

# Japan's Asia Policy

by

Dr. Takashi Inoguchi

**Takashi Inoguchi:** I thank you. Good evening, I'm very happy to be here. According to someone, there is a theory that there are three stages of making trips abroad. First, normally, when you are very young, a mission and an adventurous spirit drive you to make trips abroad. That stage is over as far as I'm concerned. And the second stage is that you start to write a letter to decline the invitation by saying that another trip abroad without being accompanied by your partner would be very difficult to consider. But the last stage, the most advanced stage, is that you start to make your trips abroad carrying luggage for your spouse as an accompanying person. That is what is taking place slowly and alarmingly increasingly with me.

I'll give you an example. In the late eighties, my wife was invited by the European Commission to make a two-week tour to study in Europe. You are given one subject, and you make a proposal to study that subject, by combining briefings and interviews and many things. And at that time, she replied that she could not envision a long trip, a two-week long trip, without being accompanied by someone to carry her luggage. The European Commission immediately replied positively, and asked her whether she might have suggestions as to who might be such a person. My name was suggested.

My category at that time was that of an accompanying person, anonymous. Then she apparently wrote another letter, and suddenly my category was elevated from that of an accompanying person, to that of an invitee. We were then asked to specialize in a policy area. She said, "defense." I said, "agriculture." Neither was approved, and she ended up with technology, while I ended up with official government assistance.

And that relates to my point, which I will give. They give a lot of briefings and discussions. What struck me the most was one briefing by the E.U. at the time, E.C., someone with a very heavy accent, who drew two lines on the map: Central/Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. He said basically that the Europeans want the people between the lines to stay where they are. Very blunt. "How do you do it?" I asked. Well, he replied most important is to help them modernize their countries by reaching them, by extending helping hands.

## Western Europeans and Japan Share Opinions about Greater Asia

I thought that Japan's Asia policy has some common elements to that. And I think Western Europeans and the Japanese think a little bit alike, at least broadly speaking, about greater Asia. Europe, being part of a peninsular proportion in comparison to the Eurasian landmass, can be part of Asia, a greater Asia. By that I mean basically, the British would say, from Brest (Britanny) to Vladivostok, all the European continent, this is greater Asia. But the French would say from Brest (Brittany) to Brest-Litovsk, this is greater Asia. And the Japanese think, maybe similarly more or less, because the European part is so small.

Two similarities: One is that its weight is too heavy, the greater Asia, too heavy for the Japanese or for the British and the continental Europeans. And once it starts making trouble, it's terrible, and the consequences are very negative for most Japanese. It's best to keep peace with themselves, and leave the neighbors alone. That's the first thing.

The other is that most people are bound to find a solution for peaceful coexistence with people of greater Asia. They realize, just like this European Commission person said, that

somehow, the Japanese have to let them stay where they are and then keep them happy. You can call that policy “co-engagement,” if you are President George W. Bush. But here the meaning of “co” is slightly different. I think President Bush means something like a containment as well as engagement. But here, I think the Japanese and probably the West Europeans believe that people should be content with what they have; not contained, but contented.

So that is a basic sentiment Japan has about greater Asia. It’s better to think of Japan’s policy very historically. I think three components are very critical. One is the following: ancient Japanese rulers proclaimed the Japanese state vis-a-vis the Chinese states and were most likely to contain heavy continental origins. They are more or less the same. Once they established their own paradise in Japan—well, I don’t know whether it is a paradise but it is at least a space and people—they did not want others on the continent to emulate what they did. They wanted their competitors to stay away and keep a distance from them.

### **Reasons for Previous Japanese Isolation**

There are two examples of why Japan tried to keep the continent “away.” First, proclaiming immediately an Asian Japanese state in that religion, Buddhism as a state religion. It’s not China originating the religion; it’s kind of a strange religion, but it was a major state religion. Of course, at that time, the Han Dynasty period, Buddhism was flourishing in China as well. And also inventing a Chinese alphabet much, much earlier than the Koreans and Vietnamese is something that tells you the Japanese proclivity and inclination vis-a-vis the continental people. Korean and Vietnamese are more or less continental in the Japanese mind.

And of course more important, is that the Tokugawa period policy of closing the door to the rest of the world was more or less implemented even before the Tokugawa period. And that is one very strong historical trend.

### **Japanese Rulers Relied on Relationship with China for Power**

The second is that Japanese rulers often rely on the prestige accorded them by the Chinese state to legitimize themselves and to intimidate their domestic competitors. After all, China has been a place where all sorts of people come and rule in the name of the Chinese emperor. To rule China, one needs a heavy dose of universalistic rhetoric and vitriol, as well as guns. There is a pretension that the Chinese emperor rules all around heaven. Without vigorous displays and intermittent displays of rhetoric and vitriol, such as investiture exercises played upon neighbors, China tends to fall apart. Japanese rulers have often played that game. It’s not just keeping your distance, but getting close when it is necessary.

### **Japan’s Asia Policy for 21st Century**

The third is the Japanese often benefit from new ideas, new institutions, and new technology originating from the continent, whether it is from China, Russia, Korea, India or...at the end, Europe. So given these basic, major characteristics of Japan’s relationship with continental Asia, I think that Japan’s Asia policy for the 21st century, can be speculated.

That is what I’m going to do. Two subjects: one is how the Japanese view the prospect of a possible or probable Chinese democratization in ten, fifteen, or twenty-five years’ time, how Japanese view that prospect. Of course there is ambivalence, but in two senses. One sense is, of course, a traditional, historical sense, which I’ve just said, and the other is more subjective, which I’m going to spell out. The other subject, if time allows, is possible or probable federation or unification of Korea in say, the year of 2025.

### **Prospect of Chinese Democratization**

First I’ll address the prospect of Chinese democratization. There are a number of perspectives among the Japanese on how to

view the prospect of Chinese democratization. The first one is following Sun Yat-sen: Chinese society is built on sand and the Chinese Communist Party is the sole organized social force in China. Falun Gong would not be the sole organized force in China, according to this perspective, should the Chinese Communist Party continue to rule China. However, it gets more corrupt as time goes. Irrespective of whether it is democracy or not, the Chinese Communist Party better stay in power. But, of course, the rule of law should be practiced much more vigorously. Otherwise, market competition is still down. That's the first kind of perspective.

