

# Asian Populism and the U.S. Security Presence in Asia

by  
Professor Kent E. Calder

**Kent Calder:** Thank you very much, John. I've been hearing about the series you have here, and I think it's a very thoughtful and important sort of series. I know that you've been raising a series of sort of crucial, I wouldn't say timeless, subjects. I know that's something that has always been a concern of yours, really, to go to fundamentals and to the progress of ideas and the concepts that transcend the details with which Washington is often obsessed. And in that spirit, to some extent, even though this is the second talk I've given since I formally got out of the government, I'll try to abstract myself from the details of U.S.-Japan relations to move to a subject which I'm pursuing from a research point of view back at Princeton: namely, well, the formal title of course is East Asian Populism in U.S. Forward Deployment.

My concern is somewhat broader in my actual research project. It has to do with the comparative politics in the various key nations where the U.S. has forward-deployed bases, and the comparative politics in those various countries. I look at the response to the U.S. presence, why it tends to take the form that it does take, and how it varies. It varies tremendously across nationalities, and I look at what that means in the longer run for the U.S. role in the world, and for the national security of the key nations involved. I've been interested in this subject for some time. Looking around the room, I see a number of people who helped to inspire it including one who did a thesis, who won our thesis prize at Princeton many years ago—not that many years, but time has been passing—on a comparative study of U.S. bases in different parts of Japan and the local politics of those bases and how those varied from place to place. That was one of the things that first interested me in this subject and of course in Tokyo, partly in the course of work that I did with the embassy, particularly

working especially closely with Ambassador Foley, making 15 trips to Okinawa.

My concerns were longer term. There's a first-rate political section in Tokyo, which has primary responsibility for the operational side together with U.S. forces in Japan. The commanders in Tokyo have primary responsibility for those things, but in the course of four and a half years in Tokyo, in various capacities, I of course did get some sense of those issues.

Back at Princeton now, I'm actually coordinating a task force on U.S.-Korea relations toward the new century. Once again, a parallel set of issues arises. Just musing a bit on the way over, this is essentially the intersection of two questions. There's the question of domestic politics in host nations that have a complex range of reactions to the U.S. presence, and then of the strategic requirements and the policy concerns that the United States has that causes it—some aspects of which are embedded in history as well either for reasons of historical accident or strategy, or usually some important combination of the two—to have forward-deployed presences.

Maybe to preface this discussion I should say just a few words about the broader, geostrategic situation in East Asia. My examination of the bases, actually, the politics of the bases, is comparative politics across various places that the U.S. has had bases over the last twenty years. But I think, to put an edge on it and perhaps to suggest some of the implications for the future, it's worthwhile to look at the East Asian strategic environment in particular detail.

## End of the Cold War

We've had a lot of talk, of course, about the waning of the Cold War, and the notion that it would lead to a revised geostrategic equation

worldwide. There were, of course, momentous geopolitical changes in Europe at the end of the 80's: the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of Socialist governments in a chain across Eastern Europe in 1990 and 1991, then the collapse of the Soviet Union itself at the end of 1991. Then there were Soviet troop withdrawals, and a financial crisis, of course, where the Soviet Union, as it was collapsing, and then Russia, intensified this tendency towards downsizing its presence worldwide.

Now, the initial U.S. response, outside of East Asia was some significant retrenchment on the part of the United States as well, covered partly by the Gulf War. The United States had around, 250,000 troops in Germany at the time of the collapse of the Berlin Wall. There were major redeployments, particularly easy, of course, because the armored divisions were the heart of that, which was exactly what we needed against Saddam Hussein. And so U.S. forces were redeployed on a massive scale to the Gulf from Germany in 1989, and then a large number of them came back to the United States after the Gulf War. So, U.S. forces fell from nearly 250,000 in the late eighties to roughly 85,000 by '92 or so and then there has been some decline since then.

There have been, and I'll go into this in more detail when I talk more about what are the dynamics, the political dynamics that I think are at work in East Asia. There have been some significant scalebacks of U.S. forces outside East Asia previously, and cases that are rather interesting. They have related to political transition and to populism and strongly competitive populist politics. In Greece, for example, in 1967, '68, in the last years of the 1960s, there was a major reduction. Papandreu pulled out of most of the operational side of NATO, echoing the French. However, this was also in response to NATO, to the presence of Turkey in NATO, and to the political situation that he happened to face in Greece at the time. In Turkey, there were some scalebacks. In Spain, after Franco died, in the post-Franco transition, there was some scale-

back of U.S. forces. Torrejon air base, a major strategic base, was closed, for example. So here and there, and then of course in the Philippines, in East Asia itself, in this same wave of post-Cold War cutbacks led to some major cutbacks. For strategic reasons—I wouldn't link it to politics in Germany in '89 or in '90, '91, at the end of the Cold War in Europe—the U.S. also pulled out after the expiration of the base agreement in 1990 from the Philippines, as you know.

### **Japanese Presence in East Asia**

Now, that takes me to the East Asian situation where it seems to me that the restructuring, some of the political pressures that are at work domestically, present one sort of wave of pressures. But they run into a new economic and technological logic, which pushes in a rather sort of different direction. It raises new dilemmas, particularly for Japan, that I think have not been fully explored. The dilemmas relate to this whole question of the future of U.S. deployment there in the longer run, and also to the foreign policy course that Japan might ultimately be taking.

There are three basic aspects of the economic changes in the last 15 years in East Asia that have significant security implications, it seems to me. The first of these is Japan's transition from exporter to investor in Asia. In 1984, it (Japan) had about \$20 billion U.S. dollars, book value of investment in the rest of Asia. That soared following the Plaza Accords, the doubling in the value of the Yen between 1984 and 1987, '85 and '87, and then ultimately, rose to something like \$100 billion U.S. dollars by the eve of the financial crisis of 1997.

There was some retrenchment after that, but there has also been a movement, a re-expansion of Japanese investment outward in Asia, once again, after the crisis has gradually begun to wane. It has shifted to some extent, and that in itself is interesting. However, the Japanese economic stakes in direct investment, that is to say bricks and mortar involvement in the

regulatory systems, concern for the local political stability of nations in the region on the part of the business world, I would argue, is fundamentally different from what it was in the middle 1980s. It is just a new reality of the region, economically speaking. And of course, Japan contributed substantially. It did, I think, before the financial crisis, and greatly added to its prosperity and basically to its long-term economic prosperity and technological advance, perhaps to a lesser degree. But it's a major economic change in the nature of how Japan relates to Asia, I would argue.

Secondly, and this development compounds the dilemma for Japan, has been the steady rise of China, technologically, militarily, and economically.

