

U.S.-Japan Relations at the Turn of the Century: Troubled or Tranquil?

by

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and

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Jitsuo Tsuchiyama: Thank you. Thank you for your kind introduction. My name is Tsuchiyama. I think whatever we say tonight, we have no impact on tomorrow's election. Over the next 10 to 20 minutes, I am going to talk about U.S.-Japan relations to answer my question, my three questions: What led Japanese nationals to enter into the alliance system in the 20th century? Why does Japan remain in the U.S.-Japan alliance despite the end of the Cold War? Then three, what role is the U.S.-Japan alliance expected to play at the turn of the century?

To talk about those issues, my presentation will be divided into four sections. The first is Japanese rationale about alliance policy. Then the second section will focus on Japan's dilemma. Actually there are two dilemmas: Japan's alliance dilemma and Japan's contradiction between Article 9 and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Then in the fourth section, I will talk about alliance ending. This alliance cannot continue forever; if it ends, how it ends, and why it is going to end.

So to deal with those questions, I will just define an alliance as a formal agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on security matters. But alliance has so many faces, so it is difficult to approach alliance with just one approach or model or theory. Like marriage, marriage has so many faces and alliance has so many faces too. Both of them are dealing with interest, power,

identity, ambitions, fears, and so many factors. So, alliance is a difficult one and perhaps that's why there is no single theory of alliances, and no single theory in alliance studies to deal with alliance. There are many theories in international regions but there is no one theory about alliance.

Japan's Fear of Isolation Encouraged Participation in International System

So, first why did Japan enter into the alliance system in the 20th century? Actually, we entered three alliances; the first is the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the second is the Axis alliance, Japan, Germany, Italian alliance, and the third is the U.S.-Japan alliance. The first reason for the Japanese to enter into alliance is expected help to Japan, and expected to locate Japan in international politics, or in the international system. The fear of being isolated in the world politics or in the world was one of Japan's strongest psychological factors to join the international system.

During the Edo period, Japan would identify itself with China, and the Japanese considered Japan as culturally backward, small and a weak state. Professor Seisaburo Sato's words, deep-rooted feeling of inferiority, or a deep anxiety about being isolated internationally, the very characteristics of Japanese attitude toward the external environment.

So, to identify Japan with the international order, alliances play a principal role. Because of this, Japan's participation in the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902 was enthusiastically welcomed as an international proof that Japan became a member of the international system. When the Japanese seek alliance partners, they have bet on a winning force. This is a major business why Japanese alliance force in this century focused so much on Anglo-American powers.

Japan Seeks Dominant Powers For its Allies

Second, relating to the first point, Japan tends to ally itself with a dominant power, a hegemon that is controlling the international system. So one could call this behavior "bandwagoning" instead of balancing, or business on balancing. On the other hand, Japanese allies, including the United Kingdom or the United States, those Japanese allies formed the alliance with Japan to control the international system by creating regional or global balances.

Third, related to the first point again, because of Japan's geographic position, Japan's alliance commitment to make a military collective action is likely to be ambiguous. Because the Japanese don't get out of the Far East, Japan is not seriously expected to act jointly, neither on the European front nor in the Far East. So Japanese allies expect Japan to a rather limited role behind their potential enemy.

In all three cases, their potential enemy is Russia or the Soviet Union. So how do we say Japan played a tiger at the back door? Being at the back door of Japan's potential enemy, Japan's allies' potential enemy should worry about that second front if a war broke out on the European front.

The fourth, because of long distances, because of many differences between Japan and its allies, Japan is likely to have a so-called "fear of abandonment." We have alliances with dilemma. Also, all three alliances that Japan entered into this century were all bilateral. Because of this, Japan has a more serious alliance with dilemma than a multi-lateral alliance.

So in the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the initiative was taken not by the Americans, but rather by the Japanese in July 1947. Japan thought it was very simple with Korea. Japan wanted the United States' security guarantee after the beginning of Japan's independence in exchange for accepting U.S military bases in Japan. Therefore, the treaty of 1951 was basically the base lending agreement. Also Japan successfully used American commitment to enter into various international economic regimes, such as OECD, GATT and the IMF.

Japan's Dilemma: Contradiction Between Article 9 and Security Treaty

Now, let me move to dilemma. Japan has two dilemmas. One is a contradiction between Article 9 and the security treaty. Article 9 renounces war, but by the time this new constitution was put in force in May 1947, the Cold War emerged in Asia. Three years later, the Korean War broke out. So McArthur issued, without the order of the Japanese government, a national police reserve. However, at that time McArthur did not amend the Constitution, Article 9. So, ever since we have had some contradiction.

Constitutionally, Japan does not have any war potential. But the security treaty of 1951 demanded Japan to collaborate in a case of emergency. This contradiction has paralyzed Japanese security policy since

then. Article 9 of the Constitution represents two different cultures of Japanese politics, which sometimes is called in Japan "Article 9 security treaty regime," or sometimes named the "Yoshida Doctrine," named after the Prime Minister Yoshida. This is a very unique problem, this is a unique Japanese problem which has divided the Japanese public into two camps: one, the constitutional school, and the other, the security school.

During the first two decades of the U.S.-Japan security relation, the constitutional school was more influential than the others, because of Japan's fear of entrapment, entrapment into the American conflicts in Asia, including the Korean War, the Taiwan Strait crisis, and the Vietnam War. Because of those same fears, the Japanese government has kept to the position that Japan would not exercise the right of self-defense.

Alliance's Dilemma Began to Shift in 1970s

Now lets talk about the alliance. Alliance dilemma began to shift in the mid-1970s because of the following events. Those events include the Nixon shock of 1971, Sino-Soviet rapprochement in 1972, U.S.-North Vietnamese peace treaty of 1973, the collapse of the Saigon regime in 1975, the U.S.'s plan to withdraw U.S. forces from South Korea, the Watergate scandal, and the War Power Act of 1973. Under those new circumstances, the Japanese government, the Miki administration, adopted new security initiatives, one of them being the National Defense Program Outline of 1976.

Another one was the guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation of 1978. The guidelines aimed at ensuring coordinating action between Japan Defense Forces

and the U.S. forces in Japan in case of a crisis.