The second perspective is that since democratization often precipitates nationalistic—read anti-Japanese as well as anti-American—violence outwards, according to Jack Snyder etc., you had better leave them to work out their own political and economic arrangement by engaging them in the form of their world view. You do this rather than trying to promote democracy and a market economy from the outside. What this means, basically, is very difficult to say. Japan must engage, and be closely watching; keep friendly, but not really try to engineer a coup d'état or anything. Do nothing except engage them.

The third perspective is that China's democratization is most likely to bring about enlargement of the democratic peace, following Immanuel Kant, Michael Doyle and Bruce Russett, etc. All major and minor wars in the East and Southeast Asia that took place in the latter part of the twentieth century have had something to do with China. By that I mean that they involved a Chinese initiative. Korea in 1950, Himalayas in 1962, Vietnam in the sixties and seventies, Soviet Union in 1969, Vietnam in 1979. So, a democratic peace process will be very welcome to Japanese as well as to many others.

The fourth perspective is that China's full-fledged democratization would remove a hindrance for the United States. China could

be a major regional ally, and Japan should be cautious about it, if not jealous. The Japanese are jealous about China if the Chinese prospect of democratizing itself becomes very clear and very near. This is the fourth perspective.

It's very difficult to assess at this moment which view will pervade, but basically the historically ambivalent thinking about China among the Japanese would continue to influence Japanese thinking about Chinese democratization. But it's very difficult to predict at this moment.

Late last year, I had a talk with Ambassador Mike Mansfield, and I was struck by the one question he posed to me. He kept asking, "What will happen in China?" And apparently following the argument by people like Henry Rowen, according to him, 2015 is the year when China's democratization becomes a real issue. And probably, following that kind of argument, the per capita income in coastal China would become very high. Throughout China, the per capita income would be very high and would still allow democratization from within. And his question is, "What would you do?" And of course, I'm not a person inside the government, and I have no responsibility or authority for what the Japanese government would do. But he said he'd like to know what the Japanese government will do once such a prospect becomes real.

### **U.S. Cannot Wage Successful Attack against China**

I said, that the American government may be thinking about doing similar things to what they did in the Philippines, in 1986 or in Indonesia in 1999. But I said, you cannot do anything vis-a-vis China. You can send the Marines and drive upward to Peking. You're spending one hour there, or so, and if your counter-attack doesn't come around, you can do so. But what would happen? You cannot do the same as in 1900. At that time of the Boxer Rebellion, the rebels were abundant,

and then Peking became chaos. The British led a western invasion and the Japanese occupied much of the Peking area.

But what would happen today? At that time it was more or less pacified, but at this time never. And you cannot hold on for one year, let alone one month or anything. So that is precluded. You could intrude from the western part of China and try doing something, but you cannot do much anyway. You cannot stay, at least it's not something you can envision doing. You can promote democratization from below, the grassroots of democracy, such as local elections at the village level. That's fine, but you cannot do much. We can only rely on the forces generated from below in Chinese society. Then he asked, "Well, what will the Japanese do?" I said, I think not much.

I'm not saying that the Japanese government doesn't do anything vis-a-vis China or the Chinese democratization in fifteen years' time, but I said that the Japanese would be more interested in working with the Chinese Communist Party. The American government was interested in 1989, if temporarily, in working with someone outside the Chinese Communist Party. But that's not going to be very visible and you have to work something from within the Chinese Communist Party.

So what would you do vis-a-vis China's Communist Party? I said not much. But of course you engage them and you discuss many issues, many matters: industrialization, anti-pollution, and many other things. And then, somehow, you hope you can change their ways of looking at, say, democracy or economic modernization or the military buildup. You've got to talk. You've got to persuade them somehow, without saying, "I'm trying to persuade you." That's terrible, but you just talk and discuss. I think those are the kinds of things the Japanese government would be interested in doing and probably has been doing, more or less.

I was very fascinated by why Mansfield was so insistent on knowing what the Japanese government might be doing vis-a-vis China, when Chinese democratization is perhaps becoming a real possibility.

### **Japanese Want Communist Party to Survive**

But that is something, all these four perspectives. It's very difficult to give differentiated weight to the Japanese thinking, because all of the perspectives look somewhat harmonious with Japanese thinking. Yes, Chinese society is like science, that's what Sun Yat-sen said. Many Japanese believe that, without the Communist Party, the Chinese society cannot remain cohesive. So the Japanese policy vis-a-vis China is long live the Chinese Communist Party, at least in the short term. But beyond that it's very difficult to say.

And also you cannot say democratization is preferred. Chinese colleagues and friends of mine—and they're very nationalistic—say that the Chinese Communist Party is very healthy and has a more direct influence vis-a-vis the forces of nationalism in Chinese society. Sometimes I'm not sure, but still the argument is always like this. And then hearing that, I leave them to work it out on their own.

And with respect to democratic peace, again, it's very difficult to assess, more or less, because there have not been very many precedents of democratic peace in Southeast Asia. But of course you can say many wars, besides America's war in Asia, I would say more than 70 percent of wars have something to do with China. I do not mean that China initiated things, but somehow they have been frequently associated with wars in Asia for the last half-century. If China becomes very democratic and many neighbors have become democratic, maybe the idea of democratic peace might invade. And if that's the case, the Japanese would be most welcome, most welcome.

And the fourth one is very disturbing. The United States government has had a policy toward Asia that has been somewhat difficult for the Japanese government to swallow or just to watch, especially in the latter half of the Clinton administration. According to this view, the United States government has been focusing too much on China and forgetting about Japan, its ally. But if China becomes democratic, that changes the whole landscape in the American mind. If China is a full-fledged democracy, and implements and practices fairly reasonable market democracy, following the rule of law, then you never know.

Right now, I think the United States government's Asia/East Asia policy is to find a good regional ally and, on that axis, it tries to formulate a regional policy. But if China becomes a free democracy, that equation becomes very problematic, at least from a Japanese point of view. They'd like to remain the key ally in the region.

So, that's kind of difficult, given the historical ambivalence toward the continent. The Japanese do not particularly like to be too close, like a too close ally with China. It's difficult; even if it's a democracy, it's a very difficult alliance. An alliance against the United States would be terrible, so the idea is not particularly welcome. Even if China's market is very big, a lot of problems remain, and the Japanese would prefer a more free trade orientation. So that makes the Japanese position very ambivalent. Look at the Hainan kind of issues. The Japanese government has been saying very little about it, because, I'm saying, it is very difficult.