The third point is the volatile, vulnerable growth of Southeast Asia. This was the linchpin of course of Japanese economic involvement in Asia up until the financial crisis of 1997. In some sense, Indonesia and the complex of nations around Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, is where the largest shares of Japanese investment were concentrated and where Japan had very intense diplomatic actions. Also many of them have centered on ASEAN, as the linchpin, in a sense, of potential balance to this rising power of China in other parts of the region, and certainly it could act as an offsetting element in the overall political economy or geopolitics of East Asia.

But then the Asian financial crisis hit, of course, and badly hurt Indonesia. And the transition, of course, has been very difficult in Indonesia. With the new Megawati government we may see more stability, but it's been a somewhat clouded situation, as many of you know far better than I do. Meanwhile, China has continued to grow more steadily. There are certainly clouds on the Chinese horizon too, such as the state-owned enterprises, and the blind stream of migrants from the countryside to the cities of China. To say that China is presumptively stable, given the history of the Cultural Revolution, given the fits and

stops of Chinese development across the 20th century, I think, is being optimistic. So to say that we have a growth of China on the one side and endemic instability and inability to cohere, politically, in Southeast Asia is probably an exaggeration.

And yet overall, taking the three points together, it's certainly true that Japan's presence has become much greater in Asia and its stakes in Asia have become much greater. This has happened in a world where China is becoming more powerful and in a Southeast Asia whose prospects have been somewhat more fragile.

### **Stabilizing Presence of the U.S.**

Now, I suppose one could conclude from that, that a stabilizer in Asia—just taking the facts that I presented—should be in the Japanese interests and that it would be, not only in Japan's interest, but it would be considerably more important than it was in the early 1980s. I think in that sense, probably the geopolitical situation of Japan in Asia is, I wouldn't say precarious, but more problematic—I'm groping for the right word. In any case, the issue of stability for Asia, and the issue of a regime of some kind that will promote, not just prosperity but stability for the region, is quite important.

Of course, all of this is made by the system that we fortuitously had for so many years, namely the stabilizing presence of the United States. On the basis of what I said you can probably infer what I think, given the economic changes of the past 15 years. In some ways the stabilizing role of the United States has become—and not only because the U.S. has become stronger globally than was the case before the collapse of the Soviet Union, but also in terms of the region, the need for a U.S. presence of some kind—more important.

This leads me to the story that I really want to focus on, namely democracy and populism, and the grassroots, the people of the countries

of the region. The people of Japan and their relationship to this security framework I think in some ways, has become more important than it was previously.

Well, the history, the proposition that I developed in some of my work is that, broadly speaking, if you look at what has happened, the local politics makes a big difference in terms of the configuration of the U.S. presence. It also makes a big difference in terms of the ability of the United States to sustain a presence on the ground, in the nations where it has had forces deployed. In a sense that's a truism, but we do have a whole body of literature, of course, that stresses that this sort of multifaceted power of the United States—the ability of the United States to do more or less whatever it wants, the dependencia literature about local governments in Latin American and elsewhere—creates clients of the United States who basically do what the U.S. wants. Their policies, their security policies, their policies towards bases and so on are simply an outcome of what the United States wants.

I don't think the evidence bears that out, but there's a lot of very interesting nuance. The broad proposition that I'm beginning to come to from some of my work so far, comparatively, is that political competition...well, it's being too simplistic to say it's democracy, because in some of the countries which have rather stable presences, for example Japan, you have had a clear case of democracy over time. However, it's been largely one-party democracy or one-party dominance in a rather stable sort of form where the grassroots has also had an element of elite dominance.

The general proposition, I think, is that political competition leads to pressure, generally speaking, against U.S. bases across a whole range of countries. I think this tends to be true. There are important nuances in this, but this was true in Greece; it was true in Turkey, off and on with the nuances, the politics there; and it's been rather true in Italy. It was true in the Philippines, beginning with the transition

from Marcos to Cory Aquino. Democratic politics in 1990, of course, put strong pressures on and was a major factor in the inability of the Philippines to come together in a coherent position to sign an agreement with the U.S. and the bases and what to do about them. So, I guess that's the most important proposition that I would like to present. When you get competitive party politics, particularly the alternation of government and opposition in power, this tends to put considerable pressure on existing status of forces agreements, sometimes even on lease agreements, and the willingness of countries to continue with a U.S. presence. Although, normally, it leads to some kind of redefinition.

### **The Nature of the U.S. Presence in Asia**

I think next I should look to the nature of the U.S. presence in Northeast Asia, since that's our focus. The U.S. does have some very important capabilities in Northeast Asia. Before the recent Middle East deployments, Northeast Asia represented the largest body of permanently deployed, stably deployed U.S. forces anywhere in the world. The only carrier home ported outside the United States is located in Northeast Asia, in Japan, at Yokosuka. It's together, of course, with a whole complex, a carrier battle group of 18 to 20 ships together, which becomes extremely important for us as we've just seen the Kitty Hawk deployed out of Yokosuka, in the last few days to the Gulf, or probably to the Arabian Sea.

Northeast Asia also has the largest U.S. airbase outside the continental United States in Kadena, the Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa, for example. It has one of the three Marine expeditionary forces that are deployed globally, a key element of the U.S. rapid deployment forces in the so-called swing strategy between the Gulf and Korea. Of course, it's been reformulated since, but it certainly is the case that, in terms of the Marine Corps rapid deployment forces, a very substantial portion of those forces are located in Okinawa.

Of course in Korea as well, mainly U.S. Army capabilities are quite important. So they're both considerable and they're also largely unchanged. They've been downsized far less than U.S. forces in almost any part of the world except the Middle East, where of course there are special circumstances over the decade since the end of the Cold War.

### **Implications of the Korean Situation**

Now there is something very important that has to be pointed out. In Northeast Asia, of course, the Cold War didn't end the way it did, at least certainly not until the last year or two, in the same form that it did in Western Europe. The Soviet Union collapses, and you have Belarus, you have the Ukraine, you have a whole series of new nations. The Communist buffer states collapse, and the whole map of European Russia and the geostrategic map of Europe is rewritten which, of course, is part of the reason why there was that rapid downsizing and disarmament, militarily, across the region. In Northeast Asia, you still have nearly two million men under arms, very heavily deployed, of course, along the DMZ. And that deployment, over the last five years, has become more forward-deployed rather than less.

All of that said, of course, I think we have to add to that the developments of the last year and a half. The implications of the North-South summit of last year have, to my mind, been qualified by some major developments, such as the failure in many ways of the North to reciprocate, and the ambivalence of the administration toward major geopolitical change on the continent. I think major geopolitical change on the continent would operate against the underlying interest of Japan and the United States, probably. In a way, it's not surprising that there should be some less positive approach to this by an American administration, although whether there aren't important opportunities that have been lost is another question.