Then starting in 1979, the Japanese government started the so-called "sympathy budget," host nation support. In 1981, the Suzuki administration committed to protect the sea-lanes and communication to 1,000 miles from Japan. During the early 1990s, there was another new turn. In the 1990s Japan's fear of abandonment reached a critical point because of the following reasons: the tension made by the Gulf War, then end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union. And then in Japan, at the time we had the bubble economy. All of these functioned to form some sort of anxiety in the United States.

To respond to the American criticism, the Japanese government took several options, several steps. One, Japan sent mine sweepers to the Gulf; two, Japan's Diet passed international peace cooperation law; and three, the government sent troops to Cambodia to participate in the United Nations peace-keeping operation. Then after those circumstances, the LDP collapse, the LDP lost power. The new coalition government, the Hosokawa coalition government commissioned the defense program advisory report to draw up a new Japanese defense policy, which then became the new National Defense Program Outline and the new guideline for the defense cooperation.

For the next few minutes, I'd like to talk about two things: first, I would like to draw a possible alternative to the U.S.-Japan relations, the U.S.-Japan security arrangement. I am especially interested in the possibility of multilateral framework. In the early 1990s, many Japanese leaders took a more positive attitude to multilateral framework in Asia. But today, however, they are not so optimistic that multilateral framework in

Asia can displace that of the U.S.-led bilateral alliance and the security arrangement in the near future. So, the majority of them still believe that Japan's security is most likely to depend on the U.S.-Japan alliance, simply because multilateral security arrangements in Asia do not have such functions as deterrence, defense and crisis management functions.

So the likely development in bilateral alliance in Asia would be as follows: one, the U.S.-Japan alliance could expand their area of responsibility to other areas than their territorial defense; two, each bilateral arrangement could coordinate security activities among them. For example, new guidelines for the U.S.-Japan security defense cooperation could enable Japan to take a defined role other than defending Japan. The Japanese government could coordinate its activities with, for example, the Australian government in dealing with security-related problems in Asia. Japan also could expand its security cooperation with South Korea. Without South Korea's cooperation, any Japanese effort to implement the guidelines in their area is doomed to failure.

There are two precedences for this sort of multilateral diplomacy for the Japanese. One is Japan's entente diplomacy of the early part of this century. The other is the Washington Conference regime of the 1920s. The important difference between those two multilateral frameworks is that under the Washington Treaty system, the Anglo-Japanese alliance had to have expired, had to have ended.

Alliance for International Cooperation

Another aspect is, I would like to say that the U.S.-Japan alliance has been transforming from a traditional alliance to something else, something new. "Alliance for inter-

national cooperation" could be divided into 36 types of cooperation using three dimensions: one, area; two, cohesiveness; three, multilateral – bilateral dimension. So there are three dimensions.

If you combine them, there are 36 differences, I mean 36 types of cooperation. So, if I use this in the case of NATO, NATO has been a highly cohesive multilateral political military alliance. In the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance, it started as a non-cohesive bilateral security arrangement, and then it gradually became a moderately cohesive political military economic alliance. Now, after new guidelines, the U.S.-Japan alliance gained more of a multilateral character, even though the U.S.-Japan alliance is deeply bilateral. It is becoming more multilateral in nature, and it is going to gain more such character in the future. So, in that sense, the U.S.-Japan alliance is in the process of transformation from a 19th century-type alliance to an institution coping with such regional and global security issues such as peace-keeping, non-combatant evacuation operations, disaster relief, and so on.

Finally, I would like to talk briefly about the end of the alliance. When the Cold War ended, many international relations specialists predicted that the Cold War alliances, including NATO and the U.S.-Japan alliance, would also end. But ten years after that, they are rather optimistic about the continuance of the alliances because NATO is expanding its role and the U.S.-Japan alliance has just been redefined.

End of the Alliance

Yet, nothing in international prediction can continue forever. The U.S.-Japan alliance is no exception. So it's not if, but when it ends, and nobody thinks it can continue for the next 100 years. Many people here think

that it can continue for at least 10 years, maybe 20 years, maybe one generation. But not so many people think that it can continue forever, or that it can continue more than half a century, the next half century. So I guess from that at some point in the next generation to the next 30 years to 50 years, the alliance will end. I won't predict when – at that time I will not be here, so I don't care about that.

The questions that interest me are if it ends, why is it going to end, and how is it going to end? I guess one of the reasons for a likely cause of the U.S.-Japan disintegration would be the relative decline of the United States, or the continuation in the decline of Japanese strength. That is one possibility.

The second possibility is a growing credibility gap between the United States and Japan. That kind of gap could be caused by many factors, including the failure of the implementation of the guidelines.

Then third factor could be a lack of domestic support. Maybe there are some other reasons, but because of basically these three reasons, the alliance could end.

Having said that, there are at least three possible patterns of alliance dissolution. The first pattern is by natural death, by which I mean either from the decline of strength of both or either parties, or from the changing of the international system, it gradually disappears. The second one is by accidental death. The alliance could end by accident, by unexpected events. Also, the alliance could end by sudden death, which is maybe similar to the accidental death. This has to do with mismanaged alliance, then the alliance ends. It dies suddenly.

If the alliance ends, Japan has several options: one, autonomous defense; two, an

alliance with another partner; three, multi-lateral security framework. The first choice is very expensive and if we pursue the first option, Japan could go nuclear. The second, to find another partner, is very difficult, because no power at this point has such a wide influence in the world of politics like the U.S. Then the third one, multilateral framework - that could be a possibility.

Japan in the 1920s first tried to combine the first and third, but ended up with the Japan-German alliance, which resulted in a total disaster. So we could think about those scenarios. Still, at this point most of us will believe the U.S.-Japan alliance will be easier for the Japanese security policy.

I have a few more things, but since the time is up, I will stop here. So I will respond to the questions after Professor Tadokoro presents his discussion. Thank you very much.

Masayuki Tadokoro: Well, first of all, my name is Masayuki Tadokoro. I actually sympathize with Professor Ikenberry because my name is usually a sheer impossibility for foreigners. And whenever I order pizza on the phone, I do have a problem. So I usually fabricate a name, whichever sounds oriental, like Wong, Kim, Mitsubishi, Sony, Matsushita – they work. So don't worry with my name. After hearing a rather well-structured, somewhat academic presentation by Professor Tsuchiyama, I think you need some relaxation and you can relax now.

