is a close one and that things

are basically rosy most of the time. There's evidence to the contrary that it has been a very contentious relationship. Even those who were authoritarian hardliners gave the United States a hard time; sometimes, they were driven by nationalistic sentiment-wanting a little more independence. Other times, they were playing politics with the U.S.

For the Washington community, it is important to keep in mind that if we take a longer historical and cultural-psychological-sociological perspective, "anti-Americanism" is not simply a byproduct or a product of the DJ administration (Kim Dae Jung). It is not simply a product or byproduct of the Sunshine Policy. It is not something that is going to go away very soon especially if Lee Hoi Chang, a more conservative candidate, becomes president of South Korea.

The assumption and the hope it seems—the wish—by many American policymakers is that with a change of administration in South Korea that is a bit more conservative than the DJ administration, things will change. Not only regarding the U.S.'s dealings with the North and the South's dealings with the North, but also U.S.-Korea relations on the ground in South Korea.

This is an erroneous line of thinking, and in the case of Mr. Lee, if he does become president, I think he's going to face a tougher challenge from activists and civil society than even the DJ administration has been facing. Simply because he's on the record as someone who is more conservative, possibly more friendly towards U.S. perspectives, and because he doesn't have a whole lot of sympathy in the activist and civil society community that galvanizes and mobilizes around these issues.

The Sunshine Policy might have added sunshine and a little water to "anti-American" sentiments, but the seeds, the sprouts were there long, long before. It's going to be difficult to simply stomp it out through a change of administration.

“Anti-Americanism” Understood Through Democratization and Globalization

My second point here is that the contemporary version of “anti-Americanism” needs to be understood in the context of Korea’s democratization and globalization. First of all in the 1990’s with the Kim Young Sam administration, there was an emphasis on redefining security to include human security. This was happening not only in Korea but also in the United States and pretty much all over the world. The security agendas after the Cold War began to change to include concerns for human welfare, human rights, environmental issues, gender sensitivity. All of these things became public policy matters that could be incorporated into security thinking and planning.

In South Korea, I would argue, that this kind of changed political environment lowered the cost for dissent and criticism. You didn’t have to fear being jailed, locked up, killed or repressed by the government post-1987, 1988, with South Korea’s democratic transition. You now could freely become a critic of the government and not a dissident. I think that’s important to keep in mind. When you talk to these activists, they have a very strong sense of themselves as civic organizations, *mingan danche*- they say that’s what they are.

Many of these guys and gals were people who were locked up under the Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan administrations. They had been jailed, beaten, or tortured, but today they say they are civil society members and civic organizations trying to do their part in promoting Korean democracy. Their identity has changed, and their methods have changed. Unlike the 1980’s when “anti-American” activists tended to take illegal measures to get their point across, the 1990’s and 2000’s activists actually are intent on abiding by Korean law, from the laws on demonstrating to pursuing legal channels of complaint, such as lawsuits.

The Korean judicial system is pretty fascinating because these activists are using it

to push the court system along. In a sense, they help develop legal culture and judicial processes by introducing issues that have never been raised before in the Korean courts or in Korean society, but they also use it as a way to legalize and legitimate their complaints. Not only are they out in the streets protesting, they’re also in the courts protesting. These are very different kinds of methods when you compare them to the radical activities of the 1980’s activists.

You also have mainstream civil society actors. Many of them are liberal and influenced by the activism of the 70’s and 80’s’s, but when you look at the political spectrum within the activist civil society, many are moderates. The Citizens Coalition for Economic Justice, *Kyongsillyon*, for example, is a well-established organization now. Also, there are environmental groups that have been taking the lead, as well as Lawyers for a Democratic Society or *Minbyun*- again legally channeling these kinds of issues and complaints. The leadership has changed, they are not radical students; they’re adults, they’re professionals, and they’re professional activists and NGO organizers.

“Anti-American” Movement Is a Coalition Movement

Second point is that this “anti-American” movement is a coalition movement. It has on any given day 100, 150, 50, depending on the issue, different groups, who, in the words of one activist I interviewed, hang their “store sign” together with one another. My point here is that because it is a coalition, the intensity of commitment to “an ‘anti-American’ issue or cause” and the ability to sustain prolonged action on a cause vary depending on the organization, its resources, interests, and other activities that they are engaging in.

For almost all of the coalition organizations, “anti-American” issues are not the only issues they’re dealing with. They have a whole slate of other issues- “anti-American” issues

happen to be one among many. So, it is not a monolithic movement and not a radical movement, when compared to the 1980's or the radicalism that we see in parts of the Middle East. It is a civic organization-led coalition movement with various degrees of commitment, intensity, complaints, goals, agendas, and methods.

All these things are important to keep in mind. Because when scholars study how democracies become mature and "consolidated" in our technical term, many of these characteristics and traits that these Korean coalition groups are exhibiting are actually considered positive and constructive for the deepening of civil society and democracy in any new democracy. Why?

For one, it allows these disparate groups who don't usually talk to one another—some of them used to hate one another—to come together to actually talk and discuss.

While they do that, they also compete for ideas and methods and generate room to moderate action, ideology and goals. This has been happening within this coalition movement. They also learn to trust one another a little bit more and give one another the benefit of doubt whereas South Korean activism from the 1970's, 1980's tended to be so antagonistic and confrontational even among the different activist groups.

These are all areas that scholars consider to be important as a way to encourage and foster democratic habits, the exchange of information, and the competition of ideas. It's also important for policymakers and other kinds of policy leaders to keep in mind that there's severe competition among the different activist groups. Even if a movement looks unified, organized on the outside when it's being performed out on the streets, in protest or in lawsuits, there has been and continues to be intense politics within the movement itself.

I'll give you two examples that are recent—the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)

revision movement and the return-of-land (*panhwan*) movement. The SOFA movement occurred in the late 1990's and very early 2000's. This was a coalition movement to give pressure to the South Korean government and tangentially to the U.S. government to revise the SOFA to be more favorable towards South Korea. This is the treaty that dictates the terms of the U.S. military presence and mutual governmental obligations regarding the U.S. military presence in South Korea.

Return of Land Movement

In Korea, it's called *panhwan* or return-of-land movement. American and Korean policymakers call the actual policy to consolidate U.S. bases and return some land to Korean citizens the Land Partnership Program (LPP). From the activists' perspective, both the SOFA and the *panhwan* movements were compromise movements, although policy elites in Seoul and Washington, D.C. considered the activists radical and nationalistic. But the activists fought themselves- they duked it out, maybe not literally, but mentally and verbally they really confronted one another: the small minority that is much more radical and nationalistic and ideologically anti-U.S. and the vast majority of the different coalition members that were more issue-oriented, grievance-oriented and seeking revisions and reforms.

