

Current Trends in East Asian Opportunities & Challenges

by

Professor Robert Scalapino

Robert Scalapino: Thank you very much, John, for the very generous introduction. First, let me say that it's a great pleasure to be here and to see so many old friends, some of whom I haven't seen for a decade or more. Let me also say that the remarks I am about to make are obviously those of one American scholar. Other Americans may disagree with them, and certainly those of you who are in the audience from various parts of Asia may have different points of view. I welcome your views when we come to the question and discussion period.

No Single East Asia

I would like to start by a few very broad observations about East Asia today. First, this area is marked by great diversity. There is no single East Asia. This is one reason I've always objected to the concept of Asian values, because there are many values and many different systems in East Asia.

For example, in the economic field one goes from societies that are still heavily state-dominated, albeit changing, with the possible exception of North Korea, to those that are experimenting with more open market economies. But even they are facing problems in making fundamental economic reforms, as I shall indicate a little later.

Emerging Civil Societies

In the political field, we range from auth-

oritarian, highly or hard authoritarian societies, I think really only one of these is left at the moment, again, North Korea, to what I've called authoritarian pluralist societies, where the systems still fall far short of political openness but where civil societies are emerging apart from the state as a result of development and where you have varying degrees of freedom of speech, of flexibility in terms of publication, and where you have a mixed economy, with the market playing an increasingly important role to the democracies.

I define democracy, incidentally, as having three essential elements, to put it very simply. First is political choice in its maximum form. Second is the requisite freedoms to make that choice meaningful. Thirdly is the rule of law. It seems to me that if a society meets those three criteria, perhaps imperfectly, it deserves the definition of a democracy.

One of the points I wish to make tonight is that we face a paradox. In East Asia, democratic societies are emerging rather rapidly and rather extensively in recent decades. Secondly, those democracies are facing serious problems today, almost without exception. But I'll come in more detail to that point later.

The next general point I wish to make is that every society today, in East Asia as well as elsewhere, is facing the interaction of three somewhat conflictual forces: internationalism, nationalism and what I call communalism. I don't think I need to

spend a great deal of time on internationalism. Both in its institutional and noninstitutional forms, it is spreading. We are seeing the advent of not only ASEAN but also ASEAN Plus Three, of ARF, of various economic entities in the region, the Asian Development Bank and IMF role in the noninstitutional form, the rapid development of trilateralism and quadrilateralism, the attempt to bring societies together, countries together, to talk about mutual issues and problems.

U.S. Foreign Policy Based on Concert of Nations and Balance of Power

It is one of my themes that American foreign policy is today and will continue to be based on two foundations in this connection. One, a concert of nations attempting to put together coalitions that have common interests, facing a specific problem and working on that. I think we've had a concert of nations on the Korean issue, because I would argue that China, the United States, Japan and South Korea have had a common interest in trying to have a peaceful evolutionary development with respect to North Korea and North-South relations.

And there are many other issues. But at the same time, a second foundation of American policy will be a balance of power. It is a hedge against the rapid growth of military modernization throughout the region, of serious territorial issues, of other potential conflicts. This combination of concert of nations and balance of power I think can and will continue to go together in varying dimensions.

But let me make it clear that I see in East Asia now the resurgence of nationalism, the second force I mentioned. In part, per-

haps, this is a reaction to the inroads of internationalism, the fear that the nation-state is being undermined. Or the feeling that some nation, often the feeling is the United States is intervening in the internal affairs of another nation. It is particularly strong in situations where people feel they have not been treated with equality or fairness, or where they have a desire to emerge as a stronger voice.

In Japan, the urge to be a normal nation, to be accepted as a major power, to have greater influence in the Security Council of the United Nations, for example, by having permanent membership. In China, I saw it very strongly. I just lectured for four weeks at EDA, at Peking University, to young graduate students. Their interests do not really stem from ideological factors of the past. Their interests are much more contemporary; i.e. make China rich and strong. It fits into their personal patterns, which are, "I want a good job, I want an income, I want to be in this society and in a better position than my father and my grandfather were in terms of standard of living." But whatever its sources, nationalism is in many situations emerging, it's important and must be taken into consideration.

Communalism a Strong Tendency

The third factor, communalism, I think in this period of intensive change, many people feel that their moorings are being undermined. Who am I? To what do I belong? What are my values? And there is, therefore, a certain tendency to revert to identification with one's ethnicity, the move toward religion, particularly fundamentalist religion or sectism, or to concentrate on the local community. In an interesting way, therefore, the nation-state

is facing two kinds of challenges, one from the top, internationalism, one from below, communalism. Every Asian state that I have visited in recent times is having to adjust to those. Let me make it very clear: this is not an Asian phenomenon, it's true in the Western world as well.

Now, having made those points let me make one final remark before turning to some specifics. I am impressed with the rapid impact of the IT revolution throughout East Asia and the degree to which it is influencing younger generations in particular. It is producing an enormous spread, generationally speaking, between those who now want to get into the whole IT revolutionary sequence, Internet, the problems of communication, versus those who are still living in the much more traditional past.

Generational Differences May Be More Important Than Ideological Differences

I think in analyzing what is going to happen in Asia, this generational factor has to be given great emphasis. Once again, I do not define this as strictly East Asian. I don't begin to understand my grandsons' and granddaughters' feelings about music and other things. I'm in a different generation. They've moved faster than I have. But I think this question, in this era, is very important, because generational differences may be more significant than ideological differences.

Let me now turn to some of the specifics and talk about some of the individual countries. We are, I believe, past the economic crisis in its more dire forms. But almost everywhere in East Asia, economic recovery is uneven. One of the problems for societies like Japan and South Korea

and some of the Southeast Asian countries are that fundamental economic change involves cultural change, and therefore it cannot come quickly or easily.

I think we are seeing in a society like Japan today the difficulty of fundamentally altering a system that was so successful for so long. The Japanese model of earlier times was that the government served as a kind of convoy leader. It identified key promising sectors of the economy; gave them maximum support, and there was much collusion in this; allowed limited transparency and supported the *keiretsu* system, import controls, protectionist and export orientation, flying up on the rising markets, particularly the United States. That system worked exceedingly well for some decades. It was passed along in various forms, to South Korea, to other societies.

But I think Japan is one case study of the fact that no economic strategy, however successful, is good for all time. Once the era of globalization set in and the need for real competitiveness increased, this system was not truly competitive in an international sense. The pressures for openness came externally and internally. Yet, to make the fundamental changes required very basic cultural adjustments that have not yet been made. This is a kind of, I won't say crisis, but it is a challenge that faces a number of societies today in the East Asian context.

Pressures Operate in Former Socialist States

I think we are seeing that other pressures operate in the former socialist states. China declares itself a socialist market economy. China's economic advances, be-

ginning with the Deng Xiaoping period, have been truly spectacular, no question about it. The standard of living has been raised for hundreds of millions of Chinese. You have a generation that is now moving into the IT revolution. You have a pragmatic leadership; the technocrats have replaced the ideologues, with few exceptions. All of these are developmental in their impact. And yet, China faces enormous problems in the socialist sector of its economy, in the state-owned enterprises, in the problem of unemployment, in the farmer unrest, in the West-East gap and in the difficulties of corruption, which are widespread. And how to make this transition further without too greatly disturbing the political system is a problem.