My presentation is rather casual and the task given to me is to discuss rather casually about the possible economic agenda between the U.S. and Japan, which is a little bit of a forgotten subject. It is forgotten in a sense that compared with just 80 years ago, the Japanese economy has lost the attention

of the Americans very rapidly, for good reasons.

Economic Concerns Dominated U.S.-Japan Relationship

When President Clinton was running the election campaign, he was talking about Japanese economic challenge. Also, the past term of the Clinton administration was very much dominated by the concern over the economic issues with Japan. As many of you remember the U.S.-Japan summit meeting broke down for the first time in the post-war history in 1994 because of relatively minor trade issues. This marked one of the lowest points in the U.S.-Japan relationship and which illustrated how economic issues dominated the concern of the United States at that time.

Well, it sounds as if it was ages ago, but it was only 6 years ago. Actually, I was first here in Washington, D.C., actually in the United States, in 1988. I happened to be a visiting fellow at SAIS and I lived just two buildings away from here. I seem to remember around that time there were many books and articles focusing on Japanese economy. I remember titles like *Containing Japan*, *Trading Places*, and so on and so forth.

Seminars and conferences on Japanese economy attracted enormous attention by the Americans, and many questions asked then were: Are Japanese behaving differently? Are Japanese unique? What might Japanese economics mean to the United States? Is it in the interests of the United States? Why should Americans see a poorer Japan, and so on and so forth.

Compared with that, of course, situations today are completely different. With the booming American economy and sluggish,

very slow Japanese economy, well, Japanese as a threat is nothing but a joke. And I don't hear any words from either of the presidential candidates about the Japanese economy. Perhaps it is a good thing.

Whenever we are focused on, we are viewed as something bad, or some problem. If the relationship is not mentioned it may be good news. Bilateral economic issues are there, of course. They do not disappear. We do have anti-dumping issues on steel imports from Japan, but it doesn't seem to threaten the U.S.-Japan alliance in a systematic manner. It is basically a minor issue, and very few Americans would pay key attention on that.

Perhaps the same thing applies with Japan, where the Japanese are not overly excited about it either. Some in the United States are talking about American trade deficit, particularly bilateral trade deficit with Japan. But who cares about the trade deficit? After all, it is abstract statistics, and without any political mechanism which transforms abstract statistics into political forces, who cares?

Perhaps those who are not caring may be right. And even if they are wrong, with the booming economy, why should we worry about abstract statistics? So the bilateral trade deficit figures do not seem to threaten U.S.-Japan bilateral political relationship either.

A Stable and Happy Relationship

In view of the fact that the U.S.-Japan relationship has been troubled by economic frictions over the last years, ever since the 1970s, on and off, it still is a very stable happy relationship. The political leadership in both countries tried very hard to isolate economic issues with more bilateral sec-

urity, or political relationships between the two countries.

Therefore, perhaps it is good for us to have this kind of situation. A sluggish Japanese economy and a booming American economy – that might be the best combination for us to have the stable U.S.-Japan political relationship.

Many economists might say no, because economists usually assume that economic games are perhaps some game, and the booming economy obviously is better for the American business interests. And it is rather difficult even for me. By the way, I am not an economist, I am merely a humble political scientist. For those who are expecting some economic focus, you'll be disappointed. But the economists' world view is basically based on the idea that the games are plus-sum and booming Japanese economies are basically in the interest of the United States. Obviously, the Japanese are benefiting out of the booming American economy, for sure, along with other Asian economies as well.

Political scientists, however, may say it's not that self-evident. Those of you who are familiar with the theory of international relations know there is a group of political scientists who emphasize relative gain, rather than absolute gain. Assuming that the current structure of the U.S.-Japan political system remains, and if we had a bigger, more prosperous Japanese economy than the U.S. economy, would our political relations be sustainable? I doubt it. Many Japanese political leaders or political commentators thought so in the late 80s as well.

I remember in a journal article on an ex-MITI official and a famous scholar's discussion. It is a story about the late 80s. Is it

advisable for us to surpass the U.S. in terms of economic might? And they both said no. So MITI should work out some measures so as to prevent Japan from becoming economically successful.

That is of course an extreme case, but I just want to say that the political logic is somewhat different from the economic logic. So in any case, in terms of economic relationship and its impact towards the political relationship between the two countries, the current situation is not that bad in a sense that it is a happy combination.

Japanese Position Is to Support American Primacy

The Japanese position is basically to support American primacy. You can call it American hegemony, or leadership, or primacy, or whatever. But basically the Japanese position is to support the kind of order where American power excels, or where and which Americans lead. Therefore, existing economic situations may be consistent with our political relationship.

Whether I am right or wrong, fortunately or unfortunately, things may change. So we may have potentially thorny economic issues in the future. Things change both on the Japanese side and the American side.

Let me start with the Japanese side. Let us suppose Japanese economy continues to slow, and the Japanese economic strength keeps declining, to the extent that it changes the balance of economic power in Asia. Also, many of you are aware of the fact that the Chinese economy is growing very fast, and also more importantly perhaps in many people's perception the Chinese economy is growing. Whether it grows or not is an open question.

By the way, the perception factor is very important because so far until very recently, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been conducted under the assumption that Japan is a growing power, and that's why Japan has to bear more of the burden and Japan has to do this and that. That logic was persuasive even for the Japanese. If that assumption is not persuasive anymore, it could have some effect over the way Japanese behave.

Also, just another anecdote: in recent years, I asked my students at an exam, "Is the Chinese economic expansion good for Japanese national interests or bad for it? Name both positive and negative impact, and state your position." This is an interesting mental exercise.

My students' answers on the political side of course is that a growing Chinese economy will give a boost to the Japanese economy, therefore it is good for us. The negative side is, improved Chinese economic capabilities could be transformed into military power, which could be threatening to Japan. And if they say only these two things, they get only a "B." Some students said, but as Chinese get richer, their behavior becomes more moderate.

So all in all, Chinese economic growth is in the Japanese interest, and then the students got "A's", or "B+'s." Other students talked about pollution associated with growing Chinese economy, which would inevitably affect Japanese environment. They also talked about other factors, and if they added some other factors which are interesting enough or original enough, they got "A's" or "B+'s."

In any case, the change of negative economic strength matters politically. How does it affect the U.S.-Japan relationship? Well, there are many possible implications and

they also depend how far the Japanese economy stagnates. But I just summed up several, just gave several possible examples, which I can imagine.