War of Words

This second group won out in both of these movements. When I asked them how they got to compromise with one another, one activist leader explained, "We had *nonjaeng* (war of words) debates, where we tried to convince and persuade one another. We also knew that ultimately the South Korean public does not want the immediate or quick withdrawal of U.S. military forces, so we didn't want to raise an issue that is not going to go anywhere in the public arena.

That kind of an issue needs to be deliberated more seriously by the general public. What we

wanted to see is a movement for some kind of South Korean-U.S. government accountability regarding citizens' concerns." Leaders of the SOFA and *panhwan* movements admitted outright that these were moderated, compromise movements. This is news that generally is not known among the Seoul elites or in Washington.

It may not be all that important when you look at foreign policymaking from the perspective of state-to-state relations, but it is very important when you consider how the U.S. representatives in South Korea are to handle these issues, respond to these kinds of protests, demonstrations and complaints. And more importantly perhaps, how the South Korean government needs to respond, acknowledge and possibly incorporate some of these concerns into its own planning and eventual dealings with the United States.

“Anti-American” Movement Has International Ties

The last aspect to raise is globalization, in that the movement within South Korea is not simply generated by South Koreans for South Koreans. It is a movement that has regional, international ties and connections. It is a transnational movement. What do I mean by this? Specifically South Korean activists who have issues with the U.S. bases or troop behavior have met, worked with, learned from and taught activists in Okinawa, Vieques, Puerto Rico, Canada, Australia, Germany, the Philippines and the list keeps growing larger.

All of the citizens of these other countries don't have as big an issue, but Okinawa, South Korea and Vieques right now are three places in the world where you have had very active anti-base activism in the last several years. The Vieques case, as part of the United States, being much more radical in some ways and also having U.S. representatives, U.S. elected officials participating in these events as well – protests, demonstrations, and break-ins into the training ground in Vieques.

These people share information through the web, the fax machine and phone, and they visit one another because they invite one another to conferences. They teach each other methods of protest, creating lawsuits, and reforming laws. In a sense, this solidarity movement is very important because it gives these individual, nationally based movements a much larger audience and a larger sense of political and moral legitimacy. Even if their own compatriots don't listen to them very much, what they'll do is use the other channels outside to get their message across.

Americans are also involved in this as well. It's a short-sighted view of Washington or even Seoul to expect some of these issues to just simply go away with a change in administration. This is not something that only Koreans are responsible for or accountable for but something that is happening regionally and internationally. Not only bottom-up pressures but outside-in pressures that are building this “anti-American” coalition movement.

Also Americans Participate in “Anti-American” Movement

My last point here on which I will end is that “anti-Americanism” is not just a Korean-made phenomenon. It is a regional, international phenomenon but also something that Americans participate in or contribute to. Many Americans have been doing serious work investigating, generating publicity, and “doing” activism for the last 10-15 years around the presence of U.S. military bases all over Asia. It's anti-militarists, pacifists and others in America who've actually been the ones mobilizing some of the Korean groups from the late 1980's on by holding conferences and raising these issues to be debated, discussed and exchanged. It also includes American academics, journalists and others who put a lot of energy and passion into digging out the “truths” of the South Korean and U.S. governments' involvement in the Kwangju massacre of 1980.

The reality happened in South Korea, but the spread effect in terms of a spillover of interests happened also in the United States. And many Americans offered credence by finding documentation for some of these allegations and charges and helped publicize the issue.

A more recent example is the alleged massacre of Korean civilians in Nogun-ri, which became a huge issue in U.S.-Korea relations from the mid 1990's onward. Those who are responsible for bringing this issue to light were not Koreans- they were Americans. Many Koreans have since said, "Nogun-ri became our family secret, family history." Although they had tried to raise it as a public issues in Korea, no one was particularly attentive.

But it's through the Associated Press and other Western media, academics, and analysts who picked up the issue that these things spread and added more fuel to the fire in South Korea. "Anti-Americanism" is truly a transnational, international phenomenon that Americans also are partly responsible for. I think it's inconsistent to view Americans' activities in these matters as a matter of freedom of speech and association but expect the Korean government to clamp down on "anti-American" activists in South Korea. It's an inconsistent expectation.

U.S. Policy Elites Did Not Learn Lessons

Lastly, U.S. policy elites didn't learn their lessons from the 1970's and 1980's when we had serious "anti-Americanism" not only in Korea in the 1980's but in the Middle East and elsewhere. When I started studying these issues, I found that there's very little written on "anti-Americanism." What is written tends to be around the late 1970's into the mid- late 1980's. This reflects actual political realities of that period.

What's more interesting is that a few books came out and then the debate just died until very recently after September 11. My point here is that we as academics, policymakers,

and interested observers have very short attention spans in the United States. And we also tend to exacerbate a problem when it's right in front of our face and not view the seeds and the sprouts, seedlings and everything else that have been developing historically. In that sense, it is also our responsibility.

U.S. Should Not Tie Everything to North Korea

We did not account for these things and we didn't take "anti-Americanism" that seriously in the 1970's and 1980's, especially in Korea in the 1980's. Now, we're asking, why is it happening and how could this happen to us. Related to that point is a specific concern about what the U.S. military could do to alleviate and improve some of these situations of tension and conflict. Here I would suggest that it is not very useful to continue to tie everything that happens regarding the U.S. military bases and troops in Korea with the North Korean situation.

This is the tendency especially in Washington- I call it putting the North Korean cart before the South Korean horse—I think we need to look at the South Korean horse as the South Korean horse. What I mean in terms of "anti-Americanism" is rather than looking at the U.S. military troop presence as a big issue of geo-politics and the future of the U.S. presence in East Asia, post-unification or pre-, during or what have you, there are other ways to regard this situation that I think are much more constructive.

One possibility is to learn lessons from studies on civil military relations. Civil military relations, meaning the relationships that any military has with the civilian population—it can mean employment, relations with the local townspeople, etc. It can mean reorienting itself in line with the changing values of a given civilian society. In Korea, I think all these things should be considered when the U.S. military assesses some of these serious issues.

Civil Military Tensions

Civil military tensions-we know about from the history of the U.S. military within the United States. Civil military tensions, distrust, differing values, and limited communication have always been present here in the United States. The military and the civilian population have not always been in sync and usually are not in sync. There's quite a lot of literature to show this.

The question is what conditions exacerbate the tensions between civilians and military folks and do the military and civilian societies adapt to these conditions? This is a question that might be worth posing in South Korea. Even though the United States military is not a representative institution of South Korean society, it is one that has become institutionalized in that society because of its presence and central place in security matters for the last 50 years.

If you look at some of the documents historically on the U.S. military's presence in South Korea, what is interesting is just as in the case of the U.S. military in the United States, civil military relations simply change depending on the time. Depending on the political conditions, the social values, etc. of the society and of the military. This has been forgotten because of the emotional, heated nature of "anti-Americanism" expressed and received respectively by Koreans and Americans.