We're seeing much of the same thing, in my opinion, in Vietnam. It is an indecision as to how far economic change and reform can go without challenging the political system. For North Korea, of course, the dilemma has only begun. It is my view that Kim Jung Il several years ago decided that North Korea had to change, otherwise the society was going to collapse. Yet he and others at the top of the elite in North Korea are naturally worried about the degree to which economic change will affect the political system, and how far and how fast to go and what kind of restraints to hold.

This dilemma, which is a part of the transition of Stalinist societies to modernity, especially in a very traditionalist society like North Korea, is an acute dilemma. Nonetheless, the broad trend is for greater openness, for the increased importance of the market. One hopes eventually to handle in some degree the problem of corruption and entanglement.

A Case for Authoritarianism

Let me turn for a moment to the political scene. I am perhaps unorthodox in one respect here. I think at a certain stage in a society's development a case for authoritarianism can be made, because it provides political stability at a time when economic development is the primary goal. I found it very interesting that in South Korea recently, a poll showed that Park Chung Hee was regarded as the most successful president in the post-1945 period. Now, Park was no democrat; he was a military authoritarian. But he launched South Korea's economic development, and did so successfully.

This dilemma confronts a democratic society. One of the crises in East Asia democracies today is the risk of immobilization, of an inability to move. Again, let me start in Northeast Asia. Japan at the moment has a weak government. Prime Minister Mori last week in a public opinion poll in Japan got 17 percent approval, 17 percent. A weak coalition where Kato Koichi is challenging Mori from within the party and the uncertainties about the future grow.

In that kind of setting, it's very difficult to pursue a strong policy, be it economic reform or political development. Even Kim Dae Jung, in South Korea, is in growing difficulty with the charge that he has spent too much time on foreign policy and not enough time on domestic economic problems. While that's a partisan view, it's one that if the economic situation in South Korea continues to be fragile, with *chaebols* going into bankruptcy, it's an issue and a view that is likely to grow.

Another factor of course is the personal-

ism in the politics of many East Asian democracies. They are not strongly institutionalized, and the personal acrimony can overwhelm the institutional safeguards and mechanism. We are witnessing in the Philippines a crisis, as you know, the impeachment of Mr. Estrada.

Once again, the question of the viability of an elected government that needs to take strong actions. Indonesia is perhaps the most troublesome case. Abdurrahman Wahid many regarded as an extraordinarily shrewd man, if somewhat mercurial, when he came into office. But now he is faced with severe challenges that seemingly are not being met. Separatism is rising and the problems of this society under a democratic order seem quite formidable.

Military Have Not Assumed Power In East Asia

There is one thing that differs from the past. As yet, the military in none of these instances has marched forward by means of a coup or a takeover to assume authority. That's what happened in the past, as you know. When civilian governments got into deep troubles in East Asia the military moved in in many instances and established a rule. At present, that has not happened. Whether it is on the horizon in any of these societies, we cannot tell. But in no East Asian society except Myanmar are the military currently in power. And in some cases they seem voluntarily to have backed up to give the civilian government a chance. But I think one must worry about the fragility of a number of the democratic systems.

Now what about the authoritarian systems? It is my view that in the short term,

starting again in Northeast Asia, North Korea will not collapse. I think Kim Jong Il is in firm control with the support of the military, and here the military are very powerful. I think you have a system which, by virtue of its traditional elements, has maintained a reasonable degree of public support despite the crises.

How do you overthrow the Son of God? That's the imagery that Kim Jong Il represents, the son of Kim Il Sung. This is a unique society today. It is one society in the region where traditionalism is so powerful and yet I suspect the elite is worried about their future, because economic change ultimately must bring political change. How will that change transpire? Will it produce internal cleavages, growing debate, uncertainty? That's very possible. Therefore this is still a highly unstable situation.

When one looks at the People's Republic of China, I see three political challenges. First, can China effect and maintain successfully the movement from one-party dominance to increasing collective leadership? That's been the trend, I think it will continue. A fourth generation, as I said more pragmatic, will have to distribute authority and power. That's not an easy task. There is no Mao Zedong on the horizon and I don't think one will come back. China, in its economic development, has provided the basis for a new politic.

The second challenge is the decline of ideology. Ideology is still advanced in formal situations, in party documents and pronouncements of leaders. But in reality, ideology is playing a less and less powerful role. This is one reason, I think, why increasingly nationalism has become so important as a basis for loyalty and sup-

port to the state. The younger generation, as far as I could see, has very limited interest in the ideology. They join the party, often, but that's a mechanism for personal advancement and in those terms understandable. Another challenge.

Neighbors Concerned About a Powerful China

The third political challenge, I think, lies with this question of nationalism. Can it be controlled, useful, important and a force that is giving some substance to policy? But what if it gets out of hand? What if it becomes militant? This is a concern throughout the region of Asia, of China's neighbors. Despite the rapid improvement of China's relations with its neighbors, and there has been improvement, this concern about a new, powerful China with a growing reach is very much the private concern of many of the neighbors.

With Vietnam, I see some of the same kinds of problems. Vietnam did not have the legacy of a single leader as much as China, despite Ho Chi Minh, because he himself bequeathed a kind of collective concept of leadership. But I think you do have a generational problem in Vietnam: the movement from an older, more rigid, more ideological, less flexible leadership to a younger, more pragmatic, developmental leadership. I see Vietnam in the midst of that transition, not yet having made it fully. Therefore, they have a great deal of ambivalence about fundamental economic reform, despite certain commitments and continuing differences between North and South, with the North being more conservative, the South being more entrepreneurial, perhaps partly a legacy of the past. Unity and development, these are

continuing problems in my view.

Let me conclude with a few remarks about foreign policy in the region and bilateral relations, and I'll be very brief. First, the relations bilaterally between the major powers because bilateralism is still the most important factor, despite the growth of multilateralism. Putting my own views briefly, let me start with U.S.-China. I think irrespective of who becomes our next president, and unless somebody has late information – I don't know whom that is, I think we will continue a policy of engagement, because containment is hopelessly outdated and ineffective. There may be variations in the emphasis, but almost certainly the broad effort will be to have a policy that is on balance positive, and yet critical issues will remain between us.

Taiwan: No Solution in Sight

Taiwan is going to be one of the most important. Taiwan is an issue, perhaps the only issue in East Asia, where there's no solution in sight, as far as I'm concerned. China and Taiwan are moving toward greater and greater economic and cultural interaction. I do not believe that there is a danger of a near-term confrontation of a military nature. I think China's priorities are clear, economic development, good relations with neighbors, interdependence. But in the longer term one can only have questions. That will be a continuing source of problems.