One, the Japanese defense budget will be increasingly under stronger pressure. Well, this is a very serious matter because I am on the government payroll, and technically I am an employee of the Japanese Defense Agency. So maybe my job is threatened. But I think it is rather unrealistic for us to see that the growth of Japanese defense budget will continue as before. In order to maintain the rapid growth of the Japanese budget, which we have seen over the last 20 years or so, that would require strong political determination.

Host Nation Support Reduced

Next, more probably directly toward the U.S.-Japan relationship, host nations' support and those Japanese financial contributions to the U.S.-Japan alliance will be under strong pressure as well. I think some of you are aware of the fact that this year, the host nation support was reduced a little bit. With that, I find it very impressive that the Americans have accepted the reduction without making a big political fuss.

Anyway, it was reduced only a little bit, but it was reduced and this is an important political development. How far can we continue this? That is an open question and a serious question. The Japanese ODA that will be also under stronger pressure and that could be a good thing because we have been spending rather carelessly. A smaller amount of ODA may not necessarily be a bad thing. We could come up with better and more effective ODA programs. Anyway, ODA is also under strong scrutiny by the Ministry of Finance or other political forces.

So all in all, Japan has been criticized for its attitude to do everything with money, and our checkbook diplomacy was sometimes criticized. But even checkbook diplomacy may be getting a little bit difficult. Of course, I am not all too pessimistic. Anybody who talks about the future of the economic situation with some certainty is either foolish or dishonest. I may be foolish but I am not dishonest. I won't predict the future of the Japanese conditions and in view of the fact of how widely our economic trends have changed over the last 10 years, it would be reckless for us to make any speculation for the future.

So the Japanese may start making some effort to re-organize its economic system, which seems to be necessary to boost its economic growth. But there again is a problem. Recently, several high-ranking LDP politicians started talking about, in a very diplomatic manner, getting rid of the existing Mori administration. They may shift the macro-economic policy away from deflation to budget tightening. I am sure that everybody knows that Japanese national debt is absolutely staggering.

It is obvious in the near future that we have to do something about it, either by cutting budget, or raising taxes, or combination of both. In any case, it requires very tough political decisions. At some point, we will have to decide when, and in which way we start the so-called "structural reforms."

Japan Criticized for Austerity Measures

That may sound very good, but not necessary. Here is my argument. In fact, structural reform was tried in 1997-1998 during the Asian crisis, and early in 1998 the Japanese were severely criticized by the Americans for its economic policy. But the issue was very interesting; it was different from the

past pattern. Japan was criticized not because of the bilateral trade issues, nor by its increasing trade surpluses, but for cutting, spending and trying to introduce austerity measures in order to get its economic house in order, which was basically consistent with what American economists have been preaching for several decades.

Basically, it is consistent with neo-classical economic ideas and administrative reforms had been, which was also conducted at that time. What was wrong, because it was deflationary? During the crisis, having a deflationary policy – that is, to say the least, very bad timing.

Structural reform is easy to say but you have to keep in mind that it is deflationary. As the Japanese economic size is still such that its deflationary economic management could have some impact toward neighboring countries, Japan has to choose the right timing. Otherwise, again it might be under strong criticism from abroad, both from the U.S. and from our neighboring countries. So structural reform is easy to say but difficult to implement, both politically and also technically.

The change may come from the U.S. side as well. The U.S. economy will slow down sooner or later, in whichever way. Good things don't continue forever. What is going to happen? The trade deficit may become again a political issue. Many relatively minor trade frictions may become major political issues between the two countries. Also, the worst scenario for the U.S. economy is kind of a capital flight from the U.S. I am not saying it is going to happen, nobody knows.

Also, from the early 1980s the U.S. has been saying that the existing regular American deficit was unsustainable. Actually, it

has been sustained for 20 years, so it may be sustained for another 20 years. One doesn't really know, but even if it happens tomorrow, it should happen tomorrow, and the future historians could easily explain it.

If that should happen, what should the Japanese do? Of course the Japanese will do their best to stabilize the global financial market. They would pump their money into the American economy, as they did in the late 80s.

But what is more important probably is, if that should happen, the American attitude toward globalization, which has worked so well in the interest of the United States, the American attitude toward financial globalization may change. The Americans may start having second thoughts and may come up with a new idea of what is called the "new global financial architecture," or whatever. Again, this may be a good thing, but that will probably be another political agenda for the U.S. and Japan, or a more global financial agenda. I think I'll stop here, and I am happy to have some discussions with the floor and the commentator. Thank you.

Thomas Berger: Being election time, I am so tempted to take off my jacket, start sighing into the microphone, launch into an impassioned speech on U.S.-Japanese relations, but I shall cling to my cloth bourgeois respectability and spare you that particular spectacle.

I haven't been able to coordinate with my folks here, and I am just sort of having a set of initial responses to this and let me share them with you.

Briefly, I am going to try to summarize what I see as being in some ways a structural background behind the comments

which Tadokoro and Tsuchiyama-san made. And then from my particular understanding, I want to suggest what seems to me to be some problems, which I think to some extent they have not fully addressed and I would like to pose them to them. And then if they care to respond to them or not, that would be great, or we can just go straight to you.

But basically there are two dimensions, one geo-strategic and one geo-economic, and each of these two dimensions in terms of looking at Japan's situation should be looked at both in terms of some sort of international and domestic level. Just to speak briefly about geo-strategic realities, I think one can say that Japan's situation, both historically for the last few decades and possibly for the foreseeable future is that on one hand it is simply too weak to become a regional hegemon in Asia. It cannot pull off that kind of role.

Japan too Large to Be an Asian Switzerland

At the same time, however, it is simply too strong to remain passive. Many Japanese would love to be. If you took public opinion polls, they would just love to be one big Switzerland. The most popular movie by the way in Japan, from the Guinness book of world records, is the Sound of Music, which played...Austria also, Switzerland; they'd like to be a small Edelweiss in the middle of Asia. But unfortunately they cannot do that. They are simply too large to take on that role. We will not let them, and other countries will not let them.

So Japan is forced to somehow become active in the international scene. But the question is how. If they try to take on too strong role, of course this awakens fears in their neighbors, in China, in Southeast Asia, but

also potentially it could raise fears in the United States if Japan took on a larger role. It is worth recalling while the Japanese would have trouble acquiring the strategic capabilities we have, they are capable technologically, economically, demographically of becoming a very, very significant military power. But they do not want to do that, partly for strategic reasons, geo-strategic reasons. If they did that, they would wind up facing counter-balancing coalitions.