I want to focus on looking at the situation from a civil military perspective because it offers more constructive possibilities for actually trying to find ways to unknot these tensions. A gentleman named Mr. Burke who is a sociologist and a former editor of the U.S. journal, *Armed Forces and Society*, has written something very interesting, and he argues that the U.S. military, in order to remain a central organization within the American society, must fulfill two roles.

U.S. Military Has Not Paid Enough Attention to Korean Society

One, institutional legitimacy and two, moral legitimacy. The latter is something important to keep in mind in the context of South Korea relations. The United States military in South Korea has been losing moral legitimacy over the last 15, 20, 25 years. It is not just a matter of political change on the peninsula, but it is also a matter of not having maintained or paid enough attention to creating the connections with Korean civil society or Korean society in general.

When I recently interviewed the U.S. military back in the spring of this year, I engaged them on these kinds of issues and listened to their concerns and perspectives, and they're very concerned and want to improve the situation. I also found it striking that several individuals, both civilian officers and men in uniform, refer to activists as dissidents. It's important to keep in mind that there are very few dissidents in Korea these days because it is a democracy.

We do not in the United States call critics of the U.S. government dissidents, but in South Korea, there are folks within the military who are used to a certain kind of 1960's, 1970's, 1980's vision of authoritarian Korea where politics were much easier. You just basically called the Blue House or the Ministry of Defense and say we don't like this, try to do something about it and in many cases, not all, the top-down approach worked. To a great extent, many of the grievances and accumulated tensions and frustrations of local Korean residents around the U.S. military bases were kept down because of that top-down authoritarian system. They simply were not allowed to speak up.

U.S. Military Should Follow Path of Constructive Engagement With Korean Society

It is important for the U.S. military to work

more actively toward constructive engagement with North Korea, but I think a certain kind of constructive engagement with Korean civil society is also needed- rather than holding these activists at bay or ignoring them by calling them radicals and North Korean sympathizers and dissidents. That doesn't get us anywhere; it disables dialogue on both sides. It's important to acknowledge the democratic foundations even if we don't like it. Even if there are excesses to the imperfect democracy that Korea is, it's still important to acknowledge these are activists who are trying to create their own democratic traditions and practices. And they need to be engaged by their own government elites but also the U.S. military.

Most militaries are not in the habit of dealing with civilians on a day-to-day matter. We need to keep in mind that historically the U.S. military with its bases overseas has been doing this for the last 50 years. But, in Japan, Okinawa, South Korea and the Philippines—on a day-to-day level there are people who oversee community relations. The tendency in the U.S. military is to focus on community relations with Korean civilians who are already pro-Americans, mainly Korean veterans' groups. This is a generation that is not the rising generation, it is a generation that is passing away. The generation that is rising in voice and power are those who are part of the "anti-American" coalition group. The target is a little misplaced and a different kind of engagement with different kinds of Koreans needs to be addressed.

Victor Cha: I'm going to make four quick points with regard to anti-Americanism and South Korea. The first is that I would agree completely with Kathy that when we think about anti-Americanism in Korea it's changed in many ways. We normally think of it as being monolithic, ideological, radical, marriages between radical students and labor—this is the way we used to think of anti-Americanism.

Anti-Americanism More Institutionalized and Mainstream

When I think of anti-Americanism today, a very good example of this new anti-Americanism, I took a trip to Seoul and went with a colleague from CSIS. We went into this room, called the Bankers Room, and we got introduced to all these people from different NGOs. As each one went by, the person who was introducing us said that's an anti-American NGO. All these people were educated, professional, and many of them were professors as well. It's much more institutionalized and much more mainstream.

Anti-Americanism is critical of the United States but it's not necessarily anti-Americanism that wants the United States off the peninsula. The anti-Americanism that's critical of the United States rather than against the United States' presence in Korea, the question is where does that come from? Kathy has given a very rich, organic, empirically robust explanation of this.

Systemic Bias of South Korean Perception of the U.S.

I'm going to give you a very sterile, theoretical and anecdotal explanation of where I think this comes from. I think it comes from a very systematic bias of South Korean perceptions of the United States and the United States alliance. Let me try to illustrate this by anecdote. When Park Chung Hee went to Washington for a summit with Lyndon Johnson and they were trying to decide how to do this one photo op in the Rose Garden where the two would be walking dogs. What they decided initially to do was to give Park Chung Hee a poodle to walk and to give LBJ a great dane and the South Koreans didn't like that because they thought that makes the South Koreans so small. The handler said, we'll switch it—we'll give Park Chung Hee the great dane and we'll give Lyndon Johnson the small dog. The South Koreans didn't like that either because the dog would be taller than Park Chung Hee.

The point is that in many ways, the United States is damned if it does and damned if it doesn't. It's related to what some in social science refer to as the fundamental attribution error in that if the United States does something that seems to be "right" or supportive of South Koreans or supportive of the alliance, that's generally discounted in South Korea as either aberrant behavior or situational. The United States behaved that way because they had to, not because they wanted to. On the other hand, if the United States does something "bad," not in support of the alliance, then for the South Koreans that's the Americans, that's the way they really are, it's dispositional; it's not situational.

A good example of this was obviously Bush's "axis of evil" statement and all the statements about pre-emption. After those statements Bush goes to Seoul for a summit and he starts scaling back some of this stuff and says that United States does not have plans to attack North Korea. The South Korean response to that was they didn't consider that to be important. He had to say that because he was in Seoul or as one South Korean reporter said to me even if you were planning to pre-empt you would say you're not going to pre-empt, right?

It was situational. When Bush starts making other statements about how North Korea remains evil then everybody focuses on that as being the true American behavior. I would agree that it's not going to go away with the change of government. It's part of this systematic bias.

If you have what we all describe as this critical element, this criticism of America versus the anti-American aspect of it, I think we are in many ways at a very significant point. Because some of this criticism of the United States could become some of this, "U.S. get out," as a result of the North Korea issue. And here again I am going to be guilty of putting the North Korean horse before the South Korean cart. For a variety of reasons, the policy gap is very obviously emerging between

the United States and South Korea on how to deal with North Korea.

Both Sides Pay Price to Achieve Nonproliferation

In particular on the relative value and the weight that's placed on the proliferation issue and the price that both sides are willing to pay to achieve the nonproliferation objective vis-à-vis North Korea. The U.S. price they're willing to pay is non-dialogue and isolation if the North doesn't come clean on its facilities. For the South Koreans, the price is not the same. They're not willing to go to an extreme if it means crisis and confrontation. Some of you may have seen Tom Friedman's piece that talked about this while here we're in contortions over North Korea's enriched uranium program, it doesn't get a lot of play in South Korea, it's not a big issue in the presidential debate.