Basically, the Japanese government wants to remain a solid regional ally to the United States. Also, the Japanese government wants to be very friendly to China. The Japanese government does not want to provoke China. Trying to do that is difficult. That's why their mouths tend to be shut on difficult issues like the Hainan situation.

## **Issue of Korean Unification**

Now, moving towards our second area, Korea. Again, this is difficult because, in part, of history. But again, a federated or unified Korea in 2025 is very speculative. How do the Japanese view that? First, since North Korea is more likely to move in the direction of unification only extremely slowly, Japan should welcome a unified Korea idea, as long as the military is entrusted, as the President of the United States has said.

There's no assurance that North Korea is so flexible. It's very difficult to read their minds on policy, and you can dismiss their assurance whenever it is given. But when South Korea is persuaded by that argument to a certain degree, Japanese mouths tend to be shut. It's difficult to say much, given the history. We don't like Korea unified, but that's not something many Japanese can really say.

Regarding the second perspective, as long as a unified confederated Korea can make a capitalistic market system function, Japan should welcome it, of course. The bigger the market the better for everybody, for the Japanese as well as everyone else. This is the second perspective, a very straightforward perspective. And many, I think, share that perspective.

The third one is that since a unified Korea is bound to lean toward the continent, meaning China and Russia, rather than its maritime neighbors, meaning Japan and Taiwan. Japan should invigorate for South Korea not to dilute its free trade orientation. A joint communiqué between Russia and South Korea endorsed the ABM Treaty, which pleased the United States government very much. But at the same time, I think the Japanese find South Korea is really getting, not closer, but more friendly to China and North Korea quite visibly. That is something that gives some apprehension to the Japanese.

This leads to the fourth perspective. Once a unified, confederated, federated Korea is born, it is bound to become a continental state as contrasted with the South Korean state. South Korea is detached from China and Russia, more or less, but geographically, it's linked to Russia and China at least a little bit. But thanks to North Korea's geography, South Korea is now detached from the continent. North Korea is empty space. It's like, not *cordon sanitaire* but *cordon dangereuse*. At the same time it is still separated, and that gives some consolation to the Japanese, because the Japanese like to see South Korea remaining a very vigorous free-trade country. And that is something that worries some Japanese.

### **East Asia Free Trade Zone**

Look, for instance, at the bilateral free trade idea. Singapore and Japan have been moving in that direction very solidly. Of course, Singapore produces nothing, which worries the Japanese producers, but that's okay. The Japan-Korea free trade idea has been on the table for some years already, but the Koreans are now saying that within the Japan Korea free trade zone, we better think more widely about a Korea-China-Japan free trade zone.

That's a totally different task, having China as a free trade partner. Because I know that if a Japan-Korea free trade zone is established in a way that the Japanese government envisions, the Korean market will have terribly negative consequences, at least temporarily, I understand. But having China? As part of a free trade partnership? Difficult. But this enables you to glimpse at their thinking. They the Koreans like the idea, China as well, because they don't want Korea to be overwhelmed by the Japanese. The Koreans like to balance China and Japan in some way and some East Asian free trade could be located in Seoul. So, again, it is very difficult.

So summing up these four perspectives, historical legacy makes the Japanese thinking

to become more articulate, because each time there are certain factors which keep the Japanese from thinking farther on. Very difficult. And even now, moving back to the first perspective, the assurance of the military presence of the United States is not very solid. Sometimes South Korea, President Kim Dae Jung and Chairman Kim Jong Il seem to say, "Sure, it's okay." but now, yesterday or the day before yesterday or last week, Kim Jong Il and his instruments are saying that the United States armed forces should disappear from the peninsula. On this, it's very difficult, very difficult.

So that basically means the Japanese would continue to say the prospect of unification of Korea is most welcome as long as U.S. military presence is assured.

And the second perspective involves capitalist things. It's very natural, you know, in many ways very natural but prospect-wise, we don't know. North Korea is not disinterested in having Korean capitalist direct investment in North Korea, at least in a very well-controlled way, perhaps through the Yanbian province of China, there are basically two million Koreans residing there. And also the Japanese-residing Koreans and Japanese making some direct investment could be harmonious with the policy in North Korea, but that's very minimal. So it's very difficult, because this would be such a dramatic capitalist practice for North Korea in any future, even in 2025.

But of course if Korea collapses then the whole thing is totally different. Internal order and security comes to the front, and again, the Japanese do not have much to say about it, at least not before someone else says something about it.

Thirdly, this continental orientation is much stronger in South Korea than in Japan. Japan is a bit like Britain with the continent. Japanese are Asians, that's for sure. However, "Japan *and* Asia" is more commonly used in Japanese sentences than "Japan *in* Asia." You

find it. I have not counted the frequency of that “Japan *and* Asia” and “Japan *in* Asia” in the major Japanese newspapers, but somehow it’s separated. It’s a bit like Britain; not trying too eagerly to join the European community in the first case, and secondly, joining, not wanting to join the European monetary system, etc. It’s a bit different, but this is the mentality of Japan.

South Korea is very different. The South Korean mentality always has in mind the balance of power between Japan and China and also the historical issues from Japanese colonialism. These issues make things more complicated.

So lastly, if Korea unifies and South Korea, basically the Republic of Korea, directly links to China, I think South Korea, or the Republic of Korea, will become more preoccupied with things taking place in China, Russia, etc. And that makes things very difficult if the South Korean rulers are interested in using Russia or China in the game of diplomacy vis-a-vis the United States or vis-a-vis Japan. The whole thing becomes very messy if you look at the lessons of history. So that is something that the Japanese are thinking about, the prospect of democratization of China, 2015, and then the prospects of a Korean confederation in 2025, but it is all speculative.

But what I wanted to do was somehow make clear some of the tendencies of the Japanese about Asia. Then, discuss the likely solution of the Japanese vis-a-vis China’s democratization and vis-a-vis Korea’s unification in a future time. Of course that prospect is very nebulous. You never know what will happen. But once it becomes a real issue, I think the Japanese would develop such perspectives more or less in tandem and try to determine their solution or policy depending on a more specific assessment. Thank you very much.

**Daniel Bob:** Well, thank you Dr. Inoguchi for very provocative comments. One area of travel I think you forgot to mention in your

opening comments was a form of travel I just experienced. I just got back from Mongolia, and that was the result of signing a contract. When I went there in February for the first time I very much regretted it. But anyway....