I think also there will be, you well know, the human rights issues and some economic issues, although WTO entry will perhaps be critical in these respects. But my own view is cautiously optimistic, that despite our differences we will be able to work on a concert basis on some issues

and perhaps increasingly so in those critical areas like resources, environment and demographic issues that are so important to human security. Incidentally, I think the Chinese, at least those I met and the polls I saw, private polls, overwhelmingly want Gore to be president.

Now conversely, the Japanese want Bush. The reason is, there is a feeling of resentment in Japan that Japan was given second-class treatment in the Clinton administration, that it was downgraded, that it was bypassed on occasion, even though attempted remedies that was not always accepted. U.S.-Japan relations, however, will continue to be crucial. Because our commonality of interests, economic, political, strategic, will be of great importance and in my view, the alliance will continue despite the problems that attended it.

I won't go into those, but I think what's important is that most of Asia sees the U.S.-Japan relationship as a very important one, whether it be to contain Japan militarily or to advantage the region economically. But let me say that Japan, like South Korea, wants to move from a patron-client relationship with us to more partnership and greater independence in its policies, particularly in Asia. That's a trend that will continue. It's a part of the new nationalism.

As far as China-Japan is concerned, I think that is a relationship that will continue to be delicate, despite great economic advances. Because here the legacy of history holds, and there is an instinctive suspicion – if not dislike – on both sides, despite high-level visits. I don't see this having been mitigated much, though maybe younger generations will do so. On the other hand, there are no issues that are so

confrontational that they would result in conflict. It is merely that this is a relationship that will continue to be somewhat fragile.

What about the role of Russia? Japan-Russia have a strategic alliance, or alignment, or partnership – which is the proper word? I don't worry about that. They have a common interest in depreciating U.S. hegemonism, unilateralism and being opposed to NMD and TMD; all of these things are understandable. But I think that fundamentally these are two societies that are quite different. At present the economic relationship is not very strong because of Russia's condition. But in the longer run these are societies that will be as competitive as cooperative. Their interests and position dictate that. Japan-Russian relations are held up by the northern territories issue, and I don't see any immediate change in that.

Putin was warned by his media and by his politicians, don't give away the Kirils. This is not a period when territorial exchanges are easily made. I once proposed to Georgi Arbatov – this was in 1972 – that Russia sell the islands to Japan. It would create no precedent and Japan had money. But he did not accept that.

Russia Will Reemerge as a Global Power

I think Russia will reemerge within 10-15 years as a global power, whether under Putin or his successor. Putin's present policy is to put great emphasis on improving relations with both Europe and Asia as a part of an attempt to rebuild Soviet influence, Russian influence. But that's going to take time.

Let me therefore end with this feeling. There has never been a period in human history where the potentials for rapid advance are as great as they are today, and East Asia holds many opportunities. It has in many cases an educated people, strong determination, an advantageous developmental position. The challenges are equally serious. I think the U.S. must continue to be much more interested and involved than it has been in recent times in trying to work with Asians on a multilateral and bilateral basis to help in the developmental process, to ease tensions. I'm hoping that that can be the course of our policy, whoever is elected president for the next four years. Thank you.

John Ikenberry: Now we'll go to our discussants. Harry, would you like to start?

Harry Harding: Thank you, John, very much, and good evening everyone. It's a great pleasure and honor to be here.

I want to actually begin by saying a few words of tribute to Bob Scalapino. I have been his student for a long time now, actually more than 30 years. And I don't mean just a student of his ideas and his writings, many of which have been presented to you here this evening. But basically a student of, to borrow a Chinese phrase, his work style. This is a man who has demonstrated tonight his breadth of knowledge about Asia. In an era of increasing specialization, he remains an extraordinarily knowledgeable generalist. That, in turn, is based in large part on an extraordinary network of contacts in Asia, many of whom of course were his students whom he trained at Berkeley over the years. Then his ability to synthesize that knowledge that he has acquired through his readings and conversation, but

to do so with enormous balance and objectivity and insight. He also has an indefatigable energy and enormous self-discipline. I won't tell you how old he is, but unless you know, you're not going to guess. This is an extraordinary man and it's a great honor for me to have the opportunity to comment on his presentation this evening.

I'm going to focus almost exclusively on the first third of Bob's presentation, which laid out the broad regional trends that he sees in East Asia. I won't say anything at all about the specific analysis of individual countries that he gave in part two. I will conclude, however, with perhaps a few words about one bilateral relationship that he stressed in part three, which is the bilateral relationship between China and the United States, which I think is increasingly the key to the future of the Asia-Pacific region.

Diversity of Economic Growth Rate and Political Dynamism in Asia

In Bob's presentation addressing the broad trends in the region, he of course began with the diversity of Asia. He mentioned in particular the diversity of economic systems, levels of development, political systems, cultures and so forth. I would also add to that the diversity of economic growth rate and political dynamism. That was implicit in many of his later remarks, but I think I would make it explicit here.

We're not only seeing a diversity in terms of the snapshots of Asia that we might take at this given point in time, but a diversity of the moving pictures as we look at individual elements of the Asian scene. Moreover, that diversity of dynamism and growth rate may change in the

years and decades ahead, as Bob alluded to in some of his concluding remarks. That those that now seem relatively lacking in dynamism, such as Russia and Japan, may regain it, and those that seem to be growing abnormally fast, China and the U.S., may decline. But this is important because these different rates of dynamism have fundamental impact on the perceived balance of power in the region, which I think is critical to some of the other themes that Bob has mentioned.

Boundaries of Asia Under Discussion

Secondly, I would also say in discussing the diversity of Asia that another trend that I think is important is increasing, disagreement or discussion about the boundaries of Asia. What is the boundary of Asia, where do we draw a line on the map and say this is Asia and this is not? You ask Australians and New Zealanders, and they will say they're part of an Asia-Pacific region, but many to their north are not so convinced that they are part of the same region. In recent decades we've talked a lot about the Pacific Rim. As a result, at an APEC meeting now in Brunei there are representatives not just of Asian countries or even of North American countries, but an increasing number of South American countries, with even one or two on the east coast of South America wanting to join the Asia-Pacific region.

Increasingly too, there is a realization that the boundaries of Asia do not end at Burma. India, Pakistan, perhaps even Central Asia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and so forth may be parts of Asia as well, especially insofar as the Sino-Indian relationship is going to be critical to the Asian balance of power. So as the contested boundaries of Asia expand, then so does the diversity, both in

the static sense and in the dynamic sense, also increase.

I also want to underscore one other theme that Bob made in this part of his remarks and maybe extend it a little bit further. Bob noted that democratic societies are emerging in Asia but they are fragile and troubled. Perhaps we could put it more broadly, that no solution, no blueprint to democracy exists. Nothing proves to be perfect. Everyone has contradictions. In the case of democracy, some of us were discussing before dinner whether there is a common denominator that explains the problems of the Philippines, of Taiwan, of Indonesia, of Japan, and of Korea. I think that there is not but there may be some common threads.