These sorts of gaps, and in particular down the road, potentially a crisis that might be perceived as unnecessarily provoked by the United States could be the galvanizing force that might change some of this criticalness of the United States into something more deep and more radical.

Don Oberdorfer: First, let me say that I very much appreciate Professor Moon's studies and her remarks on this. I think a greater focus of what is happening in South Korea is exactly what is needed, not to say certainly by me just having come back from Pyongyang that we should not have some focus on North Korea. There has been a general neglect in American policy circles and in American academics and even journalists of changing the situation in South Korea, which is fundamentally very important and which tends to get neglected because of all the focus on the obvious problems regarding North Korea. On her central point, that this is not new, that it grows out of Korean changes in South Korean society and body politic and all the rest—I quite agree.

My own experience for a moment. I was present at the creation in the sense that I was a second lieutenant and eventually a first lieutenant in Korean within days after the Korean War ended. I was there for eight months, in two different places, one near the DMZ and the other one we pulled back and we were much nearer a Korean small town. What they called fraternization was very much discouraged. They didn't want troops interacting with the Korean civilians except in certain ways.

The Korean population at that time was pathetically poor. The North Koreans had come down the country then back up the country, then back down half the country and there was horrible devastation in Korea. You could never have guessed back in 1953 that Korea would be what it is today. Our unit, an artillery battalion and later I was at division headquarters, collected funds for the Korean nearby villages. Our medical people went there and treated people in the villages free of charge, tried to help them because they needed it. The American troops understood that and that was in 1953. That's nearly half a century ago.

I was a correspondent in Tokyo and reporting on Korea in the early 1970's and I remember writing a piece for *The Washington Post* Outlook section which in those days took longer pieces from their correspondents than they do now. The headline was something like U.S. troops in Korea, babes, bombs and boredom. They had been there at that stage 20 years. What were they doing? Basically nothing much. They would have occasional maneuvers while waiting for something to happen, they were there as a tripwire. That's 30 years ago.

The same troops are there now, not the same people, but the same units and they've been there for 50 years with almost no military action for 50 years except maneuvers to keep themselves fit doing a job being a tripwire in effect. It isn't the easiest thing in the world. If these troops were there facing an enemy, the interaction with the Korean population would

be different—some would be worse, some would be better. I was a correspondent in Vietnam, too.

Difficulties Have Not Been Sufficiently Addressed

It's not surprising to me at all that there are difficulties that have not been sufficiently addressed between the U.S. troop presence and the Korean population. In my opinion, if not a new factor, a newly important factor with regard to particularly the views of the younger generation of Koreans regarding North Korea and regarding the United States.

I was in Korea at the end of July for a week and on July 31st my wife and I witnessed a protest rally near Seoul City Hall attended by hundreds of Koreans. The *Dong-a Ilbo*, the next day estimated that around 2,000 people had participated in the rally. And it also said that they were surrounded by 4,000 riot police which shows you the extent to which even the government of Kim Dae Jung doesn't want any trouble to get out of hand with regard to protest rallies. This was due to the death of the two schoolgirls, which Professor Moon spoke of. And I'm sure there are going to be more in the coming days because one of the two American soldiers was just acquitted by court marshal.

Many Koreans View Acquittal of U.S. Soldier as Unjust

Korean NGOs and a lot of Koreans will think that this was not a just verdict. This was the 49th day after their death and according to Buddhist tradition, on the 49th day what is done, services, and so forth have a great effect on the person's after-life. There was a Buddhist priest chanting in Korean and English calling for U.S. troops to get out. There were signs in Korean which I could not read, of course, but some signs in English saying U.S. troops go home. How many of those people actually would like to see the U.S. troops go home quickly, I have no way of

judging. Although that rally was much smaller than some of the rallies I saw in the mid-1980's when Koreans were fighting for democracy in rallies which came from earlier times, it is one of the larger rallies that has been seen in Seoul in recent months.

Future Korean Leaders Believe U.S. Benefits More From Bilateral Relationship

How wide and how deep is the generational change or gap in Korea? A survey that was supervised by Bill Watts of Potomac Associates recently sampled the views of 51 next-generation leaders in Korea. These are people ages 30-49 who had demonstrated some promise of future achievement to positions of leadership. The oldest of them was born at the end of the Korean War and the youngest in the early 1970's. Although the United States narrowly ranked first just ahead of China among major powers in positive expressions of countries they like as opposed to negative personal feelings, a decisive majority said the United States rather than Korea was the principle beneficiary of the bilateral relationship.

One of the people I talked to in Seoul in late July put it this way, "we used to say Americans are here for us and them. Now we think they are here for them only"—meaning only for American usage. When asked to pinpoint the biggest problem to relations with the United States, the respondents included arrogance, unilateralism, pax Americana, hegemonism, excessive economic pressure, cultural insensitivity, flunkeyism and Korean dependency, and the impact of the U.S. presence.

Such issues might seem to be minor irritants, but they're certainly not in today's Korea. The case of the two girls having been killed was started as a flashpoint situation. The Korean Ministry of Justice, this is the Korean government, asked that these men be tried by Korean courts rather than by U.S. court marshals. This is not a dissident, this is a statement by the Korean government and the U.S. said no,

they will be court marshaled under U.S. law. One of them was just acquitted, although I gather from what I read there was some evidence that there was some dereliction of duty involved, but I am not going to try the case here.

Thoughts of Next Generation on U.S.-Korea Relations

In order to find out more about what the next generation is thinking, I did a very minimal survey. I got Ewha Women's University to produce a class of students, actually freshmen, without telling them why I wanted to talk with them and the same of Korea University that produced some graduate students who had just graduated recently. The Ewha students were all in their 20's or younger. I asked both of these groups to rate U.S. relations with Korea on a scale of 1-10.

The Ewha students' ratings ranged from 2 to 7 with the average being 4.5 slightly below the halfway point. The more sophisticated and slightly older Korea University students rated U.S. relations from 6-8 on the 10-point scale. An experienced and well-informed official in Seoul said he would rate it about 6. The positive factors cited by both groups included history. That is to say a vague idea about the Korean War and U.S. assistance to the post-war Korean economy, the close relationship of the two governments. The negatives including nearly all those cited in the Watts survey plus the more recent incidents of the Korean speed skater, the "axis of evil" and especially the death of the schoolgirls. These things were felt emotionally and they came out rather strongly.

Younger People Not Really Worried About North Korea

The most surprising thing to me and the thing that I think has the greatest implications for the future was the lack among these younger people of any expression of threat from North Korea. Even though my talks took place just a month after the shoot-out between North

and South Korean naval forces in the Western Sea, among the younger Ewha students a slightly greater number considered North Korea more of a friend than an enemy, than said the opposite.