Then, finally, I think there is also the reluc-

tance of Japan to embrace and encourage fundamental change in the region. Once again, I'm not saying that's not in Japan's interest. There is a dynamic process of change on the continent with Korea, two parts of which are coming closer together, Russia and China. Of course, as we saw in the developments of the year 2000, Japan was left somewhat static and certainly not moving as rapidly. Also, given certain structural features of the Japanese system it would have been difficult to move, in any case, rapidly, even though Japan's interests, as I was saying earlier, are deeply engaged.

So there's been different forces that I think have qualified the North-South summit and Kim's initiatives, but in at least three ways I think these are going to be enduring. That takes me then, finally, to this question of deployment as it relates to Northeast Asia. Better relations between Russia and Korea, I think, are probably deeply in the interest of both Koreas. They have had some momentum. President Kim has, of course, been constrained in how far he can go with this, but I think he has pursued those better relations between China and Korea; a reduced Korean sense of threat. Others may be better able to speak to this, but a transformed Korean sense of the future of the peninsula and the future of the region, which may make the Koreans less inhibited. That the Koreans have never been terribly inhibited about expressing themselves is also, I guess, fair to say, but Korea has some inhibitions, a sense of some relaxation of the fear of major frontal attacks across the DMZ and so on.

I think, and again, I'd be very interested—I know there are a number of people here who have a lot of experience in Korea—but just as a hypothesis, I would suggest that probably going forward will make them more tough-minded, more skeptical, sometimes more confrontational in dealing with issues that for a long time they have not dealt with, and have been more deferential with respect to. We've already seen this in the revision of the SOFA

(Status of Forces Agreement), for example, in Korea, just in the last year, which I think is a response to some of these pressures.

So now, certainly with the North-South talks and with the sort of beginning of détente that we've seen beginning in June of 1970, they have perhaps encouraged some greater skepticism, some greater free thinking, or flexibility of thinking with respect to the future. But from now on the dynamic will be very much related to domestic politics, and it could well be that the international politics of the region, namely the relaxation of North-South tensions to the extent that proceeds, could be interactive with the domestic political scene. And on the domestic political scene, I would say that what's really crucial is the degree of political competition domestically that one gets in the key systems in question.

### **Rising Populist Sentiment**

Now we've seen, of course, the rise of democracy in South Korea. We saw the rise of democracy in Taiwan. We've seen rising populist sentiment, I think very clearly, in Japan. The fact that Hashimoto, who was expected to have been elected as LDP president this last spring, lost so badly in the primaries to Koizumi, the strength in the Tokyo gubernatorial election of Tokyo Governor Ishihara, the way that Tanaka Makiko, the foreign minister, has been received, and the criticism of the ministry of finance by the Japanese media and by the public in 1998, 1999 and 2000. I think all of these are a suggestion that, in Japan as well, there is a major populist sentiment that's been rising. There is criticism of the traditional combination of the ruling party and the bureaucrats. And to the extent that there's political competition—and I know we have people who are directly involved in that process here—it seems to me that may well also lead to more different ideas, critical ideas, and perhaps more pressure for a revision of certain aspects of the forward-deployed security framework that we have in Japan as well.

Within Japan, it's interesting that the area where political competition is most pronounced, one of the prefectures where it is the most pronounced, Okinawa, is also the one where you get a lot of the most vigorous debate and criticism with respect to the bases. Also, in some of the other prefectures, Kanagawa, for example, around Atsugi, with much stronger NGOs and political dissent, you have a stronger pattern of protests than you do, for example, around Iwakuni, or Misawa, both of which are on the mainland of Japan and in a different situation.

Now on Japan, to say that there are not populist pressures and to say that transformation in Japanese domestic politics, such as the coming of two-party politics, if we were to get that, which I don't think is far-fetched, is going to create new sorts of pressures. I think the evidence of other countries would suggest that.

Now at the same time, as I've said, I think for Japan economically, for the stability of the region, this forward-deployed presence in some form is crucially important. So there's a definite political challenge that I think is looming for the governments of the region of Korea, of Japan, and of the United States. As to how to deal with this, it's going to have to involve, perhaps, some rethinking about what aspects are most vital and which aspects are less vital. It does, I think, provide a cautionary note about grand experiments, grand bargains — moving things from one place to another.

If you look at the so-called SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) process, for example, after the tragic 1995 rape, of reconfiguring or increasing the dialogue between Okinawa and the Japanese national government and the United States with respect to some base issues, I think that it's important to note that most aspects of that were very successful. I think SACO has been much more successful than is generally understood, with the exception of one subset of cases, namely the attempts to shift facilities from one

location to another, which is politically a much more difficult sort of proposition.

So in this world of rising democratic pressures, more populism, and a greater role for the media, grand experiments are probably not going to be so easy to achieve as relatively simple and, in a sense, conservative innovations of various kinds take place. I can get into, perhaps, some of that later if people are interested. I do speak diffidently, because there have been so many people who have, I think, done extraordinary work in dealing with these issues and having worked with them myself. I'm well aware of the complexity. It's one thing to just talk off the top of your head and it's another to actually deal with the questions. But to say that is not say that there is not a process of change coming, because I do think that in some important respects there will be new pressures.

### **Misperceived Situation in Okinawa**

I should say one very last thing with respect to Okinawa. I think the situation in Okinawa, in some respects, is misperceived. No doubt the sentiments of the people of Okinawa, and those are very sincere in various dimensions, but there are some aspects that are not well-expressed. Certainly there are aspects of the underlying interests of the people of Okinawa that exist on the ground, and those have been transformed by the terrible economic pressures of the last three or four years: the Asian financial crisis, the collapse of the Asian economies, the depression that the Okinawan economy has been through. The relative importance in that context, for better or worse, economically speaking, is the leases that exist. Their value, of course, has not gone down like the price of Okinawan real estate, for example, which is perhaps 30 percent or more. It depends on the place you're looking at, but it's gone down very substantially in the last three to four years.

So the overall equation, the economic, the political economy, the sentiment is one thing

and the overall political equation and what one might predict as outcomes flowing from that, I think, are something else. And I think there's a real need for realism. There's a need for sensitivity, on the one hand, to the dilemmas and the problems that exist, but also for realism in terms of what solutions are feasible there.

Well, this subject, as I say, is one that bears a lot of discussion. It's gotten a lot, and there are a lot of people here who I look forward to hearing from. First and foremost, of course, I think are two of the best commentators that we could possibly have.