As far as the democratization of China and the confederation in Korea, I think one thing, in terms of Japan’s response to either, is the fact that some of the historical animosities that China and Korea hold towards Japan have not been resolved. The textbook issue that we’ve just seen is evidence of that. And until some of those issues are addressed, the path toward Japan’s becoming closer to either country is fraught with difficulty.

### **Democratization in China**

On the topic of democratization in China, that’s something that I think all of us would like to see. As someone who was intimately involved in trying to get permanent normal trade relations in China through Congress for many years, one of the arguments that we always used is that we hope, with China’s economic growth and the opening up of its economy, China would move in the direction of democracy. There is no guarantee of this, of course, but that remains the hope of many of those who worked on that issue.

If, in fact, there is democratization in China, I think perhaps the most profound impact for the United States, and for most of the rest of east Asia, would be that it opens up the possibility for reunification with Taiwan. I think only under circumstances where there is a democratic China can there be any sort of reunification or confederation. And if, in fact that takes place, it will remove the greatest irritant in U.S.-China relations. The Taiwan issue really is the essence of the problems faced between the U.S. and China. And that would be, if in fact there were some sort of reunification or confederation, that would bring a profound change to what’s happening in Asia.

As far as the U.S. and China actually becoming allies, in the case of democratization in China, that's difficult to judge. As I think Professor Inoguchi mentioned, nationalism will play a growing role, as it clearly already is in China. China and the U.S. will not always share the same interests and are likely to have some strong differences of opinion. And if, in fact, you couple that with confederation in Korea, I think the U.S. may have some difficulty in justifying its current troop presence in East Asia. If in fact North Korea falls, and if PRC is a democracy, if not an ally, I think there may be some difficulty, particularly on Capitol Hill, justifying what the U.S. troop presence would be directed at.

We already see some anti-U.S. sentiment in Japan, in Okinawa, and I think there have been some anti-American sentiments in Korea about our troop presence there. And of course there's some rather virulent anti-U.S. sentiment in China. We don't have any troops there, but with the bombing of Belgrade and this most recent incident (Hainan.)

So I think if, in fact, these two scenarios play out, there will have to be a major re-thinking of what the U.S. position in Asia is going to be and how we can justify the forward deployment of U.S. troops throughout East Asia.

### **Confederated Korea Will Become Inward-Looking**

I think another aspect of confederation, if it were to take place in Korea, is that Korea will become a very much inward-looking country. They have taken to heart the difficulties that Germany experienced in its own reunification, and, if anything, reunification on the Korean peninsula would be far more difficult, would be far more expensive, and would require massive infusions of capital, not only from South Korea, but also other countries. And I'm not certain that infusions of capital, say from Japan, would be as welcome there as would infusions of capital from other

countries, again for reasons of historical animosity.

I'm going to try and keep this short, because I know we have some questions, but let me just conclude by saying that both of these scenarios, democratization in PRC and Korea, are scenarios which are, I think, ultimately something we'd like to see. However, predicting the future on these things is always extremely difficult. North Korea has survived through some extremely tough times. Whether in fact they will fall—I guess I believe they will—and how long that will take is anyone's guess. Democratization of the PRC is something we'd like to see, but that too is fraught with difficulties. So, we're in areas here that are very difficult to predict, and the consequences of both are equally difficult to predict.

I welcome comments from the audience and conversation up here. Thank you.

**Robert Manning:** I'll just make a few remarks. I thought the presentation was quite interesting, but it seemed to presume a kind of Pan-Asian orientation as a going-in assumption. And I'm not entirely persuaded that tracks with what Japan's foreign policy is trying to do. I think Japan has had a rather interesting foreign policy developing in the post-Cold War period. Some of Japan's traditional concerns on energy, combined with its concern about the rise of China, have led it to rethink very fundamentally its relationship with Russia, for example. That's one element. And, I think its traditional pursuit of energy diplomacy has continued its play into central Asia. It is leading it into Iran, so I think there's more complexity to it than that.

I also think that, with the experience over the last century, it's quite clear that Japan has done best when it's allied with a distant maritime power, whether it's Britain or the United States. And I think there's been a real interesting change in Japanese perceptions of China over the last decade. Because up until, really the mid-1990s, there was a sort of

checkbook diplomacy; you could just keep sending checks and China would quietly grow and get out of your way. And eventually it dawned on people, particularly as Chinese military modernization continued and their economic growth was really becoming dynamic, that whatever happens in China, it's going to be a problem for Japan.

### **China Prefers Asia in Neo-Tributary Relationship**

And this gets to the democratization point. I'm not sure I buy the whole democratic peace argument. I think Asia is very different from Europe and a lot of the pathologies that led to where we were in Europe have not happened in Asia yet. Europe was the scene of the most horrendous violence in the history of the human race over the course of several hundred years. In other words, strategic competition exhausted itself. I'm not convinced that has necessarily happened in Asia yet.

And if you look at the Chinese perspective on the world, they seem to have made it fairly clear that, given their choice, they prefer to see the United States not there and the rest of Asia in a kind of neo-tributary relationship. And the problem for Japan is that I don't think Japan is interested in being a tributary of China. And I don't think China has reached a point where it's willing to accept any kind of co-equal status with Japan. So I think that presents a dilemma for the Pan-Asian perspective for Japan, unless you like Chinese food.

So, that's one aspect. On Korea, I'm also not persuaded. I think Koreans tend to think of themselves as continental, that is true. They also tend to think of themselves as a little power surrounded by large powers. This is why you hear Kim Dae Jung talk about how he wants American troops there forever: precisely because China, Russia, and Japan are much closer. And I think that is why North Korea has made noises, from time to time, in a similar direction. They are, after all, Korean.

### **Korean Unification Will Realign Strategic Chessboard in Asia**

As for Korean reunification, it will be a seminal event that will have a kind of catalytic role in realigning the strategic chessboard in Asia. Before unification, U.S. and Chinese interests there were kind of overlapping. It's one of the places in the world where I think our interests tend to overlap. Post-unification, I think the opposite is true. Once Korea is unified, I can't think that the Chinese will be very happy about the possibility of U.S. troops going all the way up to the Yellow River. I think we've done that once before. And so I think that will require a number of strategic understandings between the U.S. and China. I think it also puts the Koreans in a difficult position because they don't want to have to choose between China and the United States.