The Korea University group was more articulate but not much more concerned about a Northern threat. "North Korea is a heavy burden rather than a threat or enemy," one student said. A worker from a non-governmental organization, a recent Korea University graduate who was part of the group, characterized North Korea as a "distant cousin, you know he's family, but in a big family gathering you avoid him. We may have the same nationality, the same race, but they should go their own way."

In other words, they're saying North Korea is basically a nuisance. They're not worried really about it as a threat. Well, that has tremendous implications when you talk about the U.S. military presence. The only reason for the U.S. military presence is to protect South Korea against North Korea. If you don't think that's very important, that means that the U.S. military presence is quite expendable. And you'll easily feel that you could quite without any problem say go home or if you know that the general public of South Korea is not going to support that, you could take any position that is more acceptable to the public but really feel like you don't need these people. Now that to me is a substantial change.

In the 1980's I was in touch with small groups of very radical students. I met one group that was on the lam from the cops. I did it because I knew some of the student protesters of the 1970's and they arranged for me to talk to the media although I was a *verboden* North American reporter. They were, as Professor Moon said, much more radical, ideological and they idealized North Korea.

Not Much Idealization of North Korea in the South

I don't think there's much idealization of

North Korea today in South Korea, people know better. They have a new element in the sense that the younger population has no sense of threat. Part of it comes from Kim Dae Jung's summit meeting, but I think it's more than that, it's the fact that it's 50 years now, and except for a few shootouts in the Western Sea and occasionally one in the DMZ, it's all containable.

I don't think it's going to change a lot if Lee Hoi Chung or whoever, Chung Mong Joon or Roh Moo Hyun is elected, that attitude is not going to change a lot. I enjoyed your presentation and I learned a lot from it and thank you for making it.

Q & A

John Ikenberry: Now, we're going to open it up and if you would signal your interest in making a comment or asking a question and give us your name and address, then we'll have our panelists respond.

Questioner: I have to feel at least a bit of paternal pride both because John was a recent fellow and now the Wilson Center along with the Elliott School has Kathy for the year. As I was listening to you, Kathy, and trying to figure out why I was enjoying your remarks so much, it occurred to me what I wasn't hearing that I might have heard some years ago and the fact that you chose not to emphasize these things just suggests the richness and the sophistication of your analysis.

Let me just remind people what you might have said 10 years ago that you really didn't talk about today. Kwangju and I think you mentioned it once but that doesn't seem to be a central issue anymore. Friends we all have in Seoul have explained anti-Americanism to all of us as the result of propaganda from the North, of the work of North Korean agents in the South. We may not believe it, but nonetheless at one point that aspect might have been highlighted, but you, of course, didn't mention it. You chose with good reason I think, not to

emphasize this American administration's North Korea policy as a fundamental explanation for anti-Americanism and that also I think was refreshing.

You might have, but chose not to as well talk more generally about the tone coming out of Washington these days. And maybe not just for this administration but certainly this administration as well, which is create an anxiety not simply in Seoul but in Europe and elsewhere around the world. Again something you didn't focus on and that was part of what made your presentation interesting.

All of this is a long preface to a question about another thing that you didn't mention that I would like to get your reaction to. Elsewhere in Asia, one gets a sense that part of the uneasiness about at least the American military presence there has an element of racism to it, specifically a uneasiness about African-American U.S. soldiers. I would be interested in whether or not in your judgment this is also a factor in feelings, if not anti-Americanism at least helps explains some of the uneasiness created by the American military presence there, Korean uneasiness because of the sizable contingent of African-American soldiers.

Race Is Not an Issue

Moon: Regarding the race issue, I don't think so at all. I don't think that "anti-American" sentiments in Korea have anything to do with Koreans' attitudes or thoughts about African-Americans. The soldiers who become the focal points for Korean grievances, especially in the more brutal or egregious crime situations like murder or rape, they tend to be white guys. So if we had a string of African-Americans who tended to become the criminals, alleged or convicted, that might be, or have been a factor, but to my knowledge no Korean activists or anyone else have ever mentioned that as an issue.

Actually racism and race are important, but

it's mostly Koreans feeling that Americans are racist toward Koreans. This I hear all the time and sometimes you feel it, it's present. It's the stereotypical American superiority complex that not only comes from issues about race but also about power. You can't separate these issues—so the race issue tends to be the other way around.

Korea Public Opinion a Potential Wildcard of Alliance

In response to Victor's second point, I agree with him very much that these *pimi* or critical views of the United States and Korea's relationship with the U.S. can turn into something more radical and eventually become a problem in the alliance. A recent CSIS report calls Korean public opinion the wildcard in the future of the U.S.-Korea alliance. I do think that it's possible that it could become a wildcard that is much more radicalized, and by radical I don't mean a left-right politics but just more virulent and aggressive, which could undermine the alliance.

One main goal of my book project is to convince people who are in positions of power in Seoul and Washington that if you begin to look at these groups not as a monolith but the way I describe them, and you figure out whom you can engage and possibly work with—share information, perspectives and have some of their concerns be reflected in government policy and responses—it will be much more useful and constructive than ignoring or pushing them into one corner.

The South Korean government, especially the Foreign Ministry, and others like environment and justice, are engaging in this process. I recently spoke with people in the Foreign Ministry who manage relations with the United who basically said they realize especially after the deaths of these two girls that they need to learn more about the civic groups. "We need to know what their differences are. We need to know what their genuine grievances are versus the rhetoric we see and hear.

We need to know who they are and also try to persuade them of our situation.”

SOFA Defines U.S.-Korea Relationship

For example, regarding the Status of Forces Agreement, this is something that Korean activists have been complaining about for years. Now, it's become the boogie man, it's become the holy grail, it's become everything to define the U.S.-Korea relationship. It's sometimes misplaced anger and misplaced policy concern, but nevertheless they focus on this. The Foreign Ministry folks said they realize they need to explain the SOFA better to their public. “We simply need to get information out there about what it is, how it works, and how it doesn't work and under what circumstances certain things can happen according to the SOFA and not.”

The Status of Forces Agreement is a long, heavy document, and it's complicated. I read it many times and still scratch my head every time I read it. And you have to keep going back and forth through the articles and pages. And more importantly, the Foreign Ministry folks said sometimes Americans and they do not know how things will work until something happens. “We need to figure it out as a government, as a bureaucracy, as the Americans do and then we need to also let the Korean public know that the SOFA isn't something that's written to give a scenario pre-planned for every situation.” They want to increase information. And they also realize that groups like Lawyers for a Democratic Society, *Minbyun*- if you explain to them the legal grounds of the U.S. case for maintaining jurisdiction over the two army sergeants whose vehicle killed the two girls, the Foreign Ministry officials said they get it, the lawyers get it.