One of course is the underlying ethnic and societal differences within complex societies. Another is the absence of what I would call the normative base for effective, stable democratic institutions. Here, I'm combining both the concept of an effective rule of law, which Bob mentioned, but also what might be called either a civic culture, if you're old-fashioned like me, or in the more recent Robert Putnam definition of the term, a civil society, if you're more up to date. In other words, the notion of the values, the orientations toward political life that are widespread in a society. In other words, these may be democratic institutions without democratic culture and democratic legal systems.

Finally, just as we are learning in our own country in the past week, so too is Taiwan learning, Hong Kong is learning, that constitutions matter. Some constitutional systems have very serious contradictions; especially when legislatures and execu-

tives are elected separately, and there's no guarantee that he or she who controls the executive controls the congress. We see that this is an increasing problem in a number of Asian countries. I'm thinking especially of Taiwan but also Hong Kong, where there is a contradiction between the executive and the legislature because of different methods of selection.

So I emphasize and agree with the idea of the diversity of Asia, but I would add and expand on some of these points. In addition, I should have said that in addition to the contradictions in democratic societies, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 also alerted us to the contradictions within open market economies. The idea of export orientation at a time when perhaps major economies elsewhere are slowing down; the idea of openness to incoming foreign direct investment and portfolio investment, at a time of rapid movement of hot money; and the idea of a pegged exchange rate, when currency volatility can occur and where the peg can be broken under pressure, all suggest that there are serious contradictions even in this most successful of economic models.

Information Technology Divides as Much as it Unifies

We turn then to the second of Bob's major themes in this first part, the three conflicting forces of internationalism, nationalism and communalism. Let me suggest that the impact of information technology can be seen actually in the growth of all of these. We tend to see IT as the instrument of globalization, the instrument of internationalism. I think that's wrong. It is in part that, of course. But I think that information technology in the postmodern world is a technology that divides as much

as it unifies. In the same way that broadcasting in the United States, for example, and electronic publishing have created many multiple small communities. These have replaced what I grew up with as a boy, when you basically all read *Time*, *National Geographic* and *the Saturday Evening Post*, and you all had a choice of listening to NBC, ABC, CBS or the Mutual Network.

Now you have hundreds of cable choices, thousands of radio stations, an infinite number of Internet web sites, all of which enable you to tune in to ideas that you agree with and tune out those that you don't. So I see information technology as something that promotes nationalism and communalism as much as it does globalism and internationalism.

The key here is what kind of system, international system, are these various forces – the diversity, the different rates of dynamism, and these competing forces in Asia – producing? There's a spectrum of possibilities here, depending largely on the balance of the three competing forces that Bob mentioned. Internationalism promotes cooperation. Nationalism promotes competition. Communalism promotes disintegration. Depending on the weight and then depending on the relative power of the major actors, you can have anything from a community, on the one hand, as it's emerging in Europe, to anarchy on the other, as unfortunately is characteristic of parts of Africa. In between, you go from community, to unipolarity, to a concert of powers, to a balance of power, to bipolarity.

Bob argues that the future of Asia will lie somewhere in the middle of this spectrum from community to anarchy. He says it

will be some concert of power and a balance of power. I suppose that if all these three forces are at work that some kind of blending will produce that combination that Bob mentioned. But I'm somewhat less confident of that. One reason is that I'm less confident about the future of U.S.-China relations than he is. Bob applied to this critical issue one, if you know him, one of his most typical phrases, he is known for cautious optimism. That's how he described his views toward the future of U.S.-China relations.

Growing Security Dilemma Between China and the U.S.

I'm afraid that I am less optimistic and more cautious increasingly. I fear that we are seeing a growing security dilemma between China and the United States, growing mutual mistrust where one country feels threatened by the other, undertakes countermeasures which in turn are perceived by the other country as threatening, which therefore undertakes countermeasures, and so forth and so on. And that moreover, within each society, including our own, the issue is becoming increasingly politicized, so that those who argue for restraint, for engagement, for a mature assessment of competing and common interests are called either "panda-huggers" here in the United States at best, or basically agents of Chinese influence at worst. Or China are called *xin mei pai* at best and traitors to China and to socialism at worst.

So I'm very concerned about the future of U.S.-China relations. I think the possibility of a constructive strategic partnership is fading by the month, if not entirely dead. I think that we are going to have – this is not to say I want it or that we should say it as our policy – I think we are

going to have a competitive relationship with China. The issue is whether that relationship is going to be a destructive, zero or negative sum relationship, or whether there is such a thing as a constructive strategic competition between two countries such as China and the United States.

But because I'm more concerned about U.S.-China relations than I think Bob is, I'm also less optimistic that there will be a blend of concert of powers and balance of power. I'm more concerned about the possibility of renewed bipolarity in Asia, a confrontation between China and the United States into which others might be drawn. Thank you.

Matthew Palmer: Thank you, John, Professor Harding, Professor Scalapino. It is an honor to be here. I can recall inheriting from my father a couple of volumes of Professor Scalapino's work, books that he had read in undergrad in college. It's quite possible, actually, that he inherited them from his father, although I haven't actually checked the publication date.

Let me begin with a caveat that I hope is totally unnecessary, which is while I do in fact work for the U.S. government, currently I'm not here to represent U.S. government views, otherwise they would have sent somebody much less interesting, I trust. So the views that I express here have been informed by my years in government, but do not necessarily reflect official U.S. government policy. I assume that everybody in this room is familiar with what U.S. government policy is. If there are any particular questions about what that policy might be I would endeavor to answer them during the Q&A period to the best of my ability. But for now, the opinions are my own, at least the

intelligent ones. The foolish ones I intend to pass off on other people later on.

So let me cut right to the chase and comment on a few of the observations that Professor Scalapino made in his remarks. I was, as I believe Professor Harding was, particularly struck by the divisions that you pointed to, professor, in terms of the role of internationalism, nationalism and communalism as it affected both individual societies in Asia and affected the region as a whole. I think you made the point yourself that this was not a phenomenon that was unique to Asia, I think that's absolutely true. It's a model that I think is applicable in terms of deepening the understanding of developments in Europe and Africa, in South America to a certain extent. And I think it is a function or a reflection of trends in globalization that are impacting Asia and elsewhere.

U.S. Government Will Embrace Internationalism in East Asia

In terms of what it means for the United States in our efforts to formulate policy and decide how it is that we should engage in Asia, I think internationalism is the level at which governments are most inclined to engage, and something that the United States government, I believe, will wind up embracing very strongly in East Asia. We've seen over the last couple of years a virtual explosion in terms of fora for multilateral cooperation. Even so, I would contend that multilateral structures, multilateral fora in Asia are relatively still underdeveloped compared to the rest of the world. I expect that will change. But many of the structures that are forming for multilateral dialogue and cooperation are in some ways immature or unformed or lack a *raison d'être*. They're

structures for the sake of structures, without yet a good understanding on the part of the participants as to what it is that they hope to accomplish through those structures. That's something that will take time to work out. I expect it will run through multiple stages in development of institutions.