So, in conclusion, I would just say I think the United States should prepare, on the historical evidence from other parts of the world, for some greater pressures against the existing patterns of forward deployment that exist, based on the significant possibility of political transition. It needs more public diplomacy and consultation. I think there are some valuable innovations that have been recently made, but public diplomacy is going to be quite crucial. A rationale for the presence of the facility to exist, things like the SACO process, that provide for grassroots dialogue and strategies that are relatively simple and take account of the fragmentation and the transition in the political process itself are crucial.

So with that I look forward to hearing from our other commentators, thank you.

**John Ikenberry:** Thank you Professor Calder, I guess we'll just turn it over to our discussants now, in turn.

**Yoichi Kato:** I think the point that Dr. Calder raised, the rise of populism and its impact on the forward-deployment of United States forces in Asia, is a very important point. It will come to the political agenda in Japan and the United States, sooner or later. My take is, I agree. The major rise of populism, which will have an impact on the maintenance of alliance for deployment, is there and I think it's rising, but it doesn't necessarily translate

into the political agenda in Japan. There is a disconnect between the rising populism and the actual policy of the government of Japan. It is because of the nature and makeup of the political parties in Japan right now, and as a result, I think the alliance is under enormous risk. This may actually hurt and weaken the base of the alliance, because there is more risk than it really can take.

### **LDP Attitude toward the U.S.**

First of all, there is the disconnect. The Liberal Democratic Party, LDP, has a wide spectrum of political ideas, from liberal to conservative and from pro-American to even anti-American. And, except for liberal, anti-American, I think LDP has them all. Liberal, pro-American, conservative pro-American, conservative anti-American, I think LDP has those three parts, each one of them. But, of course, the center of gravity now rests in pro-American nature and Prime Minister Koizumi represents that nature very well. And, as you know, LDP is dominant, in a sense, in the political arena in Japan right now, and the opposition, the Democratic Party of Japan has a very contradictory nature by consisting of the former socialist party element and also a former LDP element. And so, you have the former socialist element being liberal anti-American, if I put it very simply, and former liberal LDP part, being pro-American and conservative.

So they have a very contradictory structure, the party, and that's why they cannot function very well as an effective opposition to LDP. That kind of contradictory nature is well displayed in ongoing discussions in the Diet right now regarding the new legislation to enable LDP, I mean Japanese forces to be dispatched to the combat situation. And this kind of shortcoming of the political structure of Japan cannot be changed unless LDP changes. LDP would need to transform itself to the extent that it has more of an anti-American element. It cannot be changed toward the direction where it could represent the rise of populism in the sense of applying pressure on the United

States to reduce their presence. So either LDP changes itself or a total realignment of the political parties takes place. I don't think either of these situations could happen very soon and so I think this situation of disconnect will continue, at least for the moment.

### **Populist Reaction to U.S. Troops**

As I said, however, there is a rise of populism, which demands, or hopes for, the reduction of the forward-deployment of the United States military in Japan. I think there are basically three reasons. The first and foremost, is the lack of plausible rationale for sustenance of the alliance in the current framework. The explanation or the rationale for the alliance by the government of Japan has been, basically, threat-based. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was named as a potential threat, and the defense-wide paper carried a full-page map, I remember very well, for a long time, which described deployment of the Soviet military into Northeast Asia.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, and eventually its military threat, both Japan and the United States embarked on what they called the redefinition of the alliance, as you know, or "reaffirmation," if I take the official line. And the result was the Japan-U.S. declaration of 1996, and it introduced a new rationale for the alliance, and that is, in short, to maintain the peace and security in the Asia Pacific.

Both governments revised the guidelines for the defense cooperation to substantiate this kind of change by enhancing the role of coping with contingencies that occur outside the areas surrounding Japan. The official explanation is that it's not geographically specific, but it was not secret that it was actually still threat-based, and this time the potential threat was North Korea, and probably still is. A launch by North Korea in 1998 didn't have such a threat perception among the Japanese people, but with tension in the peninsula receding, the sense of urgency is fading

among the public. And this time, with the terrorist attack in New York and Washington, DC, a new threat has emerged in the form of transnational terrorism for which the existing arrangement is of little use.

The ongoing legislation in the Diet to facilitate a new legal framework to deal with this kind of threat is concrete proof for such incapability of the existing alliance. So I would argue that the relevance of the alliance, in terms of maintaining security for Japan, is being questioned seriously. And I would say the redefinition effort in 1996 or the initiative, as it was called, is already irrelevant or obsolete.

Despite these repeated and drastic changes in the security landscape, the full structure deployment of U.S. forces in Japan has changed relatively little. And U.S. forces have been a major presence near Yokosuka and Sasabo, and as you know, Air Force and Marines in Okinawa. People in Japan feel such U.S. presence and the burden of host-nation support, if not the physical footprints, as they feel in Okinawa, and especially with the current economic downturn, the role of government has shifted in Japan from redistribution of wealth to distribution of burden. I think it is only natural that people started asking whether we are getting a fair deal through the current existing arrangement with the United States or just being taken advantage of. And so both governments, I think, need to address these questions by presenting a new rationale for the alliance, maybe less threat-based and more flexible. I don't know exactly what it should be.

### **Japanese Military Role**

And the second reason why you see the rise of populism, is the lack of confidence in political leadership to entrust the use of force, and eventually the very existence of the nation. Ever since Japan started its reconstruction of the security policy after the defeat in World War II, Japan has been going on a slow but steady path of deregulation of the use of force.

Starting from a total renouncement of use of force right after the war, to Japan taking responsibility for self-defense as the Korean War broke in 1951, and then lifting a long self-imposed restriction on dispatching its troops abroad after the Gulf War in 1991 with the condition that they're being put under the U.N. command.

And there is the significance of the recent decision by Prime Minister Koizumi, namely the seven-point plan to dispatch troops against force to support military campaigns abroad which are not under U.N. command. This is another step of deregulation in a sense. And of course in 1991, April 1991, Japan dispatched minesweepers to the Gulf area to sweep the mines after the Gulf War was over. However, I don't think this counts, at least in the eyes of Americans, because it was like picking up the trash after the party was over.

But this time, Japan is saying, "Okay, we'll come to the party while it is still on, and maybe bring a bottle of wine. However, we won't dance with you guys, because it's a long family tradition." And I think this reflects a sort of ambivalence or an incapability of the Japanese people to decide what to do with the use of force, whether we can trust the use of force to the political leadership. According to a recent public poll by *Asahi Shimbun*, which I work for, 42 percent of the people supported this new type of mission while 46 did not. Public opinion is evenly split.