You need to figure out whom you can engage with and the same thing for the U.S. military, U.S. embassy- and you also need to know who serves as a brick wall so that no matter how much time you spend, it's not going to work. In order to avoid the kind of situation or sce-

nario that you're referring to, a “constructive” engagement on the ground is very necessary.

South Korean Activists Do Not Trust Their Own Leaders

South Korean activists don't trust their own political leaders, and that's another big problem. If they don't trust the Americans, they probably trust their own leaders less; there's a real lack of confidence. And this I fear more for Korea's democracy—less security—this lack of trust among elites and regular people. That's partly what feeds this “anti-Americanism.” When something happens policy-wise, people just don't want to believe that their government did all they could.

Questioner: I'm a Georgetown student, and Dr. Ikenberry is my professor. I would like to comment on the previous mention about racism. I spent two years in the United States army as a Korean soldier so I know about what the American soldiers think about Korea. During the time I thought American troops, American soldiers' racism is provoking the Korean anti-Americanism I think.

For example, if the U.S. military goes to Germany they have mandatory class about German culture. But if you go to Korea, the newcomers to Korea don't need to go to the cultural classes. They ignore the Korean culture or ignore what the Korean people are thinking. I faced so many difficulties with the American soldiers about the racism and them ignoring Korean culture.

For example, every Friday the first sergeant came to the formation, he dispensed condoms to those military soldiers. He mentioned like a discriminatory comment on Koreans and I was very shocked and I complained sometimes.

My second question is do you ask the U.S. Army initial response to the two girl's death case. Did this come up to the formation? They didn't say anything. They don't need to take care of that responsibility for the deaths

of the girls. That kind of initial response is provoking Korean fierce response to the anti-American sentiment.

Questioner: I'm with the Korean Economic Institute and a former diplomat and a lot of my colleagues are still active in the state department and in the Embassy in Seoul. I was surprised at Bob Hathaway's list because I thought at the top of it would have been the presence of Yongsan in downtown Seoul and that didn't come up either. The people that I talk to that know a lot more about U.S.-Korean relations than I do seem to put that very high on the list of aggravations, irritants, symbols and all the rest of that. I wanted your views on that specific issue.

Questioner: I've done a little research on the subject too and looking at it in large part from the point of view of American policy. One of the things that I was interested in, and wondered if you've looked at all, is you were talking about the surprise particularly here in Washington about the Korean anti-Americanism. And the surprise of people also in Korea that the long history of our joint efforts in the war and other things haven't built stronger bonds.

What I've found in my own work is that it seems to me those strong bonds really never existed on the American side either. The degree of American public interest in Korea, the history of the relationship is very weak and very shallow and therefore the kind of anti-Americanism that's developing now is a serious threat to the relationship for the U.S. side also. The pre-occupation with this administration with North Korea, in some respects, is delaying what I think is a very fundamental re-evaluation of the U.S.-South Korean relationship which could lead to the end of the alliance.

Certainly once reunification happens, I have some serious questions about the degree to which the American people are going to want to keep forces on the peninsula because

it's very expensive and why bother. I'm curious to know to what degree you've seen any of these questions being asked on the Korean side.

Moon: The gentleman back there—your comments about your time in the U.S. military is very important, and as a female, I don't have that access, but I appreciate your views. When I was in Korea, people said to me that I should do another book or a tangential book on just the KATUSA, the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army. These are usually elite Korean guys who get placed in the U.S. military for their training. You have to speak very good English, etc. That's another big source of anti-Americanism because they feel humiliated. Many of the Korean guys who are attached to the U.S. military feel humiliated on a daily basis on many levels—race issues and other things.

I had one activist who said to me, for example, if the U.S. would be willing to have a USATKA rather than a KATUSA. And I said what on earth is a USATKA? And he said, why won't the U.S. consider a U.S. Augmentation to the Korean Army? He pressed the point: If the whole point is to make the two sides understand each other, work together, train together, and soldier together, why must the Koreans be attached to the U.S. Army?

These kinds of questions and anecdotes were enlightening in many ways. Specifically, to some of the points you made, these are the areas where I say it's U.S. inactions and actions that have fueled some of this sentiment for many years. The issuing of condoms- I know what the U.S. military commanders say, and I know what the books say about health education, but I also hear from so many men in uniform that what really happens- as one navy man said to me in an interview many years ago- that "our medic basically threw out condoms as if they were Hallmark cards" with no training at all about health issues, gender sensitivity issues. Now the U.S. military is under fire for participating in, "allegedly or not," international trafficking of women.

Many of these things are coming home to roost, and they could have been dealt with much earlier.

In terms of training, this is one area where again a mid-level organizational emphasis can alleviate some of these problems—for the short-term, medium-term, and long-term—the U.S. military needs to train the troops in language, culture, etc., when they arrive in Korea or before. Also, gender sensitivity training—because this is such a hot political issue. We do this in other places. We’ve done it within our own military for our own women and men in uniform throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s. These are possible ways to address situations, and we haven’t been doing them.

Yongsan Flares Up at Different Times

About Yongsan—it is a big issue, but what is interesting is that Yongsan flares up at different points. Right now it’s not a hot political issue. The *panhwan* or the return of land movement basically began in response to the early 1990’s plans for the U.S. military to move the headquarters to *Osan* or *P’yongtaek*. The *panhwan* movement occurred because local *P’yongtaek* citizens realized why should we get the bases? Why should we get the headquarters? Why is Seoul basically dumping—Seoul—not the U.S.—the headquarters on us? This is what one of the leaders of the *P’yongtaek panhwan* movement conveyed.

I look at the Yongsan issue as an issue between Seoul and the regions. If you look at the anti-American issue from a Korean, national, domestic perspective, it’s internally generated because politics, or as you call it, the body politic, and the political system are changing. This activist, Kim Yonghan, told me he took a train to Seoul for three months in the initial days of his crusade not to have the headquarters transferred. Why did he do this? On his own money and time, he went because he wanted to convince the more nationalistic *Chon’guk Yonhap* activists (who wanted the

bases out) to convince them that this is a bias against the regions and the countryside.

In his words, “if you do this, you Seoulites, you’re committing a human rights violation to us locals, to us country folks.’ This became, he called it, a war of words, and he went for several months to convince them. The intent of the more radical nationalists was to use Yongsan as a way to kick out the U.S. troops, period. Because they knew the U.S. bases are not easily going to be moved somewhere else.

This *P’yongtaek* activist basically was there to defend his territory but also to call the nationalists on their game— that they’re basically “dissing” the countryside. “You’re basically ignoring us; take our interests and needs seriously.” This movement has declined partly because the U.S. military and the Korean government did take action, out of their own interest, to consolidate and reduce some of the base areas that the U.S. military uses. That’s the Land Partnership Program, which in the spring of this year became official. That’s why I don’t focus on Yongsan so much.