Most Japanese Decision Makers Not Concerned With Foreign Policy

But also here is the other factor, which is worth emphasizing – there is a domestic factor. The Japanese, having played the geo-strategic game one particular way, a very aggressive way, earlier in the first half of this century and late part of the 19th century, got badly burnt. Strangely enough, the Japanese do not want to do so again. The Japanese elite, the foreign policy elite, to the extent that they think about, which is a relatively small sub-section of the Japanese elite at this point report that most of Japanese decision makers are primarily concerned with quite different sets of affairs, issues, other than foreign policy.

I did a fair number of interviews with Japanese politicians in the late 1980s and 1990s, and over and over again they kept on telling me that defense does not connect to any kind of votes. It does not pay for Japanese politicians in terms of domestic political interests to emphasize defense, and they cannot wrap themselves in the flag, if you like, as the way the American politicians and European politicians can when they deal with this. There is a strong resistance to becoming overly active, especially militarily. And this complicates the already delicate balancing act that they have to carry out in defense.

Now, there is also a certain geo-economic element to this. Some ways it flows directly out of the geo-strategic military dimension. Japan is again – as you will hear over and over again, Japan is a resource-poor island nation which, in order to survive, must trade. They cannot ignore the outside world. At the same time, however, as Tado-koro-san pointed out very nicely, when they become too active economically, they can become viewed as a threat.

There is one of these structural features of Japanese external relations with other industrialized countries has been a persistent trade deficit, especially in high technology and increasing medium technology. They have come under tremendous pressure to rectify this, but again there is a domestic political reality which has to be confronted here.

That is, it is very difficult to get things done in the Japanese political system. We have vested interests; the Japanese have many vested interests, in some ways even more deeply entrenched in the political system there than it is here. And while the Japanese have been talking now for at least close to 20 years about structural reform and administrative reform back from Nakasone on it has been a lot of talk, and while some things have been accomplished, not very much.

There is a kind of *genjoui*, a kind of status quoism, which defines the Japanese approach to these kinds of issues. Now, all of this has been a problem for a while, but there are a number of issues which are coming up which make this more difficult. I would really like to identify these issues, and then you can think about a couple of questions.

East Asia Is Potentially Unstable

First of all – and there is also an irony of history, I must say. I will mention the irony in a second. One problem is in the strategic area. Now, of course there is this threat that East Asia is an unstable area, it is more unstable, of course, than Western Europe. There are many flash points, but especially events in the last few years sort of underlined an almost – the opposite problem. If there is a security problem – if there is, God forbid, a major security crisis which takes place in the Korean Peninsula, or a major security crisis in the Taiwan's Straits, the United States would expect the Japanese to do something. And the Japanese may do something, but whether it would satisfy us is an open question, and especially the Taiwan Straits issue.

I mean, Japanese foreign policy and defense people have been talking about this as being the nightmare, the foreign policy problem from hell from their point of view for a very long time, for at least 15 years. I don't think that has changed.

But in some ways there is another problem which is emerging, which is the threat of peace. There has been, perhaps more than I would have expected 10 years ago, the problem of what to do if many of the flash points in East Asia subside, or seem to subside. There is also the danger of false perceptions on this front.

I think this is more clearly true of the Korean Peninsula right now. I am very guarded, as I think any responsible observer of the Korean situation should be. Nonetheless, increasing numbers of people, including in Japan, are asking: How are we going to be able to justify the American forced presence in Asia and including in Japan, if the Korean Peninsula problem

subsides, goes away? What would happen in these most extreme cases to the U.S.-strategic alliance, the U.S.-Japanese alliance, if there were a Korean unification?

This is a problem, because while the Japanese foreign policy elite will say, well, we still need the United States – again a basic strategic reality is Japan does not have an atomic bomb, and being a non-nuclear power has tremendous implications no matter what kind of world we are in. In the foreseeable future, they need someone to take care of strategic deterrence.

They need the alliance with the United States, but then how are they going to justify it domestically? There is tremendous pressure. The United States and Japanese disagreements on various strategic issues might potentially intensify if Korea becomes less confrontational. Also, if the Taiwan Straits – well, if the Taiwan-Chinese problem remains contained, this might be a problem as well.

Economically, I think there is also a potential problem, not simply the problem of Japanese strength per se, but also the problem of Japanese economic weakness. And by the way, this is the sort of historical irony. Five, ten years ago, when I was first doing my research – fifteen years ago now, in East Asia, the assumption was that Japan is moving forward economically; the rest of Asia is moving forward inextricably, old libraries full of books with the Asia-Pacific century sub-title. I think it would be foolish to dismiss this altogether.

Major Economic Problems in East Asia

But clearly there are major economic problems. There are major economic problems in Japan – Tadokoro referred to them, but I mean the fiscal deficit situation, 130% of

GDP deficit, maybe even larger, the entire financial system, which is rickety at very best. And to deal with this, whether the Japanese will be able to deal with it or not, is an interesting question.

But there is also a problem as we have seen since 1998, the East-Asian crisis, a tremendous economic problem in the rest of East Asia, as well. And those as well could pose challenges for U.S.-Japanese relations. Tadokoro referred to the problem of U.S. criticizing deflation – reflation, excuse me, austerity policies in Japan, in light of wanting the Japanese to reflate in order to help cushion the crisis.

Also, the United States has expectations about Japan intervening to help prop up the weak governments in the region. Right now, we are negotiating with North Korea about Japanese aid to North Korea. This is considered as part of the normalization process under the terms of war reparations. We are talking about, I believe, seven billion dollars in money. Japanese aid is expected to come in East Timor. If we have further economic problems in East Asia, Japan will be looked to again to play this kind of role, and it will be on U.S. terms. This is by the way a crisis which Tadokoro or problems which Tadokoro didn't refer to.

But the Japanese have tried to during the East Asia crisis, tried to do things in the regional sense. Finance Minister Miyazawa came up with a very reasonable plan actually in retrospect. But we did not like the way they were doing it. We forced them to do it on our terms. But actually, I would like to hear a little bit about that. And we can see both increasing pressures in the United States on Japan to do more in the light of a continued or resurgent regional crisis, and also pressures over the form to Japanese

aid. I can see all sides of pressures emerging out of that.