And then, where does Japan fit into that equation? I mean, in the worst-case scenario, you could have a kind of continental maritime polarization with— if we're going to worst-case it, let's really worst-case it— a nuclear, united Korea aligned with China and Japan with increasing doubts about the credibility of extended deterrence from the United States. My guess is, that would get us in a nuclear arms race in northeast Asia, if you want to game out worst-case scenarios.

So in terms of Japanese foreign policy, what I've sensed is a different Japanese view about the alliance that is emerging, but not about the fundamental importance of the alliance. And I think one problem is that things have been very static. There has not been a great amount of political imagination on either side in trying to renovate the U.S.-Japan alliance in terms of some of the issues that are real irritants, such as the social cost of the military presence in Japan and how that could be, perhaps, better managed.

But I think, as far out as I can see, to the end of this decade and beyond, the one issue that is

sort of my lesson in watching Asia for a long time is that nothing happens very quickly. You can go back and look at things that were written about Korea seven or eight years ago and not a lot has changed other than very surface events.

### **North Korean System Trapped the Regime**

I've been skeptical that we'll ever get a happy ending in Korea, because what I think we've seen is that the North Korean system has kind of trapped the regime, and they don't know how to get out of it. And they're not willing to do the things the Chinese and Vietnamese have done: sort of roll the dice and take a risk on a new social contract that would grow out of economic dynamism and legitimize the rulers of Korea. Kim Jong Il clearly does not believe that, or they would have done a lot more than they have done. They've been sort of putting their toes in the water of economic opening for almost a decade now if you go back and look at some of the things that have happened. And at a certain point, you've got to figure out that if you want to go swimming you're probably going to get wet.

Then you must decide what Deng Xiaoping decided. He decided that he couldn't feed 1.2 billion people other than joining the global economy and he did it. He was willing to take the risk. North Korea has not reached that point. I'm not persuaded. Although Kim Dae Jung clearly believes that they have no choice and they'll eventually get there. He might be right, but I wouldn't want to hold my breath waiting. I think the North Koreans are really a candidate for the Yasser Arafat "never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity" award.

If you think about it, the Bush administration gets criticized for the way it's dealt with Korea and for not continuing missile talks. Well, the North Koreans didn't bother responding to Bill Perry for fifteen months, and when they did, it was too late. I think they're making the same mistake now with Kim Dae Jung. After

about another eight or ten months, he's full into lame duckdom with a presidential election coming up, and he won't be in a position to do very much.

As time passes and the return summit doesn't occur, looks more and more humiliated, having taken the risks to go north and all the rest. So I think there is a possibility that Kim Jong Il may figure this out. He's what I would call a tactical genius and a strategic fool. I think that's what we've learned over the past year.

I'm not very sanguine about Korea, but I would also not want to predict that it will end any time soon, precisely because there's sort of a quite conspiracy that nobody wants to see anything change very quickly in Korea. If you're talking about Japan, or China, this is certain. Probably the only major power that would welcome Korean reunification is the United States. Others, Japan and China, will tolerate it because they have no choice. But if given a vote, I don't think that's the way they would vote.

So I think that's looming out there. Let me just finally say a couple of things about China, and this is where, again, the democratic peace argument for me really breaks down. You saw in the case of India, where they have a democracy, people dancing in the streets when they were firing off nuclear weapons. And in the case of China, you could make a case that a democratic China would be more likely to invade Taiwan.

I don't know why that's any less true than the counter argument, if there truly is a genuine nationalism that grows out of the whole century and a half of humiliation and the whole experience of Western and Japanese imperialism in China that is real. Not that the regime in Beijing is not very good at manipulating that, but even they do that sometimes at their peril because they can't control it all the time, once they unleash it.

## **China a Potential Problem for U.S.**

So I guess what I would conclude is that in whatever direction China goes, we're not going to live happily ever after. I guess the question is whether it will be just a threat or a problem. And I think there's a good argument to be made that it is a problem. I think you're going to have a kind of balance of power security environment in Asia for quite some time, regardless of which direction China goes. And as for a U.S.-China alliance—that they become allies because China is a democracy—I think it's more useful to see this in terms of great powers. China is an emerging great power, and if they were a democracy, there might be a larger overlapping of interests. But all great powers bend international systems to their interests and I don't think a democratic China would do that any differently. So I'll stop there, and thanks.

## **Status Quo Best Situation for Japan**

**John Ikenberry:** It seems the theme tonight is “be careful what you wish for, you may get it”; whether it's democracy in China, or unification in Korea. And the other impression I got from our three commentators, is that in some ways for Japan, there's no scenario for the future that would improve Japan's position in the world if they move away from the status quo in either direction in Asia. If there is militarization of relations between China and the U.S.—a kind of neo-Cold War, a new kind of balance of power; it's not engagement, it's containment—Japan is caught in the middle. And of course Japan is already disturbed by the friction that has been created by the most recent plane/jet crisis.

But if tensions decline, whether it's fully because of democratization or unification in China and Korea respectively, the U.S. becomes less necessary in the region. The troops go home and then, as several of our speakers said, Japan is caught in a kind of position where it doesn't have its offshore balancer, the United States, in position. It

doesn't have its ally and it's either going to be absorbed in a kind of Chinese “Greater Asia,” or it becomes a kind of high-tech Canada or something like that. It finds a kind of a dependency role within the region, so that's not good.

So in some sense there is no vision of the future that is any rosier for Japan than the status quo. In some sense, the task for Japan might be to hold on to that and I wonder how that works in a region with all these various projects underway.

## **Q & A**

I'll stop there and open things up. What we're going to do is let our commentators respond to each other in the context of responding to your questions. So if you would stand up and identify yourself, we have a microphone here and I think we've got a hand-held. Okay. So if you want to speak, get up and use the microphone, identify yourself, your name and your affiliation. And maybe we'll take two or three and then we'll bunch them.

**Questioner:** Admiral Blair, who's the commander of the Pacific forces, has recently made some statements about taking the unilateral relationships that the U.S. has had and changing the security arrangements. An example would be that we run an annual exercise in Thailand called “Cobra Gold,” and we've invited more than just the Thais to that. Singapore has come, we've had observers from Vietnam and other places. In other words, we're making more multilateral arrangements, more than just the unilateral or bilateral relations between the U.S. and these countries. And my question, specifically, is how would Japan see that movement? How would they view a move towards a more multilateral security arrangement in the Asian area?