And so I think it shows that people are not yet sure whether Japan should take on a military role in solving international conflicts. And then there is the challenge that the Japanese political leadership has. If I put it in a simple way, war makes a nation strong and also the political leadership. And the challenge for the Japanese political leadership is that they have to get ready for the use of force without really practicing it. And so I think the political leadership of Japan has a daunting task: to prepare themselves for deregulation on the use of force.

## Apology Fatigue

And lastly, I'll just go quickly, I think the third element which makes for the rise of populism is a lack of sense of pride as a nation, or, I would say, apology fatigue. You know, Japan has been apologizing, Japan has been demanded to apologize for the atrocities during World War II, but it comes to the point where the majority, or at least a great number of people in Japan, come to think that we can never apologize enough to the point that we can really satisfy China or Korea. And I think the textbook issue recently shows the frustration of this sort. This sort of apology fatigue will give rise to xenophobic nationalism sentiment. I think the visit by Prime Minister Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine is partly a reflection of this kind of sentiment, and this has, in short, spilled over to the alliance with the United States.

And so, in conclusion, I would say the state of alliance between Japan and the United States is stable, but the base is gradually eroding. And one single rape, maybe tomorrow, would not destroy the base of the alliance, but it would certainly drive the alliance closer to the point where it could really collapse. I think the alliance is, as I said, too important to run this kind of risk, so I think that both governments should really think seriously about what they can do in order to fix the problem before it really breaks.

**Benjamin Self:** Thank you very much. It's a real honor for me to be here. I've enjoyed this series and the various speakers and I very much enjoyed Dr. Calder's remarks. I didn't know what he was going to be saying. I didn't have an advanced transcript. I just had the title, and based on that title I sort of developed some thoughts that veered a little bit off from what he actually ended up saying, but I think it's worth going off in that direction just for a couple of seconds.

Asian populism and the U.S. security presence in Asia as a title struck me initially, because of

this term "populism." Populism, at least to a Washington audience, reads as pandering to irresponsible public opinion. We are the Washington think tank specialists and government people who know better than the mass public, who often have wrong ideas, particularly about security policy. And populism represents some kind of a threat to our expertise.

## Populism not a Serious Threat

The term "U.S. security presence" also struck me, because it's a more benign concept than forward military deployed troops. Somehow from this title alone, I had the sense that opposition to the current U.S. forward deployment structure is kind of a bad thing and that those bases are basically a good thing. I happen to agree with that position, but I was struck by how the title of this talk sort of created a bias in that direction, or an implication in that direction. It's my belief that the bases are a good thing. They're good for the United States, and they're good for those countries that are hosting them. But I don't think, necessarily, that populism is as great a threat as has been described.

One reason I don't think so is in agreement with Kato San, that the public opinion isn't necessarily reflected in policy. It's true in Japan very much, it's true in the United States, and it's true in Korea. As Professor Calder said, there's a lot of variation from place to place, country to country, and time to time. I can't figure out Korea. I don't know very much about what the domestic factors are, and it seems very, very volatile to me. Over time, watching the Korean peninsula, the factionalism, the political dynamics within South Korea, it's just very hard to predict, based on my little knowledge, what might come.

## Elite Opinion Shift

So I'll try and focus on Japan for a little bit, where I think we're seeing much more stability and we're seeing an interesting trend. While we have more populism, we're seeing

increased unity of elite opinion and I think it's interesting that Kato San talked about the anti-U.S. liberals. But we're really seeing that even those anti-U.S. liberals are supporting the alliance and they're supporting an alliance structure with a slightly lower burden, and slightly fewer incidents. They want what they call a higher quality of U.S. troop presence, which means, I guess, those who are married and aren't going to commit crimes.

But they've shifted from saying, "End the alliance and disband the SDF and get the Americans out," to "Let's tinker with this a little bit to make it less burdensome." So you're seeing an elite opinion shift. You see it even in the *Asahi* editorials that are much more supportive of this. So one aspect of that, my sanguine position about rising populism, is once you have the entire Japanese elite supporting the alliance and basically in agreement that forward deployment of U.S. troops is a good idea for Japan, I don't see the public going so far against that as to overwhelm it.

I also think of those two trends that Professor Calder mentioned and I think he's right. One is the political competition, and the other is the political economic force. As he analyzed it, Japan is increasing exposure to independence on Asia, and increasing internationalization of Japan in the region as a driver for requiring stability. I almost take a more realist paradigm. Looking at Japan's concern about relative gains from China and that competition is emerging in the region, the threat of China is having tremendous implications for Japan's need for this alliance, Japan's need of a new and different alliance, as Kato San suggests. There may be some quibbling or squabbling over the terms of that alliance, but fundamentally the support for that is very, very strong.

### **Volatile Public Opinion**

Secondly, I think public opinion, being very volatile, can be managed. And here I agree, unfortunately, with the nuts and wimps

comment we heard earlier, that the Japanese leadership, which is becoming more unified in support of this, needs to pay a little bit more political capital into supporting this. That is something the U.S. needs to help them to do. I think we can have leadership that moves away from irresponsible public opinion towards creating a much more responsible public opinion. And there needs to be dialogue within Japan between those locals who are suffering from the costs and the benefit that is spread across the entire nation. That's an internal problem for Japan to work on.

Nonetheless, we need to help them with that through some flexibility. There needs to be flexibility in shifting some deployments and shifting practice elsewhere, that we've already seen can really take the basis from an unbearable political burden to the Japanese system, to problems and costs that can be managed effectively with moderate changes. I think that's an important point. So adaptation of that deployment structure is possible, thanks to changing U.S. capabilities, thanks to changing Japanese capabilities, and thanks to changing Japanese policy. They're going through fundamental policy reviews that may make preserving the stability that is so important to Japan and to the United States possible. Even while making moderate changes, I don't think we'll see drastic changes.

### **Chinese Populism**

Before I knew what the talk was about, when the term was Asian populism, my biggest concern in Asian populism is actually Chinese populism. That is, if we see in the People's Republic of China leadership a regime devoid of ideology, focused solely on two things: providing economic growth to keep the people satisfied and fanning the flames of nationalism in order to use that nationalism as a prop for the legitimacy of its regime. That's one reason why we don't see China accepting Japanese apologies. The victory in the war against Japan is one of the key legitimizing principles of the People's Republic of China regime.

Well, I'm concerned because public sentiment in the PRC, I think, is irresponsible. It's irresponsible about things like Taiwan. It's irresponsible about things like the U.S. presence in Asia. So the Chinese public may have an attitude about the U.S. security presence in Asia that says, "Absolutely not, we have to reject this," even though, I would say, it's been very much in the benefit and in the interest of China to have that presence. It provides the stability to provide the regional order that facilitates China's economic growth and makes them all better off.