Again, from U.S. perspective, it would be important that the structures that become the most important for discussing regional issues, and I would argue in particular regional security issues, are structures that include the United States. I don't believe that there's anything inherently threatening about East Asian nations sitting down with other East Asian nations to talk about issues of Asian interest. But I do believe it would be important on our part to ensure that we are actively engaged with others in the region, both on a bilateral basis and on a multilateral basis, and that we maintain the relevance of the U.S. presence in Asia over the course of the next decade.

I was in that context struck by the relative lack of focus in your comments, professor, on the role of the U.S. in Asia, and in particular on the role of the U.S. military. I believe that the forward deployment of U.S. forces in Asia on the Korean Peninsula and in Japan has been an important factor for stability in Asia for decades and will continue to be so, or should continue to be so, in the future. The United States will need to work closely, both with allies and with others in the region, to make sure that the U.S. force presence in Asia remains most relevant and acceptable, and in particular, relevant and acceptable to the host country. That is a dialogue that needs to begin urgently and it needs to begin now.

Governments Must Explain Alliance to Public

We need to engage both Seoul and Tokyo, both separately and I believe collectively, in a high-level strategic dialogue about the nature of the alliance, the role of the U.S. in Asia and how it is that the alliance is going to operate. We need to come to an agreed conclusion about how we're going to explain that to our collective publics. Otherwise, I believe the risk is not so much of anti-U.S. sentiment, although that's part of it. But the risk of a growing perception among the publics of South Korea, and Japan in particular, that the U.S. presence has outlived its usefulness could grow to the point where it will become very difficult for the elites in Seoul and Tokyo to bring their publics around to the point of view that the U.S. continues to have an important role as a presence in East Asia.

To look at the question of nationalism and communalism, I agree that this is an important distinction and they're certainly important forces that are at work in Asia and elsewhere. I also believe that the borders between nationalism and communalism are perhaps somewhat indistinct and can blur in particular places at particular times. Having just returned from two weeks in Yugoslavia, I think there is an example where you had the move from communalism toward nationalism. You had communalism developing as Yugoslavia was breaking up into various groups within Yugoslavia, which sought to identify themselves by ethnicity and group together in those structures.

Then as Yugoslavia disintegrated into smaller states, in many cases ethnically based states, the nature of what it meant to

identify with a communal group and with a national group became essentially the same thing. We certainly saw this in Croatia and in Serbia, where the struggle for greater Serbia was both a nationalist struggle and a communalist struggle.

Nationalism Replaced Ideology In China

Back to Asia. In terms of nationalism in China, I was struck by your observation and I agree with it absolutely, that nationalism is serving now in China the role that ideology had served previously. The danger that I see in that is that nationalism is a much more difficult force to control. The advantage from an ideologue's perspective is that if you use ideology as your primary means of control in the exercise of authority, you reserve the right to interpret that ideology. You reserve the right to be the final arbiter of what is or is not consistent with the principles that you've established for the state. Nationalism is a force that is in many ways beyond the control of individuals that use nationalism to exercise power. I believe that, in that, there are great dangers for the leadership in Beijing that will need to be addressed over the coming years.

There is one point that you made, professor, that I would take strong issue with and would look forward to discussing in greater depth. That was the case for authoritarianism that could be made if, if I understand the argument correctly, the primary goal of a society was economic development. I would contend that there is no prerequisite for authoritarianism to pursue economic development. In fact, to contend that it is not up to the people of a society to set the goals for themselves, or how those goals will be set, would do

them a disservice. We have seen in particular in Eastern Europe the way that the end or the termination of authoritarian rule can promote economic development more rapidly than authoritarianism in the Eastern European experience ever could.

U.S. Is Both an Asian and European Power

I guess I would close with one final observation, which would be that there are at least two countries, in fact, maybe only two countries, now that I think about it, which would be the United States and Russia, that make a claim to be both Asian powers and European powers. The ironic thing about it is that the United States and Russia are not accepted either by Asia or Europe as truly Asian or European powers. I believe that to be the United States is to have the freedom not to have to choose. We do not have to decide that we are European or we are Asian. I believe very strongly that the United States is, has been and should remain an Asian power as well as a European power. I hope that your cautious optimism towards our relationship with China in particular bears out.

Ikenberry: We're going to open it up in a second. I just wanted to let Professor Scalapino maybe address this question of China and the different interpretations of where things are at and headed. Would you like to say a few words about that and then we'll open it up? That's the sharpest difference, I think.

Scalapino: Let me perhaps facetiously say that on Monday, Wednesday and Friday I'm optimistic about the U.S.-China relationship. On Tuesday and Thursday, I have some doubts. On Saturday and Sun-

day, I rest. Seriously, my optimism stems from the belief that the broad economic developments in China on the one hand and the sense of national interest and commitments of the U.S. on the other will be conducive to working out our differences, living with some, adjusting and resolving others, in an effort to keep a relationship that's so crucial to the peace and stability of all Asia, as well as our own mutual well-being. I think, for example, any rational leadership in China will see that a conflictual situation of the United States would not only damage their economic priorities but their relationships with their neighbors.

Confrontational Relationship With U.S. Will Hurt China

Quite frankly, most of China's neighbors are still in a wait and see attitude toward this China. On official terms they are in good relations, but underneath I know of no exception around the rim of China who are not somewhat concerned about how China will react as it acquires greater economic and military strength. Therefore developing a confrontational relationship with us will perturb all of the East Asian neighbors and thereby create new problems for the PRC.

Now having said that, I would be the first to acknowledge that I see the coming years as difficult. I think China will increase its military strength, its reach. There is the possibility of a militant nationalism. But in the final analysis, my feeling is that when the alternatives are weighed, just as we somewhat reluctantly came to the position of engagement with China rather than any further attempts at containment, China will come to a position of engagement with us. My optimism

is based upon that general thesis.

Q & A

Ikenberry: We'll take questions and comments. Introduce yourself, your name and your affiliation and then a short question.

Questioner: Just a follow up on the difference, the kind of disagreement between Bob and Harry. I guess the more optimistic assessment from Bob's point is that United States and China still can have conceivable convergence of interests, in the region, in bilateral relations, and also on a global scale. But what I hear from Harry is that that kind of convergence of interests has been decreasing instead of increasing. So I would like both of you to be more specific on these points you made and on what kind of issues in the foreseeable future we still can see the convergence of interests between the two countries. On what kind of issues we will see the decrease of common interests? I would like Bob make your point first, and I would like to hear Harry respond to what Bob says. Thank you.

Scalapino: I'd rather have Harry go first. First of all, as I said, I think China has a very great interest in maintaining relationships with its neighbors, and I don't mean us but its Asian neighbors that are conducive to growing stability and economic and cultural intercourse. I don't think a confrontation with us or high levels of tension will help.

Secondly, I see the leadership in China as moving increasingly toward the more pragmatic, technocratic types. I believe that those types will continue to put the priorities on economic development, on an acceptance of interdependence and up-

on greater pluralism in the society, though that represents many problems.