Under-Koreanization in America

I’ve been asked by some Korean groups, *pimi* groups, to write on my research for their publications, and one of them asked, “we know you study ‘anti-Americanism,’ but don’t you think the real problem is over-Americanization of Korea?” I didn’t want to go in that direction because I don’t want to add more fuel to the “anti-American” fire. So, I focused on slightly different twist— there is overexposure of America to Koreans, but there’s also underexposure, which you can call under-Koreanization, in America. That’s part of this problem.

We basically don’t teach about Korea—historically, culturally, language. I’m at Wellesley College, one of the most wealthy liberal arts colleges in the world, and it’s not a matter of money but of will and priorities. The college has been very resistant to developing a Korean

language program even though student demand has been there for 10 to 15 years or so. We in the U.S. don't educate, so the images of Korea that Americans grow up with have stayed relatively stagnant. Maybe the World Cup is one more image that now got latched onto the Korean War, poverty, MASH, the Olympics, the riot police of the 1980's, the Asian financial crisis.

The World Cup is the only positive image that your average American might have, and maybe a Hyundai car. That's a serious gap that leads to perceptions by Koreans that Americans don't know them. I have heard Korean elites also complain that sometimes their American counterparts and other elites don't get their country. There's a loss of trust or a sense of lack of mutual respect for one another that they sense.

On that level, it's not very constructive, but SOFA is a household word for Koreans, not because they sit on it, but because it's the Status of Forces Agreement. I would bet 99.99% of the American public does not know SOFA at all for any country. It's our own ignorance that sometimes breeds our own insensitivity to Koreans and others' oversensitivity to some of these issues. I think more studies on this kind of interaction is necessary.

Questioner: I'm from the U.S. Institute of Peace. Somebody during the Vietnam era, towards the end of it when things were going bad, said how can we screw this war up so badly? We've had 12 years' experience over here. Someone corrected him and said no we don't, we've got one year experience, 12 times. That same sort of situation exists in Korea, the one and two-year tour syndromes, exacerbates the lack of preparation and therefore the lack of understanding of many of the uniformed people that serve there. I'm Exhibit A, I found myself in 1988 woefully unprepared for what I was faced with. The first thing I was faced with was Yongsan relocation and I drafted the Memorandum of Agreement that is so contentious now.

Sense of Ownership on Both Sides

More broadly the former Foreign Minister Han Sung Joo in the immediate aftermath of the June 2000 summit made the observation in the atmosphere of a spike in anti-Americanism in South Korea that familiarity breeds contempt. I have a slightly different take on that and that is in the Korean context familiarity has bred a sense of ownership on both sides. There are more than a few Americans who have a sense of ownership that they've bought into, they're part owner of the Republic of Korea—we helped create it, we protect it to this day, etc.

I submit that apropos of your comments about the younger generation, I sense a sense of ownership on the part of many Koreans who have never known a situation where they were not protected by the United States and who have adopted the view that Korea is so important to the U.S. That we would never leave no matter what the conduct of South Koreans or the atmosphere in which U.S. forces in Korea serve. That feeds into a double standard where the United States is held to a standard that is quite separate and distinct. We should be in certain cases, we are guests there, and we should always be on our good behavior.

The notion that there is this crime wave that the USFK is nothing more than a collection of criminals preying on South Koreans has been exacerbated, for instance, by the press who publish statistics about the numbers of crimes this year versus last year, without saying that 95% of those crimes are traffic tickets. So you think there's this lawless band that has been loosed on the innocent citizens of South Korea. Prostitution comes to mind. This issue has more to do with the status of women in Korean society than it does necessarily the camptowns outside U.S. bases. It's in the context of a very large and thriving sex industry that is entirely Korean and has nothing to do with the USFK. We've got a real challenge on our hands and you've touched on one of the major issues and that is the fundamental

lack of Republic of Korea government's over time meeting their responsibilities to their own citizens.

My observation is that Korean officials spend a great deal of energy reassuring their American counterparts that everything is fine in the relationship and almost no time explaining and rationalizing the basis and the benefits and the costs of the relationship to their own people.

Moon: I agree with many of your observations; I think an overly simple response would be that it's exactly as you say it's happening. Americans hear the Korean elites reassure them, and then they expect the Korean elites to keep things down and manageable. But the Korean elites don't know how to manage the situation yet, probably because they're not reading some of the internal politics that well. But they're beginning to and they're intent on trying to manage the public in a constructive way, and hopefully that will gain more momentum.

Negative Aspects of Democratic Consolidation

In my larger work I emphasize that "anti-Americanism" is about America, but a lot of it is about what's going on in Korea. I only mentioned here some of the positive aspects of democratic consolidation or deepening efforts, but there are also negative aspects. This is not just in Korea- but the literature at large points out, for example, that the media in societies that are undergoing the process of democratic deepening and maturation tends to work this way – sort of a maverick style and reporting without much investigative work and fact-checking and all that. Asian media tend to be like this. The Korean press cover Korean issues—not only those related to the U.S.—in a similar manner- so you hear Koreans complaining about the media.

I've recently gotten the word from Korean NGO's working in the U.S. camptown areas

that advocate for women who work in the sex industry there, that they got so misquoted by the press. They didn't even want to have an interview but somehow the media cooked something up and put them in such a terrible position. They do this even if their politics are similar- they do this to one another. That is part of a larger problem that is not easy to solve, and I think one way to go about it is to come up with constructive programs within Korea and with international media to help exchange information and train, whether it's Korean media, Taiwanese media, what have you, to do the kind of fact-checking and non-bias kind of work.

On the other side, I've heard this from my friends in the media that basically the editors tell them this is what the papers sell. When you sell it, people keep buying it. It's a competitive thing among the papers—if one guy does it the other guy has to do it to get the papers sold. It's a complicated process, but it's something that needs to be focused on.

Cha: Three quick points and the first is on Yongsan and the military footprint and anti-Americanism as related to that. I think one of the distinctions there is that there is still that group anytime there's negative externality as a result of the footprint that talks about "U.S. go home."

Grievances About Compensation

From what I understand the majority of the people who have grievances are grievances not about pushing the U.S. out but about compensation. That was what you saw in a number of cases in the past where from a U.S. perspective they were going in there. And while the pictures were one of Korean people saying "United States leave," the actual issues were ones in which it was more about compensation for the people who were negatively affected.

With regard to a number of points that were made, one of the unintended consequences of this ground swell of anti-Americanism in

Korea is also not a ground swell, an uptake in anti-Koreanism among people who look at Korea in the United States in the sense that there are a lot of things that they focus on with regard to the Korean media, with regard to certain imperfect aspects of Korean democracy. In many ways it's a reaction to this anti-Americanism that we're seeing.