Nevertheless, I think there is a lot of irresponsibility there and no one in China is explaining that, unlike in Japan where Prime Minister Koizumi goes and explains the benefits of the alliance as his father did. What you see, instead, in China is a willingness to allow that anti-Americanism to continue and more and more difficulty in distancing themselves or rejecting that or quashing it. Maybe over time China will continue to reform in stable ways, and it will continue to democratize gradually, so that as China becomes more democratic you will see policies that are not populist, but responsible.

But of all the issues I was concerned about—more than Japan, which I think is a mature democracy, more than Korea, which, although it's unpredictable, I feel it's basically rational in its approach to its national security issues—I was very concerned about China, and that's all I would have to say. Thank you.

**Ikenberry:** I think what we'll do is we'll let Professor Calder say a couple of quick things, just a couple of minutes, and then open it up. So be prepared to stand up and ask some questions, and make some comments, but Kent wants to make a couple rebuttals.

**Calder:** You can call them rebuttals or perhaps just reaffirmation of what I think the nature of the fundamental problem is. My response, or reaction to both our discussants sensitive, interesting comments, is basically

to say there's not much of a problem here. There's not going to be much shift, really, in the existing situation. The pressure against the U.S. presence is not very strong, and the government's not going to change.

So what exactly is the problem? I mean there is a problem, but we don't have a debate and so on. The problem isn't the reconfiguring or the frustration of the basic security problems that need to be dealt with. And what I'd like to do is just sharpen that a bit, to look at the real, what seemed to be the most important implications of, if you don't want to call it populism, this sort of popular frustration, popular revolt against business as usual. You see it very clearly in aspects of Koizumi, and aspects of Tanaka Makiko very strongly.

### **Japan's Financial Support for U.S. Troops**

Basically we're fed up and why should we be paying for all of this? First, we didn't have too much to do with the original way that it was configured and we're spending huge amounts of money. You could take all these scandals that have come out about the Okinawa Summit or all the different consulates or embassies, and just to sort of express the logic of the populist, it seems to me, critique, we're spending lots of money on things that don't make any sense.

Now, to really, I think, bring home the implications for the alliance, one has to realize how it's structured. The U.S. has a very substantial presence in Japan, partly because Japan pays \$5 billion a year, and in Korea, I guess, it's been up to about 1 or 1.2, between that and \$800 million. At most it's one-fifth of the amount of money that Japan pays and nobody else even comes close. The Marine Corps has one-third of its rapid deployment globally stationed in Japan. Why? Well, it's removed from the Korean peninsula, there is some strategic rationale, but a major part of that is simply that Japan's willing to pay for it.

Now Japan is in major deficit, and there are

major projects. Futenma is supposed to cost \$7 billion to do. Construction spending is about \$1.5 billion, facilities is about 1 to 1.5 out of that five billion per year. And Japan's in a recession and GNP is definitely going to be down this year. In other words, there is the budgetary element: the relationship between populism and all of these issues mediated through the budget. People are fed up, the government doesn't have money, the people don't want them to spend money on things. I think that is the heart of the actual challenge that's emerging. On the other side of the equation, how does the United States respond if the funds are not available to support, to defray the costs that the U.S. otherwise would face? Then does it have a rationale in the kind of world that we have for all of those forces in Japan, or even secondarily elsewhere in East Asia?

## Q & A

**Ikenberry:** Now we'll invite comments, questions from the audience. Please identify yourself and ask a question, and because the time is going to be short, make the question very short.

**Questioner:** As a native of Okinawa, I'd like to confine my question to Okinawa. Professor Calder spoke quite a bit about Okinawa, I'm a native and was raised there. My basic question is about bilateral relations between Japan and the United States. I look at it more as a trilateral relationship between Okinawa, Tokyo, and Washington. There's a conflict of interest among those three. How can you reduce the tension among those three or resolve the issue between Okinawa and Tokyo and Tokyo and Washington and Washington and Okinawa? I'm sure that a major complaint coming from the people of Okinawa is basically the heavy burden placed on Okinawa in terms of the size of the military base. It is 75 percent of all the military bases, of personnel stationed in Okinawa, as I understand it—oh no, 75 percent of the island, maybe, used for supporting the military base.

I wonder if you can elaborate a little bit about the relationship, not only between Japan and Tokyo, Tokyo and Washington, but Okinawa included in that bilateral security relations, if you don't mind.

**Calder:** Thank you, just briefly, because I know Kato-san among others has written a great deal about Okinawa. He and I think Ben has too. Ben and I were down in Okinawa about a month ago, and they certainly have much to say.

The first point I would make is, obviously Okinawa is a part of Japan which is what makes this whole situation complex. In formal terms, the responsible party in dealing with security issues, of course bilaterally is the Japanese central government in Tokyo, the foreign ministry, particularly. Which, of course makes it difficult. Personally speaking, that whole diplomatic element aside—I don't want to ignore it and our foreign ministry friends would, of course, emphasize this strongly—I don't think the United States can ignore the fact that we create major burdens for Okinawa. Okinawa is tremendously strategic and we also occupied Okinawa for twenty years after the war.

The notion of affirmative action, if you want to put it that way, I think is definitely there, and it's not just another prefecture of Japan. Formally, of course, it's up to the Japanese government how it wants to treat its prefectures, but personally, as an American who specializes in these things, I think informally we have to keep that in mind continually.

Now procedurally what does that mean? I think the SACO process is very positive, and that includes the three parties. We need to get grassroots views in Okinawa on the ground. As far as how much they ought to be publicized, I used to once think that getting all this up there in the media and having a national debate about how Okinawa should be treated was a good thing, but, to be frank, I've become more skeptical about that over the

years. I think it gets used by groups that may not represent the real situation and in particular, it doesn't reflect the actual political, economic, realities on the ground in Okinawa. I would be in favor, particularly, of quieter, on the ground steps, but with a continual sense on the part of the United States that we have a special responsibility with respect to Okinawa.

**Questioner:** I must confess that I've never considered populism to be a very useful theoretical lens for understanding Korea. Be that as it may, I'm wondering how, in your framework, you can reconcile the fact that we see popular pressures. There are specific groups in Korea that are opposed to the presence of U.S. troops, but this is not translated into debate in the political sphere, in the party sphere. There's a disconnect on a range of issues, but, including the basing of U.S. troops, this is not translating into a salient issue for political parties. The party that most tries to represent these civic groups is the ruling party, and they came out and were one of the most aggressive in saying, "Where do you want us to send troops? How fast? How soon?" when the U.S. was attacked. So I'm wondering, it doesn't seem like political competition is leading to pressure with respect to Korea.