Irony of History

So, in light of these potential problems, this is really the irony of history; we have the complete reversal of the geo-strategic expectations from 10 years ago. Asia is going to be very dangerous. Now, it may still be dangerous, but we also have the potential problems of peace, and also the problem that we expect Asia and Japan to be surging forward economically, and that creates lots of problems.

Now, we have all sorts of problems revolving around the first scenario, that Asia and Japan would be economically weak. And I really would like to hear our two guests and anyone in the audience to offer some thoughts about how these particular problems can be navigated, given the kinds of limitations that Japan faces, both internationally and domestically.

Q & A

John Ikenberry: I think what we will do now is open it up for discussion.

Questioner: What if U.S.-Chinese security relations severely deteriorate? What would happen to the U.S.-Japan security alliance?

Questioner: This question is directed toward Professor Tsuchiyama. One of your possible solutions for Japan's alliance dilemma is to develop a multilateral security framework. My question is, does this framework have to have an American presence or membership in order to be effective or meaningful at all?

Ikenberry: Let's go with those now, and then hold on a second. You want to get one first and then the other one. Go ahead.

Tsuchiyama: To respond to the first question, in my presentation I didn't talk much about the future function of the U.S.-Japan alliance. There are four functions. One is the assurance between Japanese and Americans and between Japanese and Asians, or if I use your word, co-binding between Japan and the United States. The second one is "bandwagoning," still Japan is "bandwagoning" with the United States; then the third one is balancing. In that sense, to balance, to have a balancing function, it used to be that the Soviet Union is a targeting country, but if China continues to grow and if China has some threat to the Japanese, then it adds a balancing function toward China.

In that sense, maybe your question might be relevant to that category. I don't know if Sino-U.S. relations will deteriorate to the extent that United States would take action, to the extent that the security guarantee to Taiwan is threatened. Is that your question?

Questioner: Well, it could be either missile posting provided to Taiwan, it could be perhaps more of an assault on human rights violations in Taiwan. Congress could again get a very anti-Chinese posture. One can see the possibility. Certainly, Taiwan would be hit the harder.

Japanese Dilemma Regarding Taiwan

Tsuchiyama: So we suppose the only Japanese dilemma would be between the United States and China. But if Japan were forced to choose either one, perhaps they would choose to side, to go with the United States. But I don't know how far they can go. That still remains ambiguous, and even

if we talk about the guidelines, some politicians tried to commit the Japanese Defense Agency to advocate that we should include the Taiwan issues within the guidelines. But some politicians are not accepting that position still.

I cannot exactly say what we are going to do. Perhaps the Japanese public will be divided into two camps, but perhaps it is more likely that Japan will go with the United States. But there are many factors involved in here: Taiwan, Korea, TMD, human rights, and economic factors. So I cannot say definitively that we are going to take that or this action.

Questioner: Can we do a follow-up on that? Is the Japanese government telling the United States, "Don't provide theater missile defense for Taiwan?" If you want to provoke them, the Chinese are deadly serious about that issue. Is there any counsel coming from Japan to Washington on this issue? Otherwise, you are going to be presented with a very difficult situation that is going to have repercussions domestically in Japan.

Tadokoro: I am sorry, but I am not familiar with this subject so I cannot give you any expose on that subject.

Questioner: If you cannot answer that, it just describes your passive support policy. Then in fact, it's bankrupt. Well, so therefore it could be a crisis.

Berger: We could have the same kind of problems that we had in the Gulf War. The Japanese were pretty lucky on the Gulf War. If we had a hot contingency in the Taiwan Strait, that would be the worst case. But NMD would be quite difficult for them to do, too. They'll try to finesse it as they have given, I believe – I hope that Tsuchi-

yama-san or Tadokoro-san can help me out here. But I understand they are going along with the research in development phase of theater missile defense.

Elements of the Japanese foreign policy and political establishment have embraced it. Other elements are extremely negative about it. There are all sorts of cute cartoons, TMD stands for "*Tondemo Nai* Defense," "absolutely unbelievable defense," and so forth. This would be the kind of thing which will create as it has historically for 30-40 years, a crisis.

Now, what will happen on the U.S. side if we are going to be willing to produce with the Japanese prevarication on this is another question. But if you just want to take it from the strict, objective strategic point of view, to what extent do we need the Japanese to deploy this, and does it really serve our interests to take apart this relationship, given the size of Japan? They are too large for us to ignore either.

Ikenberry: OK, one more follow up and then we will move on.

Questioner: The Chinese I have talked to say that if Japan develops TMD by itself, for Japan, that is one thing. If it's TMD with U.S. cooperation or directly from the U.S. coast to Taiwan, it is something very different. I think one will be certainly not applauded, but the latter would definitely be opposed.

Regional Consequences Of TMD Deployment

Berger: I am not an expert on this and you should stop this subject in a second. But look, the Japanese are not going to produce it by themselves and give it to Taiwan. What is going to be more of a problem is

that the Japanese may, and Japanese companies will be participating regionally. Besides the regional consequences of TMD deployment is one of the things that we have to think about. There are all sorts of things that are going to happen in terms of C3I, all sorts of intensification of our military relations with countries where we want to deploy it, which is going to be important.

The Japanese could participate and contribute in a useful way to the development of this system. They will not give it themselves, but if we do it, then the Chinese will try to put pressure on the Japanese to use their leverage with us to stop them. My guess is that the Japanese will probably resist such a move and that will cause, again, a lot of crisis.

Tsuchiyama: To follow up about TMD, I have never heard that the Japanese are developing their own TMD. The Japanese now are hesitant to go with the United States to develop TMD. But I have never heard that the Japanese should have their own TMD.

Another thing is the Taiwan situation. The Taiwan crisis has kind of accidentally jumped into the pursuit of the re-definition of the new guidelines. Japan's new guidelines basically are targeted on the crisis in Korea and the Taiwan situation is very new.

It could be a new problem for the future, but so far the Japanese government has never reached a clear decision, or a consensus. They may still form a consensus in the future. It depends on China as a nation, if it's becoming a threat to the Japanese security. It depends on China's performance. So it is difficult to exclude the Taiwan crisis or the Taiwan case alone. It is difficult to answer, perhaps no Japanese has a clear answer to this question.

Regarding your question, perhaps Japanese are eager to go with the multilateral framework in which the U.S. is a strong member of that framework. The Japanese are very reluctant to go with a framework, without or excluding American strength. China may want to see other scenarios, but Japan has always been thinking that way.