## **Japan Welcomes Multilateral Security Arrangement**

**Inoguchi:** Very briefly, I think that the Japanese government welcomes such a policy

direction. After all, in the mid-1990s there was a government commission who presented a report that was, according to the Japanese government, misunderstood by the U.S. government. It says in the report that a multilateralist kind of thinking was missing. Only after that was the U.S.-Japan alliance mentioned, so it was mistakenly understood by the U.S. The Japanese government thinks it's always there. But you cannot say it too bluntly, because the U.S. government might not like it. But now, since the United States government likes it, why not?

But of course, the technological level of the gap between the United States and the rest is just terribly, terribly big and interoperability is very difficult to attain anyway, especially in the most advanced weapons applications. But one must start somewhere and I think that direction is most welcome by the Japanese government.

**Ikenberry:** Do either of you want to take it up from there?

**Bob:** Just one aspect, Japan still has some constitutional prohibitions on collective self-defense. Although there has been more discussion on this in recent years, and I guess the most recent poll showed 77 percent or some such figure supporting some constitutional revision, that's a fundamental question that has to be addressed. And when and how that will be addressed is a very difficult question, particularly in the context of continued weak political leadership in Japan. I question when that is going to take place.

**Manning:** Let me say briefly, I think there may be some positive elements to what Admiral Blair is trying to do: using these military exercises to try to build some sense of confidence in these peace-keeping exercises. But I think the potential for multilateralism in Asia has been greatly exaggerated. If you go back, really, starting with Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech in 1986, just about every country in the region, from Canada to Russia

to Mongolia to Japan, has put up one or other kind of proposal for multilateral relations. I guess I would say there's got to be some reason why none of this ever happens. It's not just bad luck.

The reason is the area just isn't ready for it. There's not a sufficient sense of community, as we have in Europe, in order to be able to do that. The de facto security system remains the sort of network of U.S. presence and bilateral security arrangements. And I think until we know the outcome of China's transformation, which direction it will go, I don't think there's much of a basis for altering that, for either Japanese or U.S. interests.

**Questioner:** I'd like to scale down, somewhat, the scope of our present discussion on international relations between Japan and China and Korea. How about looking at the overseas Chinese in Japan and ethnic groups of Koreans in Japan. What about the Japanese policies towards those Chinese and Koreans within the country of Japan? I see the birth rate in Japan is remarkably reduced, and there may be an infusion of foreigners coming into Japan. Does that change the future policy of Japan towards Korea and China, because they are already there in Japan? I wonder if you can comment on these points, and say if there is any dynamic movement going on, ethnic movements in Japan, because they're dealing with the Chinese and the Koreans as well.

**Inoguchi:** I think we have about 300,000 ethnic Chinese citizens, and then close to one million ethnic Korean citizens as quasi-permanent residents.

I think a lot of things have been taking place in Japan, amazingly. A lot of metropolitan areas are inhabited by Koreans, Chinese, and Filipinos, and Indians, etc., and the policy has been changing quite dramatically, in a positive direction. If you go, for instance, to the ward office in Tokyo, there are 23 wards, and in the offices you can see basically the instruction form for what place you have to submit

which documents. The thing is basically in Japanese, Chinese, Korean, and often times English as well: four languages! Everywhere! Some changes, some steady changes have been permeating the rest of Japan as well. I think it's a positive movement and that is one thing.

### **Japan Becoming more Ethnically Diverse**

And then also, ethnic Chinese have been more assimilated, because of their small size, and ethnic Indians are very well assimilated. I forget exactly, but Indians are being very well assimilated, and the ethnic Koreans also have started to assimilate into Japanese society much more positively. They aren't hesitant to proclaim that they have ethnic origins from Korea, and yet they have increasingly been developing an identity as Japanese. Perhaps because those who claim they are the citizens of Japan tend to be more successful than those who stick to the old visa. I think as far as I can see from newspaper columns and books, Koreans originating in Japan are very self-confident. They are quite well assimilated.

Of course, there are prejudices. These conditions do exist, but there is something qualitatively different from the time when I was an undergraduate student in the early 1960s. At that time I studied Korean and Chinese, and at that time there were not many friends who studied such esoteric languages. But now there are a number of students studying these languages, and somehow things have been changing. Of course not all of them are changing in a positive direction. For instance, lots of missile shootings from North Korea, etc. makes things much worse. So not everything is positive, but some things are positive, especially in local communities. And also businesses hiring practices are getting slightly different. So I see a movement, slowly, but steadily positive.

**Questioner:** What about the future between China and Japan?

**Inoguchi:** Yes, take the instance of the former secretary general of the Liberal Democratic Party, Hiromu Nonaka. He has a very interesting background, a sociological background in Japanese society. He doesn't hide it, and he says, basically, he was involved when very underclass groups lived together in the Kyoto suburbs. I mean, his family, a lot of Koreans, and then a lot of underworld kind of people, at least formerly, helped themselves and each other in this setting. And he also remembers when he was very young, or his brother and sister were very young, and their nanny was Korean.

So things like this make the Japanese policy toward Korea and China slightly different. And Nonaka has been a key architect of the Japanese policy towards North Korea. I do not necessarily support his particular brand of policy towards North Korea, but his argument is very simple: Japan has done terrible things towards his own group of people, inside Japan, as well as Koreans and Chinese. Why not rectify these things? He says, basically, he experienced, at home, Japanese colonialism. He's probably the last generation of Japanese who knows something about Japanese colonialism, and he should be able to do something about the Japanese policy towards North Korea. There are many opinions about his thinking and many oppose it, but somehow, at a fairly high level in the governing party, he has been pushing that policy.

But the Minister of Foreign Affairs may have some different views, and many members of the LDP have different views, but somehow this is a positive and it is a fact that he, with such a background, has led the governing party at a very high level. It's an indication of some significant change in Japanese society and probably in Japanese foreign policy towards Asians.

**Manning:** Just very briefly, I think your original question had to do with new flows of immigrants from China and Korea. There may be some slight improvement in terms of

those Koreans and Chinese who have been in Japan for two or three generations. However, I find it hard to believe that, if there were large numbers of, say North Koreans, in the aftermath of reunification, who wanted to come to Japan, there would be any acceptance of that. Or, if there were extreme economic difficulties in China, and some of those people were to try to get into Japan, I suspect there would be a tremendous outpouring of resistance to that by average Japanese and by Japanese politicians.

**Inoguchi:** Of course. Well, when the UNHCR said that the number of refugees accommodated by the Japanese government in a particular year, from one year to the next year, was doubled, the UNHCR at Japan headquarters said, but the absolute number is from one to two! Not much!