And I'm also wondering if you could talk a little bit about this issue of the footprint, and that seems to be one of the most critical issues for Korea. Not whether or not troops are based in Korea, but the fact that many of these bases are in downtown Seoul or downtown Pusan, Taegu, that it's where the bases are located more than the fact the bases themselves are stationed there that seems to be of issue.

**Calder:** Yes, I do appreciate those comments. The term populism, I think in a sense, is a catch-all for a whole range of things. I think in both Japan, and to the extent that I know Korea, what I had in mind was essentially a sort of anti-bureaucratic, an anti-ruling elite sort of sentiment. It did have some currency,

back in Japan in the thirties. I think more recently, in the last two or three years in Japan, it clearly has some definable meaning there. I guess I had in mind some of the sorts of local protests against the firing ranges. Some of them are undoubtedly trumped up, but that sort of thing, NGO protests, that sort of range of things.

You talk about a party disconnect. That was fascinating. It struck me as being very parallel to what Kato-san was saying with respect to Japan. Maybe this speaks to the unusual nature of the bilateral relationships between Japan and the United States, and Korea and the United States. That somehow, in the bilateral interaction, it inhibits a range of things that otherwise would be expressed.

I'm still not sure, you say that you don't think that political competition equates with pressure in Korea. Does it equate with debate? I guess my thought, well in both the Korean and Japanese systems, is that they have traditionally been one-party dominant, and the government certainly has a lot of levers for regulating the private sector. My hypothesis would certainly be in the other cases—as I say it's been true in Spain, it's been true in Turkey, it's been true in Greece, it was true in the Philippines after Marcos—that when you do get real party competition and alternation of parties in power that you get a more straightforward security debate.

**Questioner:** I guess one of the problems in Korea is that instead of one-party dominance, you have no party dominance. It's very volatile in terms of political parties.

**Calder:** You mean shifting, the parties aren't coherent.

**Questioner:** Right.

**Calder:** Okay, that's interesting. I would assume that the hypothesis would be that, when the parties are coherent and are sort of responsible for their positions and have

definable constituencies, you would get a straightforward security debate.

**Questioner:** Hi Kent. Let me just make two points, and I guess I'll focus on things Mr. Kato said and that he didn't say to make my point.. One is I did not hear the word China escape your lips until you got to the issue of apology. And it seems to me that when you talk about the rationale for the alliance as viewed in Japan, that's a fairly important omission.

I would also say, Kent, that because of the strategic concerns, the alliance is very popular in Japan and it's very popular in Korea. There are big problems with it, however, and I agree with your basic thesis, that we better fix it. That's why I want to go back to Mr. Kato's second point, that as popular as it is, as the alliance is in each place, and examine what might happen if we don't pay attention to the problems. I think here I may disagree with Ben. I don't know, but I think there is potential for a serious enough incident to be blown up way out of proportion. Therefore, I guess my point is that it isn't going to be fixed in the political process in either Korea or Japan. It's got to be fixed between the United States and the host nations, and we better do it smarter. It doesn't mean tomorrow, and it doesn't mean the next day, necessarily, but it does mean we'd better pay attention to it. I think Mr. Kato has a very serious point. I think it backs up what Kent was saying about it.

**Kato:** Just one point about China. I think the Japanese government should come out and say that China is one of the main reasons for the continuance of the alliance. Honestly, I covered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for many years, and I get the sense—I hope there's no one from the embassy here—they think the public is ignorant and that diplomacy should be left with them. They do it without giving the public detailed explanations, and they say, "We'll make a good deal so you should just accept it."

And this kind of attitude is very detrimental in

the maintenance of the alliance in this kind of fast-changing environment. If Japan comes up with a comprehensive grand strategy, I think Japan can talk about China as a potential, I don't know what the right word is, "target" of the alliance. With that I think the people would really support the alliance.

**Questioner:** I'm a SAIS student nearby. Several years back I was a Marine, and I was stationed in both Okinawa, trained with the Japanese self-defense forces, and was also stationed in Subic Naval Base before the volcano destroyed everything. During my time in Subic Naval Base, populism was an issue that had affected base negotiations between the Philippine government and the United States. Now, before those military bases were shut down, or afterwards, have there been any lessons in that type of engagement, from the Philippines, that might be useful in evaluating the current negotiations between the U.S., Okinawa, and Japan today?

**Calder:** I think definitely, definitely yes. That is one of the cases that I'm extremely interested in. The first thing that comes to mind, actually, has to do with the host nation in its negotiations with the United States. And again I'm just studying this now, so I hope if there's anybody who knows this case well, I hope they'll chime in. It seems that these sorts of student groups or labor groups, or groups outside of the ruling elite, plus the media, and sometimes interactively, have put more and more pressure on the Philippine government for relatively extreme stands. They say, "Let's get the most we can out of the U.S." It was partly the money factor, but also various conditions that they wanted to impose on the renewal of the leases. And of course it was hard for the local political system to resist these kinds of things and they just escalated and escalated. The sky is the limit, to the point where finally they moved beyond the levels that the United States really felt, particularly in the post-Cold War environment, that it realistically wanted to pay. It was partly a financial question, but it was more than that.

## Unrealistic Expectations in Okinawa

I think there are some dangers in the current situation in Okinawa, because of the local government in Okinawa, and the extent to which the Japanese national government refuses to come up with a clear stand of its own and simply conveys various things that are presented down in Okinawa. They also are encouraging a dialogue, in a way, where the demands escalate and they move into a world of unreality.

I don't want to be too harsh here, because I sympathize with a lot of the sentiment of many people in Okinawa about the burdens that they have. Concretely, however, the issue of the so-called 15-year limit on the facilities in Okinawa won't happen. I'm fairly sure that the U.S. government won't accept that for strategic reasons, because we basically don't know what the situation is going to be in 15 years. It actually could be much easier. There could be some process of dialogue or negotiation. My understanding is that people would be receptive to that. But just to concretely say this will all end in 15 years, I don't think that would be likely accepted.

But within Okinawa, on the Okinawan side, I think there is some degree of recognition that this is unrealistic. And yet people are so locked in politically, partly because of the media pressure and this populism that I'm talking about, that they simply can't back away from stands that are unrealistic. And so, as a result, you just don't get an agreement. It just drifts into the future and nothing happens. And in a way, that's parallel to the Philippine base case, although then the result was nothing happened. They couldn't come to an agreement, but since it was a lease, the lease expired, and then the United States simply pulled out, because it didn't want to meet these escalating series of demands.