I think China's domestic problems, thirdly, are going to attract greater and greater attention, because they are real and they lie in the economic and political realms. Therefore, I think there are enormous advantages of being willing to live with differences, being willing to interact and we're going to have more and more levels of contact through the various multi-lateral, bilateral, trilateral instruments. I think also the issues of human security, resources, environment, population, are a potential for a concert of interest. These are reasons that I think are hopeful.

Let me make one final point. When I say these things, I don't mean that a negative scenario is impossible, no. You always have to reevaluate a situation in terms of the factors that are prominent. I acknowledge the possibility of a confrontational scenario. Conflict seems to me so illogical. What I worry about in Asia today is not conflict among or between major powers. I worry about the problem of ailing to failing societies and the kind of conflict that comes out of that sort of situation. It seems to me that's a much more likely scenario for the immediate future than a conflict of major powers.

Harding: If Bob is a cautious optimist, I want to emphasize that my pessimism is also limited. As I said, I'm increasingly concerned that elements of competition are going to be more evident in U.S.-China relations than cooperative elements. But I also said that competition can be constructive, or maybe I should say it can be competition within limits or even constructive. It's fascinating that in economics we think competition is a good thing. We

think that concerts are called collusion in economics, and that's considered a bad thing. But in politics we tend to think that competition is a bad thing and dangerous, whereas collusion is called community or a concert of powers and it's a wonderful thing.

Competition in Politics Not Necessarily Bad

So when we look at it this way, competition is not necessarily a bad thing. The question is whether it is conducted under rules and within limits and whether the outcome of that competition is positive sum or zero sum as opposed to negative sum, which warfare obviously is. So it's that sort of cluster of possibilities that I have in mind. And I want to emphasize that I am talking about competition and not necessarily confrontation. I'm asking what kind of competition it could be.

Now, that doesn't answer the question, which is, basically: where do I see the convergence and the divergence, and where do I see the convergence maybe declining and the divergence increasing? I think that there was a hope in the mid- to late 1990s and especially at the time of the Sino-American summits, bringing China into an international order in the institutional sense and into a trilateral concert of power, U.S.-Japan-China, in the more traditional geopolitical sense.

I think that the problem there was best summarized by a Chinese colleague who said the following: "We understand that the purpose of the United States, American policy, is to integrate China into an international community that is led by the United States." It's not a bad summary of American policy at that time. "We accept

the integration but we don't accept the leadership." There's the rub, because Americans want the integration but also the leadership.

I think that is where the divergence is increasing. Basically, China is increasingly critical of what it calls American hegemony, American leadership. America is increasingly sensitive to what it regards as attempts by the Chinese to undermine American leadership and hegemony. Now, it may be possible to work this out in some way, but I think it'll be fiendishly difficult. That's my concern. So that's number one.

Number two, as Bob has said, interdependence between the two countries is growing. But I don't believe, as the case of U.S.-Japan relations suggested in the 1980s and early 1990s, that interdependence necessarily produces a sense of cooperation and collaboration. It can increase the sense of competition, especially if one side believes that the other side is playing in an unfair way and is not following rules and is aimed at predatory competition, which I believe Americans could very easily begin to believe about China. In fact, many already do. You can read reports of the William Casey Institute about the charges that China's investment in the United States is aimed at undermining American national economic security, and so forth and so on. So I'm not convinced that interdependence is going to eliminate the possibility of a very serious competitive relationship any more than the interdependence of the European nations prevented either World Wars I or II.

Finally, there is Taiwan. What is happening in Taiwan of course is a gradual ero-

sion of a commitment on the island to unification and a movement toward considering unification as only one possible option. I think that is an obvious flashpoint. That's a dynamic that has, I think, made the relationship between the U.S. and China more difficult to manage.

Again, I don't want to say that I am an unbounded pessimist who's talking about the coming conflict with China, but I'm very concerned, much more concerned than I would have been two or three years ago. Because I see, as I said, the beginning of a downward spiral in U.S.-China relations. I'm not entirely sure what forces are going to limit it.

Questioner: Dr. Scalapino, you had recently, or you've just mentioned that your concern with conflict is with the ailing to the failing countries. I'm wondering if you're referring to North Korea and with the current reconciliation that's going on? How do you think that will proceed in the Korean Peninsula, and if and how an eventual reunification will affect the balance of power in East Asia?

Scalapino: If I were to answer fully or try to answer fully those questions, we would have another hour here. Let me just make these points. The first, I think there is a legitimate worry about North Korea as a failing state. But on the other hand, as I said, I think this is one instance where the leadership has decided it must change. That gave an opening for Kim Dae Jung's so-called "sunshine policy" to be effective, because it was answered in a fairly affirmative way.

Now there are many challenges that lie ahead in North-South relations. We are still at the level of generalities with a few

specific advances. So when we move into the security realm, we're going to have enormous difficulties.

North Korea's Efforts An Attempt to Answer Failure

Nonetheless, I think that in the case of North Korea, the decision to try to turn out, not only to the South, but to get diplomatic recognition from a wide variety of states, including this one, and to enter the international community for economic assistance and available resources – all of this is an attempt to answer failure. There is the recognition that the Stalinist economic strategy didn't work. North Korea must still be very careful, even with the use of words – it doesn't like the word "reform" because that means system change. It wants to use just the word "change."

But the broad development is in the direction I've indicated. There are still dangers, risks, for the North in terms of increasing elitist division over speed of change, direction of change, and so forth. We've seen these in other socialist societies. But the point that I would make is that this is a situation which is, for the moment, in a direction that offers promise.

For example, there are other situations which are more difficult. The state in Indonesia, this is an ailing state. Maybe the word failing is too serious, but a state where separatism is mounting and where the center seems incapable of response. The question then is how far will this go, are we going to have a series of East Timors, and what will this mean to the entity involved? Perhaps this raises a broader question, which I think is going to be very central to 21st century politics: under

what conditions should humanitarian intervention take place? We have no agreement on that and no answers.

China, for example, takes the position that no interference in the internal affairs of another nation is permissible. But what is the difference between domestic and international in this age? Take a simple example. Citizens in Sumatra light fires to burn the forest so they can clear the land. The pollution sweeps over Singapore and southern Malaysia. Is that domestic or is it international? If refugees flow out of a country in turmoil and create disturbances in the surrounding region, is that domestic or international?

We haven't begun to face up to these questions, but it's in this range of internal collapse or conflict that I find the most difficult answers. You can say the United Nations should give permission, but under the unanimity rule in the UN Security Council Permanent Membership there are very few instances where you can get agreement at the UN level. NATO involvement – well, you can see the controversy caused in the case of Kosovo. So this is an issue which I think we've got to discuss a great deal more, because I think it's going to be at the center of some of the most critical issues in the future.

Questioner: Back to the China-U.S. relationship. When you look at specific interests, I would propose that they're more convergent than conflictual. If you look at trade, foreign direct investment, educational exchange, taming North Korea, recently nuclear proliferation, integration in international organizations and even the one China policy, it seems to me the United States will not abandon the one China policy and there's convergence with Bei-

jing on that. In terms of hegemony, if you take the case of France, France for decades has been ranting and raving about U.S. hegemony, but that doesn't mean it's going to lead to a conflict between the United States and France.