You put those two things together and there could be a crisis tomorrow and there's no constituency on either side to deal with it, particularly on the U.S. side where these Korea experts are the only people that have a chance of leading public opinion on the issue. One very well-sided example of this on the American side was the subway incident where you had this one American GI that was detained by a group of Korean NGOs that were going to an anti-American protest. When the police finally intervened, they intervened and they questioned the American GI but they did not question the 30 NGO people that took this guy basically and forced him to go in a particular place. Usually in an open and free society you're not allowed to do that.

From this anti-Korean perspective, there are a lot of people who focus on that particular aspect. There's certainly a lot of things that the United States may do wrong and the USFK may do wrong, but the Korean media plays a big part also in some of the systematic biases that I talked about in my opening comments. This sort of information and the public portrayal of the United States, there's a big issue there and there's a lot to talk about which we don't have time for right now.

Oberdorfer: The things that were raised were very interesting and I learned from them. I wrote a report in early August about the condition of the U.S. ROK alliance under the headline "Alliance Under Stress." Unfortunately, it was written basically for the Korean Economic Institute as a result of a conference here. But it could not be published because a Korean governmental agency rejected it that finances the Korean Economic Institute,

because it said, well they didn't say that was the reason, the reason was one line said that many in the Bush administration are expecting and hoping that Lee Hoi Chang will be elected president and will ease some of these concerns.

It is up on the Korean Economic Institute website and as a link to the Korea Society, which is publishing it in its next quarterly issue, so you can get the full story of what I think about the problems of the alliance. I think the Korean-U.S. alliance has some serious problems. I don't think they're easily going to get better. I think there are some underlying things at work, many of which have been discussed tonight and I think it's a serious issue that very much needs tending.

Moon: It's a thought in response to some of the comments of the questioner. When you mentioned that the Korean government needs to help explain things better to the society about the positives, negatives, and all this regarding the relationship with the U.S. I very much agree with you, but I don't think the Korean government is that "enabled," to use the word we like to use in the United States. This is not a system anymore where the Blue House can come up with a white paper or pink paper or green paper and have their ministries and bureaucracies tow the line.

Blue House and Ministries Lack Close Relationship

I expressly asked, when I was at the Foreign Ministry in October, did the Blue House send any message out about what their thoughts are on the jurisdiction issue over the two girls who died in the two U.S. soldiers' case. I've talked with these folks in the Foreign Ministry for quite some time—they said no; they said they don't have that kind of relationship anymore. It started with Kim Young Sam administration, but especially in the Kim Dae Jung administration, central edicts don't come down, and basically the bureaucracies are left to do their work on a standard operating pro-

cedure basis. Only when something really seems to need some kind of special negotiating power or weight, then perhaps the Blue House might make a special inquiry.

American elites might read that as “well, the Korean government should have done something more.” But if we look at it simply from the perspective of developing institutional politics, the bureaucracy should be left to do what they’re supposed to do. The bureaucracies did indeed meet—the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of National Defense, the Foreign Ministry, etc. to pow-wow among themselves about the jurisdiction issue. They had intra-organizational and inter-ministry debates and competition of ideas and views amongst themselves. The outcome was the Ministry of Justice’s call to demand jurisdiction over the case.

The larger problem in Korea regarding these and many other issues is that the changes on the peninsula are holding the development of democratic debates on these things hostage—because of the crises that have been occurring, the sense of exigency around the nuclear issue and different expectations and frustrations,

setbacks, etc. The Korean public is so frustrated because they’re not able to truly hear debates about these different scenarios for the future, for reunification or whatever you want to call it, or for the maintenance of U.S. troops in whatever form.

Mutually Generated Ignorance

It’s a mutually generated ignorance on the part of Korean society, the Korean government, Americans and the U.S. government that serves as a nice little incubator for these kinds of sentiments. Many of the activists are very frustrated because they feel they don’t have access to information and procedures from the South Korean government. This is an area where the U.S. side and the activist side might be in agreement. These are areas that need to be worked out, but they’re very difficult to work out in any short time period because of the hostage situation that these issues are held under, pending some kind of major change with North Korea. That’s another reason why these things will be around for awhile, and a lot of patience and a lot of careful work will be needed on everybody’s part. (End)

About the Panelists

Main Speaker **Dr. Katharine H.S. Moon** is the Jane Bishop '51 Associate Professor in Political Science at Wellesley College and is an Asian Policy Studies Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center. She has worked as a consultant for the Department of State, Office of International Women's Issues, and works with non-governmental organizations that advocate women's rights and welfare around U.S. military bases in Asia. Professor Moon has been awarded research grants from the Social Science Research Council and the American Association of University Women and serves on the editorial boards of the *International Feminist Journal of Politics* and *The International Studies Review*. She received her Ph.D. from Princeton University and her A.B. from Smith College. Professor Moon is the author of *Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations* (1997).

Discussants **Dr. Victor Cha** is Associate Professor of Government and D.S. Song-Korea Foundation Chair at Georgetown University. He is a former John H. Olin National Security Fellow at Harvard University, two-time Fulbright Scholar, and Hoover National Fellow at Stanford. Professor Cha serves as an independent consultant to the U.S. Department of Defense, and has testified before Congress on Asian security issues. He holds a Ph.D. from Columbia University and an M.A./B.A. from Oxford University. Professor Cha is the award-winning author of *Alignment Despite Antagonisms: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (1999). His articles on international relations and East Asia have appeared in *International Security*, *Foreign Affairs*, and *Journal of East Asian Studies*, among others. Professor Cha is working on a new book manuscript on strategic culture and military modernization in Asia, as well as a co-authored book on North Korea.

Mr. Don Oberdorfer is Journalist-in-Residence and Adjunct Professor in International Relations at the School of Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University. He retired in 1993 after working as a diplomatic correspondent for 17 years at *The Washington Post*. Prior to becoming a diplomatic correspondent, he served as *The Post's* White House correspondent and Northeast Asia correspondent, and reported for *The Charlotte Observer*. Professor Oberdorfer also covered the Vietnam War as a correspondent. He has won many awards for journalistic excellence, including the National Press Club's Edwin M. Hood Award for diplomatic correspondence and Georgetown University's Edward Weintal prize for diplomatic reporting. Professor Oberdorfer earned a B.A. from Princeton University. Professor Oberdorfer has written *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (1997), *The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era* (1991), and *Tet!* (1971).

Moderator **Dr. G. John Ikenberry** is the Peter F. Krogh Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice at Georgetown University. In addition, he was a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. Dr. Ikenberry is the author of numerous publications, including, *State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy* (2002), *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (2001), and *Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government* (1988).