And again, the other thing that may be relevant, too, is the financial dimension, which I think is quite important. If you're ultimately

asking what is it that causes the United States to scale back, or to revise its presence, as much as anything, it could be the financial equation. In other words, either the United States government doesn't want to pay what's involved or the local government, the Japanese government, feels that it's too much and the local parties in question can't accept it. You know, it could very well be financial questions that ultimately will create complexity. I thought Alan Romberg's sentiment about the alliance was very much in order and I was happy to hear that. I do think that on the financial side of the base issues—more narrowly conceived on things like host nation support, like how we're going to find the money to fund STEM, or this kind of thing, or base, moving facilities, land or versions—there are considerable problems in those areas that many people don't realize.

**Ikenberry:** One last question, and we have only five minutes.

**Questioner:** I'm covering this for Inter Press Service. I grew up in Japan and Korea during the Cold War and I think it's important to have some historical context here. I don't accept the premise that populism is a recent phenomenon. I kind of came of age in Korea in 1960 when there was a revolt against Sigmun Rhee. It wasn't anti-American at the time, but there certainly was a questioning of the whole basis of the U.S. role there and the Koreans were very much opposed to the normalization treaty with Japan in 1965, 1960 and 1970. There were massive demonstrations in Japan against the U.S. presence and during the Vietnam War. We happened to have a pliant government in Japan who was able to suppress these demonstrations with massive use of police and everything else. So there's been a long-time resentment by people there that we can't forget.

However, I'm also troubled by the kind of acceptance that the scene is changing. Okay, maybe the new enemy is China, but if that is so, if the Koreans are talking and there's some

normalization going on there, the whole basis for our presence there seems to be drastically changed. So shouldn't you be talking about, perhaps moving the Marine division back to the U.S.? If it's directed against China, they don't need to be in Okinawa. We can fly, I mean, what reason do they need to be there? Maybe there should be some ways of just talking practically about pulling out some of the forces, reducing the force in Korea, pulling down from the DMZ gradually, in context with the negotiations that are going on. Instead of being static, let's have some progress in having a reduction of forces and of the hostility there.

**Ikenberry:** Why don't I let the two discussants say something, if they have any reaction to that question or anything else, and we'll give the last word to Kent.

**Kato:** I agree that there should be a very fundamental discussion regarding the deployment of U.S. forces, but I understand the Pentagon is calculating how much it would cost if they relocate all the Marines to Guam. They are just startled with the amount of money they have to invest. And it's simple; it costs less to station in Okinawa. That's the basic reason why the Marines are there and unless this framework changes in some way—like a big revolt in Okinawa so that it's not sustainable or for some reason if the United States should need to move the Marines to somewhere else—I don't think anything is going to happen.

And seriously, since it costs so much less to keep the Marines in Okinawa, if the Japanese government got tough and tried to get some reductions from the U.S. government, I think the Japanese government could do so, to some extent. Of course, it's going to strain the relations with the United States, because it's still cheaper for the United States to keep the Marines in Okinawa. But I don't think it's a very smart move if you think in a longer term for the maintenance of the alliance, which serves the interest of both Japan and the United States.

**Ikenberry:** Professor Calder, last word.

**Calder:** That's a tall order. I think there are two sets of issues that your questions raise. One of them is the prescriptive set of questions. That is to say about what we should be doing and I agree that those are hugely important, but I want to defer those for just one moment. The other set is the descriptive issues, or the predictive issues. That is, if we get this changed then it will produce these kinds of pressures.

And my basic enterprise today has not been largely prescriptive. I've basically been trying to develop a kind of political science equation. If you get competitive politics then you're going to get a new set of pressures, and those are going to be pressures that you're going to have to respond to. I agree with you that populism is certainly very old. I wish I'd made that point myself. What one could add on to that is, what's new is that the political systems have become more responsive to it. It's more of a problem, I think, for the political systems of East Asia today than it was 20 years ago. It's basically a matter of democracy, where competitive democracy is much more pervasive now and in a sense more dynamic now and more interactive with the media and public opinion, than was true during the war.

I remember back in the sixties too, and yeah, certainly it was there, but I think it was more easily "contained." The diplomatic processes and so on probably insulated it more and you had a clearer kind of one-party dominance that prevented it from affecting the broader society. That, I guess, leads on to the prescriptive side, and I think I would echo something Kato-san said earlier about the need for more of a justification, more of a debate. Whether finance alone should settle geostrategic questions of deployment and so on, is, perhaps, open to question. There's a lot of historical reasons why that's true: Japan's constitution, Japan's failure, its inability under a set of its own established values to take on a kind of security burden, global burdens that the United States

took on. That was one of the main reasons why the finance is set up the way it is. But in the world we're looking to in the future, there may be some restructuring impending, and this goes way beyond what we can do to talk about it here. But my guess is that, if restructuring were to begin, then many aspects of the equation might well shift.

**Ikenberry:** Thank you very much. I would like to thank our panel members, Kent Calder and our two discussants, for a very insightful evening and I would invite you to join with me in giving our appreciation to them. (End)

## About the Panelists

- Main Speaker** **Dr. Kent E. Calder** is Professor of Politics and International Affairs and Director of the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations at Princeton University. He has recently served as Special Advisor to two U.S. Ambassadors to Japan, the Hon. Walter Mondale and the Hon. Thomas S. Foley. Dr. Calder received a Ph.D. in Government at Harvard University under the direction of Edwin O. Reischauer. Dr. Calder is the author of five books on East Asian politics and security issues, including most recently *Pacific Defense: Arms, Energy and America's Future in Asia* (William Morrow and Co. 1996), and was a recipient of the 1997 Mainichi Grand Prix in Asia-Pacific Studies.
- Discussants** **Mr. Yoichi Kato** is Visiting Research Fellow at the National Defense University and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is on leave from the *Asahi Shimbun*, the second largest daily newspaper in Japan, where he has been working as a staff writer for 20 years. His area of expertise is the national security policy of Japan and its alliance with the United States. Mr. Kato was educated at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University and the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. Mr. Kato has appeared on numerous American news programs including CNN, ABC's Nightline, News Hour with Jim Lehrer and C-SPAN to provide a Japanese perspective on political events occurring in the U.S.
- Mr. Benjamin L. Self** is Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, where he directs projects related to Japanese security. Prior to joining the Stimson Center, he was a visiting research fellow at Keio University in Tokyo for two years on a Fulbright Fellowship, and from 1993 to 1996 was Program Associate in the Asia Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Mr. Self was educated at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International studies and Stanford University. He is co-author of *Japan's Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism* (Survival, 1996).
- Moderator** **Professor G. John Ikenberry** is the Peter F. Krogh Professor of Global Justice at Georgetown University. Additionally, he was a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. Dr. Ikenberry is the author of numerous publications, including, *State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy* (forthcoming), *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (2000), and *Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government* (1988).