My point is this, and the question. There are interests in the United States and in China that want to hype the threat and they tend to be militarist. Isn't there a danger by hyping this threat that we really feed into the militarists in the PLA and what's called the Blue Team in the United States?

Questioner: I have two quick questions in my personal capacity. Before I ask them, I just want to associate myself with the introductory remarks Professor Harding had about Professor Scalapino.

The first question I have is on the question of nationalism. I got the impression from Professor Scalapino's remarks that nationalism in Asia was not only an increasing force in Asia, but it was a unifying force, replacing ideology. I may have a misimpression here, but I just want to ask him. In light of the nationalism being a two-edged sword, in Indonesia for example, where Javanese nationalism of course is not the same as Indonesian nationalism, and that the nationalism of the Han Chinese may be exactly the same force that they're worried about when they look at the ex-Soviet Union, where the Russian nationalists ended up being separated from all the minority nationalists in the union. So I think nationalism in China may end up with a centripetal result of the western provinces and maybe the northern ones flying away from the Han Chinese core. So I'd ask him to clarify the unifying principle of nationalism in China.

Secondly, with his final remarks, and I don't mean to pick on just the things I disagree with, because I agree with everything he said. However, I just want to clarify on the regional structures in Asia, in East Asia, that you seem to think they are so fragile and therefore not really doing much in the sense of bringing Asia together in cooperative efforts. I don't think that's exactly what he said, but it didn't sound like he had high hopes for their utility in the near future. But I ask him to remember that APEC was just begun in '93 and has 21 members meeting in Brunei this same day, where they did make strides toward liberalizing trade and investment in the region. They're at a loss now as what their future is, with the WTO enforced.

The ASEAN regional forum started after APEC and is discussing confidence-building measures and South China Sea is on its agenda. China is a member of ASEAN regional forum, of APEC and of the four-party talks on North Korea. So my opinion is that these regional architectures that are growing in the '90s are very valuable for the future of peace and cooperation, not something to be thought little of. I'd like your comments on those two points. Thank you very much.

Scalapino: Let me just say a word about the first point on U.S.-PRC relations. As you know, I tend to agree with you. I think one of the ironies of today is that Marx and Lenin are being proved to be wrong. It was our bourgeoisie that supported the normalization of trade relations and our proletariat that had some objections to it. So I'm not sure the classical socialist class distinctions haven't broken down. And convergence in economic terms is conducive to this, of course.

On the question of nationalism, when I use the term nationalism I mean a focus on the nation-state, that is, the existing nation-state. It's quite true in Indonesia that the Javanese control the nation-state, have controlled it from the beginning, even though they represent only slightly more than 50 percent of the Indonesian population. But I think that if there's separatist movements that are trying to pull away from the nation-state, those have to be defined as communal. Support for the nation-state has to be defined as nationalism.

Separatism Not a Problem For China Today

Now in the case of China, I don't see separatism as a powerful force in terms of East China versus West China. There are, of course, ethnic minorities in China, of which perhaps the most expressive or at least the most individualistic are the Tibetans. There you have a separatist movement, though deeply underground inside Tibet. But generally speaking, I don't think separatism is the problem for China today.

I think, however, what I meant to say was that as the appeal of ideology has gone down in China, and I believe it really has, nationalism becomes a kind of substitute for rallying support, for getting individuals to support the nation-state, to say "We want China to be rich and powerful, we want it to be an impressive force globally and regionally." I agree very much with the thesis which Harry and others have advanced that this can be dangerous; it may get out of control. That's quite possible. But I think nationalism as I have used this term is rising, partly as an opposition to separatism, partly as an

opposition to feeling internationalism is interfering too greatly in the nation-state, and partly as a substitute for ideology.

On the regionalist question, I'm all in favor of trying to support organizations like ASEAN and APEC and ARF. But I would make the point, as was made earlier, that these organizations today are not capable of making or keeping the peace. They have great functions. For one thing, they bring leaders together for private conversations and discussions and they enable an airing of issues. ASEAN's in deep trouble, incidentally, today because of the weakness of one of its key people, like Indonesia, and because of the differences in the ten, once the Indochina countries were added. But I just don't think these mechanisms have been particularly capable of going into the concrete issues. This is one reason why the informal internationalism is so important, putting together trilateral, quadrilateral groups that are capable of trying to reach some consensus on key issues. This is concert of powers.

Palmer: If I could just throw my two cents in on the issue of nationalism in China, I think at least in part in support of what you're saying. Which is that while yes, I would see nationalism as being probably on balance a force for unity, in China it does beg the question of what it means to be Chinese. I think that as China moves toward a definition of "Chineseness," there will be any number of individuals or groups within China who find themselves excluded by that definition. That would include Tibetans, it would include Muslims, it would include any number of potentially restive groups who may find the issue of Chinese nationalism – not just China as a nation-state, but

China as a state of Chinese – as being something that is problematic for them.

Both China and U.S. Hyping the Threat of Each Other

Harding: Can I respond to the question about hyping the threat? Of course the threat's being hyped. Of course, that's the problem. It's being hyped in the United States and it's being hyped in China. I think the predominant view with the Chinese is that the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was deliberate. Maybe not with the knowledge of Mr. Clinton himself, but a deliberate decision by anti-Chinese elements somewhere in the U.S. intelligence or defense establishment. There is a long litany of basically trying to show that everything the United States is doing in Asia is trying to keep China down, beginning with the president's trip to Vietnam, which will be seen as another element of encirclement of China. The strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance is seen as encirclement of China, and so forth and so on.

So both sides are hyping the threat. That's why I'm worried. It's not because I agree with those threat assessments, but because the threat is being hyped, that as each side basically makes these announcements and to some degree engages in policy responses that then feeds the hyping on the other side. Again, I would emphasize the changing political environment in which those who warn against hyping the threat are criticized in increasingly vitriolic terms as people who are selling out the interests of their country. So you kind of said, am I hyping. I'm trying not to hype the threat, but I think there are people on both sides who are and that is precisely why I'm worried.

Questioner: I wanted to ask Bob a question to bring Japan into our discussion. I guess the question is, you placed a great deal of emphasis on the centrality of the bilateral alliance for regional stability and see that stability, that importance for the foreseeable future. But many of the other comments that you made suggest the kind of dilemmas and problematic character of maintaining that centrality, whether it's the rise of China and that the U.S.-China relationship is overwhelming U.S.-Japan relations, or peace breaking out in the Korean Peninsula, making the troops question more problematic. What would you say are the important agenda items on the U.S.-Japan front? What needs to be done? Even if one only wants to maintain the status quo, what has to be done in the face of these regional developments to maintain that anchor relationship?

Japan Has a Great Role to Play in Economic Development in Asia

Scalapino: I think this is a time when we should first of all encourage Japan to develop a more independent policy with respect to economic and political activities in East Asia. My view is that Japan, which is still the second largest economy in the world, next to us, has a very great role to play in trying to encourage economic development in the regions, particularly in Southeast Asia, along market-oriented lines. It has a responsibility to try to continue its own domestic economic reforms, working together on these issues, as well as on the security issues, working together on the Korean matter and on compatible relations with China. We both have problems with China.