### **Japan's China Policy Nationalistic and Realistic**

**Questioner:** I entered this place with a very long-term view of Japan's stance and perception on the continent, especially China. And I'm curious, I'd like to hear a little bit shorter term of Japan's policy and perception now on China. It seems to me the recent Japanese policy towards China is a little bit nationalistic and realistic. I think, for example, the recent liberal pro-China *Asahi* newspaper has agreed to the same thing as the government, not to issue the visa to the former representative of Taiwan. So myself, I see a very big change in Japanese perceptions. I'm curious to hear if it's changing, how much is it going to be changed, or if not changed, I'd like to know the reason. Thank you.

**Inoguchi:** Well, I think you are right. Compared to the height of pro-Chinese sentiment in the Japanese society, early 1990s, '91, '92, when the twentieth anniversary of the normalization was registered, to 2002 or 2001, the Japanese view of China has been quite low, and something has happened.

But of course, important, is China's rise in economic as well as military terms. Also, most directly, an impact came from the top leader, Jiang Zemin's visit to Japan in 1998, and then, somehow, he preached the history issue very vigorously and very repeatedly. That was something that the Chinese government also reflected upon quite cautiously and thoughtfully, and somehow, they have changed their policy towards Japan.

But somehow a number of events have, before as well as after, been changing the Japanese opinion towards China a little more negatively. But I must say, about 25 or 35 percent, maybe feel like Governor Ishihara on China, but not more than 50 percent, definitely. The majority believes and thinks it's wise for Japan to keep a friendship, but not at any cost; basically, at any cost other than a solid alliance with the United States.

**Questioner:** We heard, in your talk and in some of the comments, a very dramatic reshaping of some of the region's security architecture, either in the case of Korean reunification or confederation or Chinese democracy. But what I kind of missed from the talk is what this means in terms of the region's economic relations. If we're talking about a region where China is dominant, what does that mean in terms of the regional economy? Does that really reshape Japan's role in the regional economy? Southeast Asia's role? China's role? and is that realistic? Because some of these security changes, in your talk, seem to imply economic business as usual, and I'm not so sure that would be the case. So could you say a little bit, if we're thinking fifteen, twenty years, what does the region look like in economic terms if some of these security changes come about?

**Inoguchi:** Well, in ten years or so, there will be a lot of difficulties, because North Korea and China's west are not like Texas or California in mid-nineteenth century America. They are more difficult, and therefore lots of efforts, lots of ingenuity, money, and goodwill

is necessary. But we are not quite sure how all these good things will go over, there. So I think the path is going to be very hazardous and difficult, despite the South Korean capitalists who wish to have a North Korean market, and the Chinese capitalists who wish to develop the Chinese west so that China can stand tall in the world market.

I think the Japanese would be most cautious among Asian capitalists in terms of investing directly in North Korea or China's west, and that's why all the aid looms very large. You've got to give, you have to have it like the Western Europeans. The guy in the late 1980s who gave me, you know, here is *cordon dangereuse*, here is *cordon sanitaire*. But you've got to think about it and in terms of further development, it takes, basically one century.

North Korea could take less time, but China's west is huge. If you look at it in terms of arable land or inhabitable land of China, from Heilongjiang province down to Guanxi province or Hainan province, it's like a Chinese ring, like the Japanese archipelago. The rest, a greater West, is kind of difficult to develop, to inhabit and to utilize.

So I think, regarding China's modernization, I'm not persuaded by China's fifth modernization guide. I think the Chinese government would stumble on that ambitious of a project, at least occasionally. Then, somehow, if Henry Rowan is correct, in 2025, the Chinese will stand up and try to rename the Chinese Communist Party to the Chinese Democratic Party and then try to democratize itself from within. But that path is also very hazardous. Eventually, I think, all capitalists are happy if they can see the Chinese west developed as the American Texas, American California were.

But it takes time. I don't share Robert Manning's view, that it is slow but it is quick. The amount of the task is immense, therefore it takes time. It's quick, but it takes time.

**Ikenberry:** Paradoxical.

**Manning:** Let me say a couple of things on the economic side. I think in a fundamental sense the economic stuff is easier, because it's not a zero-sum game. Having said that, though, first of all, you have to remember that about 70 percent of the East Asian economy is Japan. Even with all its slowdown and all the Chinese growth, we still have a Japanese economy that's about five times the size of China's.

The problem with China is that everybody discounts the present for the future and treats China as if it were already this great industrial power, when in fact you have an economy roughly the size of Britain. With China, you have a great power where you can't even drive between the two biggest cities because there is no road. I think they have a long way to go.

### **Pan-Asian Development**

But there have been a lot of Pan-Asian developments, most recently the ASEAN Plus Three exercise, and that raises some interesting questions too. They're talking about modeling ASEAN after the EU. Well, that will be really interesting. Are we going to have an RMB zone or a Yen zone? I don't think there's going to be a lot of support in Japan for that, for an RMB zone, and I can guarantee you there's no support in China for a Yen bloc. So that's going to be an interesting question.

I also think that China getting into the WTO is going to be a very interesting experiment. We don't know how it is going to work or if it will even succeed, or maybe even change the WTO in the process. So that's also a big question mark.

I think the one thing they have achieved is mostly due to American negligence. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the currency swap idea is one concrete manifestation of this sort of Pan-Asian economic cooperation. But how far we'll go beyond that is difficult to

see. I mean, the one intriguing thing is China's proposal for a free trade area within ASEAN, which is really bizarre because, essentially, China's doing all the investment, and all the markets for ASEAN. So, I'm not sure quite how that works in terms of complementary economies.

### **Asian Insularity against American Imperiousness**

But I think there is a sense of trying to, in a way, insulate the region against what I think is viewed, somewhat widely, as a kind of American unpredictability or imperiousness. Much of this feeling flows from recent experiences, major events, particularly the American response to the '97/'98 financial crisis, and then, secondly, the war with Yugoslavia over Kosovo, because I think that threw everybody off. Even in Japan, for example, which may have been sympathetic, it was really difficult to swallow, because it was outside the United Nations' framework. So you had Japan sort of torn between its own strong identification with the UN framework for inter-national relations and the alliance with the United States.

I think those events, with this notion of a sort of 800-pound gorilla that could make up the rules as it goes along, has generated kind of a backlash. I would argue that both in Europe and in Asia, they are trying to create mechanisms to insulate themselves from the impetuosity, of American policy.