Questioner: I'd like to ask about these two positions present here, which are not very forward-looking, and not to the future. They are looking back, and very pessimistic. You definitely have nationalism in Japan, young people, what do you think of the two countries' relations? I know today Japanese politics and so forth, you have economic problems, and the Mori administration is very low in terms of confidence with the people. Then I see Japan has opened its doors to the outside, inviting foreign laborers to come to Japan.

Is there a possibility that in Japan, instead of looking inward, not anymore recovering as the second largest economy as such but more toward cooperation, for example GE going out to Japan, buying out Japan companies, insurance companies.

If American companies go out there to actually buy Japanese companies it is a reversal of the 80s. And I can see that instead of becoming very pessimistic, is there a more optimistic view, like a Korean sunshine policy as such? Can we brighten up this relationship between the U.S. and Japan a little bit in terms of international education on the part of the Ministry of Education, and in young people with experience outside our work and also living, and getting educated? Isn't there a danger of becoming pessimistic about it instead of becoming more optimistic, trying to promote better relations?

Finally, I would like to ask one more question. I understand that there is a non-partisan recommendation led by Armitage and also Nye in terms of U.S.-Japan relations after this presidential election. I wonder if you can comment on this. I am not quite familiar with it, but very interested, because U.S. policy toward Japan may change or may continue as it is. So I would like to see some suggestions or comments on that matter. Sorry I took such a long time.

Tsuchiyama: In the first place, I don't think the U.S.-Japan relationship is that bad currently. I just spelled out some possible political agendas. That is why I may have sounded a little bit pessimistic. But by no means do I think I am particularly pessimistic. I'm just a political scientist; I just mentioned possible political problems or conflicts, but only possible. Otherwise, we are out of a job.

Japan Is Becoming Internationalized

Also, you mentioned opening up in those things. Of course the trend is clear. Over 50 years Japan has been getting increasingly – some say it is not fast enough, but the trend is clear, it is getting internationalized and opening up. Whether they like it or not, it is the trend. And GE is a very small case and the big case is Nissan, which is now having a CEO. Is he French? He is a Jewish-Lebanese boy born in Brazil who worked for the Ford Corporation for some time and now he is the CEO of Nissan. And he has become awfully popular. By the way, this is not inconsistent with Japanese traditions. In the early period of Meiji, the Japanese invited many foreigners as advisors and once they are finished, we get rid of them.

Difficult to Radically Reform a Successful System

Actually that is perhaps somewhat related to the comment you made about my presentation – status quoism and stagnation and the vested interest, and so on and so forth. Most Japanese know what they have to do, but in order to do that they have to break the vested interest. Besides, the Japanese system has been working so well, that it is rather difficult to radically reform a successful system. Perhaps we may need more of our economic crises in order to be radical reformists.

I believe that Japanese could have afforded even a longer recession in 1997-1998. Quite frankly, I find it very unfortunate that we have to reverse our course and start inflationary reports for the sake of foreigners. Japan perhaps is too big to become, Japan cannot afford difficulties, that is unfortunate. But in any case, the foreigners, or foreign CEO in foreign companies are very beneficial for Japanese society, because they do not have vested interests.

And about Carlos Ghosn who is now currently the CEO of Nissan – what he did was not particularly special. He could do it because he did not have all the old boy network and he did not need to have any emotional involvement with the sub-contractors, and so on and so forth. So he could have become very, somewhat cruel.

About the Armitage report, I just skimmed through it and I think that most of the comments are not surprising, I should say. But one thing new that I found – you mentioned the Japanese nationalism, and nationalism is there anyway, it earned Japan its own share. But I think the author of the report seems to have noticed some growing nationalism among Japanese in the younger

generation and they seem to think that they are not particularly mild. They seem – if I put it very bluntly, I am sorry, I cannot be very diplomatic. But they seem to think that they can take advantage of the Japanese growing nationalism in the interest of the U.S. They think by pushing this, the Japanese take on a more active military role, although limited, and this is not that dangerous.

Ikenberry: There is amazingly little of a discussion of China in that report. I find it amazing. It was almost as if the analysis has been ignored.

Questioner: We can contrast political developments from economic developments, but there are many difficulties and crises inherent in just economic developments, which require perhaps more coordinated efforts. I'm thinking in particular about the Malaysian and Indonesian reactions to the free movement of capital; the demand for openness in frank reporting of company records; and the need to lower barriers. This so that, for example, Toyota, which coordinates all of its trade throughout Southeast Asia, doesn't have to deal with it. Toyota has it now that the engine comes from Thailand, and the tires come from Malaysia, and somehow they have to be able to get all these pieces assembled together, so the trade barriers of that sort need to be reformed.

The need for a unified response to pollution brought on by economic development, we can talk about the need for protecting intellectual property rights and how those seem to be systematically violated certainly by China, but also by overseas Chinese. The whole need for an activist social bank to intercede when there is a crisis, and I know the IMF is very much looking into the role that Japan plays together with the

U.S. for a unified opinion on what roles to play.

Do you see an agenda, can you outline an agenda where you see some promising areas of cooperation between Japan and the U.S. and maybe areas where we need to be concerned?

Tsuchiyama: Thank you. I am glad that you have raised that question, because it is connected with the comment made by Dr. Berger on Asian regionalism and the Japanese attitude toward it. Actually, the Asian regionalism is one of the most remarkable diplomatic emphasis by the Japanese from 1997, from the Asian crisis. But it is not well appreciated in this country. The Japanese played very active roles, and at some point Japanese initiative to launch, as Dr. Berger mentioned, what is called the AMF, Asian Monetary Fund – it was brokered by the United States. But you are right, the Americans reversed its position and practically Japan tried to set up a kind of multilateral – it is not multilateral, it is a bunch of bilateral assistance program vis-à-vis other Asian countries, including Korea, Vietnam and other countries.

Japan Has Bailed Out Asian Countries

So, the Japanese have been very active in bailing out Asian countries and that is one of the areas where Japanese feel very comfortable, because relations with Southeast Asia, relationship with Southeast Asia are one of the few areas where the Japanese feel relatively free to take initiative. There are ironies about it, however. That is because the Americans brokered the Japanese initiatives, the Americans play the tough guy role. And it made the Japanese a little bit more popular among Asian countries, and even in the eyes of Koreans, the Japanese looked like better friends than the

Americans, or the IMF, which was practically controlled by the U.S.