Japan has perhaps in some respects more serious problems, at least in the deep

socio-cultural sense. I think that for all of these reasons, Japan is a very critical key to the situation. Now, there are some who believe that in the coming decades we're going to witness a rising Japan. I think it's very important, therefore, for the American side to interact with Japan in a variety of nonofficial manners to try to talk through the problems of democracy. We need to talk through some of the problems of keeping a politically open society. I'd like to see much more dialogue between us on that crucial issue.

Let me just make a general point, which I meant to make earlier and didn't. As I look at the future, I think the challenge for the United States is going to be how to balance a continuing leadership role in trying to support peace and stability in Asia, as well as elsewhere, and manage a revolutionary society at home.

I happen to believe that the United States is the most revolutionary society in the world, in the sense of the depth and pace of change that is affecting every American. It's not surprising that our candidates recently spent 95 percent of their time on domestic issues. Our people, our concerns about a range of issues, from education and crime, Medicare, Social Security – all of the issues go into some form of personal stability and family stability. How will we manage, in this critical period, to keep a leadership role? Whenever people overseas mention hegemony to me, I say, "You better worry also about 'withdrawalism,'" because while that's a minority sentiment at the moment, it's a sentiment that could grow under certain circumstances, particularly if our economy were to go down.

I think this challenge through the next de-

cedes - our relative power is going to decline in the world, because others are coming up, China among them, but not the only one. Our capacity to work with allies, to share burdens more fully, to balance through multilateral institutions a mix of responsibilities – that's going to be the challenge for the next president and the president beyond him. That is, to me, one of the issues we ought to be talking about.

Palmer: On the issue of burden-sharing, professor, and something that I think was likely to be central to the U.S.-Japan alliance, is the question of what it is Japan is able to do particularly with regards to peacekeeping? I would expect that there will need to be an adjustment within Tokyo in terms of their interpretation of their own laws and the constitutional limitations that will allow Japan to participate more fully in international peacekeeping efforts in order to maintain an alliance of equals.

Scalapino: I think there will be some amendment to Article 9 in the constitution. Not right away. Well, I think this will come within the next five years.

Ikenberry: Harry, what are the regional implications of that? What is China's view of Article 9 revision?

Chinese Will Likely Overreact to Revision of Article 9

Harding: I think that, again, without wanting to sound like the most pessimistic person in town, I think the Chinese will very likely overreact to a revision of Article 9 unless somehow there has been a greater ability than there has been to date to put the issue of history to rest in the

meantime. I don't think the Chinese will respond to this well. Obviously, it depends on how Article 9 is revised, but I would imagine that it would be an article that basically in a sense more fully acknowledges the reality. Japan does have an army, it does have armed force, but that it is going to use that armed force for defensive purposes in total conformity with international law. So I think it would be a very reasonable revision, but still I fear that if it were to happen today, for example, the Chinese would overreact. China would, to repeat the phrase, hype the threat.

Ikenberry: Very quick, one last question and then we'll have to call it.

Questioner: It may be a little too particular, but I would welcome some specific comment about ballistic missile defenses. Perversely, the alleged threat from North Korea is one of the main rationales for building a national system in this country, but I have a sense, perhaps particularly if it's a Bush administration, that that technology will be aggressively put forward for Taiwan. What would that do to the various combinations that you've been describing?

Scalapino: I am very concerned about that issue. I think irrespective of whom is president, we will certainly go ahead with TMD. NMD is an issue, which quite frankly divides us not only from some competitors, but is dividing us from some allies, including many members of the European Community. I'm only speaking personally here, but I have personal doubts that this is a wise course to take - I'm talking about NMD now - given the repercussions that are almost certain to follow in terms of an enhancement of, as

it were, the military race and an estrangement from some of those with whom we are allied.

Having said that, I think the thrust at the moment politically is to move ahead with missile defense, not just based on the North Korean threat. That was always a bit of a – I don't want to use the word scam, but a stretch, yes. But I think that, I hope that this receives serious discussion in the United States. I'm not sure there's great difference on this matter, incidentally, between the two candidates. At least, this has not been surfaced.

Palmer: One observation I might have that I could just add. I've been in policy planning in the State Department now for about 18 months. When I first started on the staff and started talking with Chinese officials, everything we heard from them was about TMD and Taiwan, and TMD this and TMD that. After about, I would say, six or eight months, the nature of the conversation changed. The focus shifted much more toward NMD, away from TMD. It seemed to me as though this was reflective of a shift in Beijing's view of the world, its role in the world, its relationship with the United States, and seemed to underscore at least a fundamentally different view of the nature of the relationship. And what NMD meant for Chinese interests as well as what TMD meant. That struck me as being very significant.

Ikenberry: That's going to be the last word. I want to thank our panelists and particularly Professor Scalapino for a very insightful presentation.

[End]

About the Panelists

Main Speaker

Dr. Robert A. Scalapino is Robson Research Professor of Government Emeritus at the Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley. He was director of the Institute of East Asian Studies at U.C. Berkeley between 1978 and 1990. Among his awards are the Order of the Sacred Treasure from the government of Japan, the Japan Foundation Award, the Order of Diplomatic Service Merit from the government of Korea and the Friendship Medal from the government of Mongolia. Professor Scalapino is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Science, and a member of the boards of the Asia Foundation, the Atlantic Council, the National Bureau of Asian Research and other bodies. His publications include 38 books and monographs, and some 525 articles on East Asian politics and international relations.

Discussants

Dr. Harry Harding is Professor of Political Science and Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He is a specialist on the domestic politics and international relations of Asia, with a particular emphasis on China. He is the former Chair of the Program for International Studies in Asia, a trustee of the Asia Foundation, a director of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the International Institute of Strategic Studies, Defense Policy Board, and numerous other organizations. Professor Harding received his Ph.D. from Stanford University. He is the author of several books, including *A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972* (1992), *China's Second Revolution: Reform After Mao* (1987) and *Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy, 1949-1976* (1981). His articles have appeared in such journals as *China Quarterly*, *World Politics*, and *Foreign Policy*.

Mr. Matthew Palmer, a career Foreign Service Officer, joined the Department of State's Office of Policy Planning in 1999 where he works primarily on Asian and European security issues. Prior to joining the policy planning staff, Mr. Palmer was the desk officer to Yugoslavia during the Kosovo conflict and the deputy head of the U.S. delegation to the Kosovo peace talks in Rambouillet, France. He has also served at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, including a year as special assistant to Ambassador Albright, and at the U.S. embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia during the Bosnian war. Mr. Palmer has an M.A. in Japanese History from the University of Michigan and a B.A. from Wesleyan University in East Asian Studies. He speaks Japanese and Serbo-Croatian.

Moderator

Dr. G. John Ikenberry is Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University. In addition, he has been a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. Dr. Ikenberry is the author of numerous publications, including *Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government* (1988).