**Bob:** Just very quickly. I think what Bob mentioned about Japan still being the overwhelming economic power is often forgotten. I don't think it's 70 percent, I think we're down to about 65 now after ten years of stagnation. But it will be interesting to see what happens over the next ten years in Japan and see if there is, finally, a movement out of the economic problems it faces. I must say I'm rather skeptical, because there's still no political leadership there. There's very little willpower, and I don't think the populace believes they're in as dire straits as I think outside observers think.

### **China's Entry into WTO Could Bring Problems**

Second, China's entry into the WTO, assuming it does happen, will be a very interesting phenomenon to follow. Because if China, and I stress the word if, China lives up to its obligations, in a period of about five years, they will have radically opened their market. The results of that will be incredible amounts of social dislocation, unemployment, and a tremendous number of new problems.

Now if they don't live up to their obligations, that creates a whole new set of problems as well. As far as these free trade arrangements, ASEAN Plus Three, I have to say I'm rather skeptical about things like that. People seem to have forgotten about the APEC free trade agreement, which doesn't seem to be going anywhere either. The ASEAN free trade agreement is sort of stuck in neutral. In cases of the bilaterals between Japan and Singapore, well, as Professor Inoguchi said, there's no conflict there.

But there's also been this idea of a Japan/Korea free trade agreement. That's going nowhere, because that's a case where there are conflicting interests. So I must say, I'm rather skeptical about these things. First, without U.S. leadership on global trade liberalization, I just don't think we're going to move anywhere, and that's a question that has to be resolved in this country. I hope it's resolved and gets fast-tracked and so forth, but who knows?

**Ikenberry:** One last question...yes?

**Questioner:** I have a question to Dr. Inoguchi. Since George Bush came to power it seems that the U.S. government has emphasized the importance of its relations with allies in Asia, particularly with Japan. The officials said, we will never repeat a mistake made by the Clinton administration, letting an American president stay in China for a week without even a stopover in Japan. So they're kind of

emphasizing relations with Japan, but, in the meantime, sort of downgrading the importance of China in its American/East Asian policy.

### **Bush Administration Tougher on China**

Obviously, I think it's probably good news to the Japanese. At the same time, though, I think the Bush administration also, kind of related to this "getting nice" with Japan, is also getting tougher with China. If you read the Armitage report, it's attaching more importance to Japan. It also means that the United States probably would want Japan to play a more important role in the secret affairs in East Asia. That, it seems to me, as the recent air collision indicates, could bring Japan to more of a forefront of possible confrontation with China if something goes wrong.

So I just wonder, is Japan ready for that kind of more important role in secret affairs in Asia? How does Japan perceive the policy change in the Bush Administration regarding Japan vis-a-vis China? Thank you.

**Inoguchi:** Well, I think, on the one hand, the Japanese government has welcomed the Bush administration in their regional policy in many ways. But on the other hand, it is quietly a little bit apprehensive of the tough tasks that

might be requested by the Japanese government. Like, that's why, basically, the Japanese government has been quite quiet on the Hainan thing. It's very difficult to say something because, basically, they're in a solid alliance with the United States and they have a friendly relationship with China. Two things the Japanese government thinks are very dear.

So you almost have to be shot. And so, it's not one-sided positive. They're quite apprehensive about what the Bush administration would do, very apprehensive because, you know, many actions in Asia by the United States tend to originate from Okinawa, Japan. For instance, in 1999, the Marines had started to move to Jakarta from Okinawa naval base and then the Hainan things, again, originated from Okinawa airport.

So the Japanese are quite apprehensive, a lot of anxiety, not really one-sided positive, but difficult. The Japanese government does not say, in public, they are really apprehensive about Bush. It's like the Democrats saying, "Is President Bush able to properly speak English?" These kinds of things, they don't say.

**Ikenberry:** With that we will end and I hope you would join me in thanking our three panelists for a very stimulating evening. Thank you. (End)

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## About the Panelists

### Main Speaker

**Dr. Takashi Inoguchi** is Professor of Political Science at the Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo. He also has had visiting appointments at universities such as Geneva, Harvard, SAIS, U.C. Berkeley, Aarhus, Gadjah Madah, Delhi, Beijing, and Singapore. He was an Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations, working as Senior Vice Rector of the United Nations University Headquarters in 1995-1997. He is now President of the Japan Association of International Relations and the editor of two academic journals: *Japanese Journal of Political Science* and *International Relations of the Asia Pacific*. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from M.I.T. Dr. Inoguchi has published *Japan's Asian Policy: Revival and Response* (forthcoming in 2002), *Global Change: A Japanese Perspective* (2001), and *Japanese Foreign Policy Today* (coeditor, 2000).

### Discussants

**Mr. Daniel Bob** is currently an independent consultant. Formerly he worked for Sen. William V. Roth Jr. (R-Del), Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, as Special Assistant for Asian and Pacific Affairs. When Sen. Roth previously Chaired the Governmental Affairs Committee, Mr. Bob handled nuclear nonproliferation issues, an area of jurisdiction for that Committee. Mr. Bob also has been Assistant Director for Studies and Policy Programs at the Japan Society of New York. Mr. Bob is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, serves on the Asian Advisory Committee to the International Republican Institute and the Steering Committee of Georgetown University's Congressional Forum on International Trade. He was awarded a Fulbright Scholarship in Fiji and holds a B.A from Yale and an M.A from Harvard. He speaks and writes frequently on U.S.-Asia relations.

**Dr. Robert Manning** is a C.V. Senior Fellow and Director of Asian Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and active on the Executive Board of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. Dr. Manning has been a Senior Fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute and chair of PPI's Defense Working group, an advisor to the Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State until 1993, and has served as an advisor to the Department of Defense. Dr. Manning has been a correspondent with *U.S. News and World Report* and the *Far Eastern Economic Review*. He writes, edits and contributes to numerous newspapers journals and texts and has authored *The Asian Energy Factor: Myths and Dilemmas on Energy, Security and the Pacific Future* (2000), and *Back to the Future: Towards a Post-Nuclear Ethic* (1994).

### Moderator

**Dr. G. John Ikenberry** is Professor of Political Science at Georgetown University. Additionally, he was a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. Dr. Ikenberry received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. He is the author of numerous publications, including, *State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy* (forthcoming), *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (2000), and *Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government* (1988).