So the Americans unwittingly push for Asian regionalism, and there seems to be an Asian pull. Of course, they are happier to get soft loans from Japan, so there is naturally a pull. Plus, of course Japan is willing to play a larger role in that area. Korea, which has been traditionally very suspicious, understandably suspicious of Japanese initiative in the region, started talking about a free trade agreement, and they even proposed to set up even larger funds than Japan proposed it, and was killed by the U.S.

So all in all, Asian regionalism is going off and Asian monetary crisis might be a first step, and in retrospect future historians may record that it was an interesting starting point of Asian regionalism. Having said so, there are limitations: Japanese determination to play a large role in the international finance is still a little bit unclear. While we set up – I do not want to go into a detailed discussion into the financial technicalities. But Japan set up a kind of multilateral financial scheme among Asian countries. But that is a dollar facility, not a yen facility, meaning that if the Japanese set up the yen facility, it means that they could be a lender of last resort. They would be in a position to be asked almost unlimited assistance from ASEAN countries. So they have to be a tough guy in order to play a larger role in Asia. That, obviously, is difficult.

Tsuchiyama: To respond to your question, last year when the Japan Diet passed that guideline-related role, I was interviewed from *Asahi Shimbun*. I told them again what we need were guidelines, not only for defense cooperation, but guidelines for economic cooperation between the United States and Japan in the area of Asian econo-

my, including ODA and financial support to Asian nations. And that should combine with the guidelines we were talking about in a military crisis. But a military crisis could happen; it could go with an economic crisis. Maybe we should think about that kind of complex crisis for future situations.

I do not know much about the economic area, but this is my short comment. To respond to your question about pessimism, maybe I gave you the wrong impression, because I am talking too much about the alliance ending or something. But, you know, at the end I am not so pessimistic about this alliance.

To continue the alliance, what we can do is to institutionalize this alliance like NATO. If we can do this, U.S. society and the Japanese society could have some sort of community identity, same identity, not exactly the same, but more or less community feeling. It could be a “we-ness,” that sort of thing. If we could develop in the years to come, this alliance could be even more stable. But I am not pessimistic at all.

Ikenberry: One more question. Anybody want to make a point?

Questioner: I just want to go back to the Armitage report again and the comments in there about the national sentiments in Japan. I was wondering if either of the two professors would like to comment as to whether that’s an accurate assessment of some of the forces in Japan, whether those forces are as strong as they are portrayed in the report, or whether they really lead to perhaps more, or actually suggested there was going to be more disunity in Japan as to its future course in the alliance?

Tadokoro: I won’t be surprised to see any particular point in that report. I was inter-

ested to dig into that report, that it suggested to Japan to exercise collective self-defense, and that is the kind of trend now shared by most of the Japanese. Perhaps with that amendment to Constitution Article 9, we could exercise collective self-defense. And, that’s exactly what the United Nation’s charter is saying and what Article 9 or the spirit of Article 9 is saying. So, perhaps we could exercise these rights, rights Japanese now say we have but we don’t exercise. But we could exercise them under a United Nations umbrella, which is no problem. But, with the United States it may need some sort of redefinition among the Japanese leadership. That may need something else, but it’s not too difficult to do.

Questioner: We are listening today to the East Asian three countries. Some of those East Asian three countries met in, I don’t know the name of the place, but on the occasion of the ASEAN Plus Three meeting last year. I think the relation between those three countries is becoming closer and closer, even though the agenda has been limited to the economic field, until now. How do you see the future of this, the relationship between free countries, and how do you think this will affect U.S.-Japan relations?

Tsuchiyama: OK. It depends on the issues they are going to talk about. If it’s going to be security issues, particularly relating to China, then this relation will be not equally trilateral. But the three relations I think will have more impact in Asian politics in the future. I am particularly interested in Japan-Korean relations, within the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance. It’s time to have a more direct and strong dialogue, not just dialogue, but actual arrangements between two countries in dealing with the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Closer Relations With Korea

Even if we are talking about the guidelines, we have consulted with the Korean government. But without Korean involvement, any implementation, as I said in my presentation, of guidelines in that area is going to be meaningless. So, I think we will have even closer relations with Korea. But at the same time, this Asian Plus Three or Japan's relations with those other relations will have more influence in the future. That's my general impression.

[End]

About the Panelists

Main Speaker

Dr. Jitsuo Tsuchiyama is Professor of International Security at the School of International Politics, Economics, and Business of Aoyama Gakuin University and Director of the Security Studies Program at the Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo. Previously, he was a visiting scholar at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. Professor Tsuchiyama received a B.A. from Aoyama Gakuin University, Tokyo, an M.A. at George Washington University and a Ph.D. from the University of Maryland at College Park. His latest publications include *Reisengo no Nichibei Kankei* (U.S.-Japan Relations after the Cold War, co-author, 1997), *Nichibei Doumei: Q ando A 100* (The U.S.-Japan Alliance: 100 Questions and Answers, co-editor, 1998), and *Japan's Foreign Policy Today* (co-author, 2000).

Dr. Masayuki Tadokoro is Professor of International Relations at National Defense Academy, Yokosuka. Previously, he taught at Himeji Dokkyo University and was a visiting fellow at the City University of New York. His major field is IPE and International Organizations. Professor Tadokoro graduated from Kyoto University's Department of Law and completed his doctoral degree at Kyoto University. He received an M.A. from London University. Professor Tadokoro's publications include *Kokuren Zaisei* (Financial Problems of the UN, 1996) and *Sengo Nihon Gaikoshi* (Diplomatic History of Post-War Japan, co-author, 1999).

Discussant

Dr. Thomas Berger is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University. He has been an academy scholar and a post-doctoral fellow at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. Professor Berger holds a Ph.D. from MIT. His most recent major publications include *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (1998); "Set for Stability? Prospects for Conflict and Cooperation in East Asia," *Review of International Studies* (2000); and "Ambivalent Allies: The Domestic Politics of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance," *U.S.-Japan Security Relations: Past, Present, and Future* (Patrick Cronin and Michael Green, eds., 1999).

Moderator

Dr. G. John Ikenberry is Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University. In addition, he has been a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. Dr. Ikenberry is the author of numerous publications, including *Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government* (1988).